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Full speech: Five core principles of Singapore's foreign policy

Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan on Monday (July 17) spoke to 200 civil servants about the core principles of Singapore's foreign policy, in light of a recent debate on the matter concerning Singapore's status as a small state and its posture given changing geopolitics. This is the full text of his remarks.

Let me start by saying it is not by coincidence that today we are at peace, we are at peace with all our neighbours, and we have good relations with all the major powers of the world. We owe a debt of gratitude to all our leaders and diplomats, both present and the past, for this happy state of affairs.

But more recently there has been lively debate on Singapore's foreign policy, and I think this debate is especially on the part by retired officials, academics and commentators. But there is one key difference for all the people in the room here tonight. The key difference is that we are serving members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and we in this room have line responsibility for the actual conduct of foreign policy on a daily basis. What this means is that the deliberations today are not a theoretical debate, and this not an academic word spinning exercise on a lecture circuit.

Some questions that have been raised include the following: First, has Singapore overreached? Have we forgotten our permanent status as a small state in the large dangerous world and tough region? Next question, should Singapore adjust our foreign policy posture given the evolving geopolitical situation, or even because of leadership changes in Singapore? And the third question has been, has our insistence on a consistent and principled approach actually limited our flexibility, our ability to adapt to new circumstances?

These are valid questions but I believe we need to go back to first principles. The ultimate objectives for our foreign policy are first, protect our independence and sovereignty, and second, to expand opportunities for our citizens to overcome our geographic limits. These are our ultimate objectives. It's easy to state them, difficult to achieve. The existential challenge is how do we achieve these ultimate objectives, given our circumstances that we will always be a tiny city state in South East Asia and with a multi-racial population.

We must not harbour any illusions about our place in the world. History is replete with examples of failed small states. Our founding Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew always reminded us repeatedly that we have to take the world as it is, and not as we wish it to be. But that does not mean that Mr Lee advocated a 'do nothing, say nothing' posture, or that Singapore should simply surrender to our fates. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has recently reminded us, on issues where our national interests are at stake, we must be prepared to 'stand up and be counted'.

Some people have suggested that Singapore lay low and "suffer what we must" as a small state. On the contrary, it is precisely because we are a small state that we have to stand up and be counted when we need to do so. There is no contradiction

between a realistic appreciation of realpolitik and doing whatever it takes to protect our sovereignty, maintain and expand our relevance, and to create political and economic space for ourselves. The founding fathers of our foreign policy - Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Mr S Rajaratnam, and Dr Goh Keng Swee, and their team - understood this acutely and they formulated a few core foreign policy principles. These principles have served us well since independence but are still worth reviewing again.

CORE PRINCIPLES

What are these principles? First, Singapore needs to be a successful and vibrant economy. We need to have stable politics and we need a united society. If you think about it, if we were not successful, if we were not united and if we were not stable, we would be completely irrelevant. All of us in this room have witnessed how delegations of less successful small states are ignored at international meetings. And I am always mindful that foreigners do not speak to us because of the eloquence of our presentations or because we have the highest EQ in the room. We only merit attention because everyone knows that we come from Singapore and Singapore has made a success of itself despite our size, and that we are represented by smart, honest, serious and constructive diplomats.

Second principle- we must not become a vassal state. What this means is that we cannot be bought nor can we be bullied. And it means we must be prepared to defend our territory, our assets and our way of life. This is why we just celebrated 50 years of National Service, and we maintain at great effort a Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) that everybody takes seriously. This does not just depend on the military technology that the SAF possesses, but on the courage and resolve of our soldiers, particularly NS men, to defend what we have and to fight for what we hold dear.

Third, we aim to be a friend to all, but an enemy of none. This is especially so for our immediate neighbourhood where peace and stability in Southeast Asia are absolutely essential. Consequently, Singapore was a founding member of ASEAN and we remain a strong advocate of ASEAN unity and centrality. With the superpowers and other regional powers, our aim is to expand our relationships, both politically and economically, so that we will be relevant to them and they will find our success in their own interest. This delicate balancing act is easier in good and peaceful times, but obviously more difficult when superpowers and regional powers contend with one another. Nevertheless, our basic reflex must be and should be to aim for balance and to promote an inclusive architecture. And we must avoid taking sides, siding with one side against another. While we spare no effort to develop a wide network of relations, these relations must be based on mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and the equality of nation states, regardless of size. Diplomacy is not just about having "friendly" relations at all costs. It is about promoting friendly relations as a way to protect and advance our own important interests. We don't compromise our national interests in order to have good relations. The order matters. So when others make unreasonable demands that hurt or compromise our national interests, we need to state our position and stand our ground in a firm and principled manner.

