is truth absolute essay

Truth: Absolute or Relative? Essay

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Introduction

Works cited.

Truth is a complex aspect that has been debated for ages. Truth can be defined as the state or quality of being true or rather that which is considered to be true or in accordance with reality or fact. Truth is a contentious element that is influenced by a variety of aspects. It could also be defined as that to which a given community eventually settles down.

A community is therefore a key element in the search for truth. The definition of truth, its pursuit as well as its discovery forms a critical part of human intellectual activity. Truth could be found in religion or cultural beliefs (Erban 47). This piece of work gives a critical look at the concept of truth and the aspects that surround it. Much emphasis will however be given to the issue of whether truth is absolute or relative and the theories about truth.

Truth could be understood through having a deeper look at the various theories that have been put forth with respect to the definition, origin, and pursuits of truth. Another way of understanding the concept of truth is through looking at it on the grounds of whether it is absolute or relative.

This issue has been controversial with the popular postmodern view stating that truth is relative while Christianity stipulates that truth is absolute and that the teachings of the Bible are universal and should always stand. A majority of people go by the fact that there is nothing as absolute truth.

Absolute truth can be defined as something that is deemed to be true for all people, at all times, and in all places (Erban 42). Absolute truth possesses the following characteristics; it is discovered rather than being invented, it is knowable, it is not affected by the individual that profess it and it does not change and thus it can be conveyed across time. Absolute truth is also trans-cultural meaning that it can be conveyed across different cultures and it is founded under the premise that all truths are absolute.

Relative truth on the other hand is built on the understanding of truth on the basis of the naturalist world-view. It states that there is nothing like absolute truth and that truth originates in man. The beliefs that are attributed to relative truth include the fact that truth is created rather than discovered. This therefore follows that there is no universal truth since truth is mainly invented.

Different individuals and cultures are thus expected to define truth in a different way depending on their background and perspective. In relative truth, absolute truth is not knowable, truth changes and an individual’s belief can change a truth statement. Relative truth is also affected by the attitude of the person professing it (Williams 112). Anything can therefore be true irrespective of its origin.

There have been a lot of critics of relative truth which state that it should be rejected and absolute truth be adopted. First, relativism is founded on a world-view of naturalism. This could only hold if God does not exist and man is the measure of truth. Relativism is also self-defeating, without standards.

Relativism also rejects reason as a way through which truth can be determined. Reason is very crucial in coming up with truth and thus, it should never be underrated. Although everyone has a right and freedom to believe in anything, absolute truth seems to carry more weight as compared to relativism. This does not however mean that relativism is absolutely wrong.

There are various ways through which truth could be determined or tested. They include the following: Logical consistency; this test on the availability of proper reasoning as opposed to contradictions in statements. The other test is empirical adequacy; this entails looking for evidence in support of what is being said. Evidence could be in the form of data. The other way of ascertaining truth is having a livability test. This entails looking at how consistently one can live with the belief in question (Williams 174).

Some of the theories that have been put forth to explain the concept of truth include; correspondence theory that stipulates that true statements and beliefs ought to correspond to actual state of affairs or reality.

This shows that there is a relationship between thoughts and objects. The other theory is the coherence theory. It states that truth calls for an appropriate fit of elements within an entire scheme. A system or rather a statement should reflect some elements of logical consistency. Truth is considered to be a unit of whole systems of propositions.

It can be attributed to individual proposals only according to their lucidity with the whole. Constructivist supposition on the other hand says that truth is constructed through societal progressions and is shaped through the supremacy struggles within a given group of people. Truth is also considered to be culturally and historically specific. Consensus presumption holds that truth is anything that is concurred upon by some explicit group. The group could consist of as few as two people or even the entire society (Schmitt 102).

These are just some of the theories that try to explain what truth is. The fact that many theories have emerged is enough justification that the concept of truth is controversial and complex. Various critics have been raised with respect to the different theories. It is therefore difficult to come up with a clear cut definition of what truth is but rather ideas should be drawn from the various aspects that have been raised.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the concept of truth is complex and surrounded by a variety of issues. It is a concept that has been debated for a relatively long period of time with an aim of coming up with an answer of what truth is.

Truth could be understood through having a deeper look at the various theories that have been put forth with respect to the definition, origin, and pursuits of truth. While looking at the Bible teachings and human logic we can say that truth is absolute and not relative. Truth is narrow as it does not entail its opposite.

It is also knowable and unchanging. Absolute truth is founded on God who is Supreme and eternal while relativism is founded on naturalism. This makes facts put forth for absolute truth to be stronger than those supporting relative truth. Relativism ought to be handled carefully because evidence indicates that we live in a theistic universe. It goes against biblical teachings. However, people have the freedom to choose whichever way so long as it does not affect others.

Erban, Joseph. What Is Truth? London: Lulu.com, 2008.Print

Schmitt, Fredrick. Theories of truth . Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004. Print

Williams, Christopher, John, Fards. What is truth? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Print

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All About Philosophy

Absolute Truth vs. Relative Truth (Explained)

The concept of truth has long been a subject of debate and philosophical exploration. In this article, we will delve into the intricate differences between absolute truth and relative truth . We will explore the nature of objective reality , subjective reality , universal facts , and the various perspectives that shape our understanding of truth.

Key Takeaways:

• Absolute truth refers to universally valid and unchanging statements or beliefs, while relative truth is socially or culturally constructed and subjective.
• Moral truths are a subset of absolute truths but allow for varied application based on context.
• Relativism claims that truth is subjective and denies the existence of objective truth .
• In society, there is a clash between absolute truth and relativism , leading to a post-truth culture influenced by subjective truths and emotional preferences.
• Defending truth is crucial in conveying the majesty of the Gospel and affirming the divinity of Christ in a relativistic society.

Table of Contents

What is Absolute Truth?

Absolute truth refers to statements or beliefs that are universally valid and unchanging. These truths can be both moral and neutral in nature. Moral truths , such as “lying is wrong,” are objective and apply to all situations, but they can have contextual exceptions.

Absolute truths are discovered, not invented, and exist independently of the individual’s consciousness . They are grounded in an all-powerful , all-knowing , uncaused first cause. Absolute truth provides a foundation for understanding the world and our place in it, guiding our moral compass and shaping our worldview.

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Absolute truths form a basis for moral principles and values that transcend individual opinions and cultural norms. They offer a framework for discerning right from wrong and provide a sense of objective truth in a world filled with varying perspectives and subjective experiences.

Moral Truths and Neutral Truths

Moral truths are a subset of absolute truths, encompassing principles that govern human behavior and ethics. These truths establish universal guidelines for what is right or wrong, just or unjust. Examples of moral truths include concepts like honesty, fairness, and compassion.

Neutral truths , on the other hand, are objective realities that are not inherently tied to moral judgments. They exist independent of human opinion and can include scientific facts and mathematical principles.

Discovered Truths

One important aspect of absolute truth is that it is not subject to individual interpretation or belief. Absolute truths are discovered through rational inquiry, empirical evidence, and logical reasoning. They are grounded in observable phenomena and can be verified through systematic methods.

In the search for absolute truth, individuals and societies engage in various disciplines such as philosophy , science , and mathematics . Through these pursuits, we strive to uncover the fundamental principles and laws that govern our existence.

The Objective Nature of Absolute Truth

Absolute truth is objective , meaning it exists independently of human perception or cultural relativism . It is not influenced by personal biases, societal norms, or changing perspectives. Instead, it is grounded in an all-powerful , all-knowing , uncaused first cause that transcends human limitations.

This objectivity gives absolute truth its universal validity and timeless nature. It provides a solid foundation for understanding reality, fostering intellectual growth, and guiding ethical decision-making.

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Comparing Absolute Truth and Relative Truth

The Complexity of Moral Truths

Moral truths are a subset of absolute truths, but they differ from absolute truths in that they allow for a varied application based on context, rather than being absolute in all situations. Moral truths are objective and grounded in an objective standard , but they can be interpreted differently depending on the circumstances.

An example of this is the statement “lying is wrong,” which may have exceptions in extreme situations. While lying is generally considered morally wrong, there may be instances where it is justified, such as lying to protect someone from harm. This showcases the complexity of moral truths and their dependence on the specific context.

Moral Truths: Objective Yet Context-Dependent

Moral truths, although objective, exhibit a certain level of flexibility due to their reliance on context. They are grounded in an objective standard , which establishes a foundation for determining right from wrong. However, their application can vary based on the specific circumstances surrounding an action . This contextual dependency is what gives moral truths their complexity.

For instance, the moral truth that “killing is wrong” is generally accepted as an absolute truth. However, there are exceptions to this principle, such as self-defense or war. In these cases, the act of killing may be deemed justifiable given the immediate threat to one’s life or the defense of one’s nation. The objective nature of the moral truth remains intact, but its application is altered by the contextual factors involved.

The Role of Objective Standards in Moral Truths

Moral truths, despite their varied application , are rooted in an objective standard . This standard serves as a guiding principle for determining morally right and wrong actions. It provides a framework within which moral judgments can be made.

One example of an objective standard in morality is the principle of fairness. The concept of fairness is universally valued in most cultures and is often used as a reference point for determining moral truth. Actions that promote fairness are generally considered morally right, while actions that undermine fairness are deemed morally wrong.

However, it’s important to note that different cultures and individuals may interpret fairness differently, leading to differences in the application of moral truths. For example, notions of fairness may differ between Eastern and Western cultures, leading to variations in moral judgments.

The Complexity of Moral Dilemmas

The complexity of moral truths is further exemplified in moral dilemmas, where conflicting moral principles or values collide, making it challenging to determine the morally right course of action. Moral dilemmas often arise when two or more moral truths clash, and choosing one over the other entails sacrificing another moral truth.

Understanding Relativism

Relativism is a philosophical stance that challenges the notion of an absolute and objective truth . According to relativism, truth is not an inherent or universal concept but is socially or culturally agreed upon and subjective in nature. It suggests that each individual or society can determine their own truth based on their unique perspectives and experiences.

This perspective seeks to avoid oppression or bigotry by valuing different perspectives equally, recognizing that individuals and cultures have diverse beliefs and values. It promotes tolerance and inclusivity by acknowledging the validity of various truths. However, relativism can be seen as self-refuting because it denies the existence of an objective truth while simultaneously asserting its own relative truth .

Relativism opens up a new way of understanding truth , but it also raises important questions about the denial of objective truth . If all truths are purely subjective and socially constructed, how do we address issues of oppression and bigotry? Can certain societal norms or cultural practices be condemned as universally wrong?

In an image-driven society, visual representations play a significant role in shaping our perceptions and beliefs. Take a moment to reflect on the following image:

Consider how this image relates to the concept of relativism and the subjective nature of truth. What does it evoke in terms of varying perspectives and interpretations?

One of the primary criticisms of relativism is that it can lead to moral relativism, where all moral judgments are seen as equal and subjective, regardless of their consequences or ethical implications. This raises concerns about the potential for moral relativism to justify harmful actions or ignore instances of oppression or bigotry in the name of cultural relativism.

While relativism offers insights into the subjectivity of truth, it poses challenges when it comes to addressing issues of justice , human rights, and the search for objective truth. The denial of an objective truth can undermine efforts to combat injustice and promote equality.

Below is a table outlining key points to consider in relation to relativism:

While relativism offers a unique perspective on truth, it is important to critically examine its philosophical foundations and consider the implications of denying an objective truth. Engaging in thoughtful discourse and considering diverse viewpoints can help us navigate the complexities of relativism and its impact on our understanding of truth.

Absolute Truth vs. Relative Truth in Society

In today’s society, the clash between absolute truth and relativism is evident as postmodernism takes center stage. Postmodernism , a philosophical movement, rejects the existence of objective truth, which has far-reaching consequences for how we perceive reality and truth.

Postmodernism champions subjective truth , emphasizing individual perspectives and emotional preferences over an objective standard. This shift in mindset has led to the emergence of a post-truth culture , where facts are often overshadowed by personal opinions and feelings. In this culture, subjective truths reign supreme, making it challenging to establish and uphold objective standards.

This shift towards a post-truth culture has significant consequences for society, as the erosion of objective standards can undermine trust, foster misinformation, and hinder progress. The subjective nature of truth allows for emotional preferences to influence our understanding of reality, potentially blurring the line between fact and fiction.

The Impact of Postmodernism on Society

Postmodernism’s rejection of objective truth has influenced various aspects of society, including academia, politics, and media. In academia, the emphasis on subjective truth has resulted in a proliferation of diverse perspectives and interpretations, challenging traditional notions of universal truth.

In the political realm, the rise of post-truth culture is evident in the use of emotional appeals and personal narratives to sway public opinion, often overshadowing objective facts and evidence. This trend can hinder meaningful debates and decision-making processes based on a shared understanding of reality.

The media landscape has also been significantly impacted, with the rise of opinion-based journalism and the blurring of lines between news and entertainment. In a post-truth culture, emotional narratives and sensationalism often take precedence over objective reporting, further contributing to the fragmentation of truth in society.

The consequences of living in a post-truth culture are far-reaching, affecting not only individual perspectives but also societal trust, information dissemination, and the ability to address pressing issues effectively.

A Comparison of Absolute Truth and Relative Truth

It is essential to recognize the consequences of living in a post-truth culture and to engage in critical thinking to distinguish between subjective truths and objective reality . By understanding the complexities of truth and its impact on society, we can navigate the postmodern landscape and strive for a more informed and truth-centered world.

The Importance of Defending Truth

Apologetics plays a crucial role in preserving and defending the Gospel and the existence of truth, especially in a society increasingly embracing relativism and subjectivism . Without a robust defense of truth, essential aspects of Christian belief risk being reduced to mere personal preferences or opinions. Therefore, it becomes paramount to actively engage in defending truth to convey the majesty of the Gospel and reaffirm the divinity of Christ. Christians must equip themselves to challenge the undermining of truth and effectively share their faith.

The Dilemma of Relativism and Subjectivism

Relativism, a prevalent philosophical perspective today, regards truth as socially and culturally constructed, rendering it subjective in nature. Under this view, there are no universal truths, and truths become contingent upon individual interpretation or collective agreement. While this approach aims to promote equality and tolerance, it inherently denies the existence of objective truth while simultaneously asserting its own relative truth. Hence, defending truth becomes imperative to counterbalance the pitfalls of relativism and protect the Gospel.

Reaffirming One’s Beliefs

By engaging in apologetics and defending truth, Christians reaffirm their beliefs and assert the validity of the Christian worldview. This active defense of truth serves as a powerful witness to the transformative power and relevance of the Gospel. Additionally, it helps believers navigate through a society where subjective opinions often overshadow objective standards. Through defending truth, Christians can communicate the timeless and universal truths of Christianity in a persuasive and compelling manner.

The Impact of Defending Truth

Apologetics allows Christians to:

• Counter the undermining of truth in society
• Strengthen their own convictions
• Engage in meaningful dialogue
• Effectively share their faith

By actively defending truth, Christians contribute to a more intellectually robust and spiritually vibrant community that fosters a deeper understanding and appreciation of the Gospel. Defending truth lays a solid foundation for engaging with skeptics, addressing doubts, and ultimately leading others to the transformative message of Jesus Christ.

Table: Benefits of Defending Truth

The Search for Truth in Various Contexts

The quest for truth extends beyond the realms of philosophy , penetrating various domains such as religion , science , and mathematics . Each field offers its own unique perspective on the existence and nature of absolute truth, sparking ongoing debates and discussions.

Philosophy delves into the concepts of truth in relation to reality and perception. It explores the depths of human understanding, probing the nature of existence and consciousness.

Religion , on the other hand, seeks to establish absolute truths based on faith and sacred texts. It embraces the belief in a higher power or divine revelation as a source of ultimate truth.

Science approaches truth through empirical evidence and the formulation of theories. Guided by rigorous observation and experimentation, it aims to uncover the laws and principles that govern the natural world.

Mathematics grapples with the abstract concepts and logical systems that underpin our understanding of truth. It explores the realm of absolute truth in the rigorous realm of numbers, symbols, and equations.

The debate over the existence of absolute truth is multifaceted, with each field offering unique perspectives and methodologies. While philosophy may seek truth through introspection and rational inquiry, religion relies on faith and revelation. Science relies on evidence and experimentation, while mathematics explores truth through logical reasoning and abstraction.

Here is a table that summarizes the search for truth in various contexts:

The search for truth in these different domains not only expands our understanding of the world but also underscores the complexity of the concept itself. It reveals the depth of human curiosity and the inherent drive to unravel the mysteries of existence.

As the quest for truth continues in each domain, it is important to recognize that different approaches and perspectives can coexist, enhancing our collective understanding and fostering a rich tapestry of knowledge .

In the ongoing philosophical debate between absolute truth and relative truth, it becomes clear that understanding the nature of truth is essential. Objective and subjective truths differ in their application, leading to the emergence of relativism in society. As the rejection of objective standards increases, defending truth becomes crucial. By delving into the nuances of differing perspectives , we can engage in meaningful dialogue about the nature of reality and the search for absolute truth.

In today’s world, where subjective truths and personal opinions hold sway, it is important to recognize the significance of defending truth. The defense of truth goes beyond personal beliefs or preferences. It ensures that the Gospel and other aspects of our faith remain grounded in objective reality and universal truths.

As we navigate the complexities of truth, it is crucial to understand that the philosophical debate surrounding absolute and relative truths is ongoing. By seeking to understand and defend truth, we can transcend the limitations of relativism and engage in a deeper exploration of the nature of reality. The significance of defending truth lies not only in upholding objective standards but also in fostering meaningful connections and promoting a more holistic understanding of the world we live in.

What is the difference between absolute truth and relative truth?

Are moral truths absolute or relative, what is relativism, how does postmodernism affect the concept of truth in society, why is defending truth important, how do different fields approach the concept of truth, what is the conclusion of the debate between absolute truth and relative truth, related posts.

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• Introduction

The correspondence theory

Coherence and pragmatist theories, tarski and truth conditions.

• Deflationism

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• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Truth
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - The Identity Theory of Truth
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - The Revision Theory of Truth
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - The Coherence Theory of Truth
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - The Deflationary Theory of Truth
• Table Of Contents

truth , in metaphysics and the philosophy of language , the property of sentences, assertions, beliefs , thoughts, or propositions that are said, in ordinary discourse, to agree with the facts or to state what is the case.

Truth is the aim of belief; falsity is a fault. People need the truth about the world in order to thrive . Truth is important. Believing what is not true is apt to spoil people’s plans and may even cost them their lives. Telling what is not true may result in legal and social penalties. Conversely, a dedicated pursuit of truth characterizes the good scientist, the good historian, and the good detective. So what is truth, that it should have such gravity and such a central place in people’s lives?

The classic suggestion comes from Aristotle (384–322 bce ): “To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.” In other words, the world provides “what is” or “what is not,” and the true saying or thought corresponds to the fact so provided. This idea appeals to common sense and is the germ of what is called the correspondence theory of truth. As it stands, however, it is little more than a platitude and far less than a theory. Indeed, it may amount to merely a wordy paraphrase, whereby, instead of saying “that’s true” of some assertion, one says “that corresponds with the facts.” Only if the notions of fact and correspondence can be further developed will it be possible to understand truth in these terms.

Unfortunately, many philosophers doubt whether an acceptable explanation of facts and correspondence can be given. Facts, as they point out, are strange entities. It is tempting to think of them as structures or arrangements of things in the world. However, as the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, structures have spatial locations, but facts do not. The Eiffel Tower can be moved from Paris to Rome, but the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris cannot be moved anywhere. Furthermore, critics urge, the very idea of what the facts are in a given case is nothing apart from people’s sincere beliefs about the case, which means those beliefs that people take to be true. Thus, there is no enterprise of first forming a belief or theory about some matter and then in some new process stepping outside the belief or theory to assess whether it corresponds with the facts. There are, indeed, processes of checking and verifying beliefs, but they work by bringing up further beliefs and perceptions and assessing the original in light of those. In actual investigations, what tells people what to believe is not the world or the facts but how they interpret the world or select and conceptualize the facts.

Starting in the mid-19th century, this line of criticism led some philosophers to think that they should concentrate on larger theories, rather than sentences or assertions taken one at a time. Truth, on this view, must be a feature of the overall body of belief considered as a system of logically interrelated components—what is called the “web of belief.” It might be, for example, an entire physical theory that earns its keep by making predictions or enabling people to control things or by simplifying and unifying otherwise disconnected phenomena. An individual belief in such a system is true if it sufficiently coheres with, or makes rational sense within, enough other beliefs; alternatively, a belief system is true if it is sufficiently internally coherent . Such were the views of the British idealists , including F.H. Bradley and H.H. Joachim, who, like all idealists, rejected the existence of mind-independent facts against which the truth of beliefs could be determined ( see also realism: realism and truth ).

Yet coherentism too seems inadequate, since it suggests that human beings are trapped in the sealed compartment of their own beliefs, unable to know anything of the world beyond. Moreover, as the English philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell pointed out, nothing seems to prevent there being many equally coherent but incompatible belief systems. Yet at best only one of them can be true.

Some theorists have suggested that belief systems can be compared in pragmatic or utilitarian terms. According to this idea, even if many different systems can be internally coherent, it is likely that some will be much more useful than others. Thus, one can expect that, in a process akin to Darwinian natural selection , the more useful systems will survive while the others gradually go extinct. The replacement of Newtonian mechanics by relativity theory is an example of this process. It was in this spirit that the 19th-century American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce said:

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.

In effect, Peirce’s view places primary importance on scientific curiosity , experimentation, and theorizing and identifies truth as the imagined ideal limit of their ongoing progress. Although this approach may seem appealingly hard-headed, it has prompted worries about how a society, or humanity as a whole, could know at a given moment whether it is following the path toward such an ideal. In practice it has opened the door to varying degrees of skepticism about the notion of truth. In the late 20th century philosophers such as Richard Rorty advocated retiring the notion of truth in favour of a more open-minded and open-ended process of indefinite adjustment of beliefs. Such a process, it was felt, would have its own utility , even though it lacked any final or absolute endpoint.

The rise of formal logic (the abstract study of assertions and deductive arguments) and the growth of interest in formal systems (formal or mathematical languages) among many Anglo-American philosophers in the early 20th century led to new attempts to define truth in logically or scientifically acceptable terms. It also led to a renewed respect for the ancient liar paradox (attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Epimenides ), in which a sentence says of itself that it is false, thereby apparently being true if it is false and false if it is true. Logicians set themselves the task of developing systems of mathematical reasoning that would be free of the kinds of self-reference that give rise to paradoxes such as that of the liar. However, this proved difficult to do without at the same time making some legitimate proof procedures impossible. There is good self-reference (“All sentences, including this, are of finite length”) and bad self-reference (“This sentence is false”) but no generally agreed-upon principle for distinguishing them.

These efforts culminated in the work of the Polish-born logician Alfred Tarski , who in the 1930s showed how to construct a definition of truth for a formal or mathematical language by means of a theory that would assign truth conditions (the conditions in which a given sentence is true) to each sentence in the language without making use of any semantic terms, notably including truth, in that language. Truth conditions were identified by means of “T-sentences.” For example, the English-language T-sentence for the German sentence Schnee ist weiss is: “Schnee ist weiss” is true if and only if snow is white. A T-sentence says of some sentence (S) in the object language (the language for which truth is being defined) that S is true if and only if…, where the ellipsis is replaced by a translation of S into the language used to construct the theory (the metalanguage ). Since no metalanguage translation of any S (in this case, snow is white ) will contain the term true, Tarski could claim that each T-sentence provides a “partial definition” of truth for the object language and that their sum total provides the complete definition.

While the technical aspects of Tarski’s work were much admired and have been much discussed, its philosophical significance remained unclear, in part because T-sentences struck many theorists as less than illuminating . But the weight of philosophical opinion gradually shifted, and eventually this platitudinous appearance was regarded as a virtue and indeed as indicative of the whole truth about truth. The idea was that, instead of staring at the abstract question “What is truth?,” philosophers should content themselves with the particular question “What does the truth of S amount to?”; and for any well-specified sentence, a humble T-sentence will provide the answer.

• March 22, 2015

Questions about truth and falsity saturate our existence as humans. While we may not always know what is true, we have intuitive ideas of what it would mean for something to be true and work very hard to get “closer” to it. We regularly make claims about what is true seemingly with little to no difficulty. Yet we find ourselves in a constant battle with falsehoods. Our work, our love lives, and even our most cherished recreational times are laden with discovering truth over falsehood. Is that theory true? Is my spouse lying to me? Did the goalie actually deserve that yellow card? So while truth may be an idea we use readily, getting to the truth is surprisingly difficult. Ironically, even definitions of truth that philosophers have developed fall prey to the question, “Are they true?” Still, a definition is as good a place to start as any so here’s one: truth is a statement about the way the world actually is. Let’s explore how good that definition is!

Elusive Truth

Suppose you examine an apple and determine that it’s red, sweet, smooth and crunchy. You might claim this is what the apple  is . Put another way, you’ve made  truth claims  about the apple and seemingly made statements about  real  properties of the apple. But immediate problems arise. Let’s suppose your friend is color blind (this is unknown to you or her) and when she looks at the apple, she says that the apple is a dull greenish color. She also makes a truth claim about the color of the apple but it’s different than your truth claim. What color is the apple?

Well, you might respond, that’s an easy problem to solve. It’s  actually  red because we’ve stipulated that your friend has an anomaly in her truth-gathering equipment (vision) and even though we may not know she has it, the fact that she does means her perception of reality is incorrect. But now let’s suppose  everyone  is color blind and we all see “red” apples as green? Now no one has access to the “real” color of the apple. Again, the response might be that that this is a  knowledge  problem, not a truth problem. The apple really  is  red but we all  believe  it’s green. But notice that the truth of the apple’s color has little role to play in what we believe. No one knows what the truth is and so it plays no role in our epistemology.

The challenge is that our view of truth is very closely tied to our perspective on what is true. This means that in the end, we may be able to come up with a reasonable definition of truth, but if we decide that no one can get to what is true (that is,  know  truth), what good is the definition? Even more problematic is that our perspective will even influence our ability to come up with a definition! These are no small concerns and we’ll explore some responses below.

Some Preliminaries

Epistemologists (people who study truth, belief and knowledge) use the following concepts as the framework for their study of truth.

Propositions . A common technical definition of a proposition (credited to Peter van Inwagen) is “a non-linguistic bearer of truth value.” A proposition is a representation of the world or a way the world could possibly be and propositions are either true or false. Propositions are different than sentences . Sentences are symbolic, linguistic representations of propositions. Okay, that’s all very technical. What does it mean?

Let’s take the sentence, “The moon has craters.” This is an English sentence that supposedly states some fact about the world or reality. Because it’s in English, we say it’s “linguistic” or language-based. Specifically, we can describe the sentence’s properties as having four words and 17 letters, it’s in the English language written in 11 point font and it’s black. I could write the same sentence like this:

The moon has craters .

This one still has the same number of words and letters and it’s in English. But it is in 18 point font and is written in blue. Now let’s take this sentence, “La luna tiene cráteres.” This sentence has four words but 19 letters. It’s written in 11 point font and is black but it’s Spanish. What do all three sentences have in common? Well, they all express the same idea or meaning and we could say the same “truth.” We could express the same idea in Swahili, semaphore, Morse code, or any other symbolic system that conveys meaning.

Notice that the symbols themselves are neither true nor false. The meaning the sentences represent is either true or false. This “other thing” the sentences represent are propositions. Put another way, the common property true of all sentences that express the same truth is what philosophers call the propositional content of the sentences or “the proposition.” Now we can better understand the idea behind “non-linguistic bearer of truth value.” Propositions are non-linguistic because they aren’t written or spoken in a language. They bear truth because they are the things that are true or false. This is what allows them to be expressed or “exemplified” in a variety of different symbolic systems like language-based sentences. When it comes to understanding truth, many philosophers believe propositions are at the center.

Belief . Beliefs are things (at least) people have. They don’t exist outside the mind. Some philosophers say beliefs are “dispositional.” That is, they incline a person to behave in a way as if the thing they believe is true. So a belief, simply, is a proposition that a person accepts as representing the way the world actually is. Beliefs can be about false propositions and thus be “wrong” because the person accepts them as true. This is a critical distinction. While a proposition has to be true or false, beliefs can be about true or false propositions even though a person always accepts them as true.

Some philosophers attempt to define truth “mind-independently.” That means, they want to come up with a definition that doesn’t depend on whether humans can actually believe or know what is true. Truth is viewed as independent of our minds and they seek a definition of it that captures this. Other philosophers have developed theories that keep people at the center. That is, truth and belief are considered together and are inseparable. I will try to make the relevance of the “epistemic” vs. “independent” views of truth relevant below.

Knowledge . Knowledge is belief in a true proposition that a person is justified in holding as true. The conditions under which a person is justified is somewhat complex and there are many theories about when the conditions are met. Theories of knowledge attempt to describe when a person is in a “right” cognitive relationship with true propositions. I describe some theories of knowledge and some of the challenges in understanding when a person knows in an article for Philosophy News called “ What is Knowledge? “

Common Definitions

The coherence view of truth.

The main idea behind this view is that a belief is true if it “coheres” or is consistent with other things a person believes. For example, a fact a person believes, say “grass is green” is true if that belief is consistent with other things the person believes like the definition of green and whether grass exists and the like. It also depends on the interpretation of the main terms in those other beliefs. Suppose you’ve always lived in a region covered with snow and never saw grass or formed beliefs about this strange plant life. The claim “grass is green” would not cohere with other beliefs because you have no beliefs that include the concept “grass.” The claim, “grass is green” would be nonsense because it contains a nonsensical term. You’ve never formed a belief about grass so there’s nothing for this new belief to cohere with.

As you can see, coherence theories typically are described in terms of beliefs. This puts coherence theories in the “epistemic” view of truth. This is because, coherence theorists claim, we can only ground a given belief on other things we believe. We cannot “stand outside” our own belief system to compare our beliefs with the actual world. If I believe Booth shot Lincoln, I can only determine if that belief is truth based on other things I believe like “Wikipedia provides accurate information” or “My professor knows history and communicates it well” or “Uncle John sure was a scoundrel.” These are other beliefs and serve as a basis for my original belief.

Thus truth is essentially epistemic since any other model requires a type of access to the “real world” we simply can’t have. As philosopher Donald Davidson describes the situation, “If coherence is a test of truth, there is a direct connection with epistemology, for we have reason to believe many of our beliefs cohere with many others, and in that case we have reason to believe many of our beliefs are true.” (Davidson, 2000)

The Correspondence Theory of Truth

Arguably the more widely-held view of truth, philosophers who argue for the correspondence theory hold that there is a world external to our beliefs that is somehow accessible to the human mind. Specifically, correspondence theorists hold that there are a set of “truth-bearing” representations (propositions) about the world that align to or correspond with reality. When a proposition aligns to the way the world actually is, the proposition is said to be true. Truth, on this view, is that correspondence relation.

Take this proposition: “The Seattle Seahawks won Super Bowl 48 in 2014.” The proposition is true if in fact the Seahawks did win super Bowl 48 in 2014 (they did) and false if they didn’t.

The correspondence theory only lays out the condition for truth in terms of propositions and the way the world actually is. This definition does not involve beliefs that people have. Propositions are true or false regardless of whether anyone believes them. Just think of a proposition as a way the world possibly could be: “The Seahawks won Super Bowl 48” or “The Seahawks lost Super Bowl 48” — both propositions possibly are true. True propositions are those that correspond to what actually happened.

Postmodernism

Postmodern thought covers a wide theoretical area but informs modern epistemology particularly when it comes to truth. In simple terms, postmodernists describe truth not as a relationship outside of the human mind that we can align belief to but as a product of belief. We never access reality because we can never get outside our own beliefs to do so. Our beliefs function as filters that keep reality (if such a thing exists) beyond us. Since we can never access reality, it does no good to describe knowledge or truth in terms of reality because there’s nothing we can actually say about reality that’s meaningful. Truth then is constructed by what we perceive and ultimately believe.

Immanuel Kant

I’m inclined to earmark the foundation of postmodern thought with the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically with his work The Critique of Pure Reason . In my view, Kant was at the gateway of postmodern thought. He wasn’t a postmodernist himself but provided the framework for what later developed.