Fourth, we must promote a global world order governed by the rule of law and international norms. In a system where "might is right" or the laws of the jungle prevail, small states like us have very little chance of survival. Instead, a more promising system for small states, and frankly even a better system overall for the comity of nations, is one that upholds the rights and sovereignty of all states and the rule of law. Bigger powers will still have more influence and say, but bigger powers do not get a free pass to do as they please. In exchange, they benefit from an orderly global environment, and do not have to resort to force or arms in order to get their way.

This is why Singapore has always participated actively at the United Nations, and in the formulation of international regimes and norms. We were a key player in the negotiations for the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) in 1982. Professor Tommy Koh still remains with us. And I'm sure that is one of your proudest achievements of your diplomatic career. We play an outsized role at the WTO, and in negotiating a web of free trade agreements at a bilateral and multilateral level. As a country where trade is 3.5 times our GDP, we must stand up for the multilateral, global trading system. And as a port at the narrow straits that ultimately connect the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, freedom of navigation according to UNCLOS is absolutely critical to us.

More recently, we participated actively in the negotiations for the Global Agreement on Climate Change. I spent five years, several of them as a Ministerial facilitator, for what ultimately resulted in the Paris Agreement. And we did so because we are especially susceptible to climate change as a low-lying island city state. So Singapore must support a rules-based global community, promote the rule of international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These are fundamental priorities. They reflect our vital interests, and they affect our position in the world. We must stand up on these issues, and speak with conviction, so that people know our position. And we must actively counter the tactics of other powers who may try to influence our domestic constituencies in order to make our foreign policy better suit their interests.

Ultimately, we must be clear-minded about Singapore's long-term interests, and have the gumption to make our foreign policy decisions accordingly. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were warned of the consequences they would suffer were they to give in to initial Spartan demands. Greek statesman Pericles told his fellow Athenians that if they were frightened into obedience by the initial demands of the Spartans in order to avoid war, then they would instantly have to meet a greater demand. Actually, contained in the Spartans' demand was actually a test of the Athenians' resolve. And if they give in once, they would have to give in again, and ultimately they would be enslaved. On the other hand, a firm refusal would make the Spartans clearly understand that they must treat the Athenians more as equals.

Now I know we live in a very different era and different geopolitical situation, but this lesson, this warning against appeasement remains instructive for Singapore. Whether we are dealing with a key security and economic partner or a large neighbour, Singapore has always stood firm when it comes to our own vital national interests, particularly where it impacts on sovereignty, security and the rule of law.

When the US teenager Michael Fay was sentenced to caning for vandalism, back in 1994, we upheld our court's decision, even under great pressure from the US. In 1968, to take an example further back in our history, we proceeded to hang two Indonesian marines for the bombing of MacDonald House during Konfrontasi. I want all of you to bear in mind the political and strategic circumstances in 1968. We had just been kicked out of Malaysia. The British had just announced their intention to withdraw their forces from Singapore. We were still fighting a communist insurgency. Can you imagine the guts it took for the leaders in 1968, facing such circumstances, to stand up and do the right thing?

These episodes, painful though they may be, established clear red-lines and boundaries. The message was clear: Singapore may be small, but upholding our laws and safeguarding our independence, our citizens' safety and security was of overriding importance. So we cannot afford to ever be intimidated into acquiescence. And the fact that we have consistently demonstrated this in action, put our relationships with neighbours near and far, other states big and large, on a more solid and actually stable footing.

And this is why we speak up whenever basic principles are challenged. When Russian troops took control of Crimea, Singapore strongly objected to the invasion. We expressed our view that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukraine, and international law, had to be respected.

Which brings me to my fifth principle - that we must be a credible and consistent partner. Our views are taken seriously because countries know that we always take a long term constructive view of the issues. The bigger countries engage Singapore because we do not just tell them what they want to hear. In fact, they try harder to make Singapore take their side precisely because they know that our words mean something. We are honest brokers. We deal fairly and openly with all parties. And there is a sense of strategic predictability, which has enabled Singapore to build up trust and goodwill with our partners over the decades.

And because we are credible, Singapore has been able to play a constructive role in international affairs, at ASEAN and at the UN. We have helped to create platforms for countries with similar interests. For example, in 1992, Singapore helped establish the Forum of Small States. As a group, we've been able to foster common positions and to have a bigger voice at the United Nations. And today, the Forum of Small States has grown to 107 countries, more than half the membership of the UN.

We play a constructive role in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). We also launched the Global Governance Group (3G), to ensure that the voices of small states are heard, and to serve as a bridge between the G20 and the larger UN membership. Our credibility has won us a seat at the table, even when our relevance is not immediately obvious. We are not the the 20th largest economy in the world, but yet we've just come back from the G20, where we got invited.

You want to take another example even further afield? When we first expressed interest in the Arctic Council, there were many who wondered what role a small equatorial country would play on Arctic matters. But rising sea levels and possibility of new shipping routes impact or potentially impact our position as a transhipment hub, and so it is useful for us to be on the Arctic Council. We have gained observer status in the Arctic Council since May 2013. And we participate actively and contribute our expertise on maritime affairs. And if anyone wants deeper insights into this, speak to MOS Sam Tan who has represented us resolutely and repeatedly on the Arctic Council.

LOOKING BEYOND

Now let's look beyond these five principles. Let me make a few observations. Small states are inconsequential unless we are able to offer a value proposition and make ourselves relevant. Singapore's economic success, our political stability and our social harmony and unity has attracted attention from others to do business with us, and to examine our developmental model. And this is why our diplomats, both those of you in this room as well as the other half of our family overseas, work so hard all over the world to find common ground and to make common cause with other states. And we search for win-win outcomes based on the principles of interdependence. For example, we have participated in major cooperation projects in Suzhou, Tianjin and Chongqing in China, Amaravati in India, Iskandar Malaysia in Johor, the Kendal Industrial Park in Semarang, Indonesia, and the multiple Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Parks. When we embarked on these projects, we contribute novel ideas and we implement our plans on a whole of government basis. And what this means is not just MFA, but our colleagues in all the other Ministries who also contribute whole heartedly into these projects.

Singapore's position today is far more secure than it was at our birth in 1965. But the challenges of small states will be perennial. They cannot be ignored, or wished away. A strong and credible SAF is an important deterrence and foreign policy begins at home. Our diplomacy is only credible, if we are able to maintain a domestic consensus on Singapore's core interests and our foreign policy priorities. And if our politics does not become fractious, or our society divided. We have safeguarded our international position by building a successful economy and a cohesive society; making clear that we always act in Singapore's interests, and not at the behest or the bidding of other states. We have been expanding our relationships with as many countries as possible, on the basis of mutual respect for all states regardless of size and on a win-win interdependence. Upholding international law has been a matter of fundamental principle for us; and being a credible and consistent partner with a long term view has given us a role to play and relevance on the international stage.

Colleagues, geopolitics will become more uncertain and unpredictable. But we need to ensure that our foreign policy positions reflect the changing strategic realities whilst we maintain our freedom, our right to be an independent nation, with our own foreign policy. We must anticipate frictions and difficulties from time to time. But our task is to maintain this whilst keeping in mind the broader relationships. Our approach as a state with independent foreign policy cannot be like that of a private company. Our state interests go far beyond the short term losses or gains of a private company. So, we have to stay nimble, be alert to dangers but seize opportunities.

But we need to also remember that some aspects remain consistent. We need to advance and protect our own interests. We must be prepared to make difficult decisions, weather the storms, if they come. We must be prepared to speak up, and if necessary, disagree with others, without being gratuitously disagreeable. We may always be a small state, but all the more reason we need the courage of our convictions and the resolution to secure the long term interests of all our citizens.

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Singapore foreign policy
Vivian Balakrishnan

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Singapore's foreign policy: beyond realism

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Why Singapore works: five secrets of Singapore’s success

Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal

ISSN : 2517-679X

Article publication date: 13 July 2018

Issue publication date: 5 September 2018

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore is a success story today despite the fact that its prospects for survival were dim when it became independent in August 1965.

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This paper describes the changes in Singapore’s policy context from 1959 to 2016, analyses the five factors responsible for its success and concludes with advice for policy makers interested in implementing Singapore-style reforms to solve similar problems in their countries.

Singapore’s success can be attributed to these five factors: the pragmatic leadership of the late Lee Kuan Yew and his successors; an effective public bureaucracy; effective control of corruption; reliance on the “best and brightest” citizens through investment in education and competitive compensation; and learning from other countries.

Originality/value

This paper will be useful to those scholars and policy makers interested in learning from Singapore’s success in solving its problems.