Kant makes a foundational distinction between the “objects” of subjective experience and the “objects” of “reality.” He labels the former phenomena and that latter noumena . The noumena for Kant are things in themselves ( ding an sich ). These exist outside of and separate from the mind. These are what we might call “reality” or actual states of affairs similar to what we saw in the correspondence theory above. But for Kant, the noumena are entirely unknowable in and of themselves . However, the noumena give rise to the phenomena or are the occasion by which we come to know the phenomena.

The phenomena make up the world we know, the world “for us” ( für uns ). This is the world of rocks, trees, books, tables, and any other objects we access through the five senses. This is the world of our experience. This world, however, does not exist apart from our experience. It is essentially experiential. Kant expressed this idea as follows: the world as we know it is “phenomenally real but transcendentally ideal.” That is, objects that we believe exist in the world are a “real” part of our subjective experience but they do not exist apart from that subjective experience and don’t transcend the beliefs we have. The noumena are “transcendentally real” or they exist in and of themselves but are never experienced directly or even indirectly.

The noumena are given form and shape by what Kant described as categories of the mind and this ‘ordering’ gives rise to phenomenal objects. This is where it relates to truth: phenomenal objects are not analogues, copies, representations or any such thing of the noumena. The noumena gives rise to the phenomena but in no way resembles them. Scholars have spent countless hours trying to understand Kant on this point since it seems like the mind interacts with the noumena in some way. But Kant does seem to be clear that the mind never experiences the noumena directly and the phenomena in no way represents the noumena.

We can now see the beginnings of postmodern thought. If we understand the noumena as “reality” and the phenomena as the world we experience, we can see that we never get past our experience to reality itself. It’s not like a photograph which represents a person and by seeing the photograph we can have some understanding of what the “real person” actually looks like. Rather (to use an admittedly clumsy example) it’s like being in love. We can readily have the experience and we know the brain is involved but we have no idea how it works. By experiencing the euphoria of being in love, we learn nothing about how the brain works.

On this view then, what is truth? Abstractly we might say truth is found in the noumena since that’s reality. But postmodernists have taken Kant’s idea further and argued that since we can’t say anything about the noumena, why bother with them at all? Kant didn’t provided a good reason to believe the noumena exist but seems to have asserted their existence because, after all, something was needed to give rise to the phenomena. Postmodernists just get rid of this extra baggage and focus solely on what we experience.

Perspective and Truth

Further, everyone’s experience of the world is a bit different–we all have different life experiences, background beliefs, personalities and dispositions, and even genetics that shape our view of the world. This makes it impossible, say the postmodernists, to declare an “absolute truth” about much of anything since our view of the world is a product of our individual perspective. Some say that our worldview makes up a set of lenses or a filter through which we interpret everything and we can’t remove those lenses. Interpretation and perspective are key ideas in postmodern thought and are contrasted with “simple seeing” or a purely objective view of reality. Postmodernists think simple seeing is impossible.

We can see some similarities here to the coherence theory of truth with its web of interconnected and mutually supported beliefs. On the coherence theory, coherence among beliefs gives us reason to hold that what we believe corresponds to some external reality. In postmodernism there is nothing for our beliefs to correspond to or if there is, our beliefs never get beyond the limits of our minds to enable us to make any claims about that reality.

Community Agreement

Postmodernism differs from radical subjectivism (truth is centered only in what an individual experiences) by allowing that there might be “community agreement” for some truth claims. The idea is that two or more people may be able to agree on a particular truth claim and form a shared agreement. To be clear, the perspective is not true because they agree it maps or corresponds to reality. But since the members of the group all agree that a given proposition or argument works in some practical way, or has explanatory power (seems to explain some particular thing), or has strong intuitive force for them, they can use this shared agreement to form a knowledge community.

When you think about it, this is how things tend to work. A scientist discovers something she takes to be true and writes a paper explaining why she thinks it’s true. Other scientists read her paper, run their own experiments and either validate her claims or are unable to invalidate her claims. These scientists then declare the theory “valid” or “significant” or give it some other stamp of approval. In most cases, this does not mean the theory is immune from falsification or to being disproved–it’s not absolute. It just means that the majority of the scientific community that have studied the theory agree that it’s true given what they currently understand. This shared agreement creates a communal “truth” for those scientists. This is what led Richard Rorty to state the oft-quoted phrase, “Truth is what my colleagues will let me get away with.”

What is Truth?

So we have some theories but it seems we’re no closer to answering our question. Which theory is true? Kant surely was on to something when he claimed that we have to start with our beliefs if for no other reason than that it seems impossible to deny. Any “reality” statement recast as a belief statement seems to be an exercise that adds specificity. But the reverse isn’t truth. For example, the claim, “Harvard’s library contains a copy of the Oxford English Dictionary” can readily be recast as “I believe Harvard’s library contains a copy of the Oxford English Dictionary” we naturally take this second statement as adding clarity to what we meant by the first. But if we restate, “I believe Harvard’s library contains a copy of the Oxford English Dictionary” as “Harvard’s library contains a copy of the Oxford English Dictionary” we lose the meaning of the first statement. We can see this if we add the additional phrase, “but I don’t believe it.” The “reality” statement is supposed to make a claim about the Harvard library but without the belief qualifier, we have no way to access its truth condition. In other words, the only way to get at the world is through our minds and our minds are filled with beliefs and only beliefs. If you object and claim that minds can be filled with true propositions, isn’t that something you believe?

So the question then becomes, do our beliefs correspond to the way the world actually is—do we access the noumena—or do we filter everything such that our beliefs do not correspond

Practical Concerns

Philosophers are supposed to love wisdom and wisdom is more oriented towards the practical than the theoretical. This article has been largely about a theoretical view of truth so how do we apply it? Most people don’t spend a whole lot of time thinking about what truth is but tend to get by in the world without that understanding. That’s probably because the world seems to impose itself on us rather than being subject to some theory we might come up with about how it has to operate. We all need food, water and shelter, meaning, friendship, and some purpose that compels us to get out of bed in the morning. This is a kind of practical truth that is not subject to the fluidity of philosophical theory.

Even so, we all contend with truth claims on a daily basis. We have to make decisions about what matters. Maybe you’re deeply concerned about politics and what politicians are claiming or what policy should be supported or overturned. Perhaps you care about which athlete should be traded or whether you should eat meat or support the goods produced by a large corporation. You may want to know if God exists and if so, which one. You probably care what your friends or loved ones are saying and whether you can count on them or invest in their relationship. In each of these cases, you will apply a theory of truth whether you realize it or not and so a little reflection on what you think about truth will be important.

Your view of truth will impact how you show up at work and impacts the decisions you make about how to raise your children or deal with a conflict. For example, suppose you’re faced with a complex question at work about something you’re responsible for. You need to decide whether to ship a product or do more testing. If you’re a postmodernist, your worldview may cause you to be more tentative about the conclusions you’re drawing about the product’s readiness because you understand that your interpretation of the facts you have about the product may be clouded by your own background beliefs. Because of this, you may seek more input or seek more consensus before you move forward. You may find yourself silently scoffing at your boss who makes absolute decisions about the “right” way to move forward because you believe there is no “right” way to do much of anything. There’s just each person’s interpretation of what is right and whoever has the loudest voice or exerts the most force wins.

An engineer may disagree here. She may argue, as an example, that there is a “right” way to build an airplane and a lot of wrong ways and years of aviation history documents both. Here is an instance where the world imposes itself on us: airplanes built with wings and that follow specific rules of aerodynamics fly and machines that don’t follow those “laws” don’t. Further most of us would rather fly in airplanes built by engineers that have more of a correspondence view of truth. We want to believe that the engineers that built the plane we’re in understand aerodynamics and built a plane that corresponds with the propositions that make up the laws of aerodynamics.

Your view of truth matters. You may be a correspondence theorist when it comes to airplanes but a postmodernist when it comes to ethics or politics. But why hold different views of truth for different aspects of your life? This is where a theory comes in. As you reflect on the problems posed by airplanes and ethics, the readiness of your product to be delivered to consumers and the readiness of your child to be loosed upon the world, about what makes you happy and about your responsibility to your fellow man, you will develop a theory of truth that will help you navigate these situations with more clarity and consistency.

Bibliography

Ackerman, D. F. (1976, December). Plantinga, Proper Names and Propositions. Philosophical Studies, 30 , 409-412.

Barrett, W. (1962). Irrational Man. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books.

Brown, C. (1986). What Is a Belief State? Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10 , 357-78.

Brown, C. (1992). Direct and Indirect Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 , 289-316.

Chisholm, R. (1957). Percieving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University.

Chisholm, R. M. (1989). Theory of Knowledge (3 ed.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Davidson, D. (2000). A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In S. Bernecker, & F. Dretske (Eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (pp. 413-428). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Dennett, D. C. (1998, August 13). Postmodernism and Truth. Retrieved December 26, 2014, from Tufts: http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/postmod.tru.htm

Frankfurt, H. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frankfurt, H. (2006). On Truth. New York: Knopf.

Gettier, E. (2000). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge. In S. Bernecker, & F. Dretske (Eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

James, W. (1907). Pragmatism. Amazon Digital Services, Inc.

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press.

Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. Mind, 59 (235), 320-344.

Williams, B. (2004). Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

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Is there such a thing as absolute truth, independent of who is doing the thinking, and where?  Or is truth relative to backgrounds, cultures, creeds, times, and places?  Can it be true that what is right for me isn't right for you? John and Ken search for truth with Helen Longino, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Minnesota.

Listening Notes

 John begins by distinguishing types of relativity. Ken points out that absolute truth is hard to establish. Ken introduces Helen Longino, professor at the University of Minnesota. John asks Longino if there is a realm of relative truth, say, in art and morality. Longino says that we need to establish what we mean by "true" first, then decide about "relative" and "absolute." Longino describes the correspondence theory of truth which is the theory that statements are true if they correspond to facts in the world. She points out that this creates problems about truth in relation to value. Ken describes some ways to get to relativism with the correspondence theory of truth. Longino makes the distinction between attributing absoluteness to truths and to reasons. 

One of the things that drives people to relativism is insurmountable disagreement. Longino agrees that there are areas that seem reasonable to apply relativism. Longino says that we could distinguish between judgments of value and judgments of fact. Ken says we need to distinguish between intersubjective agreement and objective truth. Courts of law find people guilty of a crime, but are the decisions true if the defendant is actually innocent? John thinks not. Ken asks since dispute is inexhaustible in science, how can we ever arrive at an absolute truth of any kind? How much does our notion or truth depend on our system of concepts and our physical makeup?

How would things change if relativism were true? How do we reconcile religious truth and scientific truth? Why do we need the concept of absolute truth? Longino says we need to distinguish between absolute truth from something weaker, like bedrock beliefs. John thinks that the notion of absolute truth motivates inquiry. Ken doubts that relativism implies complete tolerance. How can disagreement between parties be resolved without an omniscient third-party? Longino explains why appeals to an omniscient being don't help resolve disagreement and how we can resolve disagreements in light of that knowledge. 

• Roving Philosophical Report  (Seek to 04:12): Amy Standen interviews a public defender, a priest, and a philosopher about the nature of truth. 
• Conundrum (Seek to 49:06): Gordon Earle says that his mother was recently diagnosed with cancer. She lives several thousand miles away. He wants to visit her and she tells him that he doesn't have to come back. Should he go visit her, ignoring what she said?

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Postmodernism, is it all relative, should beliefs aim at truth, related resources.

• entry on the correspondence theory of truth
• entry on the coherence theory of truth
• entry on the deflationary theory of truth
• entry on the identity theory of truth
• entry on the revision theory of truth
• The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philospohy ( subscription required )
• entry on truth and meaning
• entry on truth and art
• Wikipedia entry on truth
• Online introduction to the concept of truth
• An introductory book, Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction
• Simon Blackburn's overview of truth, Truth: A Guide
• Scott Soames's book on the concept of truth, Understanding Truth
• A collection of contemporary essays on truth, entitled Truth
• Another collection of contemporary essays on truth, The Nature of Truth
• A third collection of contemporary essays on truth, Theories of Truth
• Michael Lynch's True to Life: Why Truth Matters
• Paul Horwich's book defending a minimalist conception of truth, Truth
• William Alston's defense of a realist view of truth, A Realist Conception of Truth
• A collection of essays by Donald Davidson which, in part, deal with the notion of truth, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
• An introduction to relativism, Relativism: Feet Planted Firmly in Mid-Air
• A collection on relativism, Rationality and Relativism
• Nietzsche's essay “Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense”
• Kripke, Saul, 1975, "Outline of a Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophy , 72: 690 – 716 (Requires a subscription to JSTOR )

Bonus Content

Comments (1).

Friday, January 22, 2021 -- 5:42 PM

Unfortunately we do not have a definition of truth in our societies around the globe. But if you read Bible and Vedas carefully you will find the following definition of truth embedded in their pages, stories, and verses: “(1) Laws of nature are the only truths. (2) These laws are created by the objects of nature and their characteristics. (3) The nature always demonstrates its all laws for us to observe, learn, and emancipate.”

It should be clear that this truth is unique, universal, and eternal. Eternal means if a law was valid million years back then it will be valid now, and will remain valid million years from now. Universal means if it is valid in USA then it must be valid in China also. It also means if a law is valid on earth then it will be valid in any other plant in the universe. And unique means everybody will understand them in the same way. It is also clear that such truths are neither objective nor subjective. For more details take a look at https://www.academia.edu/43619619/Truth_and_MLE_-the_only_way_for_Eterna...

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Part Four: Evaluating the Truth of the Premises

Chapter Nine: How to Think About Truth

For to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false. And to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. —Aristotle, Metaphysics

TRUTH , n. An ingenious compound of desirability and appearance. —Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary

• Objectivity and Truth
• Probability, Evidence, and Truth
• Self-Evidence
• Experiential Evidence
• Strategies for Evaluating Premises

This chapter provides an introduction to one of the central merits of arguments: the truth of premises. In a way, the entire book is about truth, since it aims to offer guidance, by way of good reasoning, for anyone who wishes to know the truth. But the point of this chapter is more specific: it aims to provide detailed practical directions for thinking about whether premises are true.

Remember—it takes only one false premise to render any argument unsound. [1]  A false premise doesn’t guarantee that the conclusion is false, since anyone can concoct a bad argument for a true conclusion. But if the unsound argument is the best reason you have for that conclusion, then it does guarantee that you have no good reason to accept the conclusion as true.

9.1 Objectivity and Truth

9.1.1 two laws of truth.

There are two venerable so-called laws of truth which serve us well for practical purposes. One of them, the law of noncontradiction, says that no statement is both true and false. It follows from this that truth is objective and absolute—there cannot be any statement, for example, that is true for you but false for me. Its flip side is the law of the excluded middle, which says that every statement is either true or false. It follows from this that there is no middle ground between the true and the false. Truth-values are evaluations—like true and false —that can be given of how well a statement fits with the world. (In the same way, moral values include evaluations—like good and evil —that can be given of, say, actions; and aesthetic values include evaluations—like beautiful and ugly —that can be given of, say, paintings). Another way of stating the law of the excluded middle is to say there are exactly two truth-values—namely, true and false —with nothing in the middle.

Why, then, is it so commonly asserted that truth is relative, that “what is true for you may be false for me”—a remark that seems to violate the law of noncontradiction? According to one poll, 62 percent of American adults believe that “there is no such thing as absolute truth.” The proportion rises to 74 percent for those ranging in age from 18 to 25. [2]

Should this be interpreted as flagrant disregard for the law of noncontradiction? Probably not. The survey response provides a good opportunity to apply the principle of charity; these apparent denials of absolute truth are often used as a convenient shorthand for a variety of other related and reasonable expressions, including these:

What you believe to be true I may believe to be false. What works in your life may not work in mine. The way you see things may not be the way I see things. The evidence available to you may not be available to me. What is reasonable for you may not be reasonable for me. Neither one of us is in the position to decide the truth for everyone everywhere always.

These paraphrases not only are fully harmonious with the law of noncontradiction, but also are absolutely true.

As Aristotle says, a true statement is one that says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. What is may appear to you to be different from the way it appears to me. And you may desire it to be different from the way I desire it to be. But this can’t make what is be two different ways at the same time; it can be only the way it is. When Ambrose Bierce writes satirically of “an ingenious compound of desirability and appearance” it is not really truth that he refers to (and he knows it) but what is often believed to be the truth.

Two Practical Laws of Truth

• Law of noncontradiction —no statement is both true and false.
• Law of excluded middle —every statement is either true or false.

9.1.2 Ambiguity Rather than Relative Truth

Some statements appear to violate these laws even though, on closer inspection, they do not. Consider the following:

Today is July 9. My name is David Carl Wilson. A train station is one mile from here. Chocolate ice cream tastes bad.

When I express these words here and now the statements are true. But when you express them at a different place and time, the statements are probably false. Does this mean they are both true and false or, perhaps, that they are neither?

No. In each case there are two different statements, one true, the other false. We are tempted to think otherwise only because the statements can be referentially ambiguous (to make use of terminology from Chapter 5). When I say today on July 9, it refers to July 9—thus, it can be disambiguated with the true statement Today, July 9, is July 9. But when you say it on November 18, it refers to November 18, and would be properly disambiguated by the false statement Today, November 18, is July 9. My name is David Carl Wilson and A train station is one mile from here are similar. The referents of my and here   would change with a change of speaker and location; when disambiguated, it would become clear that the statement with a different referent is a different statement.

Chocolate ice cream tastes bad is a trickier case. When I say it now it is true, but I probably mean to allow that it could be false when you say it or even when I say it next month. (If I mean instead that it tastes bad always and for everyone—and that you’re just mistaken if you think it tastes good—then I may have a strange view, but there is no apparent lack of objectivity to explain away.) But the statement includes no expression that changes its referent when expressed by a different person or at a different time or in a different place. This is because such an expression is implicit; what I am really saying is Chocolate ice cream tastes bad to me now, which can be made even clearer as Chocolate ice cream tastes bad to David Carl Wilson on July 9.  So when you say it, or when I say it next month, it really is a different statement with potentially a different truth-value. The same thing is usually true of any other sentence including a subjective verb such as tastes, looks, smells, feels, or sounds.

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (a)

Paraphrase each statement to eliminate the appearance that its truth is relative. (You do not need to make the statement true; simply eliminate any possibility of referential ambiguity.)

Sample exercise. My state is one of the biggest in America.

Sample answer.  California is one of the biggest states in America.

• Harleys are the best-sounding bikes on the road.
• My brother is shorter than I am.
• Last year our country enjoyed a boom in the stock market.
• The home team is enjoying a winning season.

9.1.3 Some Cases in Which You Can’t Decide

I have described the two laws of truth as “useful for practical purposes”—not as necessary, inviolate, and unbending. This is because language is not always law-abiding. The ordinary folks who constantly use language in new and serviceable ways seldom get a note from their logician first. The result is that there are some interesting and puzzling cases in which it is at least conceivable that a statement is both true and false, or that it is neither true nor false. And in each case, there is not any simple and uncontroversial way of settling the matter (though in none of these cases is there any worry about whether truth is objective).

• Robert is bald. (Imagine that Robert is exactly in the border area between bald and not bald.)
• Hans is a Kraut. (Imagine that it is true that Hans is German, but false that Hans is deserving of disparagement on that count.)
• This sentence is false. (Just think about it!)
• Hercules cleaned the Augean stables. (It isn’t clearly true, since Hercules didn’t even exist, but it also seems mistaken to say it is false, since it is certainly truer than, say, Hercules cleaned the Augean stables using power tools. )

Sometimes there is a well-defined fictional world that a character such as Hercules inhabits; in those cases, the best strategy is to evaluate premises like Hercules cleaned the Augean stables according to whether they are true or false in their fictional world. Otherwise, in the fairly unusual instances when statements like these four appear as premises, it is best to evaluate them as can’t decide, with an explanation.

Generally, as we will see, when you evaluate a premise as can’t decide it will be because the evidence you have is more or less evenly balanced; if you were able to collect more evidence, you would be able eventually to settle the question. But it is at least conceivable in these four cases that the reason for evaluating a premise as can’t decide is that there is no fact of the matter—perhaps the statement is neither true nor false, or both true and false, and thus there is no choice to be made regardless of how much evidence you go on to collect. (On this option, indeterminate could actually be a third truth-value, between truth and falsity. ) Fortunately, given our practical aims in this text, we don’t need to decide why we can’t decide in these sorts of cases.

9.2 Probability, Evidence, and Truth

What makes a statement true is the way the world is; and it is always possible for me to make a mistake about the way the world is. This is because the world is one thing, while my judgment about the world is something else—and as the ancient proverb says, there is many a slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip. Many things can go wrong in that gap between the world and my judgment about it, no matter how tiny the gap might be. I may have poor evidence. I may be subject to wishful thinking. I may be inattentive. I may be fooled. Thus, it is ordinarily better to avoid evaluating premises with the unmodified adjectives true and false and to prefer expressions such as probably true and probably false (or even, in the strongest cases, certainly true and certainly false, assuming that by this we mean extremes in probability).

9.2.1 Probability as a Measure of Evidence

But what exactly is meant here by probably ? There are at least three different and legitimate notions of probability. The one that we are most concerned with in this text is epistemic probability . which is the likelihood that a statement is true, given the total evidence available to you—that is, given all of your background beliefs and experiences. ( Epistemic means having to do with knowledge. ) This is the notion of probability that should be used in your evaluation of premises. To say in your evaluation that a premise is probably true is just to say that you have fairly good evidence for its truth.

Unlike truth, epistemic probability always comes in degrees. It ranges along a continuum that can be expressed either colloquially (ranging from certainly true to certainly false ) or quantitatively (ranging from 1 to 0, respectively). Here are some examples:

Degrees of Epistemic Probability

Although it can sometimes be useful to express these probabilities quantitatively, doing so is likely to convey a false sense of precision. I might be able to tell the difference between beliefs with epistemic probabilities of .6 and .9 (that is, those that are somewhat probable and those that are very probable), but I doubt that I could discriminate between a .84 and a .85 belief. So I will rely chiefly on the less precise—but less misleading—colloquial expressions.

Epistemic probability, again unlike truth, has a very definite relative component. It is relative to you. It is your evidence— your background beliefs and experiences—that determine whether a statement is epistemically probable for you. There is widespread agreement about epistemic probabilities among many people regarding many statements. This is because we share such a wide range of background beliefs and experiences. Anyone with a rudimentary understanding of U.S. geography, for example, would assign a very high epistemic probability to this statement:

Alaska is larger than Rhode Island.

But consider this statement:

Minnesota is larger than Oregon.

I would have to say that I can’t decide (or that it has an epistemic probability of about .5). My meager evidence does not point clearly in either direction. But there are others (the current governors of the two states, for example, or those who are interested enough to Google it) who have evidence for its truth or falsity which is every bit as strong as the evidence most of us share regarding the statement about Alaska and Rhode Island. For them, it is either almost certainly true or almost certainly false (that is, it has an epistemic probability either close to 1 or close to 0).

It is important to add that epistemic probability has an objective component as well. Given the evidence that you have, there is nothing relative about how probable it makes the premise. There is a fact of the matter about how probable it is—regardless of whether you assess its probability correctly or not. In this way, epistemic probability is like the strike zone in baseball. A pitched ball is in the strike zone if it is over home plate and between the knees and arms of the batter. The strike zone is relative to the batter because a shorter batter or a batter who crouches will have a smaller strike zone. But it also has an objective component. Given the size and stance of the individual batter, there is an objective fact about whether the ball is in the zone—regardless of whether the batter assesses it correctly or not.

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (b)

Provide two statements to which most people would assign the following measure of epistemic probability.

Sample exercise. Certainly false.

Sample answer. Two and two are five. The United States has 100 states.

• Certainly true.
• Probably true.
• Can’t decide.
• Probably false.
• Certainly false.

9.2.2 Probability as a Measure of Confidence

There is a second notion of probability, one that is not necessarily connected to evidence. Suppose you say, “I’m probably going to win the lottery, even though I realize that everything points against it.” You are acknowledging that the evidence is bad and thus that the epistemic probability of your winning is low. In this case, to say that you will probably win is to say merely that you have confidence you will win. You are not describing the strength of your evidence but the strength of your confidence, that is, the strength of your belief.

This is sometimes termed subjective probability and may be roughly defined as the amount of confidence you have that a given statement is true. Like epistemic probability, it is a matter of degrees and can also be expressed in colloquial terms ranging from certainly true to certainly false or in quantitative terms ranging from 1 to 0. But, unlike epistemic probability, it is relative to you; there is no fact over and above your level of confidence.

If we are intellectually honest—if our aim is to know the truth regarding the questions we care about—then we will endeavor to match subjective probability to epistemic probability. That is to say, we will aim to have the amount of confidence in a statement’s truth that is warranted by the total available evidence. When we succeed, our evaluations of probability will at the same time indicate both epistemic and subjective probability. This frequently does not happen. Even when my evidence for a belief remains the same from today to tomorrow, my mood about it may change. In Chapter 1 much was said about cases in which we adopt and support beliefs with little regard for the evidence—sometimes because of our innocent misuse of shortcuts in reasoning, sometimes because of bad motives. The problem in those cases can now be stated in another way—as the problem of mismatch between the subjective and epistemic probabilities.

The importance of matching subjective with epistemic probability, however, should not tempt you to make certain mistakes. Note, for example, that if I find that my confidence outstrips my apparent evidence—if, for example, I have a hunch that you are a decent human being despite my inability to say exactly why—this is not necessarily an indicator of bad reasoning or dishonesty on my part. It may mean there is some good reason submerged within my total evidence that I have not yet been able to put my finger on—I sense a reason is there, but it isn’t vivid enough for my thinking to have quickly turned it up. Hunches can go in either direction, however—they may be caused by still-subconscious evidence, or they may be caused by wishful thinking. There is no formula for telling the difference; continued cultivation of the intellectual virtues is the only way to get better at doing so.

Another mistake to avoid is the assumption that I must act with tentativeness if my belief is tentative—that is, if my belief is only slightly probable (whether epistemically or subjectively). Consider the statement My child is at the bottom of the pool. If both my evidence and my confidence are only slightly greater than .5 that this is true, it surely does not follow that I should be tentative as I dive in to rescue what may be my child. In short, when it comes to beliefs about the way the world is, confidence about how the belief translates into action must be distinguished from confidence in the belief itself. [3]

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (c)

For each of these statements, describe a way in which your own epistemic and subjective probabilities might differ.

Sample exercise. The Yankees will win the World Series this year.

Sample answer. The epistemic probability might be in the area of “somewhat probable that this is false,” since the evidence suggests that they are one of the best teams, but only one of the teams will get through every round of the playoffs and end up on top. But the subjective probability might be very high—I may strongly believe it strictly because I am a lifelong Yankee fan.

• The proposed law eliminating a state sales tax will pass.
• Napoleon was the greatest military leader of all time.
• The professor was biased against me when he graded my paper.
• It won’t rain today.
• Even though I’m only three months pregnant, I can just tell this baby is going to be a boy.
• My nephew is the best candidate for the position I’m now hiring for.
• My car can go a long way after the gas gauge is on empty.
• I don’t have a cold, just allergies.

9.2.3 Probability as a Measure of Frequency

There is a third notion of probability—one that occurs often in science, and that differs from the others in that it is entirely objective. Suppose I say, “50 percent of all fair coin tosses come up heads, so there is a .5 probability that this coin toss will come up heads.” I am talking about frequency probability , which may be roughly defined as the likelihood that a specific thing has a property, based on the frequency with which all things of that sort have the property. The probability statement in the example ( There is a .5 probability that this coin toss will come up heads ) is based on a frequency statement about how frequently fair coin tosses do come up heads ( 50 percent of all fair coin tosses come up heads ). [4] This is why it is called frequency probability. And because these frequencies are said to occur in the world, independently of our beliefs about them, frequency probability is entirely objective.

Determining the objective facts does involve us subjectively; I try to establish the epistemic probability of a certain frequency probability—that is, I rely on evidence that a certain sort of thing occurs in the world with a certain frequency. But the truth of a typical statement about frequency has nothing to do with whether anyone believes it, has evidence for it, or makes any judgment about it; so this is an entirely objective notion. (Frequency probability is introduced here solely to contrast it with subjective and epistemic probability. We will not need to otherwise refer to it until Chapter 13, when we cover frequency syllogisms.)

Types of Probability

9.3 Self-Evidence

Because your evaluations must be expressed in language, you will typically support your beliefs by referring to other beliefs of yours. Recall sample evaluations we have already done. Why do I think, for example, that the sentence Not many people are qualified to work as lifeguards is probably true? Because of another belief of mine— Lifeguards must be in excellent physical shape, must be able to swim well, and must have extensive training. And why do I believe that the sentence If air sacs in birds play a role in their breathing, then carbon monoxide introduced into the air sacs will kill them is probably true? Because of another belief of mine— Carbon monoxide interferes with the ability of blood to carry life-sustaining oxygen.

You are making use of inferential evidence when you support a belief by another belief, since you are saying that you infer one from the other. But you have more than inferential evidence available to you when you consider your evidence. If you had only inferential evidence, then ultimately all of your beliefs would be supported only by one another—and they would together be as well supported as a castle in the clouds. You also have noninferential evidence —that is, you can appeal to something other than your beliefs in support of your beliefs. Noninferential evidence may be divided into two categories: self-evidence and experiential evidence. (Of course, you will be able to express even your non-inferential evidence only as beliefs; but since they are beliefs about self-evidence and experiential evidence, that is enough to bring the castle down out of the clouds and put it on firm ground.)

9.3.1 Self-Evidence and Definition

Suppose you have the easy task of evaluating the following premise:

All bachelors are unmarried.

In most contexts, you do not have to think very hard about why you believe that a premise like this is true. There seems to be no need, for example, to think about what other beliefs lead you to believe this or to look for experiential evidence—to interview bachelors, for example, to find out whether they are married. You can see that it is simply true by definition. Suppose, alternatively, the premise had been this:

Some married men are bachelors.

You might, for similar reasons, say that you can see that it is false by definition.

The evidence we have in these cases is self-evidence , since within the statement itself is found the most important evidence bearing on its truth or falsity—namely, the evidence of the meanings of the words themselves. [5] A statement that can be seen to be true or false by definition may be described as self-evidently true or false. In self-evidently true or false statements, if you understand what the words mean you ordinarily need no other evidence to make a reasonable decision about truth or falsity.

Shakespeare illustrates this when he has Hamlet tell his friends that he brings “wonderful news,” namely that “there’s ne’er a villain dwelling in all Denmark, but he’s an arrant knave.” Horatio answers, “There needs no ghost, my Lord, come from the grave to tell us this.” In other words, to say that all villains are knaves is self-evidently true to all those who understand the words villain and knave. Self-evidence, however, like all other evidence, is relative to the person; if villain and knave are not included in your vocabulary, Hamlet’s statement will nevertheless be true, but its truth will not be evident to you.

There is much to keep in mind, however, before blithely judging premises to be self-evidently true or false. The term self-evident easily lends itself to abuse; Ambrose Bierce defined it as “evident to one’s self and to no one else.” The point is to avoid using it as another way of saying “it is obvious to me.” Even if something is obvious to you, the purpose of your evaluation is to provide the reasons why it is obvious to you. And only one such reason may be that it is self-evident.

The most famous use of the expression is in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. . . .” But Thomas Jefferson’s use here—while entirely appropriate for that context—is broader than the use recommended for your evaluations. Jefferson might be described as appealing not to definitional but to conversational self-evidence (that is, he appeals to what is evident to ourselves ). Jefferson’s conviction that all men are created equal was not based on his understanding of the meanings of terms such as men, created, and equal. His point was that it was evident to all participants in the conversation—to the writers and to the intended audience—that all men are created equal; given this agreement, for the purposes of the conversation there was no need to provide any supporting reasons. This is a perfectly good way to use the expression, but we will use it more narrowly.

Likewise, exercise caution before you judge a premise to be self-evidently false. Consider again the preceding simple example:

It would be extremely unusual for someone to make such an obvious mistake. Thus, it provides an especially important opportunity to apply the principle of charity. Is there some clue in the context to suggest, for example, that the arguer is using bachelor or married metaphorically or as shorthand for something else? Maybe the context suggests that the arguer simply means that some married men behave like bachelors. If that proved to be the case, then rather than calling the premise self-evidently false, it would be preferable to paraphrase it charitably and grant that it is almost certainly true—based, perhaps, on your own experience of the behavior of some married men.