Policy diffusion
Lee Kuan Yew
Pragmatic leadership
Effective public bureaucracy
Competitive compensation

Quah, J.S.T. (2018), "Why Singapore works: five secrets of Singapore’s success", Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal , Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 5-21. https://doi.org/10.1108/PAP-06-2018-002

Emerald Publishing Limited

Published in Public Administration and Policy . Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

Explaining Singapore’s success

Singapore is the smallest of […] Asia’s four “Little Dragons” […] but in many ways it is the most successful. Singapore is Asia’s dream country. […] Singapore’s success says a great deal about how a country with virtually no natural resources can create economic advantages with influence far beyond its region. […] But it certainly is an example of an extraordinarily successful small country in a big world ( Naisbitt, 1994 , pp. 252, 254).

We had been asked to leave Malaysia and go our own way with no signposts to our next destination. We faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival. […] On that 9th day of August 1965, I started out with great trepidation on a journey along an unmarked road to an unknown destination (pp. 19, 25).

Fortunately for Singaporeans, Lee’s fears were unfounded as Singapore has not only survived but has been transformed from a Third World country to a First World country during the past 53 years. The tremendous changes in Singapore’s policy context from 1959 to 2016 are shown in Table I . First, Singapore’s land area has increased by 137.7 km 2 from 581.5 km 2 in 1959 to 719.2 km 2 in 2016 as a result of land reclamation efforts. Second, as a consequence of its liberal immigration policy, Singapore’s population has increased by 3.6 times from 1.58 to 5.61m during the same period. Third, the most phenomenal manifestation of Singapore’s transformation from a poor Third World country to an affluent First World nation during 1960–2016 is that its GDP per capita has increased by 56 times from S$1,310 to S$73,167. Fourth, Singapore’s official foreign reserves have grown by 310 times from S$1,151m in 1963 to S$356,253.9m in 2016.

The lives of Singaporeans have also improved as reflected in the drastic decline in the unemployment rate from 14 per cent to 2.1 per cent during 1959–2016. Furthermore, the proportion of the population living in public housing has also increased from 9 per cent in 1960 to 82 per cent in 2016. Government expenditure on education has also risen by 200 times from S$63.39m in 1959 to S$12,660m in 2016. The heavy investment by the People’s Action Party (PAP) government on education during the past 57 years has reaped dividends as reflected in Singapore’s top ranking among 76 countries on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s study on the provision of comprehensive education ( Teng, 2015 , p. A1). Finally, as a result of the effectiveness of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in enforcing the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) impartially, corruption has been minimised in Singapore, which is the least corrupt Asian country according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2016 and 2017.

The following five sections in this paper will be devoted to analysing the secrets of Singapore’s success, beginning with the important legacy of Lee Kuan Yew’s pragmatic leadership. The concluding section advises policy makers in other countries on the relevance and applicability of Singapore’s secrets of success to the solution of their problems.

Pragmatic leadership: Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy

During the recent Non-Aligned Meeting in Jakarta, the Nepalese Prime Minister asked me for the secret of Singapore’s success. I smiled and replied, “Lee Kuan Yew.” I went on to explain that I meant it as a short form to encapsulate the principles, values and determination with which he governed and built Singapore ( Goh, 1992 , p. 15).

In the same speech, Goh (1992 , p. 15) concluded that meritocracy was the key to Singapore’s success because the “practice of meritocracy in the civil service, in politics, in business and in schools” enabled Singaporeans “to achieve excellence and to compete against others”.

My experience of developments in Asia has led me to conclude that we need good men to have good government. However good the system of government, bad leaders will bring harm to their people. […] The single decisive factor that made for Singapore’s development was the ability of its ministers and the high quality of the civil servants who supported them.

Indeed, leaders matter because of their role in “stretching” the constraints of “geography and natural resources, institutional legacies and international location” ( Samuels, 2003 , pp. 1-2). Applying Richard Samuels’ concept of political leadership, Lee and his colleagues have succeeded in stretching those constraints facing them and transformed Singapore to First World status by 2000, 41 years after assuming office in June 1959.