This doesn’t mean you will find no self-evidently false statements. The great actor John Barrymore once received a call from the secretary of one of Hollywood’s most important producers. “I am speaking for Mr. Laskin, who wants you to attend an important party he is giving tomorrow,” said the other voice imperiously. “And I,” said Barrymore, “am speaking for John Barrymore, who has a previous engagement which he will make as soon as you have hung up.” There is no problem in understanding Barrymore’s reply to be self-evidently false. The context shows that he meant it to be so, since he clearly meant to return Mr. Laskin’s insult. [6]

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (d)

For each premise, state whether it is self-evidently true, self-evidently false, or neither.

Sample exercise. Abraham Lincoln was president of the United States.

Sample answer. Neither.

• Squares have four sides.
• Mammals are larger than insects.
• Milk is white.
• The future lies before us.
• My mother is one of my parents.
• Instruction at the beginning of a Robert Schumann composition: “To be played as fast as possible.” Instruction a few measures later: “Faster.” Consider the statement: The second instruction can be followed.
• Former NBA star Charles Barkley published an autobiography titled Outrageous. Asked about a particular remark he made in it, he replied, “I was misquoted.”
• In Tom Sawyer Abroad, Mark Twain has Huck Finn report: “They was all Moslems, Tom said, and when I asked him what Moslems was, he said it was a person that wasn’t a Presbyterian. So there is plenty of them in Missouri, though I didn’t know it before.” Suppose the premise is this: Moslems are, by definition, any persons who are not Presbyterians.

9.3.2 Stipulative Definitions

When we say that a statement is seen to be true by definition, or that it is self-evidently true, we are normally assuming that the words in the statement are being used in a standard way. On some occasions, however, an arguer will decree a nonstandard definition for a term; in such a case, the arguer is using a stipulative definition .

Stipulative definitions can be quite useful. They are sometimes used to add precision to a discussion; in an argument about poverty, the arguer might say, “By poor I mean a family of four that earns less than $12,000 per year.” On other occasions, new words are introduced and defined by stipulation, usually for picking out a notion for which we have no handy term; “By blik, ” the philosopher R. M. Hare has said, “I refer to the theoretical framework one uses to interpret the world.”

Premises that stipulate a definition are certainly entitled to be evaluated as self-evidently true, since they are, by stipulation, true by definition. But they do present opportunities for committing the fallacy of equivocation. Suppose after stipulating the preceding definition for poor, I say, “So quit claiming to be poor; you earn almost $13,000 a year for your family.” The conclusion has to do with someone’s real-world concern about being poor; as such, it uses poor in its normal sense, which involves not only yearly earnings but also how many people are supported by the earnings, the other financial resources the family has, and the necessary expenses of the family. But the premise uses it in the more precise, stipulated sense. So the meaning of the term poor has shifted between premise and conclusion, and this means the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. As described in Chapter 5, the ambiguity should be eliminated in the clarifying process.

A newspaper story seeking to determine the greatest athletes of all time includes the following argument:

Defining athletic greatness as the ability to prove it in at least two highly competitive areas, Babe Ruth was number one. As a pitcher he was a World Series winner, and as a hitter he revolutionized the game. He was the greatest of them all.

One premise of this argument is found in the first sentence, which might be paraphrased as follows:

1. Athletic greatness is to be defined as the ability to prove it in at least two highly competitive areas.

But (skipping the remainder of the argument) the conclusion is this:

• ∴ Babe Ruth was the greatest athlete.

Since 1 is a stipulated definition, C is supported only if “greatest athlete” is used there in the same stipulated, nonstandard way as in 1. To avoid equivocation, it should be disambiguated something like this:

• ∴ Babe Ruth did more than anyone else to prove his athletic ability in at least two highly competitive areas.

Once paraphrased, the question whether he was the greatest athlete (in the standard, non-stipulative sense of the term) remains unanswered by the argument. The argument may now be seen to commit a second argument-based fallacy—the fallacy of missing the point.

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (e)

Create an argument that commits the fallacy of equivocation due to a stipulative definition.

Sample exercise. Term: fish. Argue that you did not exceed the limit on fish.

Sample answer. Trout are too wonderful to be considered mere fish. I do not include trout in the definition of fish. So, Mr. Ranger, you can’t cite me for exceeding the limit of 12 fish, since I have 4 bass and 11 trout.

• Term: gift. Argue that you did not forget to give your friend a birthday gift since you did leave a voice mail.
• Term: music. Argue that your friend’s “Chopsticks” rendition on the piano is not music.
• Term: steal. Argue that by shoplifting a bar of candy you were not stealing.
• Term: dependent. Argue that you can claim four dependents on your federal tax return since you have a cat and three still-uncaught mice.

9.4 Experiential Evidence

So far we have covered two broad categories of evidence that you will find relevant in putting together the evaluation of a premise. First, there is inferential evidence—that is, other beliefs of yours from which you can infer your evaluation. Second, there is noninferential evidence of a sort that we have termed self-evidence; this is the evidence found in the meanings of terms themselves. But there is another important category that is also noninferential in nature. It is experiential evidence , the evidence provided by sense experience.

9.4.1 What You Have Directly Observed

The most obvious experiential evidence is that which you have observed—what you have seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched. Suppose an arguer uses the following premise:

1. All swans are white.

In your evaluation of this premise you might be fully entitled, on the basis of your observations—that is, your sense experience—to say this:

Premise 1 is almost certainly false because I personally saw a black swan at the local zoo.

These sorts of appeals to observation are natural, intuitive, and legitimate. There are, however, three important questions that you should ask when you make such appeals to observation.

The first question is How reliable was your observation, given the circumstances? Perhaps you are not particularly skilled at identifying swans. Or perhaps the lighting was bad, you had a poor viewing angle, you had left your glasses in the car, or the swan had just emerged from the mud. Any of these circumstances would make your observation less than reliable, and if you were aware of the undermining circumstances you should have had less confidence in the observation and, on that basis, should have adjusted the probability in your evaluation.

The second question is How reliable is your memory of the observation? Observations that you appeal to as evidence are ordinarily observations that you remember, not observations that are occurring at that moment. If you just a moment ago made the observation, your memory is probably highly reliable. But you depend on many observations that you made days, weeks, and years ago. Time presents opportunities for memories to fade and to be unconsciously revised—all the more likely if wishful thinking or someone else’s suggestion is prompting you to remember one way rather than another. We are all familiar with this phenomenon, and scientific research has confirmed it. As for the black swan, chances are that your memory is serving you well. But you may have reason to consider it less reliable if I said to you, “After all, it was a couple of years ago. And haven’t you conveniently forgotten that you argued heatedly with me at the time, since I was insisting that it was just an odd-shaped piece of wood protruding from the water?”

The third question is How probable would your belief be had you not made the observation? A slightly more technical way of putting exactly the same thing is to ask what the prior probability of the belief is. (In this case, prior simply means independent of the observation ; and it is epistemic probability that is referred to.) The higher the prior probability of the observation, the more reliable it is. Thus, the more likely it is that there is a black swan at the zoo, independent of your having observed it, the more you can trust your observation of it to be reliable. Suppose you read a feature story in the local newspaper that comments on the pride the zoo takes in its collection of five white swans, the only swans it has ever had for the last 10 years. This would significantly reduce the prior probability that there is a black swan and would render your observation somewhat less reliable. It would not mean that you didn’t see one—the news account could have been mistaken, or a black swan may have stopped over for a visit on the day you were there. But it would mean that a single observation has only limited evidential weight.

If someone tells you that a car is coming down the road, you accept it with no question. If someone tells you that several frogs flying on lily pads are coming down the road, you may suggest they take another look. Consider the observations, contained in the following Los Angeles Times account, that some have made on the Willcox Playa, a remote and eerie expanse of desert in southern Arizona:

Most stunning are the Playa’s endless mirages. Everyone sees them. Everyone swears by them—buildings rising from the shimmering horizon, trucks speeding along upside down, groups of people dancing. Pete Cowgill, former outdoor writer for the Arizona Daily Star, once saw a Southern Pacific train chugging across the Playa. As he watched, the engine disappeared into the earth. The next car followed it, then the next, and the next. “One by one, about a hundred cars flat disappeared,” says Cowgill. “It was the most fascinating non-sight I ever saw.”

On the desert and far from any railroad tracks, the prior probability that a train will pass by—and disappear into the earth—is virtually nil. Seeing it was not reason enough for Cowgill to believe it and should not have been. In short, the more preposterous the belief—that is, the lower its prior probability—the stronger the evidence needed to support it. As Sherlock Holmes says in The Valley of Fear:

I ought to know by this time that when a fact appears opposed to a long train of deductions, it invariably proves to be capable of bearing some other interpretation.

And this applies even if what is opposed to the long train of deductions is a long train of Southern Pacific rail cars.

Three Questions to Ask of Any Observation

• How reliable was your observation, given the circumstances?
• How reliable is your memory of the observation?
• How probable would your belief be had you not made the observation?

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (f)

Propose a way in which the described observation might be unreliable, and explain why.

Sample exercise. You recall that your older brother was at your 10th birthday party.

Sample answer. Your parents and brother all remember that he was away at camp that year. This means that there is a very low prior probability that he was there.

• You hear someone blowing a whistle.
• You remember hearing someone blowing a whistle.
• You see your mother at the bus station.
• You see the president of the United States at the bus station.
• You remember your professor saying that there would be no final exam.
• You remember your professor saying there would be a final exam.
• You feel a spider on your neck.

9.4.2 What Authorities Have Reported

Reports from authorities make up one important part of your experience. (They are part of your experience because the reports are themselves something that you see or hear.) An authority is simply someone who is presumed to be in a better position than you to know the truth about the premise in question. This superiority may be due to either special ability or special access. A scientist or expert may have special ability to evaluate certain information; an eyewitness or a journalist may have special access to certain information.

As noted in Chapter 8, appealing to authority should be scrupulously avoided in circumstances where you are just as capable as anyone else of thinking through a view. In such cases, appealing to authority merely promotes intellectual timidity and can undermine the virtue of intellectual honesty. But we are quite right to rely on the authoritative reports of others for vast numbers of our beliefs, including most of our beliefs about science, history, and current affairs. There are two questions that you should ask to be sure that your use of authority is appropriate.

The first question is, How reliable is the authority’s report, given the circumstances?

A variety of circumstances can undermine the reliability of an authority’s report. A witness’s memory can be subject to “creative” forces of which the witness is unaware. Or an expert might be an expert—but on a different topic. But perhaps the most important undermining circumstance is conflict of interest. It would ordinarily be in the best interest of most authorities to be reliable. But that interest can be overridden by other competing interests. This can be a problem for journalists, for example. One media critic, David Shaw of the Los Angeles Times, identifies what he calls several “basic flaws in the way the contemporary news organizations function.” They include the following: “Pack journalism. Laziness. Superficiality. Cozy relationships with prosecutors. A competitive zeal that sends reporters off in a frantic search to be first with the latest shocking allegation, responsible journalism be damned. A tradition that often discourages reporters from raising key questions. . . .”

Like journalists, trained experts can also be rendered less than reliable due to overriding interests. Note, for example, this brief item from the Chronicle of Higher Education :

The spring sale catalog from LSU Press includes ads for a collection of essays by Cleanth Brooks and one by Louis Rubin. The blurb for the Brooks collection calls him “our best critic” and continues, “These essays are vintage Brooks.” The blurb for Rubin’s book calls him “one of the very best of our literary critics” and goes on to affirm that “these essays are vintage Rubin.” Curiously, the commendation for Brooks comes from the pen of Rubin, whose commendation comes from—you guessed it—Brooks.

This provides no reason to think that either Brooks or Rubin is deceiving us; but they do apparently have a conflict of interest, and thus we should have more to go on than their reports if we are to confidently believe that either of them is “among our best critics.”

The second question is, How probable would the statement be if you had no report from the authority? As in the last section, a more technical way of putting this is to ask what the prior probability of the statement is, where prior simply means supposing you had no report from the authority. If a normally reliable witness reports seeing green men come out of a spaceship or Elvis come out of a deli on Broadway, that should not be enough to persuade us. If a normally reliable scientist reports success in building a perpetual motion machine or in achieving cold fusion in a tabletop apparatus, we should reserve judgment until additional evidence is amassed. Improbable things often do turn out to be true. But the more improbable it is, the less ready we should be to accept it solely on the report of an authority.

Sometimes a report will reach you after passing through a chain of authorities. Your friend may tell you that she heard on the news that a scientist has made a certain new discovery. Every link in the chain—your friend, the newscaster, and the scientist—must be reliable; and the more improbable the discovery, the more reliable each must be. And note that there are probably other links that you do now know about—the individuals or services, for example, who got the information from the scientist and passed it on to the newscaster. Those links must also be reliable.

Two Questions to Ask of Any Presumed Authority

• How reliable is the authority, given the circumstances?
• How probable would the statement be if you had no report from the authority?

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (g)

Identify the authority and the claim supported by the authority in each of the passages below. State what makes the authority less than perfectly reliable.

Sample exercise. Philadelphia lawyer Jay Lambert recalls a tough medical malpractice case against his client, a neurosurgeon, eight years ago. Lambert was fretting over a damaging report filed by an opposing “expert.” On the eve of trial, Lambert called a contact in the expert’s hometown and hit pay dirt. It seems the expert wrote the report but was in a federal penitentiary—where he was doing time for falsifying medical reports. — Forbes

Sample answer.  The medical expert filed a report showing that Lambert’s client might well be guilty. But his reliability as a medical expert is questionable, given that he has been convicted of falsifying medical reports.

• A network news program advertises that their exclusive interview with the president will definitively settle the latest White House scandal.
• A large corporation announces that, overall, employees have benefited from the latest round of downsizing.
• The National Golf Foundation (which in part exists in order to promote golf) has projections which show that the country’s golf boom will require more than 300 new courses a year for the next several years.
• A young doctor listened intently to a panel of distinguished physicians discuss advances in hypertension treatment at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Family Physicians. By the end of the three-hour presentation, he was thinking seriously about switching some of his hypertensive patients to a drug called a calcium channel blocker, which was much discussed at the presentation. The pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle sponsored the seminar, as the young physician knew. But he didn’t realize that Searle—which was then running a promotional campaign for Calan, one of several calcium channel blockers—had carefully picked speakers who were well-known advocates for this class of drugs. — Consumer Reports
• An unemployed Texas salesman on Monday claimed that his father was one of three people who killed John F. Kennedy. Ricky Don White contends that his father joined the Dallas police department in September 1963 to carry out the assassination. He said his father, Roscoe White, was one of three CIA operatives who fired the shots. He said that his father also killed Dallas police officer J. D. Tippet about an hour after the assassination. Tippet’s killing has long been blamed on Oswald. White said that his father served in the Marines with Oswald. He made his claims during a news conference at the JFK Assassination Information Center, a privately run group that researches various assassination theories. White acknowledged that he has tried to sell a book or movie on his theory. —Associated Press

Two Kinds of Evidence

• Inferential evidence
• Self-evidence
• Experiential evidence

9.5 Strategies for Evaluating Premises

To evaluate the truth of a premise is to consider its epistemic probability—that is, to consider the quality of your evidence for it. How should you describe this evidence in the relevant portion of your evaluation of the argument?

9.5.1 The Reasonable Objector over Your Shoulder

In evaluating premises, try not to focus on what others—say, your peers or professors—expect you to believe or what beliefs they might find impressive. A much better place to start is by asking yourself what you actually do believe, more or less instinctively, about the premise, and what your actual evidence seems to be for that belief. And be sure that what you settle on is a real reason and not merely a restatement of the premise in slightly different words (nor a restatement of the denial of the premise, if you take it to be false).

As you think about the premise, remember the strategy of writing your evaluation as though there is a reasonable objector looking over your shoulder. Thus, you must satisfy someone who has roughly the same evidence that you have and who possesses the intellectual virtues of honesty, critical reflection, and inquiry. This may help you to keep the intellectual virtues in the forefront of your mind, in ways such as this:

• Exhibit critical reflection by asking what your evidence is, whether it supports your belief, and whether either your evidence or your belief can be improved.
• Exhibit inquisitiveness by seeking more evidence if it is meager (and withhold judgment if there is no opportunity to seek further evidence).
• Exhibit intellectual honesty by insuring that your chief objective in evaluating this premise is to know whether it is true or false regardless of your prejudices. Try to identify your own biases and habitual modes of thinking, and watch for them as you evaluate your evidence.

In your evaluation of every premise, you will provide your judgment and your defense of that judgment. Given that you will be doing this with a reasonable objector over your shoulder, you should also be prepared to provide, where necessary, a brief response to reasonable objections that might be raised. To the premise All swans are white, for example, we’ve already seen the following sample evaluation:

Premise 1 is almost certainly false, since I personally saw a black swan at the local zoo.

But black swans are rare; since the prior probability of your sighting is quite low, a reasonable objector is likely to object that it is best to remain unpersuaded until stronger evidence comes along. Your evaluation is much stronger if you anticipate that objection and deal with it in advance; here is one way you might do that:

Premise 1 is almost certainly false, since I personally saw a black swan at the local zoo. I realize, of course, that they are quite rare; so I made a special effort to be sure that I got a good look and wasn’t being misled in any way. I checked with others around me and they agreed that they also saw a black swan.

At this point, the objector would probably have to be unreasonable to continue to object.

Or consider the premise If air sacs in birds play a role in their breathing, then carbon monoxide introduced into the air sacs will kill them. Our sample evaluation goes something like this:

Premise 1 is probably true, since carbon monoxide interferes with the ability of blood to carry life-sustaining oxygen.

How might a reasonable objector find fault with this? One sensible objection might be that nothing has been said here about how much carbon monoxide it takes to have this effect, nor how much is being administered to the birds. It might be better to say can’t decide, due to the limited information. You have two choices at this point: concede that the objector has a good point (as always, since by definition the objector is reasonable!) and revise your judgment to can’t decide, or revise your defense slightly, as follows:

Premise 1 is probably true, since carbon monoxide interferes with the ability of blood to carry life-sustaining oxygen. This, of course, is based on the assumption that the scientist who is conducting the experiment is competent enough to know how much carbon monoxide is required and to introduce at least that much into the air sacs.

This seems to be a reasonable assumption and should satisfy the objector.

Let’s look at one more example, the premise Not many people are qualified to work as lifeguards. The sample evaluation is this:

Premise 1 is almost certainly true, since lifeguards must be in excellent physical shape, must be able to swim well, and must have extensive training—qualifications that are rare.

I can’t think of a reasonable objection to this defense and thus would leave the evaluation as it is.

These guidelines apply to any judgment you have about the premise—even if it is can’t decide. When you cannot decide, explain why you cannot decide. Chances are it will be because the evidence—whether there is a lot or a little—is balanced. In these cases, state the best reason you can come up with on each side. Don’t feel that you must force a decision, but don’t use cannot decide as an excuse for not thinking. When you do use it, be sure to show that you have thought carefully about it.

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (h)

For each of the evaluations of a premise below, augment it by providing a response to an objection that might be posed by a reasonable objector over your shoulder. (In your augmentation, continue to agree with the evaluation already presented.)

Sample exercise. Premise: All triangles have 180 degrees. Evaluation: The premise is almost certainly true, since it is self-evident. This is just what we mean by the word triangle.

Sample answer. Add the following: It might be objected that in real life, we grant that triangles do exist even though perfect triangles don’t exist; the fact that a man-made or natural object is off imperceptibly doesn’t mean that it isn’t a triangle. This is a reasonable objection, and means I must add that the premise is only true on the charitable, and thus reasonable, assumption that it is talking about geometry and not real life.

• Premise: Taxes will continue to rise during our lifetime. Evaluation: This is probably false, since there is a rising tide of opinion that government is growing too big, taking too much of our income, and not using it responsibly. The politicians will get the message.
• Premise: James Cameron’s Titanic is one of the best movies ever made. Evaluation: This is almost certainly false. A good script is necessary for a good movie, and just about everyone agrees that the script for this movie is extremely weak.
• Premise. Large cities provide a higher quality of life than small towns. Evaluation: This is probably true. Cultural opportunities make a huge contribution to quality of life, and large cities far outweigh small towns in this regard.
• Premise: Most of the wealth created in America in this millenium has been from high technology. Evaluation: This is probably false. Lists of the wealthiest people in America are full of people who made their money in the stock market (like Warren Buffet), in retailing (like Jeff Bezos), and in entertainment (like Oprah Winfrey).

9.5.2 Thinking Backward and Thinking Ahead

As you consider your evidence, one natural strategy is to think backward—to look for what seems to have led you to believe or disbelieve the premise. Almost all of the examples provided so far have been of this sort. Why do I believe that all triangles have 180 degrees? I think back and recall that I learned it as a definition in high school geometry. Why do I not believe that all swans are white? Because I think back to my sighting of a black swan at the zoo. Other examples are easy to come by. Suppose you clarify an argument that has the following premise:

1. For any liquid, its freezing and melting temperature is the same.

Plausible though this may be, you realize that it is probably false on thinking back and recalling a magazine article you once read. You might then evaluate it in this preliminary way:

Premise 1 is probably false. Science News, which is normally a very reliable publication on matters of science, recently carried a story about the discovery of fish that live in very cold waters; their blood has a very low freezing temperature, even though, once frozen, the melting temperature is far higher.

In this way, by thinking backward you are able to appeal to a reliable authority.

But another useful strategy is to think ahead. This second strategy can take one of two forms. One way of doing this is to assume that the premise is true and see if anything obviously false follows from it; if so, that would show the premise to be false. Suppose, for example, the premise is this:

1. The meaning of any word is the thing that it picks out in the world.

This might seem superficially plausible. But you might arrive at the following evaluation:

Premise 1 is very probably false. It entails, for example, that the word unicorn has no meaning; for there are no unicorns, and thus the word picks out nothing in the world. But this is absurd—it is self-evidently false. The word unicorn is obviously meaningful, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to check and see whether there were any unicorns.

In this example, by thinking ahead you have run into a consequence that is self-evidently false; for by understanding the very meaning of the term, you understand that the word unicorn is meaningful.

Another way of doing this is to assume that the premise is false and see if anything obviously false follows from that ; if so, then that would show the premise to be true. Suppose, for example, there is a premise such as this:

4. It is sometimes morally acceptable to break the law.

Your preliminary evaluation might be as follows:

Premise 4 is very probably true. Assume it is false. This would mean that it is never morally acceptable to break the law. But this would mean that you would be morally obligated to obey the speed limit even if driving faster would save someone’s life. But this is absurd. Since this absurdity results from assuming that the premise is false, the premise is very likely not false.

These two forward-thinking strategies search for implications that are absurd, concluding that the assumption that led to the absurdity must be rejected. Because they attack the assumption indirectly, via its implications, they are known as indirect arguments . They are also known as reductio ad absurdum arguments, since they aim to reduce the assumption to absurdity.

Such arguments can be effective but should be used with care. It is always possible that the absurd implication is produced not by the falsity of your assumption about the premise, but by some other false assumption that you are implicitly making. In the first case, for example, someone might argue that the mistake doesn’t lie in the premise The meaning of any word is the thing that it picks out in the world, but in this additional assumption: The word “unicorn” picks out nothing. Perhaps there really are unicorns (and thus the word picks out unicorns). Or, safely assuming that there are no unicorns, perhaps it picks out the idea of unicorns; in that case it does pick out something, so it is meaningful. This sort of mistake—failing to blame a false secondary or implicit premise—is common enough that it long ago earned a name of its own: the fallacy of non causa pro causa (i.e., the absurdity is not caused by the cause that is set forth ).

Note that the practice of assuming there is a reasonable objector over your shoulder applies to indirect arguments as well. And you should be prepared for the possibility that your reasonable objector will accuse you of committing the fallacy of non causa pro causa. Return to the premise The meaning of any word is the thing that it picks out in the world. The evaluation, as it now stands, is as follows:

Premise 1 is very probably false. It entails, for example, that the word unicorn has no meaning because there are no unicorns, and thus the word picks out nothing in the world. But this is absurd—in fact, it is self-evidently false. The word unicorn is obviously meaningful, otherwise we wouldn’t know how to check and see whether there were any unicorns.

But it is stronger if you append the following sentences to it:

It might reasonably be objected, however, that the word unicorn does pick out something—namely the idea of unicorns (and thus, the fault would lie in the assumption that it does not pick out anything; the fault would not lie in Premise 1). But this objection cannot be right, because the objector would then have to admit that there are indeed unicorns in the world—since the objector says that unicorn means idea of unicorn, and the idea indeed exists even though unicorns do not.

Again, in this way you identify what is probably the weakest part of your defense and convince yourself (by convincing the reasonable objector over your shoulder) that your indirect argument is successful after all.

Indirect Arguments (“Thinking ahead”)

• Assume the premise is true and show that this leads to an absurd consequence. This shows the premise is false.
• Assume the premise is false and show that this leads to an absurd consequence. This shows the premise is true.

EXERCISES Chapter 9, set (i)

For each premise, provide an evaluation that uses an indirect argument. Where relevant, respond to the reasonable objector over your shoulder.

Sample exercise. No one who has broken the law should be allowed to serve on a jury.

Sample answer. This is certainly false. Assume it’s true. It would follow that juries would no longer exist, since virtually everyone has broken the law at some time (even if only by speeding or jaywalking.) It might be reasonably objected that, in practice, this wouldn’t happen, since there would have to be a way of establishing that someone broke the law before you could exclude the person from a jury. This turns out to be a weak objection, however, since one way of establishing it would be to ask them. Most people would probably admit to it if it meant getting out of jury duty.

• Some males are unmarried. (Assume it is false.)
• People can do whatever they decide they want to do. (Assume it is true.)
• To become a millionaire requires more than just intelligence. (Assume it is false.)
• The only painting that should be counted as art is painting that literally represents the world, such as portraits and landscapes. (Assume it is true.)

9.5.3 Fallacies and Truth

Sometimes false beliefs are branded as fallacies. In Aristotle to Zoos, for example, P. B. and J. S. Medawar write,

It is a popular fallacy that chewing gum regains its flavor if removed from the mouth and parked, say, under a chair. What is regained is not the flavor but the ability to taste the flavor as sensory adaptation wears off.

This is not a misuse of the term; a fallacy, recall, is an easy-to-make intellectual mistake, and there are many mistakes about truth (such as believing that chewing gum regains its flavor overnight) that are easy to make.

But although this is not a misuse of the term, it is not helpful in evaluating the premise. To say the premise Chewing gum regains its flavor overnight commits the fallacy of believing that chewing gum regains its flavor overnight is simply to say that the premise is false (note that the terms fallacy and false are closely related) and that a lot of people think it is true. It does not tell us anything about why people make the mistake, which is what it must do if it is to be useful in an evaluation. The other uses of the term fallacy that we look at in this text are generic. They tell us something about why an argument has gone wrong, regardless of the subject matter of the argument. The fallacy of equivocation, for example, can occur in any argument where the meaning of a word might shift—which is to say, in any argument. It can occur in an argument about gum (which might shift from chewing gum to the flesh under the teeth ); and—to simply reverse the word—it can occur in an argument about a mug (which might shift from a cup to a face —reaffirming the many slips ‘twixt cup and lip). When we identify such a fallacy we are saying that the argument has gone wrong, in part, because of such a shift.

Since the point of your evaluation of each premise is to defend your judgment in a way that would satisfy the reasonable objector over your shoulder, it is best to skip the unhelpful step of accusing a premise of committing a fallacy. Instead, go straight to the explanation of why you believe it to be false. No need to bother saying, for example, that the belief commits the fallacy of believing that chewing gum regains its flavor overnight. Better simply to say that the premise is almost certainly false, and that the reasonable objection that our experiences support the premise—since the gum always does taste better the next morning—is explained by a change that occurs in our sense of taste (due to sensory adaptation) and not by any change in the gum. [7]

9.6 Summary of Chapter Nine

Although people often reasonably disagree about the truth of a premise, that does not mean that what is true for one person may be false for another. Truth has to do with whether a belief fits with the world. It is not relative to the believer. This is consistent with the law of noncontradiction, which says that a statement cannot be both true and false, and with the closely related law of the excluded middle, which says that it must be either true or false. These two laws are valuable practical guidelines in thinking about truth.

Evidence, however, is relative to the believer; so evaluations of premises must be made in shades of gray. The best you can hope for is to evaluate a premise’s epistemic probability—that is, how strong your evidence is for its truth or falsity—using expressions such as probably true and probably false. One alternative notion of probability, subjective probability, is simply a measure of how much confidence you have in the truth of a belief; you should attempt to match your subjective with your epistemic probability.

Some of your evidence will be found in other beliefs of yours—that is, it will be inferential. But some of it—self-evidence and experiential evidence —will be noninferential. Self-evidence is what you have when the premise itself, by virtue of the very meanings of the words, provides you with all the evidence you need to make a reasonable judgment. Experiential evidence is what is provided by the observations that you make with any of your five senses. One important category of experiential evidence is reports that you hear or read from authorities who have special access to information or special abilities to evaluate it.

For any experiential evidence, it is important to be aware of circumstances that might undermine its reliability. It is also important that you require more evidence whenever the prior probability of your belief is extremely low.

In preparing your evaluation, ask yourself what you really think, both about the premise and about your evidence for or against it. You might do this by thinking backward about how you arrived at your belief or by thinking ahead to see whether you can produce an indirect argument. As you do so, keep in mind the intellectual virtues of honesty, critical reflection, and empirical inquiry. Then present your evaluation for each premise by stating your belief, your evidence for that belief, and, if there is a reasonable objection, a brief response to it as though there is a reasonable objector over your shoulder.

9.7 Guidelines for Chapter Nine

• For practical purposes, assume that no statement is both true and false and that every statement is either true or false.
• If it looks as though the truth-value of a statement will be different depending on who expresses it, it is usually because the statement is referentially ambiguous. Look for the ambiguous term, which may be implicit, and eliminate the ambiguity before evaluating its truth.
• The rare statements that appear to violate the two laws of truth, yet do not merely suffer from a referential ambiguity, should be evaluated as can’t decide, with an explanation.
• Evaluate premises according to their epistemic probability—that is, according to how strong your evidence is for their truth or falsity—using expressions such as probably true and probably false.
• Aim to match your subjective and epistemic probabilities—that is, to have the amount of confidence that is warranted by the evidence.
• If a premise can charitably be seen to be almost certainly true or false solely on the basis of your understanding of the meanings of the words within it, evaluate it as self-evidently true or false.
• Stipulative definitions, in which the arguer offers a revised or new definition for a term, may be considered self-evidently true. But be sure that arguments with such definitions do not commit the fallacy of equivocation.
• Observations made by any of your five senses can provide powerful evidence in evaluating your beliefs. Be on the alert, however, for circumstances that can weaken them.
• Reports of authorities can provide powerful evidence in evaluating beliefs. Be on the alert, however, for circumstances that can weaken them.
• For each premise, state your judgment, your defense of the judgment, and, where relevant, a brief response to any objections that might be posed by a “reasonable objector over your shoulder.”
• Ask yourself what you really think about the premise and your evidence for or against it. You might do this by thinking backward about how you arrived at your belief or by thinking ahead to see whether you can produce an indirect argument (though you should avoid the fallacy of non causa pro causa in doing so). As you do so, keep in mind the reasonable objector over your shoulder.
• Instead of accusing any premise of committing a fallacy, focus on explaining why you believe the premise to be false.

9.8 Glossary for Chapter Nine

Authority —someone who is presumed to be in a better position than you to know the truth about a statement. This superiority may be due to either special ability (as with a scientist or expert) or special access (as with an eyewitness or a journalist).

Epistemic —having to do with knowledge.

Epistemic probability —the likelihood that a statement is true, given the total evidence available to you—that is, given all of your background beliefs and experiences. This is the notion of probability that should be used in your evaluation of premises. To say that a premise is probably true is, then, just to say that you have fairly good evidence for its truth.

Experiential evidence —evidence provided by sense experience—that is, that which is seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted. It is one kind of noninferential evidence.

Fallacy of non causa pro causa —the mistake in an indirect argument of relying on a secondary assumption—often implicit—that is false, so that it is really the secondary assumption that should be blamed, not the assumption blamed by the arguer. (It literally means that the absurdity is not caused by the cause that is set forth. )

Frequency probability —the likelihood that a specific thing has a property, based strictly on the frequency with which all things of that sort have the property.