In addition to his belief in the importance of having good leaders, Lee was also a pragmatic leader. In November 1993, Lee advised visiting African leaders to adopt a pragmatic approach in formulating economic policy rather than a dogmatic stance. Instead of following the then-politically correct approach of being anti-American and anti-multinational corporations (MNCs) in the 1960s and 1970s, Lee and Singapore went against the grain and “assiduously courted MNCs” because “they had the technology, know-how, techniques, expertise and the markets” and “it was a fast way of learning on the job working for them and with them”. This strategy of relying on the MNCs paid off as “they have been a powerful factor in Singapore’s growth”. Lee (1994 , p. 13) concluded that Singapore succeeded because it “rejected conventional wisdom when it did not accord with rational analysis and its own experience”.

Number one is: get rid of the Communists; how you get rid of them does not interest me as an economist, but get them out of the government, get them out of the unions, get them off the streets. How you do it, is your job. Number two is: let [the statue of Stamford] Raffles [who founded Singapore] stand where he stands today; say publicly that you accept the heavy ties with the West because you will very much need them in your economic programme (quoted in Drysdale, 1984 , p. 252).

As a rational and pragmatic leader, Lee took Winsemius’ advice seriously, neutralised the communist threat and attracted many MNCs from the USA, Europe and Japan to Singapore. After Winsemius’ death in December 1996, Lee acknowledged Singapore’s debt as he had learnt from Winsemius a great deal about the operations of European and American companies and how he and his colleagues could attract them to invest in Singapore ( Lee, 1996 , p. 32). Singapore succeeded in developing its economy because Lee implemented the sound economic policies recommended by Winsemius.

I do not work on a theory. Instead I ask: what will make this work? If, after a series of such solutions, I find that a certain approach worked, then I try to find out what was the principle behind the solution. […] What is my guiding principle? Presented with the difficulty or major problem or an assessment of conflicting facts, I review what alternatives I have if my proposed solution doesn’t work. I choose a solution which offers a higher probability of success, but if it fails, I have some other way. Never a dead end (quoted in Plate, 2010 , pp. 46-47).

In short, Singapore has adopted a pragmatic approach to policy formulation which entails “a willingness to introduce new policies or modify existing ones as circumstances dictate, regardless of ideological principle” ( Jones, 2016 , p. 316).

A good piano playing good music: an effective public bureaucracy

Sir Kenneth Stowe, a former Permanent Secretary of the UK’s Department of Health and Social Security (1981–1987), has described “the efficient and well-tuned public service” as a “good piano” which should not “play bad music” by not “serving ends which are wrong by ministerial design or incompetence” ( Stowe, 1996 , pp. 89-90). The second secret of Singapore’s success is that it has an effective public bureaucracy that plays good music, to use Stowe’s analogy. The public bureaucracy in Singapore consists of 16 ministries and 64 statutory boards ( Republic of Singapore, 2018 ) and has grown from 127,279 to 144,980 employees during 2010–2016, as shown in Table II .

The World Bank defines “government effectiveness” as “the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies” ( Kaufmann et al. , 2004 , p. 3). Table III shows that Singapore has performed well consistently on the World Bank’s governance indicator of government effectiveness as its score ranges from 1.85 in 2002 to 2.43 in 2008. It has attained 100 percentile ranking for these ten years: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

Thus, it is not surprising that Singapore is ranked first for government effectiveness in 2016 as shown in Table IV . A comparative analysis of the role of the public bureaucracy in policy implementation in five ASEAN countries has confirmed that Singapore is the most effective because of its favourable policy context and its effective public bureaucracy. The emphasis on meritocracy and training in Singapore’s public bureaucracy has resulted in a high level of competence of the personnel in implementing policies ( Jones, 2016 , p. 319). Conversely, Indonesia is the least effective because of its unfavourable policy context and its ineffective public bureaucracy. Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines occupy intermediate positions between Singapore and Indonesia and are ranked second, third and fourth, respectively, depending on the nature of their policy contexts and the levels of effectiveness of their public bureaucracies ( Quah, 2016a , p. 72).

Sustaining clean government: keeping corruption at bay

Stay clean: dismiss the venal ( Lee, 1979 , p. 38).

Corruption was a serious problem in Singapore during the British colonial period because of the government’s lack of political will and the ineffective Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), which had only 17 personnel to deal with both corruption and non-corruption-related functions and was handicapped in tackling police corruption because it was located within the Criminal Investigation Department of the Singapore Police Force (SPF) ( Quah, 2007 , pp. 14-15). The problem of corruption deteriorated during the Japanese Occupation (February 1942 to August 1945) as civil servants could not survive on their low wages because of the high inflation rate and the scarcity of food and other commodities forced many people to trade in the black market. The Japanese Occupation’s worst legacy was “the corruption of public and private integrity: flourishing gambling dens and brothels, both legalised by the Japanese, the resurgence of opium smoking, universal profiteering and bribery” ( Turnbull, 1977 , p. 225).