Indirect argument —an argument that shows a statement is false by showing that it leads to an absurd consequence. This is sometimes, alternatively, used to show that the negation of the statement is true (which amounts to the same thing as showing that the belief itself is false). Sometimes also called a reductio ad absurdum argument or, for short, reductio.

Inferential evidence —beliefs that are appealed to in support of another belief (which is inferred from them).

Law of the excluded middle —every statement is either true or false. It follows from this that there is no middle ground between the true and the false.

Law of noncontradiction —no statement is both true and false. It follows from this that truth is objective and absolute—there cannot be any statement, for example, that is true for you but false for me.

Noninferential evidence —things other than beliefs that are appealed to in support of a belief. This includes self-evidence and experiential evidence.

Prior probability —the epistemic probability of a belief independent of (i.e., prior to) a specified piece of evidence. When considering, for example, the prior probability of something you heard, its prior probability is simply how probable it would be if you had not heard it.

Self-evidence —evidence that comes from understanding the very meanings of the words themselves in a statement. Statements that are self-evidently true or false can be seen to be true or false largely by virtue of understanding the words of the statement. Philosophers sometimes refer to these statements as analytic a priori statements; they are also sometimes described as statements that are seen to be true or false by definition.

Stipulative definition —a nonstandard definition for a term, decreed by a speaker or writer for some specific use.

Subjective probability —the degree of confidence you have that a given statement is true. It is entirely relative to the believer; there is no fact of the matter over and above the believer’s level of confidence.

Truth-values —evaluations, like true and false, which can be given of how well a statement fits with the world.

• There is one exception. Some arguments have “throwaway premises” that should not be included in the clarification because they make no logical contribution to the argument. If one of these is false, it is not in the clarification so it doesn’t make the argument unsound (so, excluding it is an application of the principle of charity). Suppose someone argues as follows: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is fat; and thus Socrates is mortal. You would not include Socrates is fat in your clarification, so it doesn’t matter whether it is true or false. ↵
• Poll conducted by the Barna Research Group. It does not say whether those polled believed it to be absolutely true that there is no absolute truth. ↵
• Some theorists have tried to make subjective probability more scientific—to move it from the vague and hidden realm of inner moods to the measurable realm of external behavior—by spelling it out in terms of betting behavior. Consider these two statements: Sitting Pretty will win the third race. Harvest Moon will win the third race. The subjective probability of the first statement would be higher than the second if and only if I were willing either to bet more money or to take longer odds on Sitting Pretty. The same principle would apply to any belief (say, It is wrong to tell a lie ). This approach ultimately does not completely work, for there are many reasons that my betting behavior might not reflect my actual confidence level. For example, if I strongly believed it was wrong to bet, then I would probably not bet any money on the statement It is wrong to bet, even though it would have a high subjective probability! But is does nicely illustrate how it is that our subjective probability has much more influence on behavior than does epistemic probability—and, thus, the importance of matching them. ↵
• Frequency statements used for this purpose are sometimes called base rates . ↵
• Philosophers sometimes refer to such statements as analytic a priori. ↵
• It is also possible to have a self-evidently false pair of premises. If two premises are contradictory, you know that at least one of them is false even if you don’t know which. ↵
• Philosophers have not been reluctant to brand certain beliefs as fallacies. G. E. Moore, to cite a famous example, coined the term naturalistic fallacy to describe the belief that moral properties (such as goodness ) are ultimately nothing more than certain natural properties of the world (such as the amount of pleasure the “good” thing provides). But, as you might expect, other philosophers think this is no mistake at all, and thus no fallacy. As in other cases, it would be more helpful to focus on why he thinks the belief is false rather than to be told that it is a fallacy. ↵

No statement is both true and false. It follows from this that truth is objective and absolute—there cannot be any statement, for example, that is true for you but false for me.

Every statement is either true or false. It follows from this that there is no middle ground between the true and the false.

Evaluations, like true and false, which can be given of how well a statement fits with the world.

The likelihood that a statement is true, given the total evidence available to you—that is, given all of your background beliefs and experiences. This is the notion of probability that should be used in your evaluation of premises. To say that a premise is probably true is, then, just to say that you have fairly good evidence for its truth.

Having to do with knowledge.

The degree of confidence you have that a given statement is true. It is entirely relative to the believer; there is no fact of the matter over and above the believer’s level of confidence.

The likelihood that a specific thing has a property, based strictly on the frequency with which all things of that sort have the property.

Beliefs that are appealed to in support of another belief (which is inferred from them).

Things other than beliefs that are appealed to in support of a belief. This includes self-evidence and experiential evidence.

Evidence that comes from understanding the very meanings of the words themselves in a statement. Statements that are self-evidently true or false can be seen to be true or false largely by virtue of understanding the words of the statement. Philosophers sometimes refer to these statements as analytic a priori statements; they are also sometimes described as statements that are seen to be true or false by definition.

A nonstandard definition for a term, decreed by a speaker or writer for some specific use.

Evidence provided by sense experience—that is, that which is seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted. It is one kind of noninferential evidence.

The epistemic probability of a belief independent of (i.e., prior to) a specified piece of evidence. When considering, for example, the prior probability of something you heard, its prior probability is simply how probable it would be if you had not heard it.

Someone who is presumed to be in a better position than you to know the truth about a statement. This superiority may be due to either special ability (as with a scientist or expert) or special access (as with an eyewitness or a journalist).

An argument that shows a statement is false by showing that it leads to an absurd consequence. This is sometimes, alternatively, used to show that the negation of the statement is true (which amounts to the same thing as showing that the belief itself is false). Sometimes also called a reductio ad absurdum argument or, for short, reductio.

The mistake in an indirect argument of relying on a secondary assumption—often implicit—that is false, so that it is really the secondary assumption that should be blamed, not the assumption blamed by the arguer. (It literally means that the absurdity is not caused by the cause that is set forth. )

A Guide to Good Reasoning: Cultivating Intellectual Virtues Copyright © 2020 by David Carl Wilson is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Truth: Absolute or Relative?

• February 18, 2007

Is truth relative or absolute? Is there such a thing as universal and objective truth? Can any group or individual honestly say they possess the truth? The popular postmodern view today is that truth is relative. Christianity, on the other hand, is built on the premise that truth is absolute and that the teachings of the Bible are universal. The notion that truth is relative presents one of the most significant challenges facing the Church. A survey of the American public revealed that sixty-six percent agreed with the statement, “There is no such thing as absolute truth.” 1 Among youth, seventy percent believe that there is no such thing as absolute truth; two people could define “truth” in conflicting ways and both be correct.” 2 Relativism has made significant inroads into the church as well. According to the latest research, 53 percent of adults in church believe there is no absolute truth. Among youth in church, research shows that 57 percent do not believe an objective standard of truth exists. 3 For two millennia, the Church has been the guardian of truth. The Church cannot allow its foundation to be dismantled by relativism. It is important that Christians understand the nature of truth and engage relativist thinking.

Absolute Truth

Truth that is defined as being absolute, possesses the following qualities. 4

• Truth is discovered not invented
• Truth is transcultural: it can be conveyed across different cultures.
• Truth is unchanging: it can be conveyed across time.
• Beliefs cannot change a truth statement no matter how sincere one may be
• Truth is unaffected by the attitude of the one professing it
• All Truths are absolute
• Truth is knowable

In order for truth to be absolute and holding these qualities, it must be grounded in a source that is personal, unchanging, and sovereign over all creation.

Postmodern Relativism

The popular view on truth in our culture today is that objective, universal and absolute truth is implausible. Those who hold to it are often viewed with contempt. Postmodern relativists build their understanding of truth on the foundation of the naturalist worldview. Truth then has its origin in man. This leads to conclusions that differ greatly from those who hold to absolute truth. They believe:

• Truth is created not discovered. Truth is a matter of perspective and each culture or individual defines for themselves what is truth.
• Since truth is invented, there is no universal transcultural truth. Each culture or individual will define truth differently according to their background and perspective.
• Truth changes. Since it is inseparably connected to individuals and cultures which continually change, truth perpetually to changes.
• Since truth is a matter of a group or individual’s perspective, one’s beliefs can change a truth statement.
• Since an individual determines truth, truth is affected by the attitude of the one professing it.
• There can be no such thing as absolute truth.
• Absolute truth is not knowable. Absolute and objective truth cannot be known since it is built on the shifting foundation of man’s perceptions. As each individual’s perception is different, truth cannot be known.

Jim Leffel summarizes postmodern relativism this way, Relativism says the truth isn’t fixed by outside reality, but is decided by a group or individual for themselves. Truth isn’t discovered but manufactured. Truth is ever changing not only in insignificant matters of taste or fashion, but in crucial matters of spirituality, morality and reality itself. 5 Leading postmodern thinker John Caputo writes, “The cold, hermeneutic truth, is that there is no truth, no master name which holds things captive.” 6 Both men summarize the postmodern belief that objective truth does not exist leading to the conclusion that all truth claims are equal even if they are contradictory. Before we can present the evidences for the existence of God and Jesus Christ, apologists today must present the case for absolute truth. In the following sections, I will build a case for absolute truth.

Relativism’s Slippery Slide

The philosophy of relativism should be rejected for several reasons. First of all, postmodern relativism is built on a worldview of naturalism. Relativism is a logical conclusion if man is the measure of truth and God does not exist. However, the evidence indicates we live in a theistic universe. In a theistic universe, God whose nature is truth, created a universe built on His truth that He communicates to His created beings. Secondly, relativism is a self-defeating position. A self-defeating statement is one that fails its own standard. To say, “There are no absolute truths,” is, indeed, an absolute truth statement. To say, “there is no truth,” is a statement of truth. When a relativist says, “All truth is relative,” we need to ask him, “Is that a relative statement?” If it is, then why should we take his statement seriously? When a relativist claims that all truth is relative and believes that all should hold this principle, he just made an absolute truth statement. What we learn from the previous point leads us to another instance of how relativism fails. To say, “there is no truth,” requires one to acknowledge a truth statement. The truth that there is no truth, is self-defeating. Thus, truth does exist and is undeniable. The fourth fallacy of relativism is their rejection of reason as a way to determine truth. The modern era rationalism was utopian in that they believed in the possibility of establishing all truth by reason alone. Postmodern relativists reacted with a harsh skepticism toward human reason. Relativists believe that humans cannot know the true nature of reality, individuals are shaped by their culture, and no one can be objective. Therefore, many reject the idea that truth can be arrived at through reasoning. The problem relativists run into is that all theories are derived through reasoning. Theories are tested as proofs are accumulated and presented in a coherent and logical fashion. For postmodernists to arrive at their conclusion requires the use of reason. If reason is not valid, it destroys any theory that requires us to arrive at it through reasoned thinking. Furthermore, language can communicate objective truth. Based on the naturalist worldview, postmodern relativists believe language originates with man with communication being confined within the context of a person’s particular culture. They then conclude language cannot convey objective truth. However, language originates with God and it is intrinsic to His personality and nature. Through His word, He created the universe (Genesis 1:3 and John 1:1). All creation finds its origin in God’s word. Mankind uses language because we are created in God’s image. It is through language God creates and maintains a relationship with man. Granted, there is a difference between God’s language and human language. Human language is fallen and therefore limited. However, God continues to communicate with humans through language found in His word and through His Son. Postmodern relativists view language as a prison house since it is a cultural construct and believe there is no transcendent meaning outside the text. This is true if God does not exist. Human language may have gaps and limits but it is an overstatement to say language cannot communicate objective truth. Veith states, “…human language is a sign, a trace, of a divine language. Language may get in the way sometimes, but it is revelatory. Meaning is not only subjective; the external world itself grounded in the Word of God, which established its form and gave it an objective meaning. When we study science, we are not merely making up mental models, but we are, in a sense, reading the divine language inscribed in the universe. Language is not merely a prison house; God’s language can break in from the outside and give us freedom.” 7 The world is built on God’s word, which encompasses meaning and objective truths. God has ordained language and although human language is flawed, it is rooted in His being and can communicate truths about His world. Truth exists outside of language. It exists in the mind of God.

How Discover Truth

How does one come to discover truth? Truth is discovered with self-evident laws of logic called first principles. Two key principles are the Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle.

The Law of Non-Contradiction states that two opposite statements cannot both be true at the same time in the same sense. 8 For example, if we make the statement, “God exists,” then its opposite, “God does not exist,” cannot be true at the same time. If one is true, the other must be false. Humans are designed so that we cannot believe contradictory propositions. This is a universal law that cannot be refuted. Any truth statement requires that its converse cannot be true. Postmodern relativists and pantheists reject this law but that is not the same as actually refuting the law. Those who make the appeal that the Law of Non-Contradiction does not apply to religion or morality make a statement of truth that cannot be contradicted. In order to refute the law, they must appeal to the law itself. “Any meaningful affirmation about anything at all, regardless of how cryptic, vague, paradoxical or imprecise the statement might be, if intended as true, makes implicit appeal to the principle ruling out its negation as false.” 9 The second law is the Law of the Excluded Middle that states that something either is or is not and there is no third alternative. 10 The statement, “God exists” is either true or false. There is no third choice. Not only do we use the first principles to discover truth, we also use our senses to observe the world around us. From these observations, we draw conclusions. This process of discovery is called induction. Through logic and observation we can make conclusions that are reasonably certain but not absolutely certain. For example we can be reasonably sure that the sun will rise and set tomorrow. However, we cannot be absolutely sure since we do not have perfect knowledge of the future. But we act on our reasonably sure knowledge and make our plans. Although we may not have absolute certainty, we can discover truth and make conclusions that can be trusted. Postmodern relativists overstate their case when they say truth cannot be known. Truth is undeniable, objective, and absolute. Truth is also narrow since its opposite is false.

What is truth?

Truth is defined as that which corresponds to its object or that which describes an actual state of affairs. 11 Truth then is what corresponds to reality. Truth is absolute and narrow by nature because it excludes its opposite. Although relativists will argue that we cannot truly know reality, this is an exaggerated and inconsistent premise. One must know reality to be able to question the nature of one’s reality. We also live in a theistic universe with a God who is involved and understands the character of His creation. Therefore, what He says about His creation is true and authoritative. God has created man in His image with the ability to understand truth and know reality. The correspondence theory is supported in the Old and New Testament.

The Old Testament Definition of Truth

The Hebrew word for truth is emet and involves ideas of support and stability. From this root we derive a twofold notion of truth as faithfulness and conformity to fact. 12 Emet can also mean that which is conformed to reality in contrast to anything that would be erroneous or deceitful. Emet can also connote what is authentic, reliable, or simply right. 13

The New Testament Definition

The New Testament word for truth is aletheia and retains the Hebrew idea of truth. Truth is defined as conformity to fact. It also carries with it the ideas of genuineness and opposition to falsities. John, in his gospel, develops his unique meaning where truth refers to the reality of God the Father revealed in Jesus the Son. John’s understanding of truth presupposes a correspondence view of truth, but it also builds this foundation theologically by adding specific content concerning the manifestation of truth in Jesus Christ (John 7:28 and 8:16). 14 Both Old and New Testament emphasize that truth is conforms to reality and is an antithesis to lies and errors. The Biblical view of truth contains the idea of factuality, faithfulness and completeness. Truth is not a cultural construct of the Jewish people or the Christians. God presented His truth to them and they were expected to live in conformity to this truth. 15

Biblical Character of Truth

Truth is Revealed by God

Truth finds its source in God who is personal and moral. Paul states in Romans 1 and 2, that God has revealed Himself through creation and the human conscience. God has also unveiled Himself through the Bible, His special revelation. 2 Timothy 3:16 states, “All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in righteousness,…” God, who embodies truth, communicates His truth through language which has eternally existed with God. He uses this language to convey truth to creatures created in His image.

Objective Truth Exists and is Knowable

Objective truth is truth that is not dependent on the perspective or attitudes of any individual. God’s truth is objective because truth is rooted in the nature of God who is truth. He is the source of truth and His truths are true no matter what the beliefs or attitudes an individual or culture may have towards it. Those who do not acknowledge God’s truth will be judged by it. God is just to judge people because His truth is objective and knowable. Consequently, all are accountable to respond to it.

Biblical Truth is Absolute

God’s truth is absolute, meaning it is true without exception and it does not change. Beliefs change but truth itself is unchangeable. God is the author of absolute truth because He is eternal and His character does not change.

Truth is Universal

God’s truth applies to all peoples and all cultures at all times because He ruler over all creation (Philippians 2:6). His authority and truths apply to every area. In the Great Commission Jesus states, “All authority in heaven and earth has been given to me. Go into all the world and make disciples, teaching them to obey all that I have commanded you.” In the Great Commission, Jesus declares His rule over all creation and the authority of His laws extends to and must be obeyed by all people.

Truth is Eternal

Isaiah 40:8 states, “The grass withers and the flower falls, but the word of God endures forever.” God’s truth is rooted in His eternal nature. What was true two thousand years ago, remains true to this day. The application of truth will change, but the truth itself endures forever.

Truth is Exclusive

Truth is narrow and exclusive since whatever opposes it is false. God states in Isaiah 43:10 “…before me no god was formed, nor will there be one after me.” God is saying He alone is God and there are no other gods. Worship of any other divine being is an act of living in falsehood. Truth is precise and cannot be deviated from. The Law of Non-Contradiction states that two opposite statements cannot be true at the same time in the same sense. If God states He alone is God, polytheism cannot be true at the same time. The Law of Non-Contradiction is a universal law because God’s truth is exclusive and narrow.

Truth is Coherent

All truth statements cohere and are consistent with one another. “In a universe subject to the rule of one creator-God… truth is seen as an interrelated and coherent whole.” 16 It is not God’s nature to teach what is contradictory, illogical, or false. Therefore, truth statements will not contradict one another.

Truth is Comprehensive

Although the Bible does not speak exhaustively on such subjects as geology, cosmology, philosophy, and other subjects, the Bible presents truths in a wide range of areas. Biblical truth is consistent with truth discovered in science, psychology, and philosophy. God’s truth is not fragmented but fits together in a consistent and unified whole with His creation.

The Bible, together with human logic, and experience support the notion that truth is absolute and not relative. Truth is narrow since it rejects its opposite. It is universal, unchanging and knowable. Absolute truth finds its source in God who is eternal, unchanging and sovereign over all creation. God, who is truth, communicates truth to beings made in His image. Relativism should be rejected because the evidence shows we live in a theistic universe. Since the worldview of naturalism is false, the foundation upon which relativists build is unsound. Relativism is also self-defeating, unlivable, and contrary to Biblical teaching.

Bibliography

Beckwith, Francis and Koukl, Gregory. Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air. Grand Rapids, MI.: Baker Books, 1998. C.S. Lewis, C.S. The Abolition of Man. New York: Macmillan Publishing 1955. _______. Mere Christianity. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1952. Caputo, John. That’s Just Your Interpretation. Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 2001. Geisler, Norman and Turek, Frank. I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist. Wheaton, IL.: Crossway Books, 2004. Groothius, Doug. Truth Decay. Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 2000. McCallum, Dennis ed. The Death of Truth. Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1996. McDowell, Josh and Hostetler, Bob. The New Tolerance. Wheaton, IL.: Tyndale House Publishers, 1998. Netland, Harold. Encountering Religious Pluralism. Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 2001. Veith, Gene Edward. Postmodern Times. Wheaton, IL.: Crossway

• Gene Edward Veith, Postmodern Times, (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994), 16.
• Barna, Third Millenium Teens, (Ventura, CA.: Barna Research Group, 1999), 44.
• Josh McDowell and Bob Hostetler, The New Tolerance (Wheaton, IL.: Tyndale House Publishers, 1998) 172-173
• Norman Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist (Wheaton, IL.: Crossway Books, 2004), 37-38.
• Dennis McCallum ed., The Death of Truth, (Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1996), “Our New Challenge: Postmodernism,” by Jim Leffel, 31.
• John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 192.
• Gene Edward Veith, Postmodern Times (Wheaton, IL.: Crossway Books, 1994), 67-68.
• Norman Geisler and Ron Brooks, When Skeptics Ask (Wheaton, IL.: Victor Books, 1989), 271.
• Harold Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism (Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 296.
• Norman Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist (Wheaton, IL.: Crossway Books, 2004), 62.
• Norman Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist (Wheaton, IL.: Crossway Books, 2004), 37.
• Roger Nicole, “The Biblical Concept of Truth,” in Scripture and Truth, ed. D.A. Carson and John Woodridge, (Grand Rapids, MI.: Zondervan, 1983), 290.
• Ibid., 290.
• D.M. Crump, “Truth” in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. Joel Green, Scott Mcknight, and I Howard Marshall (Downers Grove, Il.: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 859.
• Douglas Groothuis, Truth Decay (Downers Grove, Il.: 2000), 64.
• Arthur Holmes, All Truth Is God’s Truth (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans Publishing, 1977), 7, quoted in Doug Groothius, Truth Decay (Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 80.

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Of Truth, by Francis Bacon

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• An Introduction to Punctuation
• Ph.D., Rhetoric and English, University of Georgia
• M.A., Modern English and American Literature, University of Leicester
• B.A., English, State University of New York

"Of Truth" is the opening essay in the final edition of the philosopher, statesman and jurist  Francis Bacon 's "Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral" (1625). In this essay, as associate professor of philosophy Svetozar Minkov points out, Bacon addresses the question of "whether it is worse to lie to others or to oneself--to possess truth (and lie, when necessary, to others) or to think one possesses the truth but be mistaken and hence unintentionally convey falsehoods to both oneself and to others" ("Francis Bacon's 'Inquiry Touching Human Nature,'" 2010). In "Of Truth," Bacon argues that people have a natural inclination to lie to others: "a natural though corrupt love, of the lie itself."

"What is truth?" said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly, there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief, affecting free-will in thinking as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labor which men take in finding out of truth, nor again that when it is found it imposeth upon men's thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor, but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie's sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight that doth not show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and daintily as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum daemonum [the wine of devils] because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever these things are thus in men's depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God in the works of the days was the light of the sense; the last was the light of reason; and his Sabbath work ever since is the illumination of his spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the matter, or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. The poet that beautified the sect that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well, "It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below; but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and wanderings and mists and tempests in the vale below"*; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business: it will be acknowledged, even by those that practice it not, that clear and round dealing is the honor of man's nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent, which goeth basely upon the belly and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious; and therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace and such an odious charge. Saith he, "If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much as to say that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards man." For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men: it being foretold that when Christ cometh, "He shall not find faith upon the earth."

*Bacon's paraphrase of the opening lines of Book II of "On the Nature of Things" by Roman poet Titus Lucretius Carus.

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16 The Socratic Concept of Truth

• Published: February 2005
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This essay explores the question of why Socrates practiced the elenctic method. It argues that the elenchus is a method that generally leads to truth, and suggests that Socrates was convinced that he himself would gain in wisdom and clarity from elenctic exchanges with others, even if they were not as wise as he. People mean what others can take them to mean; to learn what we mean is to learn what others we talk with mean. The understanding of others, agreeing with them on basic concepts, clarity about what we mean, come — to the extent that they do — together. The elenchus is a model of our only method for promoting these ends.

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Reason and Meaning

Philosophical reflections on life, death, and the meaning of life, is truth relative.

What is Relativism?

Is LA close to New York City? Well, it’s relative . LA is closer to NYC than it is to Mars, but it’s not closer to NYC than it is to San Diego. Is hip hop good music? Well, it depends . Many young people love it; many senior citizens don’t. In both cases, the answers depend upon what close or good is being measured against. Compared to Mars, LA and NYC are almost on top of each other; compared to San Diego, LA and NYC are a continent apart. Relative to a teenager’s musical tastes, hip hop may be better than Bach, As for me; I’d choose Bach over hip hop anytime. Now, what about the logical law of non-contradiction, the distributive law of arithmetic, the parallel postulate in geometry, or gravitational, evolutionary, or atomic theory? Are these relative to, conditioned by, dependent upon, or measured against, something else? Or are they just true?

This kind of relativism is called epistemological relativism . The basic idea is that there are no universal truths about the world, just different ways of interpreting it. The theory dates back at least to the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras, who said: “man is the measure of all things.” But this basic idea is also captured by contemporary sayings:

• What you believe is true (for you); what I believe is true (for me).
• Truth is subjective.
• Truth is in the eye of the beholder.
• Different strokes for different folks.
• You have your beliefs; I have mine, and that’s the end of it.

To be a relativist means that a belief, idea, proposition, claim, etc. is never true or false, good or bad, or right or wrong, absolutely . According to the relativist, there is no absolute or objective truth; truth is relative and subjective. For example, a relativist can’t consistently claim that 2 + 2 = 4 because the answer 4 is neither right nor wrong. It just depends. Your math teacher likes 4, but you like 6; so for you , the answer is 6. And you can’t consistently claim that gravity pulls objects downward, that airplanes fly because of aeronautical engineering principles, or that the earth is round since none of these are absolute truths—at least according to the relativist.

Consider some implications of relativism. If you are an art expert who loves Rembrandt while your eight-year-old sister thinks her doodling is the best art, as a relativist you cannot consistently maintain that your opinion about art is better than your sister’s. And if you eat well, exercise, maintain an ideal weight, and engage in stress reduction activities; you cannot consistently argue that your lifestyle is healthier than your roommate who eats poorly, lives a sedentary lifestyle, is overweight, and smokes to relieve stress. After all, it’s all relative. Or suppose your brother has a Ph.D. in physics from Oxford and has recently found compelling evidence for superstring theory. As a relativist, you have no justification to say that your brother knows more about physical reality than your mother, who believes that she lives in a universe composed of tiny, invisible gremlins whose gyrations are responsible for the expansion of the universe. After all, physicists have their view of reality and your Mom has hers, and that’s the end of it.

Critique of Relativism

Do you really believe that the palm reader knows as much about the physical universe or the future as a physicist? (If you do, it’s costing you money!) Or that farmers know as much about medicine as physicians? Or that auto mechanics know as much about the brain as neurophysiologists? Or that airplanes stay aloft because we understand the principles of aeronautical engineering, but holding hands and chanting “up, up, and away” works just as well? If you’re a relativist you have to believe all these things, because nothing is true or false. But is everything just relative? You might say this, but do you really believe it?  Would you rather drive over a bridge built by the army corps of engineers, or one made of duct tape built by psychics? Do you believe that one bridge is as good as the other? Would you consult the next person you meet to determine if you need heart disease, or would you ask a cardiologist instead? And don’t you ask experts because you assume there really are truths about the universe?

In addition to the outrageous implications of relativism, there are other reasons why relativism is problematic. Consider the statement “I know you don’t think I’m a poached egg, but I think I’m one, so it is true for me .” Now, what does this mean? All it means is that you believe something such as you’re a poached egg, or that the moon is made of cheese, or Elvis is alive and living in Mozambique. To say that something is true—for you—doesn’t add truth to a statement; it merely reports that you believe something. But here’s the rub. Believing something doesn’t make it true! You aren’t a poached egg; the moon isn’t made of cheese, and Elvis isn’t alive and well in Mozambique. To respond that those statements are true for me is just silly because you’re human, the moon is a rock, and Elvis is dead. And those things are true for me, and for you! The truth is independent of your beliefs.

Moreover, relativism is logically incoherent. Consider the statement: all truth is relative . If this statement is objectively true , then relativism is false because there is at least one objective truth—namely, the truth that truth is relative. But if the statement is only subjectively true , then, as we have already seen, this just means that you believe in relativism. Thus, by claiming that truth is relative, you either contradict yourself or make a trivial claim with nothing to recommend your belief. (The other possibilities? Relativism is objectively false, in which case you obviously shouldn’t be a relativist; or relativism is subjectively false, in which case you don’t believe in it.)

In response, a relativist could claim that the proposition that the truth is relative is the one objectively true proposition, while  all other propositions are relative. So the only true proposition is: all truth is relative except the claim that truth is relative. Apart from wondering why such a puzzling proposition is true, we also wonder if this modified proposition is objectively or subjectively true? If objectively true, then you have again contradicted yourself, inasmuch as you have to admit that this new proposition is absolute; if subjectively true, then again you have merely made the trivial claim that you believe in relativism. And of course, if this new proposition is objectively or subjectively false, you haven’t helped your case at all.

In reply, you could construct a new proposition: all truth is relative except the claim that “all truth is relative except the claim that all truth is relative.” (Hang on if you feel you need a beer!) This is known as an infinite regress argument; you continue to construct a new claim to save your previous claim indefinitely. But whatever proposition you advance, we can always show that what you’re claiming is either a contradiction or just states your belief in relativism. Now you don’t want to be contradicting yourself because that’s just silly. And you don’t want to say that you believe in relativism because you just believe in it without any reason. Thus relativism is either self-refuting or trivial.  

Relativism, the Unknown, and Belief

Relativism also seduces you because you might confuse your inability to know the truth with there  being no truth. I don’t know if intelligent life exists elsewhere in the universe, but intelligent life either does or doesn’t exist elsewhere—my inability to determine the truth is irrelevant to the actual truth about the matter. You may not know whether any Gods exist or not, or if the author of this text is married with children, but Gods either exist or they don’t, and I either do or don’t have a wife and children. The fact that you don’t know what 2 + 2 equals, doesn’t mean there is no solution to the problem; it means you’re bad at arithmetic. Therefore, your inability to distinguish between truth and falsity is not evidence for the truth of relativism.

This leads to a related idea. Don’t confuse the fervency of your belief with a belief being true. You may be convinced the universe is teeming with intelligent life, that a God exists, or that the author of this text has six wives, but this doesn’t mean these beliefs are true. Remember that you often believe things that are mistaken. You may believe that continental drift is impossible, that biological evolution didn’t happen, or that relativity theory is bogus. But your belief has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of these ideas. (In fact, continental drift, biological evolution, and relativity theory are all true beyond any reasonable doubt.) Therefore, the strength of your belief in something—say that all truth is relative—is not evidence for the truth of relativism.

Summary and Transition

Ok, let’s summarize. The claim that all truth is relative is either incoherent or trivial. Moreover, relativism is neither supported by our inability to know what’s true, nor by the fervency of our belief in relativism. But does this mean that nothing is relative? No. The answers to all the following questions are relative. Is LA close to NYC? Does chocolate taste better than vanilla? Who’s the world’s greatest athlete? Am I a great philosopher? It’s not the claim that some things are relative that has been positively refuted; rather, it is the claim that all things are relative that is incoherent or illogical. And if all things aren’t relative and subjective, then some things must be absolute and objective.

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15 thoughts on “ is truth relative ”.

Relativists are weird, but they persist because people insist eternal Truths (with a capital T to denote the philosophical usage) exist when they actually cannot. All knowledge (even knowledge about Truth) is only ever *contingent* because we cannot know what the future will reveal to us. Descartes’ evil demon showed that. To me, the concept of Truth is a relic of our ancient cosmology when we thought the universe was eternal and unchanging. Now that we know the universe has been evolving since the Big Bang, we should incorporate this understanding to our concept of Truth too. Cosmological revolutions need to extend to epistemological ones. Knowledge cannot be 1) justified, 2) true, 3) beliefs. Knowledge can only ever be: 1) justified, 2) beliefs, 3) that survive. I wrote more about this here if you are interested:

http://www.evphil.com/blog/knowledge-cannot-be-justified-true-belief

Thanks Ed – Like you I am an evolutionary epistemologist, although I’m a bit more of a realist about truth. I’m not sure truth is only what survives. I think it a bit more objective than that. But this is a very complicated discussion. Perhaps another reader will weigh in.

I think we probably agree on this again. I closed the essay I linked above with this:

“Finally, this brings us back to tenet #1, our first assumption [that we live in a rational, knowable, physical universe]. Through the eons of the entire age of life, and over all the instances of individual organisms acting within the universe, the ability of life to predict its environment and continue to survive in it has required that *ontologically* the universe must be singular, objective, and knowable. If it were otherwise, life could not make sense of things and survive here. As we now see, we may never know if that is TRUE, but so far that knowledge has survived. The objective existence of the universe may indeed be an assumption, but as a starting point, it now seems to be the strongest knowledge we have.”

So…I think that makes me a realist about truth, but I try to be careful now to say our *knowledge* of it is evolutionary and we must be humble about any claims to Truth. I think this is the proper line to walk between relativists and dogmatists for it softens both of them into more helpful attitudes.

Well I basically agree with what you say here, at least it is the common sense view. Of course Bostrom will question our starting point with the simulation argument, metaphysicians of various stripes may believe with Berkeley that we create reality, etc. And I do like your skepticism too, since in the end we must be fallibilists—any idea we have may be wrong. But that doesn’t mean we must be relativists because some ideas are still more likely to be true than others. So again, I think you have it about right … with the caveat that we are all wandering around in the dark …

Yes, I think that’s right. Relativists are unhelpful because much of our knowledge is true…for now…since it has survived all of the best investigations we have thrown at it. Nassim Taleb would quibble with your usage of some ideas being “more likely” to be true, but I know what you mean, even if we can’t calculate the probability of black swan events coming from out of the darkness ahead.

Bostrom, on the other hand, can be dismissed as unpersuasive because his math is poor. You can’t calculate probabilities when dealing with infinite imaginary metaphysical possibilities. And as for Berkeley, I loved reading these letters in the form of a limerick that both summarised him and dismissed him (to a naturalist like me anyway):

“God / Must find it exceedingly odd / To think that the tree / Should continue to be / When there’s no one about in the quad.” // “Dear Sir: Your astonishment’s odd; / I am always about in the quad. / And that’s why the tree / Will continue to be / Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God.”

All well said with the exception that I take intellectually seriously the idea that we live in a simulation. Sort of like I take Berkeley that way. Now back to all my political thoughts which will be posted daily for the foreseeable future.

excellent article, I think you brilliantly tore the argument “everything is relative” to pieces.

I had written a long reply but then decided I will let it simmer and check it in the future and understand if I am talking trash or not 🙂

But regardless, this to me is the ultimate article about Relativism. I didn’t know much about Relativism but I had heard this “everything is subjective” statement somewhere and it gave out a horrible smell 🙂

but briefly, when I have first read what Protagoras said, a question immediately sprang to mind: “How do YOU know that man is the measure for all things? For you would have to measure all things in order to know that”. I guess it’s similar to what you wrote about “ inability to know the truth with there being no truth.“. But maybe not the same, in that I am indicating arrogance too, not just the inability to know. So yeah, this Relativism thing illogical and incoherent, just as you wrote. I think it’s nonsense.

“For you would have to measure all things in order to know that”

i.e. know the truth about EVERYTHING, whether subjective or not. An obviously impossible task for anyone.

The idea that truth is relative should be understood from the premise of what exactly is truth relative too. Let us look at the most far fetched example of truth being relative presented in the article above.

I know you don’t think I’m a poached egg, but I think I’m one, so it is true for me. In order to facilitate relativity in this situation I will present a scenario where this statement is not also plausible but actually a factual truth. “I” in the scenario is a 8 yr old boy dressed up as a poached egg during a halloween trick or treat costume party. The antagonist is another 8 yr old child in disbelief that the costume is anything but a overblown soccer ball. With this “relativity” added to the statement this proves the statement to be true. To say that truth is not relative is to be able to justifiably eliminate all scenarios where relativity cannot prove a situation to be true.

The very foundation or building blocks of our reality is not based on absolutes but probability. Quantum entanglement.

Relative to classical mathematics it is true that 2 + 2 = 4 . Relative to modulo counting base (3) then it is also true that 2 +2 = 1 .

“Would you rather drive over a bridge built by the army corps of engineers, or one made of duct tape built by psychics?”

It is relative. It depends if you value your life. If I did not care if I died, it would not matter to me. At the same time, the army bridge is most likely better, relative to the one built by psychics.

Even time is relative. I can say time exist, or I can say that I only experience existence in the now. The past only a memory in my brain, and the future only a vision in my mind. I never get to the future, because when i comes, I will experience it as “now”.

Who is to say which is the true way to look at it?

Imagine eating a piece of chocolate. Now go and do it. Pay attention to how it feels to eat it. To be in “the future”.

Everything is relative. Up/down. Good/evil. Pleasure / pain. Dark/light. Creation / destruction. Truth/falsehood. Hate / love. meaning / meaninglessness. What you choose to give meaning to may be totally meaningless to others. What is good to you can be evil to me. Who will decide what is right?

Absolutely EVERYTHING is relative.

So what? Well, if you are willing to let your belief die, and accept that everything is relative, you can discover how reality is a construction you have built in your mind.

Your thoughts can only exist in a dualistic world and where you divide everything up into dualities. This enables you to make judgements on what is good and bad for you and your flock. You create an understanding of reality about the world to ensure your survival, physically, socially and ideologically.

And that the only way to observe this is to disassociate yourself from the mental construction you have created, your identity, your ego. It requires something else, something that is not dualistic, something that is not thoughts. It requires a an awareness for a non-dualistic state, where you just are, you just exist. You can recognise this state in animals, like a cat. Extremely present.

From that state you can then use the mind as a master and not as a slave. And find out who and what you really are. The ultimate Truths cannot be communicated through language or thoughts, as they are constructed in the space in which they exist.

Regardless, thank you for a great article, and it helps me deepen my understanding of your (relative 🙂 point of view!

thanks for the comments although I don’t think you’ve grappled with the devastating argument presented AGAINST the idea that truth is relative. I say 2 + 2 = 4 and you say it equals 5. Does that truth really depend on you? I say the earth is spherical and you say it’s flat. Is that really relative?

The discussion is a false dichotomy. Truth does not have to be either absolute or relative. For example, I think that truth is contingent–a category that straddles absolutism and relativism.

It would seem that the relativist approach to truth is the explanation of it that is true, but this statement is contradictory, consequently truth cannot exist at all! The same loss of logic idea applies to free-will being certain. The problem is basically with our language because we tend to think in both logical and emotional terms.

Our language is inadequate, but without it we would not even be able to follow the matter being doubted. “To be and not to be, this is the answer!”

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What Is Truth? Essay Example

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The ideal of truth is relevant to the individual. Truth is based on a number of factors that are usually derived from absolute knowledge. However, when finding the relationship between knowledge and truth, one questions their own competence and confidence in establishing what is actually true. There are several debates among philosophers and research that try to derive the nature of truth. Defining the nature of truth is routed in technical analysis, a morass of arcane jargon, subtle distinctions from competing theories, and precise definition. Rene Desecrates famously wrote, “I am therefore I exist.” In stating this he holds that only truth that is certain is what the individuals own cognition of their existence. The principle question among the long time debate is to answer, what is truth? This questions have plagued the minds of philosophers since the time of Plato and Socrates. It has been a never ending debate trying to draw the relationship of knowledge, truth, and understanding what is relevant to their own assessment. From the readings of Martin Luther, Descartes, and others, this paper will explore the philosophical questions of knowledge and truth. Drawing on these reasons to come to a consensus on what can be the individual be assured of what they believe is the absolute truth, and what prevents individuals from the truth.

The notion of truth is developed through the ideas, belief, and opinion of what is and what is not. Truth is an object of relativism of an individual’s ideas, the agreement and disagreement of reality. In understanding truth, there are three principal interpretations that are used, truth as absolute, truth as relative, and truth as an unattainable reality. According to definition, absolute truth is, “is defined as inflexible reality: fixed, invariable, unalterable facts.” (All About Philosophy, n.d) Essentially it is a truth understood universally that cannot be altered. Plato was a staunch believer in this interpretation, as the truth found on earth was a shadow of the truth that existed within the universe. This is the hardest interpretation of truth because there can be no indefinite argument with those that try to negate the existence of absolute truth. In arguing against the interpretation, the arguer themselves tries to search for validation in their statement that absolute truth doesn’t exist. In a matter of contradiction in understanding what is truth is to establish that truth exists. In a better interpretation seeing the truth as relative is explaining that facts and realities vary dependent on their circumstances.

Relativism is in the matter of where no objectivity exists and is subjective which the validity of truth doesn’t exist. According to philosophy, “Relativism is not a single doctrine but a family of views whose common theme is that some central aspect of experience, thought, evaluation, or even reality is somehow relative to something else.” (Swoyer, 2014) The last interpretation of truth is that truth is an unattainable reality where no truth exists. Truth is a universal fact in which corresponds with evidence, reality, and experience. Since an individual’s reality and experience constantly change, it is impossible to reach an absolute truth. This interpretation is relative to one’s own knowledge because it is present in their person’s mind. Using this interpretation many philosophers have carved out several theories of truth.

The pragmatic approach to defining truth is by seeing that truth is the objects and ideas that the individual can validate, assimilate, verify, and corroborate. In understanding what is not true it is essentially what the individual cannot. In establishing the absolute truth, it is what happens and becomes true events that are verified through a process of verification.  In the view of this paper, is that truth is dependent on the individual’s fact and reality, as Aristotle stated, “to say of what is that is it not, or what is not that is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and what is not that it is not, is true.” As confusing as the statement may be to some, the concept of truth is based on a person’s confidence in their own reality as the basis of truth. Not only is the general consensus now, but in also philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas in the 9 th century in which, truth is the equation of things and intellect, more importantly the basis of truth as true is up to the individuals’ knowledge.

In Rene Descartes search for truth, he begins with the method of doubt. Written Descartes, Meditation , “I seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive, very clearly and distinctly is true.” (Descartes, 7.35) Descartes add to the questions of what is truth is by the confidence and certainty in knowing that what is true is from the natural experiences and own personal truths. The individuals’ definition of truth is what the person understands in life through logic and reason. The individual establishes their idea of reality from their senses, what they see, and true perceptions.  Descartes wrote in his, Letter to Mersenne , any doubts about truth is perpetuated by the notion that no one can be ignorant of truth because it symbolizes the conformity of thought with its object. (Smith, 2014) Drawing from Descartes works we will answer what prevents us from the truth.

In his Method of Doubt from his First Meditation , his purpose was to negate skepticism by doubting the truth of everything including what we know in our minds. The reasons in which people doubt their truth is based on people second guessing their own subsequent beliefs. People claim to know the truth beyond their own realms of justification. People senses and experiences that have been taught are largely provided from prejudices past down. (Descartes, 1639) People are disappointed that what they believe to be true is often not. Descartes stated, “Whatever I have accepted until now as most true has come to me through my senses. But occasionally I have found that they have deceived me, and it is unwise to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.” (Descartes, 1639)  From these understandings people then began to doubt what they know to be true because they have reasonable doubt.

In order for a person to understand truth, they must first doubt all things around them in a hypothetical doubt, in order to provide a pretense of what we know is the truth and what we cannot know. By determining our own knowledge of what is true, such as the snow is white, because we know there is no other color in existence, we can have a foundation of unshakeable truths.  While the senses can sometimes present falsehood, it is subjective to suggest that all senses are wrong. In determining using one’s experience to determine truth, it is important to note that everyone’s experience is not the same. The way one person sees an event can be different from someone that sees the same event. Take for example the group of five blind men that felt the tusk of an elephant. One men said it was like a snake, while another suggested that was the neck of a giraffe. Who is to tell who is correct and not? From their own experiences, knowledge, and senses what they believe is to be true. By limiting knowledge on what we know is absolute certain is limiting one’s own perception of reality. This is how doubt is raised, and takes away from the confidence of the individuals’ own knowledge of the truth.

Martin Luther takes on the quest for truth through his thesis, which he wrote to the church. In his appendage for reformation of the Catholic Church, he questioned the authority of the Pope, and what their interpretation of the Bible. In his belief that the word of God is the truth, his stance is that followers of the religion must have faith. In believing what is true and what is not, Luther’s is bound by his idea of faith which correspond with God is the absolute truth.  His justification of God being true is based on the works of God, but more importantly the understanding of truth is by faith alone. His unshakeable foundation of what he believes to be true is routed in his on senses, ideas, and experiences derived from his faith.  Just like knowing what is true and not, Descartes share that while we cannot prove that God doesn’t exist, we can prove that he doesn’t exist. While we can see the things around us does exist, if that has indubitable truth in believing that something exists, it is impossible to prove it isn’t true.

From drawing on the works on how a person can assure that they know is true is using Descartes Method of Doubt to provide a foundation in which what we know is true, and what we know is not. Luther bases his justifications of truth on faith and knowledge, while drawing from logic and reasoning to know what is true. A person is able to draw from their own cognitive knowledge in determining what is true. While knowledge all things is limited, one cannot be limited to suggesting to know the truth of things beyond our resonance. Until proven otherwise, what we say is the truth and everything else is subjective. In the relationship between truth and knowledge, Plato and Charles Peirce had their own separate perceptions. Plato believed that truth is derived from a person’s knowledge, while Pierce believed absolute knowledge to determine absolute truth can never be obtained. Plato’s belief of knowledge and the truth is more correct in providing reasoning that knowledge is based on past experiences, where universal knowledge is a factor in determining truth.

The definition of truth and search for knowledge will continue to be an ongoing debate in which many great philosophers in past, present, and the future will offer philosophies to help guide the debate. While truth will continue to be a matter of one’s own perception, in order to assure that what people believe is the truth is to base their knowledge on their own perceptions.  Based what they know on their own absolute truth in their senses, knowledge, ideas, and beliefs that help form their own realities. Truth is relative to only that individual, as people will experience events differently from other individuals. Descartes said it best that what he knows to be true is based on his own existence. Since he knows that he exists, he knows that the reality around him exists, therefore, his own perception of what is true.

Absolute Truth. (n.d). All About Philosophy . Retrieved from http://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/absolute-truth.htm

Bennett, Jonathan. (1990). Truth and Stability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy . Vo. 16. Pg. 75-108. Retrieved from http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/jfb/trustab.pdf

Descartes, Rene. (1639). Meditations on First Philosophy . Marxists. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/descartes/1639/meditations.htm

James, William. (1909). The Meaning of Truth . Authorama. Retrieved from http://www.authorama.com/meaning-of-truth-1.html

Luther, Martin. (1520). The Freedom of a Christian . Lutheran Online. Retrieved from https://www.lutheransonline.com/lo/894/FSLO-1328308894-111894.pdf

Smith, Kurt. (2014). Descartes’ Life and Works.   The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/descartes-works

Swoyer, Chris. (2014). Relativism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/relativism

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What Is Truth?

An overview of the philosophy of truth..

Posted August 23, 2018 | Reviewed by Jessica Schrader

[Article updated on 17 June 2019.]

Rather than love, than money, than fame, give me truth. –Thoreau

Truth tends to lead to successful action. In that much, truth has instrumental value. But truth also has intrinsic value. Given the choice between a life of limitless pleasure as a brain in a vat and a genuine human life along with all its pain and suffering, most people opt for the latter.

In Plato’s Cratylus , on the philosophy of language, Socrates says that aletheia (Greek, ‘truth’) is a compression of the phrase ‘a wandering that is divine.’ Since Plato, many thinkers have spoken of truth and God in the same breath, and truth has also been linked with concepts such as justice, power, and freedom. According to John the Apostle, Jesus said to the Jews: ‘And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.’

Today, God may be dying, but what about truth? Rudy Giuliani, Donald Trump ’s personal lawyer, claimed that ‘truth isn’t truth,’ while Kellyanne Conway, Trump’s counselor, presented the public with what she called ‘alternative facts.’ Over in the U.K. in the run-up to the Brexit referendum, Michael Gove, then Minister of Justice and Lord Chancellor, opined that people ‘have had enough of experts.’

Following his defeat at the Battle of Actium in 31 BC, Mark Antony heard a rumor that Cleopatra had committed suicide and, in consequence, stabbed himself in the abdomen—only to discover that Cleopatra herself had been responsible for spreading the rumor. He later died in her arms. ‘ Fake news ’ is nothing new, but in our internet age it has spread like a disease, swinging elections, fomenting social unrest, undermining institutions, and diverting political capital away from health, education , and good government. Initially, ‘fake news’ referred to false news with large scale popular traction, although Trump seems to have broadened the definition to include any news that is unfavorable to him.

Those who are alarmed, or who despair, might take some comfort in the words of Søren Kierkegaard:

Truth always rests with the minority, and the minority is always stronger than the majority, because the minority is generally formed by those who really have an opinion, while the strength of a majority is illusory, formed by the gangs who have no opinion—and who, therefore, in the next instant (when it is evident that the minority is the stronger) assume its opinion… while truth again reverts to a new minority.

One way to understand truth is simply to look at its opposite, or opposites, namely, lies and bullsh*t. Lies differ from bullsh*t in that the liar must track the truth in order to conceal it, whereas the bullsh*tter has no regard or sensitivity for the truth or even for what his or her audience believes. In the words of Harry Frankfurt:

Someone who lies and someone who tells the truth are playing on opposite sides, so to speak, in the same game. Each responds to the facts as he understands them, although the response of the one is guided by the authority of the truth, while the response of the other defies that authority and refuses to meet its demands. The bullsh*tter ignores these demands altogether. He does not reject the authority of the truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to it. He pays no attention to it at all. By virtue of this, bullsh*t is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.

Truth is a property not so much of thoughts and ideas but more properly of beliefs and assertions. But to believe or assert something is not enough to make it true, or else the claim that ‘to believe something makes it true’ would be just as true as the claim that ‘to believe something does not make it true.’ For centuries, philosophers have agreed that thought or language is true if it corresponds to an independent reality. For Aristotle, ‘to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true.’ For Avicenna, truth is ‘what corresponds in the mind to what is outside it.’ And for Aquinas, it is ‘the adequation of things and the intellect’ ( adæquatio rei et intellectus ). Unfortunately for this so-called correspondence theory of truth, the mind does not perceive reality as it is, but only as it can, filtering, distorting, and interpreting it. In modern times, it has been argued that truth is constructed by social and cultural processes, to say nothing of individual desires and dispositions. Michel Foucault famously spoke, not of truth or truths, but of ‘regimes of truth.’ Categories and constructs concerning, for example, race, sexuality , and mental disorder may not reflect biological let alone metaphysical realities.

According to the coherence theory of truth, a thing is more likely to be true if it fits comfortably into a large and coherent system of beliefs. It remains that the system could be a giant fiction, entirely detached from reality, but this becomes increasingly unlikely as we investigate, curate, and add to its components—assuming, and it is quite an assumption, that we are operating in good faith, with truth, rather than self-preservation or -aggrandizement, as our aim. Thus conceived, truth is not a property, or merely a property, but an attitude, a way of being in the world. Martin Heidegger appears to take this idea further still:

'Truth' is not a feature of correct propositions which are asserted of an 'object' by a human 'subject' and then are 'valid' somewhere, in what sphere we know not. Rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds. All human comportment and bearing are exposed in its open region.

All the better if we can actually do something useful with our system and its components. According to the pragmatic theory of truth, truth leads to successful action; therefore, successful action is an indicator of truth. Clearly, we could not have sent a rocket to the moon if our science had been wide off the mark. For William James, the truth is ‘only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.’ If something works, it may well be true; if it doesn’t, it most probably isn’t. But what if something works for me but not for you? Is that thing then true for me but not for you? For Nietzsche, who made himself the natural ally of two-penny tyrants, truth is power, and power truth: ‘The falseness of a judgment is not necessarily an objection to a judgment … The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding …’ Short-term or long-term, Freddy, and at what cost?

That a thing fits into a system, or leads to successful action, may suggest that it is true, but does not tell us much about what truth actually is, while the correspondence theory of truth is so thin as to be almost or entirely tautological. And perhaps for a reason. It has been argued that to say that ‘X is true’ is merely to say that X, and therefore that truth is an empty predicate. Truth is not a real property of things. Rather, it is a feature of language used to emphasize, agree, or hypothesize, or for stylistic purposes. For example, it can be used to explicate the Catholic dogma of papal infallibility: ‘Everything that the pope says is true.’ But this is merely shorthand for saying that if the Pope says A, then it is the case that A; and if he says B, then B.

For some thinkers, something can only be true or false if it is open to verification, at least in theory if not also in practice. The truth of something lies at the end of our inquiry into that thing. But as our inquiry can have no end, the truth of something can never be more than our best opinion of that thing. If best opinion is all that we can have or hope for, then best opinion is as good as truth, and truth is a redundant concept. But—as I argue in my new book, Hypersanity: Thinking Beyond Thinking — best opinion is only best because, at least on average, it is closest to the truth, which, as well as instrumental value, has deep intrinsic value.

Some Practical Advice

A reader once emailed me to ask, ‘how can I know when I am lying to myself’?

And this was my reply.

By its very nature self-deception is hard to distinguish from the truth—whether our internal, emotional truth or the external truth. One has to develop and trust one’s instinct: what does it feel like to react in the way that I’m reacting? Does it feel calm, considered, and nuanced, or shallow and knee-jerk? Am I taking the welfare of others into consideration, or is it just all about me? Am I satisfied with, even proud of, my self-conquering effort, or am I left feeling small, anxious , or ashamed?

Self-deception doesn’t ‘add up’ in the grand scheme of things and can easily be brought down by even superficial questioning. As with a jigsaw, try to look at the bigger picture of your life and see how the thought or reaction might fit in. Did you react from a position of strength or vulnerability? What would the person you most respect think? What would Socrates or the Dalai Lama think? Talk to other people and gather their opinions. If they disagree with you, does that make you feel angry, upset, or defensive? The coherence of your reaction speaks volumes about the character of your motives.

Finally, truth is constructive and adaptive, while lies are destructive and self-defeating. So how useful is a self-deceptive thought or reaction going to be for you? Are you just covering up an irrational fear , or helping to create a solid foundation for the future? Are you empowering yourself to fulfill your highest potential, or depriving yourself of opportunities for growth and creating further problems down the line? Is the cycle simply going to repeat itself, or will the truth, at last, make you free?

Related articles by the same author: The Problem of Knowledge , The Limits of Reason , The Problems of Science .

Plato,Cratylus.

Bible, John 8:32 (KJV).

Rudy Giuliani during a Meet the Pressinterview on August 18, 2018, discussing the fear that Donald Trump could ‘get trapped into perjury’ under special-counsel questioning.

Kellyanne Conway during a Meet the Pressinterview on January 22, 2017, defending Sean Spicer’s false statement about the attendance numbers at Donald Trump’s inauguration.

Michael Gove during an interview with Faisal Islam on Sky News, June 3, 2016.

Søren Kierkegaard (1850), The Diary of Søren Kierkegaard, 5, 3, 128.

Harry Frankfurt (2005), The Importance of Bullsh*t, The Importance of What We Care About.

Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, vii.

Avicenna, Kitab Al-Shifa The Book of Healing, I, viii.

Aquinas (1485), Summa Theologiae I, 16, 1, and De Veritate1, 1.

Martin Heidegger (1943), On the Essence of Truth. Trans. John Sallis.

William James (1909), The Meaning of Truth, Preface.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1886), Beyond Good and Evil, 333.

Neel Burton, M.D. , is a psychiatrist, philosopher, and writer who lives and teaches in Oxford, England.

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Absolute Truth

Absolute Truth - Inflexible Reality "Absolute truth" is defined as inflexible reality: fixed, invariable, unalterable facts. For example, it is a fixed, invariable, unalterable fact that there are absolutely no square circles and there are absolutely no round squares.

Absolute Truth vs. Relativism While absolute truth is a logical necessity, there are some religious orientations (atheistic humanists, for example) who argue against the existence of absolute truth. Humanism's exclusion of God necessitates moral relativism. Humanist John Dewey (1859-1952), co-author and signer of the Humanist Manifesto 1 (1933), declared, "There is no God and there is no soul. Hence, there are no needs for the props of traditional religion. With dogma and creed excluded, then immutable truth is also dead and buried. There is no room for fixed, natural law or moral absolutes." Humanists believe one should do, as one feels is right.

Absolute Truth - A Logical Necessity You can't logically argue against the existence of absolute truth. To argue against something is to establish that a truth exists. You cannot argue against absolute truth unless an absolute truth is the basis of your argument. Consider a few of the classic arguments and declarations made by those who seek to argue against the existence of absolute truth… "There are no absolutes." First of all, the relativist is declaring there are absolutely no absolutes. That is an absolute statement. The statement is logically contradictory. If the statement is true, there is, in fact, an absolute - there are absolutely no absolutes. "Truth is relative." Again, this is an absolute statement implying truth is absolutely relative. Besides positing an absolute, suppose the statement was true and "truth is relative." Everything including that statement would be relative. If a statement is relative, it is not always true. If "truth is relative" is not always true, sometimes truth is not relative. This means there are absolutes, which means the above statement is false. When you follow the logic, relativist arguments will always contradict themselves. "Who knows what the truth is, right?" In the same sentence the speaker declares that no one knows what the truth is, then he turns around and asks those who are listening to affirm the truth of his statement. "No one knows what the truth is." The speaker obviously believes his statement is true. There are philosophers who actually spend countless hours toiling over thick volumes written on the "meaninglessness" of everything. We can assume they think the text is meaningful! Then there are those philosophy teachers who teach their students, "No one's opinion is superior to anyone else's. There is no hierarchy of truth or values. Anyone's viewpoint is just as valid as anyone else's viewpoint. We all have our own truth." Then they turn around and grade the papers!

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Relativism, roughly put, is the view that truth and falsity, right and wrong, standards of reasoning, and procedures of justification are products of differing conventions and frameworks of assessment and that their authority is confined to the context giving rise to them. More precisely, “relativism” covers views which maintain that—at a high level of abstraction—at least some class of things have the properties they have (e.g., beautiful, morally good, epistemically justified) not simpliciter , but only relative to a given framework of assessment (e.g., local cultural norms, individual standards), and correspondingly, that the truth of claims attributing these properties holds only once the relevant framework of assessment is specified or supplied. Relativists characteristically insist, furthermore, that if something is only relatively so, then there can be no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can be established.

Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness. Debates about relativism permeate the whole spectrum of philosophical sub-disciplines. From ethics to epistemology, science to religion, political theory to ontology, theories of meaning and even logic, philosophy has felt the need to respond to this heady and seemingly subversive idea. Discussions of relativism often also invoke considerations relevant to the very nature and methodology of philosophy and to the division between the so-called “analytic and continental” camps in philosophy. And yet, despite a long history of debate going back to Plato and an increasingly large body of writing, it is still difficult to come to an agreed definition of what, at its core, relativism is, and what philosophical import it has. This entry attempts to provide a broad account of the many ways in which “relativism” has been defined, explained, defended and criticized.

1.1 The co-variance definition

1.2 relativism by contrast, 1.3 the hidden parameter definition, 1.4.1 global vs. local relativism, 1.4.2 strong vs. weak relativism, 2.1 empirical claims of diversity and their consequences, 2.2 disagreements and intractability, 2.3 no neutral ground, 2.4 underdetermination of theory by data, 2.5 context dependence, 2.6 the principle of tolerance, 3. a brief history of an old idea, 4.1 cultural relativism, 4.2 conceptual relativism, 4.3.1 alethic relativism and the charge of self-refutation., 4.4.1 relativism about rationality, 4.4.2 relativism about logic, 4.4.3 relativism about science, 4.4.4 social constructionism, 4.5 moral relativism, 5.1 the individuating features of new relativism, 5.2.1 lasersohn (2005) and the judge parameter, 5.2.2 kölbel and faultless disagreement, 5.2.3 moral relativism, 5.3 truth relativism and epistemic modals, 5.4 truth relativism and future contingents, 5.5 truth relativism and knowledge ascriptions, 5.6.1 relativism and assertion, 5.6.2 simplicity, 6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. what is relativism.

The label “relativism” has been attached to a wide range of ideas and positions which may explain the lack of consensus on how the term should be defined. The profusion of the use of the term “relativism” in contemporary philosophy means that there is no ready consensus on any one definition. Here are three prominent, but not necessarily incompatible, approaches:

A standard way of defining and distinguishing between different types of relativism is to begin with the claim that a phenomenon x (e.g., values, epistemic, aesthetic and ethical norms, experiences, judgments, and even the world) is somehow dependent on and co-varies with some underlying, independent variable y (e.g., paradigms, cultures, conceptual schemes, belief systems, language). The type of dependency relativists propose has a bearing on the question of definitions. Let us take some examples.

Each of (a)–(c) exhibits a relation of dependence where a change in the independent variable y will result in variations in the dependent variable x . However, of the three examples cited above, normally only (a) and (b) are deemed relevant to philosophical discussions of relativism, for one main attraction of relativism is that it offers a way of settling (or explaining away) what appear to be profound disagreements on questions of value, knowledge and ontology and the relativizing parameter often involves people, their beliefs, cultures or languages.

The co-variance definition proceeds by asking the dual questions: (i) what is relativized? and (ii) what is it relativized to? The first question enables us to distinguish forms of relativism in terms of their objects , for example, relativism about truth, goodness, beauty, and their subject matters, e.g., science, law, religion. The answer to the second question individuates forms of relativism in terms of their domains or frames of reference—e.g., conceptual frameworks, cultures, historical periods, etc. Such classifications have been proposed by Haack (1996), O’Grady (2002), Baghramian (2004), Swoyer (2010), and Baghramian & Coliva (2019). The following table classifies different relativistic positions according to what is being relativized, or its objects, and what is being relativized to, or its domains.

Table 1: Domains of Relativization ( y )

Table 1 reflects the availability of fine-grained distinctions between different forms of relativism as functions of both objects ( x ) and domains ( y ) of relativization. In practice, however, much contemporary discussions of relativism focus on subjectivism, historicism, cultural relativism and conceptual relativism, along the axis of y , and cognitive/epistemic relativism, ethical or moral relativism and aesthetic relativism, along the axis of x . As we shall see in §5 , New Relativism, where the objects of relativization (in the left column) are utterance tokens expressing claims about cognitive norms, moral values, etc. and the domain of relativization is the standards of an assessor, has also been the focus of much recent discussion.

A second approach to defining relativism casts its net more widely by focusing primarily on what relativists deny . Defined negatively, relativism amounts to the rejection of a number of interconnected philosophical positions. Traditionally, relativism is contrasted with:

Absolutism , the view that at least some truths or values in the relevant domain apply to all times, places or social and cultural frameworks. They are universal and not bound by historical or social conditions. Absolutism is often used as the key contrast idea to relativism.

Objectivism or the position that cognitive, ethical and aesthetic norms and values in general, but truth in particular, are independent of judgments and beliefs at particular times and places, or in other words they are (non-trivially) mind-independent. The anti-objectivist on the other hand, denies that there is such thing as simply being ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘tasty’ or ‘beautiful’ but argues that we can coherently discuss such values only in relation to parameters that have something to do with our mental lives.

Monism or the view that, in any given area or topic subject to disagreement, there can be no more than one correct opinion, judgment, or norm. The relativist often wishes to allow for a plurality of equally valid values or even truths.

Realism , when defined in such a way that it entails both the objectivity and singularity of truth, also stands in opposition to relativism.

Relativism in this negative sense is a prominent feature of the work of the relativists malgré eux such as Richard Rorty (1979) and Jacques Derrida (1974). What justifies the appellation ‘relativist’, rather than ‘skeptic’, is not only these philosophers’ suspicion of the possibility of objectivity but their insistence on the role of socio-historical, psychological and textual contexts in accounts of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ claims.

What also binds various forms of relativism is an underlying idea that claims to truth, knowledge or justification have an implicit, maybe even unnoticed, relationship to a parameter or domain. Gilbert Harman (1975), Robert Nozick (2001), and Crispin Wright (2008b) are among the philosophers to propose versions of this thesis. Paul Boghossian summarizes the position this way:

the relativist about a given domain, D , purports to have discovered that the truths of D involve an unexpected relation to a parameter. (Boghossian 2006b: 13)

To take an example, moral relativism, according to this approach, is the claim that the truth or justification of beliefs with moral content is relative to specific moral codes. So the sentence “It is wrong to sell people as slaves” is elliptical for “It is wrong to sell people as slaves relative to the moral code of …”. Or alternatively, as Kusch (2010) formulates the idea on behalf of the relativist: “It is wrong-relative-to-the-moral-code-of-… ” to sell people as slaves. The resulting sentence(s) turns out to be true, according to the relativist, depending on how we fill in the “…”. So, “It is wrong to sell people as slaves” comes out true relative to the moral code of the United Nations Charter of Human Rights and false relative to the moral code of ancient Greece. The justifying thought is that judgments about the morality of slavery, or any other ethical issue, are based on differing conventions, and there is no universal or objective criterion for choosing among differing competing socio-historically constituted conventions. Moreover, as a corollary of this approach, there is no truth of the matter of whether it is wrong to sell people as slaves, independently of the specification of some standard. Thus on the hidden parameter account, a consequence is that the relevant claims will be true, if at all, only relative to some parameter.