We were sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders. […] We had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government. When we took the oath of office […] in June 1959, we all wore white shirts and white slacks to symbolise purity and honesty in our personal behaviour and our public life. […] We made sure from the day we took office in June 1959 that every dollar in revenue would be properly accounted for and would reach the beneficiaries at the grass roots as one dollar, without being siphoned off along the way. So from the very beginning we gave special attention to the areas where discretionary powers had been exploited for personal gain and sharpened the instruments that could prevent, detect or deter such practices ( Lee, 2000 , pp. 182-184).

As corruption was endemic in Singapore when the PAP leaders assumed office, they learned from the mistakes made by the British colonial government in curbing corruption and showed their political will by enacting the POCA on 17 June 1960 to replace the ineffective Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) and to strengthen the CPIB by providing it with more legal powers, personnel and funding. The British colonial government’s most serious error was to make the ACB, which was part of the SPF, responsible for corruption control with the enactment of the POCO in December 1937 even though the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry had confirmed the prevalence of police corruption in Singapore ( Quah, 2007 , pp. 9, 14, 16). The British authorities failed to observe the “golden rule” that “the police cannot and should not be responsible for investigating their deviance and crimes” ( Punch, 2009 , p. 245).

The folly of making the ACB responsible for curbing corruption was only realised by the British colonial government in October 1951 when three police detectives and some senior police officers were implicated in the Opium Hijacking scandal involving the robbery of 1,800 pounds of opium worth S$400,000 (US$133,333) ( Tan, 1999 , p. 59). It corrected the first mistake by replacing the ACB with the CPIB in September 1952 as a Type A anti-corruption agency (ACA) dedicated to combating corruption. However, it made a second mistake by not providing the CPIB with adequate legal powers, budget and personnel to perform its functions effectively. The POCO did not provide CPIB officers with adequate enforcement powers and the CPIB was ineffective because its reliance on 13 seconded personnel from the SPF hindered the investigation of police officers accused of corruption offences ( Quah, 2017 , p. 266).

Unlike the British colonial government’s weak political will in combating corruption, the PAP leaders realised from the outset the critical importance of political will by enhancing the CPIB’s legal powers and providing it with the required personnel and budget to perform its functions effectively. The substantial growth in the CPIB’s budget and personnel from 2010 to 2015 is shown in Table V and reflected in the increase of its per capita expenditure from US$2.88 in 2010 to US$4.55 in 2015. The CPIB’s staff-population ratio has also improved from 1:56,408 to 1:26,109 during the same period.

Apart from its adequate legal powers, budget and personnel, the CPIB is an effective Type A ACA for four reasons. First, even though the CPIB comes under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office, it has operational autonomy because the prime minister and other political leaders do not interfere in its daily operations and its director reports to the secretary of the cabinet. Furthermore, the CPIB’s director can obtain the elected president’s consent to investigate allegations of corruption against ministers, members of parliament and senior civil servants if the prime minister withholds his consent ( Quah, 2007 , pp. 40-41).

Second, the CPIB adopts a “total approach to enforcement” and deals with both major and minor cases of public and private sector corruption, regardless of the amount, rank or status of the persons under investigation. The same processes and procedures apply to everyone being investigated, including ministers and chief executive officers of major companies. Both bribe-givers and bribe-takers are equally culpable according to the POCA ( Soh, 2008 , pp. 1-2).

Third, the CPIB’s effectiveness is also the result of its efforts to enhance the capabilities of its officers by sending them for training programmes on management and professional topics in Singapore and other countries. In July 2004, the CPIB created a Computer Forensics Unit to improve the investigative and evidence-gathering skills of its officers by providing them with the knowledge of forensic accounting to enable them to trace ill-gotten assets and retrieve incriminating evidence from seized computers and mobile telephones. The CPIB has also conducted joint operations with the Commercial Affairs Department and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority to develop networks and partnerships with other public agencies in Singapore ( Soh, 2008 , pp. 3-4).