This particular approach to relativism is often expressed in explicitly linguistic terms and is favored by philosophers interested in the semantic dimensions of relativism. The claim is that predicates such as “is true”, “is rational”, “is right”, “is good” etc. in a natural language have the apparent logical form of one-place predicates, but their surface grammatical form is misleading, because upon further investigation they prove to be elliptical for two-place predicates such as “is true relative to…”, “is right according to”, etc., (of course, where such predicates are available). Relativism, according to this approach, is the claim that a statement of the form “ A is P ” within a given domain (e.g., science, ethics, metaphysics, etc.) is elliptical for the statement “ A is P in relation to C ”, where A stands for an assertion, belief, judgment or action, P stands for a predicate such as “true”, “beautiful”, “right”, “rational”, “logical”, “known” etc., and C stands for a specific culture, epistemic framework, language, belief-system, etc.

The three approaches outlined here are compatible and sometimes complementary. A relativistic thesis as captured by the approach outlined in §1.1 for instance, will also be relativistic in at least one of the negative senses outlined in §1.2 . Moreover, as we shall see, since various subdivisions of relativism appearing in table 1 could, with appropriate modification, be expressed as claims about the truth of sentences falling in a particular domain, then the hidden predicate approach is applicable to them as well. (See §5 for a more detailed way to give expression to the hidden parameter insight within recent work in the philosophy of language.)

1.4 The scope of relativism

A further consideration relevant to defining relativism is its scope.

The basic idea of global relativism is captured by the oft-repeated slogan “all is relative”. The claim is that all beliefs, regardless of their subject matter, are true only relative to a framework or parameter. Local relativists, by contrast, limit their claim of relativization to self-contained areas of discourse, e.g., ethics, aesthetics and taste but argue that, for instance, scientific truths are not suitable candidates for a relativistic understanding (but also see §4.4.3 ). It is worth noting that local relativisms, typically, are endorsed on the basis of philosophical considerations connected to the kinds of features that are claimed to be relative (e.g., aesthetic standards, epistemic principles), or relatedly, semantic considerations to do with discourse where such features are attributed. Global relativism, by contrast, seems to be motivated not so much by considerations about particular features, but by more general considerations about truth itself.

As we will see, global relativism is open to the charge of inconsistency and self-refutation, for if all is relative, then so is relativism. Local relativism is immune from this type of criticism, as it need not include its own statement in the scope of what is to be relativized. Unsurprisingly, local rather than global relativism is much more common within contemporary debates. There is also a question mark on whether we could apply relativism to all truths in a completely unrestricted way; for instance, Kölbel (2011) has argued that claims such as “an object is beautiful and not beautiful” and “an object is identical to itself” have to be excluded.

A further distinction is made between weak and strong forms of relativism. Strong relativism is the claim that one and the same belief or judgment may be true in one context (e.g., culture or framework or assessment) and false in another. Weak relativism is the claim that there may be beliefs or judgments that are true in one framework but not true in a second simply because they are not available or expressible in the second. Bernard Williams’ “relativism of distance” (Williams 1985) and Ian Hacking’s (1982) defense of variability in styles of reasoning are instances of weak relativism. Williams argues that certain concepts are only available to people who live a particular form of life. These are concepts that are not a part of what Williams calls the “absolute conception of the world” and do not express truths that any rational creature, regardless of her culture, would in principle acknowledge. Truths that require these concepts for their formulation are expressible only in languages whose speakers take part in that particular form of life. Such truths need not be true in a relativized sense—true relative to some parameters, false relative to others; rather, such truths are perspectival: real but visible only from a certain angle, i.e., for people who adopt a certain way of life. This weaker form of relativism, in so far as it denies the universality of certain truth claims, is captured more readily by the negative definition ( §1.2 ) of relativism.

2. Why Relativism?

Interest in relativism as a philosophical doctrine goes back to ancient Greece. In more recent decades, however, relativism has also proven popular not only as a philosophical position but also as an idea underwriting a normative—ethical and political-outlook. (see Bloom 1987, in particular the Introduction, and Kusch (ed.) 2019). A number of philosophical considerations as well as socio-historical developments explain the enduring interest in and the more recent popularity of relativism.

Data regarding diversity of belief systems, conceptual frameworks and ways of life have frequently been used by philosophers and anthropologists alike to give credibility to philosophical arguments for relativism (For example see Hollis & Lukes 1982 and Wilson 1970). The mere fact of empirical diversity does not lead to relativism, but, relativism as a philosophical doctrine, has often been taken as a natural position to adopt in light of empirical diversity, in part, because relativism helps to make sense of such diversity without the burden of explaining who is in error.

Descriptive relativism, an empirical and methodological position adopted by social anthropologists, relies on ethnographic data to highlight the paucity of universally agreed upon norms, values and explanatory frameworks. From polygamy to cannibalism, from witchcraft to science we find major differences between the worldviews and outlooks of individuals and groups. Descriptive relativism is often used as the starting point for philosophical debates on relativism in general and cultural relativism in particular. The observed radical differences among cultures, it is argued, show the need for a relativistic assessment of value systems and conceptual commitments. Some anti-relativist universalists, on the other hand, argue that underlying the apparent individual and cultural differences, there are some core commonalities to all belief systems and socio-cultural outlooks (e.g., Nussbaum 1997). But the relativistically inclined respond by first pointing to the seeming incommensurability of various ethical and conceptual frameworks and the variability of cognitive norms and practices in difference cultures, and then, on this basis, maintain that the so-called “commonalities” belie significant differences. The anti-relativist may concede the point and insist that where such disagreements exist, at most one view is correct and the rest mistaken. But in so far as we are reluctant to impute widespread and systematic error to other cultures, or to our own, relativism remains an attractive option. Descriptive relativism is also central to the brand of relativism advocated by the sociologists of scientific knowledge and other social constructionists who argue that, even in the so-called “hard sciences”, we cannot escape the specter of irresolvable differences and even incommensurability (see §4.4.3 ).

There is not only a marked diversity of views on questions of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, etc., but more significantly, many disputes arising from such differences seem intractable . There are instances of long-standing disagreement, such that the disputants are very plausibly talking about the same subject matter (thus avoiding incommensurability) and genuinely disagreeing with each other; and yet, no amount of information and debate enables them or us to resolve the disagreement. And moreover, in such cases, it can seem that neither side seems to have made any obvious mistake (see, e.g., Hales 2014 and Beddor 2019).

If well-informed, honest and intelligent people are unable to resolve conflicts of opinion, we should, some relativists argue, accept that all parties to such disputes could be right and their conflicting positions have equal claims to truth, each according to their own perspective or point of view. Their disagreement is faultless (Kölbel 2004; Brogaard 2007; Hales 2014). Many relativistically inclined philosophers, (e.g., Max Kölbel (2004), Wright (2006) and John MacFarlane with terminological qualification (2014: 133–136)) see the presence of faultless disagreements as central to motivating and justifying relativism. The anti-relativists counter that the very notion of a “faultless” disagreement is incompatible with our common understanding of what it means to disagree. It is a hallmark of disagreement, as commonly understood, that the parties involved find fault with the other sides’ views. When people disagree at least one of them is making a mistake or is failing to believe what he or she ought to believe given his or her cognitive aims. Relativism accordingly offers a revisionary account of what it means to disagree (e.g., MacFarlane 2007, 2014; see §5 where the point has been discussed in some detail); but it is not clear if the account can explain what is left of a disagreement to preserve once we allow that both parties to a disagreement could be right (Carter 2013; Dreier 2009).

A sophisticated semantic version of relativism about truth, known as truth-relativism, and alternatively as “new relativism”, has been proposed in recent years and which attempts to deal with some of these issues (e.g., MacFarlane 2014 and Ferrari 2019 for an overview). We will return to this variety of relativism in §5.

A different perspective on the move from disagreement to relativism is offered in recent work by Carol Rovane (2012 and 2013), who rejects the prevailing consensus on what she calls the “disagreement intuition of relativism” in favor of an “alternatives intuition”. According to Rovane, relativism is motivated by the existence of truths that cannot be embraced together, not because they contradict and hence disagree with each other but because they are not universal truths. The example Rovane gives is conflict between a belief that deference to parents is morally obligatory in Indian traditionalist sense and the belief that it is not morally obligatory in the American individualist sense. Each belief is true within its particular ethical framework but the two beliefs cannot be conjoined or embraced together. Or more generally, it is not possible both to exercise full autonomy and simultaneously be dedicated to one’s community and its norms. The underlying thought, for Rovane, is that not all truth-value-bearers are in logical relations to one another, that there are many noncomprehensive bodies of truths that cannot be conjoined.

What the two approaches have in common is the claim that truth and justification are plural, that there could be more than one correct account of how things stand in at least some domains and their correctness has to be decided relative to a framework of context of assessment.

Additionally, the relativistically inclined find further support for their position in the contention that there is no meta-justification of our evaluative or normative systems, that all justifications have to start and end somewhere (see Sankey 2010 and 2011) and that there are no higher-order or meta-level standards available for adjudicating clashes between systems in a non-question begging way. Steven Hales, for instance, argues that faced with disagreement and given non-neutrality, relativism is the most viable non-skeptical conclusion to draw (Hales 2006: 98; 2014). Similar considerations apply to attempts to anchor beliefs on secure foundations. Various intellectual developments, leading to loss of old certainties in the scientific and social arena have strengthened the appeal of this point. The scientific revolution of the early 20 th century, brought about by, for instance, the advent of Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics and the loss of faith in lasting religious or political truths (Marxism in particular), as well as the failure of foundationalist philosophical programs have been used in arguments to vindicate relativistic views (for relativism about science see §4.4.3 ). The relativists often argue that justifications are not only perspectival but also interest-relative and there is no neutral or objective starting ground for any of our beliefs (see Seidel 2014; Carter 2015: ch. 4 and Siegel in Hales 2011: 205 for criticisms of this type of justification of relativism).

Pierre Duhem’s (1861–1916) thesis of underdetermination of theory by data, the claim that empirical evidence alone is not adequate for providing justification for any given scientific theory, has played an important role in building up a case both for conceptual relativism ( §4.2 ) and for constructionism and relativism about science ( §4.4.2 and §4.4.3 ). According to the underdetermination thesis, incompatible theories can be consistent with available evidence. Relativism threatens whenever conflicting theories or views appear to have equal claim to truth or justification. The relativistically inclined use underdetermination to claim that evidence could be brought to justify opposing explanations and justification. The underdetermination thesis is also used to highlight the absence of neutral starting points for our beliefs. Choices between incompatible but equally well-supported rival theories, it is argued, are often made based on interests and local preferences rather than neutral universal grounds.

Relativists argue that beliefs and values get their justification or truth only relative to specific epistemic systems or practices (see Kusch forthcoming ). Strong support for this view has come from social scientists and cultural theorist who focus on the socio-cultural determinants of human beliefs and actions. The social sciences, from their very inception, were hospitable to relativism. Indeed, August Comte, the father of sociology, claimed that a strength of “positive sociology” was its “tendency to render relative the ideas which were at first absolute” (Comte 1976 [1830–42]: 89). Comte also was responsible for the battle cry “all is relative”, but immediately and no doubt self-consciously contradicted himself by adding “and that’s the only absolute”. Other social scientists, under the influence of Karl Marx (1818–1883), Max Weber (1864–1920), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), have given credence to the idea that human beliefs and actions could be understood and evaluated only relative to their social and economic background and context (cf., Kinzel 2019). Beliefs, desires and actions, the argument goes, are never independent of a background of cultural presuppositions, interests and values. We cannot step out of our language, culture and socio-historical conditions to survey reality from an Archimedean vantage point. Even perceptions are “theory-laden” and could vary between linguistic and cultural groupings. The sociological view that beliefs are context-dependent, in the sense that their context helps explain why people have the beliefs they do, has also been used to support what is sometimes called “social” or “sociological relativism” or the view that truth or correctness is relative to social contexts because we can both understand and judge beliefs and values only relative to the context out of which they arise. Context-dependence is also used to explain empirical observations of diversity in beliefs and values; different social contexts, the argument goes, give rise to differing, possibly incompatible norms and values.

Advocates of relativism, particularly outside philosophical circles, often cite tolerance as a key normative reason for becoming a relativist. On this rationale, all ways of life and cultures are worthy of respect in their own terms, and it is a sign of unacceptable ethnocentrism to presume that we could single out one outlook or point of view as objectively superior to others. The Principle of Tolerance acquires an overtly socio-political form in the hand of Paul Feyerabend who maintains that “A free society is a society in which all traditions are given equal rights” (Feyerabend 1978: 30). Anti-relativists find this normative advocacy of relativism unconvincing for two key kinds of reasons. Some anti-relativists (e.g., Rachels 2009) often appeal to cases at the limits (e.g., toleration of heinous crimes) to show the thesis to be implausibly overpermissive (see §4.5 ). Others argue that if all values are relative then tolerance and maximizing freedom are valuable only to those who have already embraced them. Relativists counter that they are not defending a global version of relativism regarding all truths and justification but local versions concerning the ethics and politics of belief and the usefulness of relativism in our attempt to become better, or at least more flexible and less dogmatic, thinkers and more tolerant citizens (e.g., Feyerabend 1978: 82–84). The anti-relativists counter-argue that even if we grant that political tolerance is an important value, and that accepting relativism would promote it, we should never adopt philosophical views about the nature of truth or justification simply because of their assumed good moral or political consequences. Second, and more importantly: political toleration does not require the strong doctrine of philosophical relativism. Increased awareness of diversity together with an awareness of the historical contingency of one’s own convictions will promote political toleration just as effectively. As Knobe and Nichols point out, simply being made aware of radically different view points can lead to a:

…crisis akin to that of the [Christian] child confronted with religious diversity… For the discovery of religious diversity can prompt the thought that it’s in some sense accidental that one happens to be raised in a Christian household rather than a Hindu household. This kind of arbitrariness can make the child wonder whether there’s any reason to think that his religious beliefs are more likely to be right than those of the Hindu child (Knobe & Nichols 2007: 11)

A separate strand of argument connecting tolerance and relativism has appealed to the claimed virtues of relativism as a kind of philosophical stance (e.g., Bloor 2011; Baghramian 2019), one that is characterised by anti-absolutist intellectual virtues such as curiosity and anti-dogmatism. The idea that a relativistic stance involves the manifesting of intellectually beneficial attitudes has been championed by, along with Bloor, Feyerabend (1975) and Code (1995), the latter of whom have emphasised the value of emancipatory thinking, e.g., thinking that is not artificially constrained by attempts to “enforce a universalist truth”.

However, critics of relativism as a stance have countered such arguments from ‘relativist virtues’ with arguments from vice. Baghramian (2019), for instance, has suggested that even if we grant that a relativist stance aligns with a cluster of intellectually virtuous dispositions in thinking, the stance also has the consequence of encouraging several corresponding vices, including intellectual insouciance (e.g., Cassam 2019), and lack of conviction (Baghramian 2019: 265; cf., Kusch 2019 for replies).

The English term “relativism” came into usage only in the 19 th Century. John Grote was probably the first to employ it when in Exploratio Philosophica (1865) he wrote:

The notion of the mask over the face of nature is…. what I have called “relativism”. If “the face of nature” is reality, then the mask over it, which is what theory gives us, is so much deception, and that is what relativism really comes to. (Grote 1865: I.xi, 229).

Its German counterpart, “ Relativismus ”, has a longer history. Wilhelm Traugott Krug, who succeeded Kant in the University of Königsberg in his philosophical lexicon, defines it as

the assumption that everything which we experience and think (the self, the idea of reason, truth, morality, religion etc.) is only something relative, and therefore has no essential endurance and no universal validity. (Krug 2010 [1838]: 224)

Although the term “relativism” is of recent coinage, doctrines and positions, with some of the hallmarks of contemporary relativism, date back to the very beginnings of Western philosophy. Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–420 BC) is often considered the first overt champion of relativism, and his dictum

Man ( anthrôpos ) is the measure ( metron ) of all things ( chrêmatôn ), of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not ( tôn men ontôn hôs esti, tôn de mê ontôn hôs ouk estin ) (from Plato’s Theaetetus 152a 2–4)

its first battle-cry. According to Plato, Protagoras thought:

Each thing appears ( phainesthai ) to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you—you and I each being a man. ( Theaetetus 152a 6–8)

For instance, the same wind could be cold to one person and hot to another. The extent to which Protagoras’s view, or at least what comes down to us from Plato, amounts to genuine relativism remains somewhat controversial. As Burnyeat (1976b: 172) notes, Sextus Empiricus thought—though Burnyeat thinks mistakenly—that the Protagorean measure doctrine was to be understood as the subjectivist thesis that every appearance is true ( simpliciter ). This kind of radical subjectivism, though, quickly can be shown to turn on itself: it can appear that the thesis that “every appearance is true” is false. And so this radical subjectivist interpretation, regardless of whether it is accurate, is as Sextus had thought, untenable. However, Plato also ascribes a social or ethical dimension to Protagorean relativism which seem to go beyond individualistic subjectivism. In Theaetetus 172a 2–6 he says

what may or may not fittingly be done, of just and unjust, of what is sanctioned by religion and what is not; and here the theory may be prepared to maintain that whatever view a city takes on these matters and establishes as its law or convention, is truth and fact for that city . In such matters, neither any individual nor any city can claim superior wisdom. [emphasis added]

Plato’s attempted refutation of Protagoras, known as peritrope or “turning around”, is the first of the many attempts to show that relativism is self-refuting.

Protagorean relativism directly influenced the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, who saw the “man is the measure” doctrine as a precursor to their brand of skepticism. Sextus Empiricus, for instance, in his “Relativity Mode” states that judgments and observations are relative to the person who makes them, to their context as well as the object being observed and goes on to say,

since we have established in this way that everything is relative ( pros ti ), it is clear then that we shall not be able to say what an existing object is like in its own nature and purely, but only what it appears to be like relative to something. (Sextus Empiricus PH I 140)

But the conclusion he draws favors skepticism rather than relativism as understood in modern philosophy, for he concludes, “It follows that we must suspend judgment about the nature of objects” (ibid.).

Glimpses of relativistic thinking were in evidence in Boethius (480–524) (see Marenbon 2003) as well as in the double truth doctrine, or the view that religion and philosophy are separate and at times conflicting sources of truth, originally found in Averroes (1126–1198) and the 13 th century Latin Averroists. However, the dominant belief in a singular and absolute revealed truth within a Christian framework, on the whole, made the medieval period inhospitable to relativism. There was a renewed interest in both relativism and skepticism at the inception of modern philosophy inspired, in part, by Latin translations of Sextus Empiricus in the 16 th century. Michel de Montaigne’s work (1533–1592), in common with others sympathetic towards relativism, ancient or contemporary, relies on accounts of faraway cultures to argue that “we have no other criterion of truth or right-reason than the example and form of the opinion and customs of our own country” (Montaigne 1580 [1991: 152]) (but also see Fricker 2013 for a dissenting view). His advocacy of toleration, even for the cannibal, paved the way for not only the acceptance but the valorization of idealized versions of alien creeds and distant cultures by Enlightenment figures such as Rousseau (1712–1778), Voltaire (1694–1778), Diderot (1713–1784), Montesquieu (1689–1755) and Condorcet (1743–1794), who in turn, were instrumental in establishing an intellectual climate hospitable to cultural relativism. These authors were also the first to explore the idea of viewing one’s culture from an outsider’s point of view and using this external perspective as a vehicle to criticize local customs and norms. To take just one example, Diderot, in his “Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville”, tells us that the Tahitian is mild, innocent, and happy while civilized people are corrupt, vile, and wretched; the natives live according to customs and rules that vary greatly from the Western ones. They do not possess private property or operate their affairs based on egalitarian principles, and they exercise sexual freedom not accepted in “civilized societies”. Diderot accordingly opposes the European mission of civilizing the natives, and despite his belief in a common human nature, he advocates the relativistic sounding maxim to

be monks in France and savages in Tahiti. Put on the costume of the country you visit, but keep the suit of clothes you will need to go home in. (Diderot 1956 [1772]: 228 in Baghramian 2010: 37)

Discussions of relativism in the 19 th century had two sources (see Gardiner 1981). On the one hand, figures from the so-called Counter-Enlightenment, a philosophical movement which arose in the late 18 th century and the early 19 th century in opposition to the Enlightenment, Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) emphasized the diversity of languages and customs and their role in shaping human thought. Hamann’s views on language, for instance, foreshadow contemporary conceptual and epistemic relativism. He maintained that language is the “instrument and criterion of reason” as well as the source of all the confusions and fallacies of reason. Furthermore, the rules of rationality are embedded within language, which in turn, is governed by local norms of custom and use (Hamann 1967 [1759]). Relativism ensues because languages and their rules of rationality vary a great deal. Herder, on the other hand, not only railed against the rational, universalizing and science-oriented ethos of the Enlightenment but, much like later relativists, also argued that different nations and epochs have their distinct preferences in ethical and aesthetics matters as well as their varied conceptions of truth and we are not in a position to adjudicate between them (Herder 1774 [2002: 272–358]).

The Counter Enlightenment had a significant influence on Hegel, Nietzsche, and Dilthey, who in turn have shaped relativistic thinking in certain strands of continental philosophy, postmodernism and cultural studies. Hamann’s rejection of objectivism was central to Nietzsche’s even more profound recoil from objectivity. And indeed, Nietzsche is possibly the single most influential voice in shaping relativistic sensibilities in 20 th century continental philosophy. His declaration that all human conceptions and descriptions, including those advanced by scientists, are

only an interpretation and arrangement of the world (according to our own requirements, if I may say so!)—and not an explanation of the world. (Nietzsche 1886a [1996]: §14)

and that “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing” (Nietzsche 1886b [1968]: §540), irrespective of how Nietzsche himself intended them, have been taken to express a core contention of relativism that no single account of truth or reality can occupy a privileged position, for such accounts are only one of many perspectives that prevail at a given time in history. We cannot appeal to any facts or standards of evaluation independently of their relation to the perspectives available to us; we can do little more than to insist on the legitimacy of our own perspective and try to impose it on other people through our “will to power”.

A second source was the German post-Kantian and British Idealist discussions of the “relativity of knowledge” taking place in the context of the distinction between being-for-other ( für anderes sein ) and being-for-itself ( fürsichsein )—a distinction influenced by the Kantian idea that all knowledge is ultimately relational because knowledge of the Real or “the thing in itself” is impossible. John Stuart Mill, for instance ascribes to the Kantian William Hamilton the “doctrine of relativity of our human knowledge” because Hamilton, according to Mill, believed that there could be no unconditional or absolute knowledge for all knowledge is dependent on the knowing mind (Mill 1884: 8).

The end of the 19 th century witnessed the emergence of yet another strand of relativism motivated by empirical-psychological and physiological interpretations of Kantian categories. The view, known as species relativism , and defended by neo-Kantian psychologists such as Theodore Lipps (1851–1914), holds that the rules of logic are products of the human mind and psychology and therefore may be unique to the human species; different species could have and use different logical principles. The view was vehemently, but quite effectively, attacked by Frege and Husserl as part of their arguments against what they called “psychologism” and “speciesism” (Kusch 1995: 47). Logic in this approach is identified with the actual thinking processes of individuals or communities and its authority is seen to be local, or relative to the practices of particular epistemic groupings. But Frege and Husserl argued that with such relativization we would lose the ability to distinguish between reasoning correctly and merely seeming to do so.

Finally, the popularity of the very idea of relativism in the 20 th century owes something to Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (1905) which was to be used both as model and as well as a vindication for various relativistic claims. Gilbert Harman is among the philosophers to use Einsteinian relativity as a model for philosophical versions of relativism. He says:

According to Einstein’s Theory of Relativity even an object’s mass is relative to a choice of spatio-temporal framework. An object can have one mass in relation to one such framework and a different mass in relation to another. …. I am going to argue for a similar claim about moral right and wrong. … I am going to argue that moral right and wrong …. are always relative to a choice of moral framework. (Harman 1996: 3)

The Sapir-Whorf theory of linguistic relativity (see §4.1 ) is also thought to have been inspired by the Relativity Theory. It is however worth noting that Einstein did not think that the Theory of Relativity supported relativism in ethics or epistemology because, although in his model simultaneity and sameness of place are relative to reference frames, the physical laws expressing such relativity are constant and universal and hence in no sense relative.

The different strands of the intellectual genealogy of relativism have shaped a variety of relativistic doctrines.

4. Varieties of Relativism

Relativism is discussed under a variety of headings some of which have been more prominent in recent philosophical and cultural debates.

Public debates about relativism often revolve around the frequently cited but unclear notion of cultural relativism . The idea that norms and values are born out of conventions can be traced back to the Greek historian Herodotus (c. 484–425 BC), but it is only in the 20 th century, and particularly with the advent of social anthropology, that cultural relativism has gained wide currency. Franz Boas, responsible for the founding of social anthropology in the U.S., claimed that

The data of ethnology prove that not only our knowledge but also our emotions are the result of the form of our social life and of the history of the people to whom we belong. (Boas 1940: 636)

Boas’s views became the orthodoxy of anthropology through M. J. Herskovits’ “principle of cultural relativism” stating: “Judgments are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation” (Herskovits 1955:15).

Since those early days, social anthropologists have come to develop more nuanced approaches to cultural relativism (see for instance Geertz 1993); however, its core tenet, a claim to the equal standing of all cultural perspectives and values which co-vary with their cultural and social background, has remained constant.

Cultural relativists justify their position by recourse to a combination of empirical, conceptual and normative considerations:

Claims (a)–(d) are open to a variety of objections. Some anthropologists and biologists have argued against the empirical assumption of the variability of cultures and have disputed its extent. Kinship, death and its attendant rituals of mourning, birth, the experience of empathy, expressions of sympathy and fear, and the biological needs that give rise to these, are some of the constant elements of human experience that belie the seeming diversity reported by ethnographers (Brown 2004). (c) has also been challenged by naturalistically inclined social scientists who believe that an evolutionary or a biologically informed approach can provide a context-independent, universally applicable theoretical framework for explaining what is common to all cultures, despite their superficial differences. Moreover, Moody-Adams (1997), among others, has argued that cultures are not integrated wholes that could determine uni-directionally the beliefs and experiences of their members; they are porous, riddled with inconsistencies and amenable to change. Finally, (d) is under pressure from the very relativism it advocates. Other critics, Pope Benedict XVI for instance, in his very first homily delivered upon election (18 April 2005), reject and condemn prescriptive cultural relativism as a harbinger of nihilism and an “anything goes” extreme permissiveness.

An influential form of descriptive cultural relativism owes its genesis to linguistics. Benjamin Whorf, inspired by his teacher Edward Sapir, who in turn was supervised by the social anthropologist Franz Boas, used ethnographic evidence from American Indian languages, such as Hopi, to argue that languages mold our views of the world and different languages do so differently, because “we dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages” (Whorf 1956: 213). In the case of the Hopi, the claim was that their language imposes a conception of time very different from that of the speakers of the Indo-European languages. The so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and the position known as “linguistic relativity”, became popular in both psychology and social anthropology in the mid 20 th century. However, the empirical work by the psychologists Berlin and Key (1969) and later by Eleanor Rosch (1974) pointed to the universality of color terms. The linguistic theories of Noam Chomsky regarding the universality of grammar were also widely taken to have discredited linguistic relativity. Moreover, Malotki (1983) had argued that, contrary to Whorf’s claim, the Hopi language does indeed have tense, as well as units of time, such as days, weeks, months and seasons, and terminology for yesterday and tomorrow. Things have changed recently and there has been a slight swing of the pendulum back in favor of linguistic relativity on the part of so called “neo-Whorfians”. Stephen Levinson, for instance, drawing on experimental evidence, has argued that the frame of reference that underlies any given language shapes our spatial experiences and perceptual modalities (see Gumperz & Levinson 1996). Similar claims have been made about emotions, object representation, and memory. But the claims of linguistic relativity in all these cases are much more modest than Whorf’s original thesis.

Historical relativism, or historicism, is the diachronic version of cultural relativism. As Clifford Geertz points out, cultural and historical relativism are in effect the same doctrine with a core claim that “we cannot apprehend another people’s or another period’s imagination neatly, as though it were our own” (1993: 44). Historicism originated in reaction to the universalist tendencies of the Enlightenment but proved most influential in the social sciences, particularly in the hands of 19 th century theorists such as Karl Marx and Max Weber. Oswald Spengler, the then-influential turn-of-the-century German historian and philosopher, also declared that: “There are no eternal truths. Every philosophy is an expression of its time” (Spengler 1918: 58). Karl Mannheim, to whom we owe the sub-discipline of sociology of knowledge, pronounced that historicism is a significant intellectual force that epitomizes our worldview ( Weltanschauung) .

The historicist principle not only organizes, like an invisible hand, the work of the cultural sciences ( Geisteswissenschaften ), but also permeates everyday thinking. (Mannheim 1952 [1924]:84)

As we will see ( §4.4.3 ), in more recent times historicist interpretations of science, chiefly those espoused by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, have played a major role in popularizing relativistic interpretations of scientific knowledge.

Conceptual relativism is a narrowly delineated form of relativism where ontology, or what exists, rather than ethical and epistemic norms, is relativized to conceptual schemes, scientific paradigms, or categorical frameworks. In this sense, conceptual relativism is often characterized as a metaphysical doctrine rather than as variant of epistemic or cultural relativism. The underlying rationale for this form of relativism is the anti-realist thesis that the world does not present itself to us ready-made or ready-carved; rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways of categorizing and conceptualizing it. Reflection on the connections between mind and the world, rather than empirical observations of historic and cultural diversity, is the primary engine driving various forms of conceptual relativism, but data from anthropology and linguistics are also used in its support. The thought, at least since Kant, is that the human mind is not a passive faculty merely representing an independent reality; rather, it has an active role in shaping, if not constructing, the “real”. The conceptual relativist adds, as Kant did not, that human beings may construct the real in different ways thanks to differences in language or culture.

In the 20 th century, a variety of positions sympathetic to conceptual relativism were developed. Quine’s ontological relativity, Nelson Goodman’s “irrealism” with its claim of the plurality of “world-versions” and Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity are prominent examples. What these authors have in common is an insistence that there could be more than one “right” way of describing what there is, that incompatible “manuals of translation” and “world-versions” can be equally correct or acceptable.

Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity, probably the most influential of 20 th century approaches to conceptual relativity, is expressed both in an epistemic as well as in a stronger metaphysical form. Quine supports an epistemic thesis when he claims that incompatible scientific theories can account equally adequately for the data available to us (his underdetermination thesis) and that “there are various defensible ways of conceiving the world”, (Quine 1992: 102). But his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation makes the stronger claim that different incompatible manuals of translation, or conceptual schemes, can account for one and the same verbal behavior and the indeterminacy resides at the level of facts rather than our knowledge, a position that leads to unavoidable ontological relativity.

Nelson Goodman’s irrealism is an even more radical claim to the effect that the existence of many adequate, and indeed correct, but irreconcilable descriptions and representations of the world shows that there is no such thing as one unique actual world; rather there are many worlds, one for each correct description (e.g., Goodman 1975; cf. Sider 2009). Hilary Putnam disagrees with Goodman’s formulation of relativity with its radical talk of “world-making” but relies on arguments from conceptual plurality to reject metaphysical realism, the view that there is one single correct account of what the world is like (cf., Arageorgis 2017). According to Putnam, our most basic metaphysical categories, e.g., objecthood and existence, could be defined variously depending on what conceptual scheme we use. What counts as an object itself, he argues, is determined by and hence is relative to the ontological framework we opt for.

Thomas Kuhn’s highly influential discussion of the governing role of paradigms in science (see §4.4.3 ) has also been interpreted as a form of conceptual relativism by friends (Kusch 2002) and critics (Davidson 1974) of relativism alike.

The key difficulty facing conceptual relativism is that of formulating the position in a coherent but non-trivial manner. Trivial versions allow that the world can be described in different ways, but make no claims to the incompatibility of these descriptions. The charge of incoherence arises from the claim that there could be genuinely conflicting and equally true accounts or descriptions of one and the same phenomenon. To use an example that is the corner-stone of Hilary Putnam’s conceptual relativity, Putnam claims that the simple question how many objects there are (say on a given table) could be answered variously depending on whether we use “a mereological or a Carnapian, common-sense, method of individuating objects”. In circumstances where a Carnapian counts three objects A , B and C , a mereologist will count seven: A , B , C , plus the mereological sum objects A + B , A + C , B + C , A + B + C . As Putnam puts it:

The suggestion … is that what is (by commonsense standards) the same situation can be described in many different ways, depending on how we use the words. The situation does not itself legislate how words like “object”, “entity”, and “exist” must be used. What is wrong with the notion of objects existing “independently” of conceptual schemes is that there are no standards for the use of even the logical notions apart from conceptual choices. (Putnam 1988: 114)

The puzzle is to explain how both the Carnapian and mereological answers to the one and same question could be correct and yet mutually incompatible, for unless we abandon the most fundamental law of logic, the law of non-contradiction, we cannot deem one and the same proposition true and not true. Relativists respond that both answers are correct, each relative to the conceptual scheme it invokes . So, once we accept the insight that there is no Archimedean vantage point for choosing among conflicting frameworks, we no longer face a genuine contradiction. The response invokes, often implicitly, a relativized conception of truth, which as we shall see below, faces its own difficulties.

4.3 Relativism about truth or alethic relativism

Relativism about truth, or alethic relativism , at its simplest, is the claim that what is true for one individual or social group may not be true for another, and there is no context-independent vantage point to adjudicate the matter. What is true or false is always relative to a conceptual, cultural, or linguistic framework.

Alethic relativism is the most central of all relativistic positions since other subdivisions of the philosophical theses of relativism—with the possible exception of some narrowly defined versions of conceptual relativism such as Nelson Goodman’s irrealism (see §4.2 )—are in principle, reducible to it (Baghramian 2004: 92). For instance, relativism about logic may be restated as a view according to which the standing of logical truths (including truths about consequence relations) is relative to cultures or cognitive schemes. Ethical relativism can be seen as the claim that the truth of ethical judgments, if such truths exist, is relative to context or culture. If truth is to be seen as equally applicable to all areas of discourse and also unitary, rather than domain specific or plural, then alethic relativism is not only a strong form of global relativism but it also entails the denial of the possibility of more local forms of relativism because all localized relativistic claims are also attempts at relativizing truth (seemingly in a particular domain of discourse).

The central claim of alethic relativism is that “is true”, despite appearances to the contrary, is (at least, in some relevant domains of discourse) not a one-place but a two-place predicate such that “ P is true” should correctly be understood as ( modulo differences in particular ways of developing this idea) shorthand for “ P is true for X ”, where X is a culture, conceptual scheme, belief framework, etc. And within the broad camp of alethic relativists, the matter of how it is that which we should opt for “ P -is-true-for- X ”, rather than “ P is true”, simpliciter, is developed in different ways (e.g., see Meiland 1977; MacFarlane 2014: ch. 5; Egan 2007; Ferrari & Moruzzi 2018). One shared commitment of relativizing the truth predicate is that claims such as “misfortune is caused by witchcraft” could be true according to the Azande cultural framework and false in the Western scientific framework. One major difficulty facing alethic relativists is to explain what “true for” actually means, and how “true for” should be understood as related to the more familiar absolutist truth predicate. For instance, should relative truth be understood as a modification on an already familiar strategy for thinking about truth (e.g., the correspondence, pragmatic or epistemic model) or in some different way, entirely? (MacFarlane 2014: ch. 2). Much of the work of New Relativists such as John MacFarlane (see §5 ) can be see as an attempt to clarify this thorny issue.

The strongest and most persistent charge leveled against all types of relativism, but (global) alethic relativism in particular, is the accusation of self-refutation. Here is for instance Harvey Siegel:

This incoherence charge is by far the most difficult problem facing the relativist. It is worth noting that attempts to overcome the problem by appealing to the notion of relative truth appear not to succeed. Many versions of relativism rely on such a notion, but it is very difficult to make sense of it. An assertion that a proposition is “true for me” (or “true for members of my culture”) is more readily understood as a claim concerning what I (or members of my culture, scheme, etc.) believe than it is as a claim ascribing to that proposition some special sort of truth. Constructing a conception of relative truth such that “ p is relatively true” (or “ p is true for S ”, or “ p is true for members of culture C ”) amounts to something stronger than “ S believes that p ” (or “members of culture C believe that p ”), but weaker than “ p is true ( simpliciter )”, has proved to be quite difficult, and is arguably beyond the conceptual resources available to the relativist. (Siegel 2011: 203)

The original argument goes back to Plato’s criticism of Protagoras in the Theaetetus where he argues:

Most people believe that Protagoras’s doctrine is false. Protagoras, on the other hand, believes his doctrine to be true. By his own doctrine, Protagoras must believe that his opponents’ view is true. Therefore, Protagoras must believe that his own doctrine is false (see Theaetetus : 171a–c)

Plato’s argument, as it stands, appears to be damaging only if we assume that Protagoras, at least implicitly, is committed to the universal or objective truth of relativism. On this view, Plato begs the question on behalf of an absolutist conception of truth (Burnyeat 1976a: 44). Protagoras, the relativists counter, could indeed accept that his own doctrine is false for those who accept absolutism but continue believing that his doctrine is true for him . He could also try to persuade others to become the sort of thinker for whom relativism is true without being entangled in self-contradiction. Such an effort at persuasions, however, could involve Protagoras in a performative contradiction as the relativist cannot assume that her arguments are good for persuading others. Ordinarily, the very act of defending a philosophical position commits us to the dialectical move of attempting to convince our interlocutors of the superior value of what we are arguing for. The relativist cannot make such a commitment and therefore his attempts to persuade others to accept his position may be pragmatically self-refuting. The relativist can avoid the standard charge of self-refutation by accepting that relativism cannot be proven true in any non-relative sense— viz., that relativism itself as a philosophical position is at best true only relative to a cultural or historical context and therefore could be false in other frameworks or cultures. But such an admission will undermine the relativist’s attempt to convince others of her position, for the very act of argumentation, as it is commonly understood, is an attempt to convince those who disagree with us of the falsehood of their position. In other words, if Protagoras really believes in relativism why would he bother to argue for it?

It may be argued that Protagoras could have opted for a more sensible form of alethic relativism where a person’s beliefs are not automatically true relative to the framework she accepts. Rather a belief p is true according to X ’s framework iff (roughly) X would believe that p if she were to reason cogently by her own standards on the basis of full relevant information. This form of alethic relativism allows for argument and persuasion among people who initially disagree, for despite their disagreement they may share or come to share a framework. Protagoras may, on this reinterpretation, be trying to persuade his interlocutor that if she were to reason cogently by her own standards from their shared framework, she would accept relativism. However, it is not clear how the relativist could share a framework with the absolutist on the nature of truth or what argumentative strategies he can use to convert the absolutist without presupposing a shared (relativist or absolutist) conceptions of truth. In particular, a consistent relativist will have only a relativized criteria of what counts as “true” information, which presumably will not be shared by the absolutist.

A second strand of the self-refutation argument focuses on the nature and role of truth. J.L. Mackie, for instance, has argued that alethic absolutism is a requisite of a coherent notion of truth and that a claim to the effect that “There are no absolute truths” is absolutely self-refuting (Mackie 1964: 200). But the relativists reject the quick move that presupposes the very conception of truth they are at pains to undermine and have offered sophisticated approaches of defense. A good example of such a defense is Hales’ (1997)—who uses a “u” operator to represent “It is true in some perspectives that” and a “n” operator to represent “It is true in all perspectives that”—in order to establish that there could indeed be a consistent relativist logic which avoids the charge of self-refutation. Key to this approach, according to Hales, is that we abandon a conception of global relativism on which the lose thesis “everything is relative” is embraced—a thesis Hales concedes to be inconsistent—for the thesis “everything that is true is relatively true”, which he maintains is not ( cf. Shogenji 1997 for a criticism of Hales on this point).

It has also been claimed that alethic relativism gives rise to what J.L. Mackie calls “operational” (Mackie 1964: 202) and Max Kölbel “conversational” self-refutation (Kölbel 2011) by flouting one or more crucial norms of discourse and thereby undermines the very possibility of coherent discourse. One version of the argument, advanced most notably by Gareth Evans (1985: 346–63), begins with the premise that a publicly shared distinction between correct and incorrect, and hence true and false, assertion is a necessary condition for coherent assertoric discourse. As Evans puts it, a theory that

permits a subject to deduce merely that a particular utterance is now correct but later will be incorrect … cannot assist the subject in deciding what to say, nor in interpreting the remarks of others. What should we aim at, or take others to be aiming at?. (1985: 349)

And if truth is relative, then there is no single shared definite aim for any given assertion (see MacFarlane 2014: ch. 12 for a discussion). The relativists however, could respond that truth is relative to a group (conceptual scheme, framework) and they take speakers to be aiming a truth relative to the scheme that they and their interlocutors are presumed to share. The difficulty with this approach is that it seems to make communication across frameworks impossible.

Such a response, however, will be answerable to the charge of incoherence raised by Donald Davidson against both alethic and conceptual relativism. According to Davidson, the principle of charity—the assumption that other speakers by and large speak truly (by our lights)—is a pre-requisite of all interpretation. He takes this to imply that there could not be languages or conceptual schemes that we cannot in principle understand and interpret, in other words, if a system of signs L is not recognizable as a language by us then L is not a language. Languages are either inter-translatable and hence not radically different from ours, or incommensurable and beyond our ability to recognize them as languages (Davidson 1974). The relativist, in effect, places other speakers and their languages beyond our recognitional reach and thereby undermines the initial claim that they could be radically different or incommensurable.

New Relativism, as we shall see, offers a novel take on the old question of alethic relativism and gives weight to Alasdair MacIntyre’s observation that relativism may have been refuted a number of times too often, whereas genuinely refutable doctrines only need to be refuted once (MacIntyre 1985: 5).

4.4 Epistemic relativism

Claims to knowledge and justification have proven receptive to relativistic interpretations. Epistemic relativism is the thesis that cognitive norms that determine what counts as knowledge, or whether a belief is rational, justifiable, etc. could vary with and are dependent on local conceptual or cultural frameworks and lack the universality they aspire or pretend to. The three key assumptions underlying epistemic relativism are:

The epistemic relativist, as Paul Boghossian in developing his trenchant criticisms of relativism points out, is committed to a “doctrine of equal validity”, the view that “there are many radically different, incompatible, yet, ‘equally valid’ ways of knowing the world, with science being just one of them” (Boghossian 2006a: 2). The relativist’s key claim is that either we can chauvinistically maintain that our epistemic system is superior to all or accept the equal legitimacy of varying epistemic systems.

One crucial question facing epistemic relativism is how to identify and individuate alternative epistemic systems. The intuitive idea is that varying and possibly incompatible cognitive principles, ground-level beliefs and presuppositions, or what Wittgenstein calls “hinge” and “bedrock” propositions (Wittgenstein 1969: §§341–343) separate non-convergent epistemic schemes. A simple and quite commonly used example is the contrast between scientific and religious belief systems. Boghossian, for instance, uses the debate between Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine as a case study of an encounter between antagonists operating within putatively different epistemic frameworks, who use different frameworks, or as Rorty (1979) put it “grids”, for determining what would count as appropriate evidence on planetary movements. The relativist claims that there is no fact of the matter about whether the Copernican theory or the geocentric view is justified by the evidence, “for there are no absolute facts about what justifies what” (Boghossian 2006a: 62) while the anti-relativist attempts to show the unintelligibility or the implausibility of such a claim.

Boghossian has been criticized however for his characterization of epistemic relativism. One notable such criticism has been advanced by Crispin Wright (2008), who takes issue with Boghossian’s attributing to the epistemic relativist a version of (a) above , what Boghossian calls epistemic relationism , or the thesis that any claim of the form “Evidence E justifies belief B ”, if it is to have any prospect of being true, must be construed as expressing the claim According to the epistemic system C, that I, S accept, information E justifies belief B (Boghossian 2006a:73). Having characterized the relativist’s position in this fashion, Boghossian suggests—after considering various ways of articulating what the relativist might say about the untruth of claims of the form “Evidence E justifies belief B ”—that the relativist is left, ultimately, with no coherent way to account for how she should count as accepting or adhering to a given epistemic system. And on this basis, Boghossian concludes that there is no coherent way to formulate the position because the relativist in formulating his position and setting up the opposition between two or more alternative non-convergent epistemic systems cannot but assume the universality of at least some epistemic principles, including deduction, induction, warrant through empirical evidence, etc. (see Boghossian 2006a).

As Wright sees it, however, Boghossian’s attributing the relationist clause to the epistemic relativist is to simply

fail to take seriously the thesis that claims such as [Evidence E justifies belief B ] can indeed by true or false, albeit only relatively so . (Wright 2008: 383, our italics)

Moreover, Wright argues, the epistemic relationist clause Boghossian includes in the kind of epistemic relativism he challenges betrays a failure to distinguish between (i) making a judgment in the light of certain standards and (ii) judging that those standards mandate that judgment. (See also MacFarlane (2008b and Carter & McKenna forthcoming for different critiques of Boghossian’s argument against the epistemic relativist.)

Conceptions of rationality, and its key components of logic and justification, are some of the principles that are often used to differentiate between epistemic systems. Below we look at attempts at relativizing each.

Earlier defenses of epistemic relativism centered on the idea of alternative rationalities and were often developed as a reaction to the charge of irrationality leveled at non-Western tribal people. Rationality traditionally is seen as a cognitive virtue as well as a hallmark of the scientific method. The complex notion of rationality is intimately tied to requirements of consistency, justification, warrant and evidence for beliefs. Relativists about rationality cast doubt on the universal applicability of one or more of these features of rational thought, and deem them merely local epistemic values. Peter Winch’s treatment of E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s account of the Azande tribe’s beliefs in witchcraft and magic is now a classic of the “rationality wars” of the 1960s and 70s. Winch had argued that since standards of rationality in different societies do not always coincide, we should use only contextually and internally given criteria of rationality in our assessment of the systems of belief of other cultures and societies. Under the influence of the later Wittgenstein, he maintained that it does not make sense to speak of a universal standard of rationality because what is rational is decided by a backdrop of norms governing a given language and form of life. As outside observers, we are not in a position to impute irrationality or illogicality to the Azande or any other group whose practices and language-games may differ from ours. Critics of Winch, Steven Lukes, for instance, using considerations reminiscent of Davidson’s principle of charity, have argued that we will not be in a position to understand a language or culture with standards of rationality radically different from ours, and that we must have at least some core principles, or what Martin Hollis had called a “bridgehead” with elements such as consistency and the goal of truth, in common with the Azande in order to understand them (Hollis 1968; Lukes 1970). They, thereby, conclude that an all-out or strong relativism about rationality is not tenable. The weaker claim is that some elements of rationality, for instance what counts as good evidence or a better style of reasoning, could vary with historic conditions and traditions of enquiry and therefore a degree of relativization of such norms, without succumbing to irrationalism, is acceptable (see Hacking 1982 and MacIntyre 1988).

Being rational also means having warrant, in the form of good reasons and justification for one’s beliefs. Epistemic relativists maintain that the legitimacy of a justificatory system and the presumed strength of epistemic warrants are decided locally. Richard Rorty has made the influential claim that

there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society— ours —uses in one or another area of inquiry. (Rorty 1991: 23)

For Rorty, warrant is a “sociological matter, to be ascertained by observing the reception of [a speaker’s] statement by her peers” (1993: 449). Rorty also claims that knowledge and truth are compliments “paid to beliefs which we think so well justified that, for the moment, further justification is not needed” (Rorty 1991: 24) where the “we” is a historically conditioned community of enquirers. Rorty rejects the label “relativist” because he insists that, unlike the relativists, he does not subscribe to the view that all beliefs are equally true or good. He calls his position “ethnocentrism”, because the only form of warrant available to any of us is the one provided through solidarity with our peers. His rejection of the label “relativist” has had little effect on critics such as Hilary Putnam (1999) or Paul Boghossian (2006a) who do not see the distinction Rorty wishes to draw between his brand of ethnocentrism and relativism

Debates about the scope and authority of logic are also focal to discussions of rationality. The argument for relativism about logic is usually traced to the French anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) who claimed that tribal or “primitive” cultures did not subscribe to universal laws of logic such as the principles of non-contradiction and identity and were in a pre-logical stage of thinking (Lévy-Bruhl 1922/1923). In a posthumous publication, Lévy-Bruhl renounced his earlier views, finding them “simplistic and rather crude” (Lévy-Bruhl 1949/1975: 48) but he remains the standard bearer for relativism about logic.

Peter Winch’s interpretation of the Azande material became the impetus for a new wave of arguments for relativism about logic. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, for instance, have argued that different societies may have incompatible but internally coherent systems of logic because validity and rules of inference are defined by, and hence are relative to, the practices of a given community, rather than a priori universal restrictions on all thought. According to Bloor,

The Azande have the same psychology as us but radically different institutions. If we relate logic to the psychology of reasoning we shall be inclined to say that they have the same logic; if we relate logic more closely to the institutional framework of thought then we shall incline to the view that the two cultures have different logics. (Bloor 1976: 129–130)

Even the status of “contradictions” is at times seen as culturally relative and the Azande’s application of witchcraft in determining guilt is cited as an example. The Azande, according to Evans-Prichard, believe that it is possible to identify a witch by examining the contents of his intestine (through the use of a poison oracle). They also believe that Witchhood is inherited patrilineally. Since the Azande clan members are related to each other through the male line, it follows that if one person is shown to be a witch, then all the members of his clan must also be witches. Evans-Pritchard tells us that although the Azande see the sense of this argument they do not accept the conclusion; they seem to side-step the contradiction in their belief-system. Relativistically inclined commentators have argued that the Azande both do and do not contradict themselves depending on, or relative to, the culture that is being taken as the vantage point (Bloor 1976: 124 and Jennings 1989: 281). See Seidel (2014) for a sustained critique.

More recently, Peng and Nisbett, using experimental data, have argued that Chinese and American students have different attitudes towards the Law of Non-Contradiction. The Chinese, they claim, are more willing to accept that conflicting views may be compatible and therefore are less disposed to recognize or condemn contradictions (Peng & Nisbett 1999). In his The Geography of Thought (2003), Nisbett has generalized his results to claim that Asian and European structures of thinking, including perception and conceptualization, differ significantly.

Nisbitt’s data, as well as the claims by Barnes and Bloor, are contributions to a long-standing debate about the status of logic. Their approach attempts to naturalize logic by tying it to actual practices of the human subjects. The relativistically inclined, however, argue that to think of logic as singular, a priori, and universal speaks of a philosophical prejudice and does not sit well with a naturalistic and scientific attitude. As to the claim by Quine and Davidson, that an allegedly illogical culture is in fact a misinterpreted or badly interpreted culture—that if the speakers of a language seem to accept sentence of the form “ P and not- P ”, this is conclusive evidence that “and” and “not” in their language do not mean what these words mean in English (Quine 1960)—the relativists and their sympathisers point out that reasoning in deviant ways is quite common and is not an impediment to understanding or translating others (e.g., Stich 2012). They further argue that such diversity is better explained by the relativist’s claim that the correctness of the principles of reasoning is relative to their cultural background rather than by the absolutist approach that attributes wholesale error to alternative epistemic systems or to the members of other cultures.

A different line of support for relativism about logic starts with pluralism about logic, the view that there can be a multitude of correct but not fully compatible conceptions of logic where differing accounts of logical consequence, logical connectives or even validity are on offer. Relativism ensues if we also assume that there is no neutral framework for adjudicating between the differing accounts. What counts as a correct account of logical consequence and validity or even the choice of logical vocabulary are relative to the system of logic that embed and justify these accounts and choices. (See Steinberger 2019 for a useful survey.)

Stewart Shapiro (2014) is probably the most vocal defender of this approach. His argument for relativism about logic is similar to defences of relativism in other areas where intractable differences in a particular domain and an inability to reconcile them are used as the motivators for relativism. Shapiro advocates what, following Crispin Wright, he calls “folk-relativism” and its slogan that “There is no such thing as simply being Φ” (Shapiro, 2014: 7; Wright 2008a: 158) and applies it to validity and logical consequence. The claim is that there are different conceptions of logical consequence. in classical and non-classical logic, which although not compatible can still capture correct accounts of the idea of logical consequence. Therefore, it does not make sense to think that there is a uniquely correct conception of validity and logical consequence. Different conceptions can be legitimate in so far as each is (internally) consistent and also non-trivial in the sense that it is the basis a workable mathematical systems, i.e., the means of making sense of “the practice of pursuing and applying mathematics” (Shapiro 2014: 81). Intuitionism and fuzzy logic are notable examples. Choices between different logical vocabularies also can lead to a relativized conception of logic in so far a these vocabularies play a decisive role in generating different relations of logical consequence.

For further discussion, see the entry on logical pluralism .

Discussions of relativism about science gained currency with the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and the emergence of a historicist approach to question of change and progress in science. Pronouncements such as

In so far as their only recourse to [the] world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 111)

The very ease and rapidity with which astronomers saw new things when looking at old objects with old instruments may make us wish to say that, after Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 117)

were taken to suggest that not only standards of epistemic appraisal but even the data gathered by scientists were, to a significant extent, determined by governing paradigms and hence relative to them. Although Kuhn stepped back from such radical relativism, his views gave currency to relativistic interpretations of science (though see Sankey 2018).

Relativism about science is motivated by considerations arising from the methodology and history of science (Baghramian 2007). As we saw in §4.2 , Quine has argued that

Physical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all possible data even in the broadest possible sense. In a word, they can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent. (1970: 179)

Relativists about science have argued that only with the addition of auxiliary hypotheses could the scientist choose between various theories and that such auxiliary hypotheses are colored by socially and historically grounded norms as well as by personal and group interests. Paul Feyerabend’s “democratic relativism”—the view that different societies may look at the world in different ways and regard different things as acceptable (1987: 59) and that we need to give equal voice to these differing perspectives—is one instance of the use of the underdetermination thesis in support of relativism. According to Feyerabend, underdetermination ultimately demonstrates that

for every statement, theory, point of view believed (to be true) with good reason there exist arguments showing a conflicting alternative to be at least as good, or even better. (1987: 76)

Larry Laudan usefully lists the ways underdetermination is used to motivate relativism or its proximate doctrines. He says:

Lakatos and Feyerabend have taken the underdetermination of theories to justify the claim that the only difference between empirically successful and empirically unsuccessful theories lies in the talents and resources of their respective advocates (i.e., with sufficient ingenuity, more or less any theory can be made to look methodologically respectable). Hesse and Bloor have claimed that underdetermination shows the necessity for bringing noncognitive, social factors into play in explaining the theory choices of scientists (on the grounds that methodological and evidential considerations alone are demonstrably insufficient to account for such choices). H. M. Collins, and several of his fellow sociologists of knowledge, have asserted that underdetermination lends credence to the view that the world does little if anything to shape or constrain our beliefs about it. (Laudan 1990: 321)

Laudan even connects Derrida’s deconstructionism and the view that texts do not lend themselves to determinate readings with underdetermination (ibid.). He also believes that an appropriately modest understanding of what underdetermination entails will distance it from relativism, but most relativistically inclined advocates of underdetermination are not willing to follow Laudan’s advice to circumscribe its scope. The key issue is that both the relativists and the anti-relativists could agree that the totality of evidence available does not prove the truth of any given theory. But the anti-relativists responds to this fact of underdetermination by pointing out that the we have good reasons for embracing the best theory available and moreover that there are indeed objective facts about the world, even if we are not in possession of them. The relativist, in contrast, argues that there are many, equally acceptable principles for accepting theories, all on the basis of evidence available, but such theories could result in very different verdicts. They also argue that in the absence of any strong epistemic grounds for accepting the existence of absolute facts in any given domain, we have no grounds, other than some kind of metaphysical faith, for thinking that there are such facts.

Relativism about science is also influenced by the related doctrine that all observations are theory-laden. Even anti-relativists such as Karl Popper admit that the idea that observations are not in some way tinted by theoretical assumptions is naïve. But some relativists about science offer a particularly extreme form of the doctrine of the widely accepted thesis of theory-ladenness. Feyerabend, for instance, goes so far as to argue that different systems of classification can result in perceptual objects that are not easily comparable.

Relativists about science also point to the prevalence of both synchronic and diachronic disagreement among scientists as a justification of their view. Looking at the history of science, Kuhn and his followers argued that Aristotelian physics presupposes a totally different conception of the universe compared to Newtonian physics; the same is true of Einsteinian physics compared to its predecessors. Moreover, these differing conceptions may be incommensurable in the sense that they are not readily amenable to comparison or inter-theoretical translation. There are also strong and unresolved disagreements between scientists working contemporaneously. The many different interpretations of quantum mechanics are a case in point.

Anti-relativist philosophers of science are often willing to concede all three points above, but insist that they do not, singly or jointly, justify the claim that scientific knowledge, in any philosophically interesting sense, is relative to its context of production. The success of science, both theoretical and applied, indicates that progress does take place. Fallibilism, the view that all scientific claims are provisional and liable to fail, they argue, is sufficient for dealing with difficulties arising from considerations of underdetermination and theory-ladenness of observations. Relativism, with its attendant denial that there could be objective and universal scientific truths or knowledge exacts too high a price for dealing with these allegedly troublesome features of the methodology and history of science.

Social constructionism is a particularly radical form of conceptual relativism with implications for our understanding of the methodology and subject matter of the sciences. According to social constructionism, nature as studied by scientists does not come carved at its joints (to use Plato’s metaphor from Phaedrus : 265d–266a). Reality—with its objects, entities, properties and categories—is not simply “out there” to be discovered only by empirical investigation or observation; rather, it is constructed through a variety of norm-governed socially sanctioned cognitive activities such as interpretation, description, manipulation of data, etc. Social constructionism has relativistic consequences insofar as it claims that different social forces lead to the construction of different “worlds” and that there is no neutral ground for adjudicating between them. The “Science Studies” approach of Bruno Latour is a prime example of constructionism with relativistic consequences. Latour and Woolgar (1986) have argued that so-called “scientific facts” and the “truths” of science emerge out of social and conceptual practices and inevitably bear their imprints. This is because the very idea of a mind-independent reality open to scientific study, or as they call it “out-there-ness”, itself is the consequence of scientific work rather than the cause. A crucial difference between scientific realists and constructionists is that whereas the realists see nature and society as the causes that explain the outcomes of scientific enquiry, for the constructionists the activity of

scientists and engineers and of all their human and non-human allies is the cause, of which various states of nature and societies are the consequence. (Callon & Latour 1992: 350–1)

Scientific theories are also products of socially constituted practices. They are

contextually specific constructions which bear the mark of the situated contingency and interest structure of the process by which they are generated. (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 226)

So called “scientific facts” and “natural kinds”, the primary subjects of scientific investigation are, at least in part, the products of the contingent social and epistemic norms that define the very subject matter of science. It may be argued that the view, if taken literally, entails a counter-intuitive form of backward causation to the effect that, for instance, the scientific facts about dinosaur anatomy 50 million years ago were caused in the 20 th century when a scientific consensus about dinosaur anatomy was formed (see Boghossian 2006a). But constructionism, at least in its most extreme form, accepts this consequence, insisting that there are indeed no facts except for socially constructed ones, created and modified at particular times and places courtesy of prevailing theoretical and conceptual frameworks.

Moral or ethical relativism is simultaneously the most influential and the most reviled of all relativistic positions. Supporters see it as a harbinger of tolerance (see §2.6 ), open-mindedness and anti-authoritarianism. Detractors think it undermines the very possibility of ethics and signals either confused thinking or moral turpitude.

Briefly stated, moral relativism is the view that moral judgments, beliefs about right and wrong, good and bad, not only vary greatly across time and contexts, but that their correctness is dependent on or relative to individual or cultural perspectives and frameworks. Moral subjectivism is the view that moral judgments are judgments about contingent and variable features of our moral sensibilities. For the subjectivist, to say that abortion is wrong is to say something like, “I disapprove of abortion”, or “Around here, we disapprove of abortion”. Once the content of the subjectivist’s claim is made explicit, the truth or acceptability of a subjectivist moral judgment is no longer a relative matter. Moral relativism proper, on the other hand, is the claim that facts about right and wrong vary with and are dependent on social and cultural background. Understood in this way, moral relativism could be seen as a sub-division of cultural relativism. Values may also be relativized to frameworks of assessment, independent of specific cultures or social settings.

Moral relativism, like most relativistic positions, comes in various forms and strengths. It is customary to distinguish between descriptive or empirical, prescriptive or normative, and meta-ethical versions of moral relativism. These views in turn are motivated by a number of empirical and philosophical considerations similar to those introduced in defense of cultural relativism. The purported fact of ethical diversity, the claim that there are no universally agreed moral norms or values, conjoined with the intractability of the arguments about them, are the core components of descriptive moral relativism. The anti-relativists counter-argue that the observed diversity and lack of convergence in local norms can in fact be explained by some very general universal norms, which combine with the different circumstances (or false empirical beliefs) of the different groups to entail different particular norms. The objectivist thereby can accommodate diversity and lack of agreement at this higher level of generalization (see Philippa Foot (1982) for this type of argument).

As in the case of cultural relativism, the imperative of tolerance is often seen as a normative reason for adopting moral relativism. Moral relativism, it is argued, leads to tolerance by making us not only more open-minded but also alerting us to the limitations of our own views. Edward Westermarck, for instance, in his early classic defense of relativism writes:

Could it be brought home to people that there is no absolute standard in morality, they would perhaps be on the one hand more tolerant and on the other more critical in their judgments. (Westermarck 1932: 59)

Critics however point out that for the consistent relativist tolerance can be only a framework-dependent virtue, while Westermarck, and others, seem to recommend it as a universal desideratum. A second problem with arguing for normative moral relativism on the grounds of tolerance is known as the Argumentum ad Nazium . Relativists, as this argument goes, are not in a position to condemn even the most abhorrent of worldviews as they are forced to admit that every point of view is right (relative to the perspective of its beholder). W.T. Stace, arguing against Westermarck’s relativism gives an early example of this type of criticism:

Certainly, if we believe that any one moral standard is as good as any other, we are likely to be more tolerant. We shall tolerate widow-burning, human sacrifice, cannibalism, slavery, the infliction of physical torture, or any other of the thousand and one abominations which are, or have been, from time approved by moral code or another. But this is not the kind of toleration that we want, and I do not think its cultivation will prove “an advantage to morality”. (Stace 1937: 58–59)

More moderate forms of normative moral relativism, positions that sometimes are characterized as moral pluralism, have been defended by David Wong (2006) and David Velleman (2013). Moderate moral relativists endorse the idea of diversity and plurality of ethical values and accept that such values are justified according to differing local normative frameworks, but they avoid a full blown “anything goes” relativism by maintaining that all such frameworks are ultimately answerable to conditions for human flourishing and other overarching universal constraints such as the value of accommodation (Wong 2006). (It should however be noted that while theses under the description of pluralism needn’t entail a commitment to relativism, some formulations of relativism (such as Boghossian’s 2006b), include, as an essential ingredient, a “pluralist” clause. Whether particular instances of moral pluralism entail moral relativism depends entirely on the details of relevant claim to pluralism).

Metaethical versions of moral relativism are often motivated by the thought that ethical positions, unlike scientific beliefs, are not apt for objective truth-evaluation. Strong realists about science such as Gilbert Harman have argued that the intractability of moral disagreements, the absence of convergence in ethics as opposed to the natural sciences and mathematics, point to fundamental differences between natural facts and ethical values (Harman & Thompson 1996). This is a metaethical, rather than a descriptive or normative position, because it is a theory about the nature of ethics or morality. The ethical domain, Harman argue, is such that all relevant evaluations could be undertaken only in the context of social norms or personal preferences and commitments. Values are not objective—they are not part of the fabric of the universe. Rather they always arise from some form of convention and agreement among people. Therefore, there can be no objective or externally justified ethical knowledge or judgment (Harman 1975). In this sense, metaethical relativism shares common concerns with non-cognitivist approaches to ethics. What distinguishes it, however, is the insistence on the part of metaethical relativists that moral judgments contain an implicit relativization to the speaker’s moral outlook (Dreier 2006: 261). It is possible to talk about the truth or falsity of a moral judgment but only in the context of pre-existing standards or value systems. For instance, we can ask questions about just actions or judgments in the context of standards of justice prevalent in a society at a given time; but questions about the objective standing of these standards do not make sense (cf., Boghossian 2017). (For further discussion of moral relativism see the separate entry on this topic. What has become known as New Moral Relativism will be discussed below).