Finally, the most important reason for the CPIB’s success is its impartial enforcement of the POCA as anyone found guilty of a corruption offence is punished regardless of his or her position, status or political affiliation. The CPIB has investigated five PAP leaders and eight senior civil servants in Singapore without fear or favour from 1966 to 2014. In November 1986, the Minister for National Development, Teh Cheang Wan, was accused of accepting S$1m in bribes from two property developers. He was investigated and interrogated by CPIB officers but he committed suicide one month later before he could be charged in court. In July 2013, Edwin Yeo, the CPIB’s Assistant Director, was charged with misappropriating US$1.41m from 2008 to 2012. He was found guilty of criminal breach of trust and forgery and sentenced to ten years imprisonment on 20 February 2014 ( Quah, 2015a , pp. 77, 80-81).

The CPIB’s effectiveness is confirmed by its 100 per cent conviction rate and the CPIB Public Perceptions Survey’s finding that 89 per cent of the 1,011 respondents had rated Singapore positively on its anti-corruption efforts in 2016 ( CPIB, 2017 , pp. 7, 9). Its effectiveness is also reflected in Singapore’s sixth ranking among 180 countries with a score of 84 on the CPI in 2017 ( Transparency International, 2018 ) and its consistently good performance on the other five indicators of the perceived extent of corruption in Table VI . The sixth indicator, “Public Trust in Politicians”, is included as an indirect indicator because “corruption influences the level of trust” and citizens living in those countries where corruption is widespread would have low trust in their politicians ( Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016 , p. 259).

Nurturing the “best and brightest”: education and competitive compensation

If we underpay men of quality as ministers, we cannot expect them to stay long in office earning a fraction of what they could outside. […] Underpaid ministers and public officials have ruined many governments in Asia ( Lee, 2000 , p. 193).

Education is the key to the long-term future of the population in Singapore which has no natural resources. Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong observed in March 1997 that Singapore was “blessed” by its lack of natural resources because it was forced to develop its only resource: its people ( Chua, 1997 , p. 1). In other words, Singapore has compensated for its absence of natural resources by investing heavily in education to enhance the skills of its population and to attract the “best and brightest” Singaporeans to join and remain in the public bureaucracy and government by its policies of meritocracy and paying these citizens competitive salaries.

The PAP government views education as “a national investment” and has increased government expenditure on education by about 200 times from S$63.39m in 1959 to S$12,660m in 2016. Consequently, the enrolment in all educational institutions in Singapore has grown from 352,952 students in 1960 to 651,655 students in 2016, and the literacy rate has also improved from 72.2 per cent in 1970 to 97.0 per cent in 2016 ( Department of Statistics, 1983 , pp. 231, 248, 249; 2017 , pp. 281, 296, 299). Singapore’s intensive investment in education and training during the past 57 years has certainly enhanced the quality of its population as reflected in the excellent performance of its students in many international assessments.

In 1997, the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), which compared the scores of 13-year-olds in mathematics and science tests in 41 countries, ranked Singapore first in both subjects with scores of 643 and 607, respectively, which were significantly higher than the international average score of 500 ( Economist, 1997 , p. 21). In 2015, Singapore students not only retained their top position in both subjects in the TIMSS assessment but also topped the Program for International Student Assessment of 65 countries in mathematics, reading and science literacy skills, and, as mentioned earlier, the OECD’s global school rankings in 76 countries ( Goodwin et al. , 2017 , pp. 1-2).

Singapore was a poor country when the PAP government assumed office in June 1959 and inherited a huge budget deficit because the previous Labour Front government had spent S$200m. Accordingly, it removed the cost of living allowance for 6,000 middle and senior civil servants and saved S$10m. In 1968, the Harvey Report on public sector salaries recommended salary increases for senior civil servants in the Superscale Grades C to G. The government did not accept this recommendation because it could not afford a major salary revision and the private sector was not viewed as a serious competitor for talented personnel ( Quah, 2015b , p. 383).

However, the improvement in Singapore’s economy in the 1970s resulted in higher private sector salaries, which led to an exodus of talented senior civil servants to more lucrative jobs in the private sector. In February 1972, the National Wages Council was established to advise the government on wage polices and, one month later, it recommended that all public sector employees be paid a 13th-month non-pensionable allowance comparable to the bonus in the private sector. The salaries of senior civil servants were increased substantially in 1973 and 1979 to reduce the gap with the private sector. A 1981 survey of 30,197 graduates in Singapore conducted by the Internal Revenue Department found that graduates in the private sector jobs earned, on the average, 42 per cent more than their counterparts working in the public sector. Consequently, it was not surprising that eight superscale and 67 timescale administrative officers had resigned from the civil service for better-paid private sector jobs. The government responded by revising the salaries of senior civil servants in 1982, 1988, 1989 and 1994 to reduce the gap with private sector salaries and to minimise their outflow to the private sector ( Quah, 2010 , pp. 104-110).