5. New Relativism

There is a recent version of relativism according to which some of the views considered so far—for instance, Harman’s (1975) variety of moral relativism—will be regarded varieties of contextualism as opposed to bona fide relativism. This recent version—sufficiently distinct from the relativisms so far considered that it is deserving of attention in its own right—we are calling “New Relativism”, a variety of relativism that has arisen out of work in the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition, and for which the leading proponents have included Max Kölbel (2003, 2004), Peter Lasersohn (2005), Crispin Wright (2006) and, in particular, John MacFarlane (2005b, 2007, 2014); cf., Marques (2019). In this section we aim to (i) outline several features that individuate New Relativism; (ii) consider in turn motivations for (and objections to) several prominent strands of it; and, finally, (iii) conclude with some philosophical problems that face New Relativism more generally.

It is a commonplace that the truth-value of an utterance can depend on the context in which it is uttered. If you say “I’m happy” and I say the same sentence, your utterance may be true and mine false. In such cases, the context of utterance plays a role in determining which proposition the sentence expresses. This can happen even when the sentence does not contain an overtly indexical expression. Thus Harman and Dreier hold that a statement of the form “ A is wrong” is roughly equivalent to “ A is wrong according to the moral system I accept”. So two utterances of (say) “Torture is wrong” can differ in truth-value if they are uttered by speakers who accept very different moral systems. Contextualists about (for instance) moral, aesthetic and epistemic discourse will view moral, aesthetic and epistemic expressions likewise as indexical expressions but (as we’ll see) with some difficulty explaining apparent genuine disagreement in these areas of discourse. On this point, New Relativists claim an important advantage over contextualists. New relativism , by contrast with contextualism, aims to achieve this advantage via a much less familiar form of context dependence.

Truth-relativism with respect to utterances in area of discourse D is the claim that, following MacFarlane’s notable version of the view: the truth of S ’s D -utterance u depends (in part) on a context of assessment ; that is (and in short) what S asserts, u , gets a truth value—according to the truth-relativist’s D -semantics—only once the D -standard of the assessor is specified. Independent of the specification of such a standard, S ’s u assertion lacks a truth-value much as, by comparison, indexical expressions such as “The barn is nearby” do not get a truth-value independent of contextual facts about the context of use (i.e. the context in which the utterance is made). And, as a further point of clarification here: while the contextualist can, no less than the relativist, recognize a “standards” or “judge” parameter, for the contextualist, its value will be supplied by the context of use , whereas the relativist takes it to be supplied completely independently of the context of use, by the context of evaluation (or, as MacFarlane calls it, the context of assessment ).

To see how this view is claimed to offer a satisfying take on disagreement in types of discourse (see Beddor 2019), consider a simple example, concerning predicates of personal taste. A utters, “Pretzels are tasty”, and B utters, “Pretzels are not tasty”. While the semantic invariantist (for whom the truth-value of taste predications is in no way context sensitive) will insist that the above exchange constitutes a genuine disagreement about whether pretzels are tasty and that at least one party is wrong , contextualists and truth-relativists have the prima facie advantageous resources to avoid the result that at least one party to the apparent disagreement has made a mistake.

The contextualist claims that the truth-evaluable content expressed by A ’s utterance encodes A ’s standards ( cf. non-indexical contextualism). Thus, in this apparent disagreement, the proposition expressed by A is “Pretzels are tasty relative to my [ A ’s] standards” while B expresses the proposition “Pretzels are not tasty relative to my [ B ’s] standards”. This maneuver avoids the result that at least one of the two parties has uttered something false, but (as the new relativist points out) this result comes at the price of being unable to offer a clear explanation of our intuition that there is some uniform content about which A and B disagree .

The new relativist, on the other hand, claims to be able to preserve both the apparent subjectivity of taste discourse and (and, unlike the contextualist) our intuition that exchanges of the form mentioned constitute genuine disagreements. They do this by first insisting (unlike the contextualist—though see Suikkanen 2019) that there is a single truth-evaluable proposition which A affirms and B denies. In the case where A says “Pretzels are tasty”, and B denies this, there is a uniform content that is affirmed by A ’s utterance and denied by B ’s, namely the proposition that pretzels are tasty , period. So we have a genuine disagreement. Unlike the truth-absolutist, however, the new relativist will add that the disagreement is faultless because the proposition affirmed in A ’s utterance has a truth value only relative to a judge or standards parameter, and in this case: A ’s standards, when A is the assessor, B ’s standards, when B is the assessor. Hence, the truth-relativist about predicates of personal taste will, by insisting that the truth of Pretzels are tasty depends on the context of assessment, allow a single proposition to be (at the same time):

New Relativist views, which endorse truth-relativism locally for some domain of discourse, stand in opposition to the more traditional view of propositional content (what Cappelen & Hawthorne call “The Simple View”) according to which propositions bear truth and falsity as monadic properties (cf. however, MacFarlane 2011a for some resistance to Cappelen & Hawthorne’s claim that this simple characterization should be regarded as the “received” view.)

A key source of philosophical motivation for relativizing truth in the fashion of New Relativism traces to Lewis’s (1980) and Kaplan’s (1989) foundational work in semantics, according to which sentence truth is to be understood as relative to a circumstance of evaluation that includes world, time and location. New Relativists inherit the formal apparatus of Lewis and Kaplan and add another parameter, but their reasons for doing so are quite different from the reasons that motivated the framework in the first place. While Lewis’s and Kaplan’s reasons for “proliferating” parameters were primarily based on considerations to do with intensional operators (though see Yli-Vakkuri et al. 2019), the more contemporary reasons for adding a judge or standard parameter are often to do with respecting (for instance) disagreement data. (For further discussion here, see Kölbel (2015)). (Note that “old-style contextualism” can also be stated in Kaplan’s framework; it involves variation in content with respect to the context of utterance rather than in truth value with respect to the circumstance of evaluation).

Kaplan’s view specifically was that the need for particular parameters in the circumstance of evaluation was a function of the non-specificity of certain propositional contents with respect to world, time and location (see Kaplan’s (1989) analysis of indexicals). On Kaplan’s view:

A circumstance will usually include a possible state or history of the world, a time, and perhaps other features as well. The amount of information we require from a circumstance is linked to the degree of specificity of contents and thus to the kinds of operators in the language…. (1989: 502)

John MacFarlane, a leading contemporary relativist, writes:

Taking this line of thought a little farther, the relativist might envision contents that are “sense-of-humor neutral” or “standard-of-taste neutral” or “epistemic-state neutral”, and circumstances of evaluation that include parameters for a sense of humor, a standard of taste or an epistemic state. This move would open up room for the truth value of a proposition to vary with these “subjective” factors in much the same way that it varies with the world of evaluation. (MacFarlane 2007: 6–7)

Similarly, Cappelen and Hawthorne write:

Contemporary analytic relativists reason as follows: ‘Lewis and Kaplan have shown that we need to relativize truth to triples of <world, time, location>[’]. … But, having already started down this road, why not exploit these strategies further? In particular, by adding new and exotic parameters into the circumstances of evaluation, we can allow the contents of thought and talk to be non-specific (in Kaplan’s sense) along dimensions other than world, time and location. (2009: 10; edited )

A question on which New Relativists are divided, however, is: what contents are non-specific along dimensions other than world, time and location? It is with respect to this general question that different families of New Relativism are generated.

The taxonomy we offer is that a view falls within the category of New Relativism if, and only if, the view endorses a truth-relativist semantics (as previously outlined) for utterance tokens in some domain of discourse, such as: discourse about predicates of personal taste (Lasersohn 2005; Kölbel 2003), epistemic modals (Egan 2007; Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson 2005; MacFarlane 2011b; Stephenson 2007), future contingents (MacFarlane 2003), indicative conditionals (Weatherson 2009; Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010) gradable adjectives (Richard 2004), deontic modals (Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010 and MacFarlane 2014: ch. 11) and knowledge attributions (Richard 2004); MacFarlane 2005b, 2011c, 2014). The motivations for truth-relativism in each of these domains include various considerations unique to those domains. We consider some of the arguments for New Relativism in four of these domains in the following sections.

5.2 Truth Relativism and predicates of personal taste

One area of discourse that has been particularly fertile ground for New Relativism is discourse that concerns predicates of personal taste (e.g., “tasty” and “fun”.)

Take a case where Mary says: “The chili is tasty” and John says, “The chili is not tasty”. Lasersohn argues (much as Kölbel does) that only the truth-relativist can make sense of the nature of John and Mary’s disagreement: It is a genuine disagreement. One affirms what the other denies. And yet neither is wrong. Lasersohn argues that there is an elegant way to make sense of the idea that John and Mary are both (in some sense) right, even though John asserts the negation of what is expressed by Mary. What Lasersohn) suggests, more formally, is the introduction of a judge parameter.

Instead of treating the content of a sentence as a set of time-world pairs, we should treat it as a set of time-world-individual triples. We assume that the content will provide an individual to be used in evaluating the sentences for truth and falsity, just as it provides a time and world. (Lasersohn: 2005: 17)

Lasersohn adds (2005: 23) that in order to maintain an authentically subjective assignment of truth-values to sentences containing predicates of personal taste, we must allow that the objective facts of the situation of utterance do not uniquely determine a judge. But who is the judge? Typically, it is us , and when it is, the evaluation is from what Lasersohn calls an autocentric perspective . Importantly, Lasersohn allows that in certain circumstances we take an exocentric perspective when assessing predicates of personal taste: assessing these sentences for truth relative to contexts in which someone other than ourselves is specified as the judge ( cf. “Come on, it’ll be fun!” “Is this fun?” (2005: 26); cf. Stanley (2005: 10) for a response to Lasersohn’s program).

Kölbel’s (2003) faultless disagreement argument for relativism about predicates of personal taste features a “proof” that there is no faultless disagreement followed by a demonstration that the proof is indefensible. The proof proceeds from two premises: an equivalence schema

and an apparent truism about mistakes:

(ES) and (T) generate the conclusion that there is no faultless disagreement through the following proof (see also Wright 2001:52)

But because Kölbel takes (9) to be implausible in what Kölbel takes to be “discretionary” (non-objective, as Kölbel sees it) areas of discourse he contends that we should introduce a relativized version of (T) to avoid the conclusion that at least one party has made a mistake.

Kölbel claims further that, for reasons of uniformity, we should “relativize truth of all propositions across the board…” and he accordingly endorses the following version of truth relativism:

Kölbel (2003: 71) thinks that this position allows the possibility of maintaining that faultless disagreement is impossible in some non-discretionary (objective) areas, and this will depend on the relation of perspective possession (but see also Boghossian 2011 for the contrary view). An implication of the position is that Kölbel’s view will allow assertions of the form: “Pretzels are not tasty, though John believes they are. And yet John is not mistaken”. For other discussions of faultless disagreement, see Richard (2008), MacFarlane (2012, 2014: ch. 6), and Zeman (2019). For an attempt to countenance faultless disagreement within an absolutist framework, see Baker & Robson (2017).

There is a version of moral relativism (e.g., Kölbel 2004) that falls squarely within the New Relativist tradition. We can think of this relativism simply as a generalization of the position just discussed that treats moral terms (e.g., “right”, “good”) as assessment-sensitive along with predicates of personal taste.

Such an extension faces problems analogous to those faced by truth-relativists about predicates of personal taste (cf. Beebe (2010) for a helpful discussion of truth-relativist semantics versus varieties of contextualist competitors).

A broader kind of problem for this semantic thesis (as well as to moral relativists more generally), raised by Coliva and Moruzzi (2012) is that it succumbs to the progress argument , an argument that famously challenges, in particular, cultural relativists (as well as indexical contextualists) about moral judgments by insisting that moral progress is both evident and not something the relativist can countenance (e.g., Rachels 2009). A third and particularly important kind of worry, addressed by Capps, Lynch and Massey (2009), involves explaining the source and nature of moral relativity, on a truth-relativist framework. Specifically, they claim that

we ought to have some account of why it is that truth in the moral domain is such that it varies with a parameter set by the context of assessment. (Capps, Lynch & Massey 2009: 416)

An additional problem concerns the plausibility of simply extending disagreement based arguments for relativism about predicates of personal taste over to moral predicates like ‘right’ and ‘good’. As Wedgwood (2019) has suggested, moral disagreements, in a way that is disanalogous to disagreements about what’s tasty, implicate a kind of ‘inexcusable irrationality’ (2019: 97)—at least, if the moral truths that constitute moral principles are a priori knowable. To the extent that there is a difference in inexcusability across the two cases of disagreement, it would be contentious to think that an argument from ‘faultless disagreement’ to relativism in the arena of predicates of personal taste would extend, mutatis mutandis, to an analogous argument in the moral arena.

Epistemic modality (e.g., claims of the form “ S might be F ”) is another particularly fertile ground for New Relativists. A key reason for this is the dialectical force of Eavesdropper Arguments , which attempt to show the perils of contextualist treatments of utterances containing epistemic modals. Another prominent argument concerns metasemantic complexity. We will examine both of these argument strategies. But first, let’s distinguish epistemic modality from metaphysical modality . To say that p is metaphysically possible is to say that p might have been the case in the sense that: in some possible world, p is true. To say that p is epistemically possible is by contrast to say that p might be the case, or that p is the case for all we know (see the entry on Varieties of Modality ). A canonical example of a statement expressing an epistemic modal is the claim A might be F . The truth of claims of the form A might be F will depend on whether F is an epistemic possibility for some individual or group, which is to say, that F must not be ruled out by what some individual or group knows. But which individual or group ? This is not always clear. As Egan and Weatherson (2011: 4) remark:

…statements of epistemic possibility in plain English do not make any explicit reference to such a person, group, evidence set, or information state. One of the key issues confronting a semanticist attempting to theorize about epistemic modals is what to do about this lack of reference.

Eavesdropper-style cases highlight the difficulty of determining exactly which individual’s or group’s body of information is relevant to the truth of claims of epistemic possibility and are taken by defenders of truth-relativism about epistemic modals to motivate their position. A variety of different eavesdropper cases have been given by different proponents (and attempted refuters) of truth-relativism about epistemic modals in the literature. For ease of exposition, we will use an especially simple version of the case, from Hawthorne’s (2007), slightly amended:

EAVESDROPPER: [Sandra] is on the way to the grocery store. I hear her say: “Susan might be at the store. I could run into her”. No party to the conversation that I am listening in on knows that Susan is on vacation. But I know that she is. Despite the fact that it is compatible with what the conversants know that Susan is in the store and that the speaker will run into her, I am inclined to judge the speaker’s [Sandra’s] modal judgments to be incorrect. (Hawthorne 2007: 92)

Egan (2007), Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane (2011b) share a similar set of diagnoses here: (i) it seems that while Sandra and I disagree about the truth value of Sandra’s statement, neither she nor I have made a mistake; (ii) the contextualist can’t explain this; (iii) the truth-relativist can.

Why can’t the contextualist explain this? As noted, the truth of claims expressing epistemic modals must depend on what some individual or group knows. But in these cases the context of use does not pick out a single such individual or group. After all, if it did, then either Sandra or I would be wrong, but it seems that neither of us is. That the context of use does not uniquely pick out one relevant body of knowledge for determining the truth of epistemic modal statements is not, as MacFarlane notes, something that can be accommodated by “the framework of contextualism, which requires that the relevant body of knowledge be determined by features of the context of use”. (MacFarlane 2011c)

Additionally, as Egan and Weatherson (2011) suggest, any contextualist account of the semantics of epistemic modals that could handle eavesdropper-style cases in a principled way would be hideously complicated. This motivates a metasemantic argument against contextualism (and a corresponding argument for relativism): if contextualism about epistemic modals is correct, then the semantics for epistemic modals will be hideously complicated; the semantics is not hideously complicated on the truth-relativist’s proposal, therefore, ceteris paribus , truth-relativism for epistemic modals is more plausible than contextualism. However, Glanzberg (2007) notably denies that metasemantic complexity in this case must be problematic.

How can the relativist accommodate eavesdropper cases? MacFarlane (2011b) articulates the relativist solution: Sandra and I disagree about the truth-value of a single proposition , the proposition that Susan might be at the store. This proposition, even when fully articulated, makes no reference to any particular body of knowledge. But such propositions cannot be true or false simpliciter. They are true only relative to a context of assessment that includes a body of knowledge. In this case, the proposition is true relative to a context of assessment where what Sandra knows is operative—a context in which Sandra is the evaluator—and false relative to a context of assessment where what I know is operative because I am the evaluator. Thus: both disagreement and faultlessness are preserved ( cf. Ross & Schroeder 2013 for criticism and Kindermann & Egan (2019) for an alternative proposal).

Along with MacFarlane, Egan (2007) and Stephenson (2007) have also offered positive defenses of truth-relativism about epistemic modals; their defenses share MacFarlane’s view that propositions expressing epistemic modals are non-specific along dimensions that include the body of information possessed by a judge or assessor.

More recently, experimental philosophy has contributed to this debate. Empirical studies reported by Knobe & Yalcin (2014) and Khoo (2015) indicate that folk judgments about the truth of claims featuring epistemic modals aligns more closely with what contextualism rather than relativism would predict. However, see Beddor and Egan (2019) for experimental results that are argued to better support (a version of) relativism than contextualism.

Propositions termed “future contingents” are about the future and their truth-values are not settled by the state of the world in the past or present (see entry on Future Contingents , and MacFarlane 2014: ch. 9). In a deterministic world there are no future contingent statements in this sense. But in an indeterministic world, statements partly about the future will often satisfy these conditions. Consider Aristotle’s oft-cited example: the proposition There will be a sea battle tomorrow , uttered at t . Contrast now two intuitions: the determinacy intuition that utterances that “turned out true” were true at the time of utterance; and the indeterminacy intuition that, at the time of the utterance, multiple histories are possible, including one where there was a sea battle and the proposition is true, and one where there was not, and the proposition is false. The indeterminacy intuition leads us to think the truth-value of future contingents is indeterminate at the time of utterance, and either true or false at a later time ( cf. MacFarlane 2003; Carter 2011).

John MacFarlane (2003) thinks that both the indeterminacy intuition and the determinacy intuition should be taken at face value and that the only way to account for the semantics of future contingents is to allow the truth of future contingent statements to be, as he puts it, doubly relativized: to both the context of utterance and the context of assessment. When we evaluate a single token utterance of “There will be a sea battle tomorrow” produced on (say) Monday, this counts as neither true nor false when the context of assessment is the context in which the utterance is being made (as multiple possible histories are open at this point). However the very same statement will have a determinate truth-value relative to the context of assessment of the following day. So we can have faultless transtemporal disagreement about the truth-value of a single utterance (MacFarlane 2003: 36; cf. Carter 2011).

MacFarlane (2005b) argues that “know” is sensitive to the epistemic standards at play in the context of assessment; that is, the extension of “know” varies with the context of assessment. Much as the relativist about future contingents aimed to accommodate both the determinacy and indeterminacy intuitions, the relativist about knowledge attributions can be viewed as offering an attempted synthesis between the contextualist and both sensitive and insensitive varieties of invariantist (see entry on Epistemic Contextualism ). As MacFarlane (2014: 190) puts it:

Invariantism is right that there is a single knowledge relation, and that the accuracy of knowledge ascriptions does not depend on which epistemic standard is relevant at the context of use . But contextualism is right that the accuracy of such ascriptions depends somehow on contextually relevant standards. Relativism seeks to synthesize these insights into a more satisfactory picture.

To apply this view, suppose George says, “Bill knows that his car is in the driveway”, while Barry says, “Bill doesn’t know that his car is in the driveway”. According to the relativist, the assessment of the truth-values of Bill’s and Barry’s statements depends also on the specification of some epistemic standard. For the truth-relativist, the standard will be the operative standard in the context of assessment. George’s utterance may be true (and Barry’s false) relative to a context of assessment in which ordinary “low” standards are in place, whereas Barry’s may be true (and George’s false) relative to a context of assessment in which high “Cartesian” standards are in place. See Stanley (2005: ch. 7) for a detailed criticism of this position, though see also MacFarlane (2014: §8.5 for a reply). See also Richard (2004), for another version of truth-relativism for knowledge attributions. In MacFarlane’s more recent (2014) defense of a truth-relativist semantics for “knows”, the context of assessment is taken to fix which alternatives count as relevant. See, however, Carter 2015 for an argument that MacFarlane’s more recent view generates counterintuitive results in cases of environmental epistemic luck (e.g., barn façade-style cases) and normative defeaters.

5.6 General Objections to New Relativism

We turn now to two general arguments against New Relativism in all its forms. The first is an argument from assertion , the second an argument from simplicity .

Two assertion-related objections to New Relativism arise from work by Gareth Evans (1985) and Robert Stalnaker (1978), respectively. Greenough (2010: 2) concisely captures Evans’s challenge to truth-relativism on assertoric grounds as follows:

The relativist must plausibly take issue with (2) or (3), (or both). For an attempt to meet Evans’ challenge, MacFarlane has defended a way to effectively reject (2) via what Marques has called a “meet-the-challenge” norm of assertion ( cf. MacFarlane 2003; though see also his 2014: ch. 5; cf., Stanley 2016: 181–2)—according to which ( à la Brandom 1983), in asserting p one undertakes a commitment to either defending p or giving up p if the challenge cannot be met satisfactorily (see Kölbel (2004: 308) for some other discussions of this objection).

A related assertion-based challenge to truth-relativism emerges by appeal to Stalnaker’s (1978) belief transfer model of assertion ( cf. 2011). The idea here is to appeal to a plausible view of the purpose of assertion—to “transfer beliefs from assertor to members of her audience” (Egan 2007: 15) and then to object that what is asserted, according to the truth-relativist, cannot play this characteristic role; specifically, this will be because, for the truth-relativist, the asserted contents are liable to be true relative to the speaker but false relative to the audience. For instance, Sam hardly (on the truth-relativist’s program) seems to “transfer” to Dean his belief Apples are tasty (which is true) by asserting this to Dean, when what Dean comes to believe Apples are tasty is something (on the assumption that Dean doesn’t like apples) that will be false. Thus, and more generally, it’s not clear what, exactly, could be said to be transferred and a fortiori asserted. See Egan (2007) and Dinges (2017) for attempts to reconcile truth-relativism (about epistemic modals) with Stalnaker’s belief-transfer model of assertion.

Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) assess the merits of New Relativism as it stands to challenge what they take to be the received view of the objects of thought and talk, “Simplicity”, the core tenets of which are:

Cappelen and Hawthorne understand New Relativism (what they call analytic relativism ) as a direct challenge to (T1) and that, if this challenge were successful, it would consequently bring down the more general picture they call “simplicity” (cf., Ferrari & Wright 2017). Accordingly, Cappelen and Hawthorne’s central objective is to show that truth-relativist’s arguments aimed at undermining (T1) are ultimately unsuccessful; more specifically, their broad strategy is to insist that the arguments adduced in favor of truth-relativism—when thoroughly understood—constitute a presumptive case for contextualism (in the domains where relativism was defended, and in particular, in the domain of predicates of personal taste).

Relativism comes in a plethora of forms that are themselves grounded in disparate philosophical motivations. There is no such thing as Relativism simpliciter, and no single argument that would establish or refute every relativistic position that has been proposed. Despite this diversity, however, there are commonalities and family resemblances that justify the use of the label “relativism” for the various views we have discussed. Relativism remains a hotly disputed topic still surviving various attempts to eliminate it from philosophical discourse. What is most surprising, however, is the recent popularity of some versions of the doctrine in at least some circles of analytic philosophy.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Swoyer, Chris, “Relativism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/relativism/ >. [This was the previous entry on relativism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see the version history .]
• Carter, J. Adam, “ Epistemology and Relativism ”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Epistemic Relativism , edited bibliography at PhilPapers.

contextualism, epistemic | Davidson, Donald | feminist philosophy, interventions: epistemology and philosophy of science | Feyerabend, Paul | future contingents | Herder, Johann Gottfried von | Kuhn, Thomas | logical pluralism | modality: varieties of | moral realism | moral relativism | reflective equilibrium | Rorty, Richard | Zhuangzi

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Paul Boghossian, Annalisa Coliva, Steven Hales, Max Kölbel, Martin Kusch, John MacFarlane, Michela Massimi, Brian Morrissey, Brian Rabern, Tim Williamson and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on various earlier drafts of this paper.

Copyright © 2020 by Maria Baghramian < maria . baghramian @ ucd . ie > J. Adam Carter < jadamcarter @ gmail . com >

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Donald Trump’s Hush-Money Trial Is a Referendum on Truth

T he closing arguments for Donald Trump’s hush-money trial have ended and a jury now decides Trump’s fate in a Manhattan courtroom. But in many ways, it is truth itself that is on trial.

For the past several weeks, jurors have heard arguments regarding Trump’s alleged attempt to disinform Americans and sway the 2016 presidential election by falsifying business records and concealing hush-money payments to adult film actress Stormy Daniels. Depending on your view of Trump, the trial is either a much-awaited moment of accountability or a politically motivated case of prosecutorial overreach. But the case represents something more than the guilt or innocence of the former president—it is a referendum on whether facts and law still matter. Depending on which view one has of the case, the verdict likely will be seen as a commitment to the rule of law or a miscarriage of justice.

First comes the finding of facts. In our post-truth era, a jury’s quest for the facts may seem like a quaint notion. Yet every day in courtrooms across America, citizens selected at random gather to discern facts from evidence and render verdicts. Their verdicts to hold people accountable for committing crimes is what upholds the rule of law.

Read More: 5 Things We Learned From the Trump Trial

In Trump’s case, the jury will soon deliberate on whether Trump falsified business records regarding the payment of $130,000 to Daniels, and did so with intent to conceal violations of campaign and tax laws. According to the testimony of former Trump lawyer Michael Cohen, the October 2016 release of a recording of Trump making disparaging comments about groping women on an open mic for the Access Hollywood television show made it imperative to prevent another disclosure about sexual impropriety before the election. Unless Trump blocked Americans from learning about his alleged act of adultery, Cohen testified, Trump believed his campaign would suffer a “ total disaster .”  In addition, David Pecker , former publisher of the National Enquirer, testified at trial that in August 2016, shortly after Trump became the GOP nominee for president, he paid $150,000 to silence former Playboy model Karen McDougal regarding a extra-marital relationship with Trump.

Some critics of the case argue that there is nothing illegal about paying hush money, and that charges would not have been filed at all if the defendant’s name were anything other than Donald Trump. Testimony during the trial has disclosed that other famous men entered agreements with AMI, the parent company of the National Enquirer, to kill stories alleging extra-marital affairs.

But that criticism misses the point. It is not the payment of hush money alone that is the crime. It is the cover-up by someone who is a candidate for president. Running for public office brings with it the responsibility of filing accurate campaign finance reports. The indictment charges that when Trump allegedly caused 34 checks, invoices, and ledger entries to be falsely characterized as legal expenses, he intended to conceal violations of state and federal campaign finance laws as well as tax laws. New York law makes it a crime to conspire to promote or prevent the election of a candidate by illegal means. Federal law prohibits corporate contributions, like the one made by AMI, and limits the amount of individual contributions to $2,700, far below the $130,000 allegedly made by Cohen. When Trump reimbursed Cohen, he allegedly falsely characterized the payments as income, resulting in the tax charge.

In addition to violating the law, the alleged scheme, if true, also betrays the trust of the American people. Voters have a right to know the facts about a candidate when casting their ballots. If candidates can covertly manipulate public perception to serve their own interests, they undermine the public’s ability to make decisions based on facts.

The jurors will decide whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and return a verdict. The prosecution’s case is far from perfect. Daniels and Cohen both admitted to making prior inconsistent statements. Cohen, who went to prison for perjury, even admitted to stealing money from the former president. Even if convicted, as a first-time offender, Trump is unlikely to face a prison term of any significance or be removed from the ballot as the presumptive GOP nominee for president. But the verdict will likely elicit strong opinions, even from people who did not listen to all of the evidence or review all of the exhibits, as the jury did.

Read More: What Happens if Trump Is Convicted? Your Questions, Answered

This is where the rule of law will be tested. As a former prosecutor, I was trained to argue cases in court zealously, but to accept a jury’s verdict with respect, even when it was not the decision I had sought. I learned to acknowledge that reasonable minds can disagree, and that it is more important to uphold public confidence in our legal system than to obtain a conviction in any particular case. To support our legal system means that we focus on a fair process, and tolerate decisions with which we disagree. Otherwise, our criminal justice system would fall apart.

But throughout this trial, Trump and his supporters have groomed the public to distrust the fairness of the trial. Trump has called the case a “sham” and “a Biden show trial, ” even though the case was brought by a state court prosecutor outside the president’s federal chain of command. Trump has called Justice Juan Merchan “corrupt” and “highly conflicted. ” Trump even falsely claimed that the gag order entered to prevent either party from making comments outside of court about witnesses, court staff and jurors prevents him from testifying, a “misunderstanding” Justice Merchan corrected on the record, but a narrative that Trump can use to explain away a decision not to testify.

On May 14, a group of Republican members of Congress attended the trial, dressed in identical navy blue suits with white shirts and red ties. Outside the courthouse, they addressed the media, and House Speaker Mike Johnson disparaged all of the pending criminal cases against Trump. “These are politically motivated trials, and they are a disgrace,” he said. “It is election interference.” Their unity and uniforms signaled an allegiance to one man over the rule of law.

Their stunt was the latest chapter in Trump’s playbook to disparage institutions that might stand in his way. By undermining public confidence in potential critics, Trump can downplay their inevitable criticism as illegitimate. Blunting potential critics is the reason he refers to the media as “the enemy of the people” and career civil servants as “the deep state.” And now, according to Trump, any case filed to hold him accountable for alleged criminal conduct is simply “election interference.” Not only do these claims provide pretextual defenses for Trump, they also tend to reduce public confidence in the institutions of democracy.

The jury’s decision in this case will end this trial. But public opinion will render the verdict on truth and the future of our faith in the justice system.

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Most Americans are in support of public transit, but 3% use it to commute.

The COVID-19 pandemic took a massive toll on public transit, as commuter buses and trains were nearly empty during the early months of the pandemic. Passenger fares and other transit agency revenue dropped by 30% between 2020 and 2021. The federal government intervened, spending more than $69 billion in relief funds – five times the amount spent on public transportation in 2019, according to the Congressional Research Service.

This action saved thousands of jobs in an industry that employees more than 430,000 workers, according to American Public Transportation Association.

Although a majority of Americans are in support of public transportation and passenger rail, the share of people who use public transit everyday to commute to work is miniscule: 3.1%, to be exact.

Part of the reason that percentage is so small is because close to half of all Americans have no access to public transportation.

Here's a breakdown of public transit ridership and how Americans utilize transit:

How do people get to work?

The most recent year of commuter data shows that 3.1% of Americans used public transportation to travel to work. A majority of Americans drive alone to work. That percentage has been relatively consistent for the past decade up until 2020 when the pandemic shifted many jobs online.

According to the American Community Survey, in 2019, 75.9% of workers drove alone to work, compared to about 67.8% in 2021.

Although the rate increased slightly in 2022, it is significantly less than the share of Americans driving alone to work prior to the pandemic.

Carpooling was the second most common method of commuting to work between 2010 and 2019.

Between 2019 and 2021, the rate dropped from 8.9% to 7.8% in 2021.

Working from home was relatively uncommon until 2020. By 2022, it was the second most common response to the ACS commuting survey, behind driving alone.

Public transit ridership declined after the pandemic

About 70% of public transit commuters in the U.S. live in one of the following metro areas:

• Los Angeles
• Philadelphia
• San Francisco
• Washington, D.C.

Public transit ridership took a sharp decline after the COVID-19 pandemic and has yet to bounce back to pre-pandemic numbers.

The New York metro area has the most public transit commuters of any other U.S. metro area. Between 2019 and 2022, commuter ridership dropped by 700,000. A similar trend affected the Washington, D.C. metro area.

The number of transit commuters in 2022 was less than half of total commuters in 2019, according to the American Community Survey.

What occupations are popular among public transit riders?

Of the small portion of daily commuters who used public transit, a quarter were employed in education, health care or social service industries.

About 13% of public transit commuters worked in arts, entertainment, and food services.

Those working in armed forces had the smallest share of public transit commuters, with less than 1% representation.