On 17 March 1989, Lee Hsien Loong, the Minister for Trade and Industry, recommended a hefty salary increase for senior civil servants because the low salaries and slow promotion in the Administrative Service had contributed to its low recruitment and high resignation rates. He stressed that as the government’s fundamental philosophy was to “pay civil servants market rates for their abilities and responsibilities”, it “will offer whatever salaries are necessary to attract and retain the talent that it needs”. He concluded his speech in Parliament by reiterating that “paying civil servants adequate salaries is absolutely essential to maintain the quality of public administration” in Singapore ( Quah, 2010 , pp. 107-108).

To justify the government’s practice of matching public sector salaries with private sector salaries, a White Paper on “ Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government ” was presented to Parliament on 21 October 1994 to justify the pegging of the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants to the average salaries of the top four earners in the six private sector professions of accounting, banking, engineering, law, local manufacturing companies and MNCs. The adoption of the long-term formula suggested in the White Paper removed the need to justify the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants “from scratch with each salary revision”, and also ensured the building of “an efficient public service and a competent and honest political leadership, which have been vital for Singapore’s prosperity and success” ( Republic of Singapore, 1994 , pp. 7-12, 18).

In December 2007, the Public Service Division (PSD) announced that the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants would be increased from 4 to 21 per cent from January 2008. On 24 November 2008, the PSD indicated that their salaries would be decreased by 19 per cent in 2009 because of the economic recession. Consequently, the president’s annual salary was reduced from S$3.87m to S$3.14m and the prime minister’s annual salary was also reduced from S$3.76m to S$3.04m from 2008 to 2009 ( Quah, 2010 , p. 116). However, the economy recovered in 2010 and the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants were revised upwards. Even though the PAP won 81 of the 87 parliamentary seats in the May 2011 general election, the percentage of votes captured declined to 60.1 from 66.6 per cent in the May 2006 general election.

As the high salaries of political appointments were a controversial issue during the campaign for the 7 May 2011 general election, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong appointed on 21 May a committee to “review the basis and level of salaries for the President, Prime Minister, political appointment holders and MPs [Members of Parliament] to ensure that the salary framework will remain relevant for the future”. The Committee submitted its report to Prime Minister Lee on 30 December 2011 and the government accepted all its recommendations and implemented the revised salaries from 21 May 2011 ( Republic of Singapore, 2012 , pp. i-ii). Table VII shows the substantial reduction in the annual salaries of key political appointments from 2010 to 2011, ranging from S$1,627,000 for the president to S$103,700 for the minister of state.

In December 2017, an independent committee formed by the PAP government a few months earlier to review ministerial salaries recommended wage increases for key political appointments as their salaries had not risen since 2011 to keep pace with salary increases in Singapore’s private sector. For example, as the annual salary of an entry-level minister (MR4) is benchmarked to 60 per cent of the median income of the top 1,000 earners in Singapore, the committee recommended increasing his annual salary from S$1.1m to S$1.2m. During the debate on the 2018 budget for ministries on 1 March 2018, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean did not accept the committee’s recommendations and explained that the government would not be increasing ministerial salaries because the committee had confirmed that the current salary structure was still relevant and sound ( Seow, 2018 , p. A4). As the salaries of Singapore’s ministers and senior civil servants are already the highest in the world, any further salary increase would be unpopular among Singaporeans and politically costly for the PAP government.

Edgar Schein (1996 , pp. 221-222) attributed Singapore’s success to its incorruptible and competent civil service as “having the best and brightest” citizens in government is probably one of Singapore’s major strengths in that they are potentially the most able to invent what the country needs to survive and grow”. Indeed, the PAP government’s policy of paying competitive salaries to attract the “best and brightest” Singaporeans to join the public bureaucracy has been successful as reflected in Singapore’s consistently high scores and percentile rankings on the World Bank’s governance indicator on government effectiveness as shown in Table III .

Learning from other countries: the importance of policy diffusion

The object of looking abroad is not to copy but to learn under what circumstances and to what extent programmes effective elsewhere may also work here. Moreover, the failures of other governments offer lessons about what not to do at far less political cost than making the same mistakes yourself ( Rose, 2005 , p. 1).

An important strength of the PAP government is its willingness to learn from the experiences of other countries by not repeating the mistakes they have made in solving their problems. Thus, instead of “reinventing the wheel”, which is unnecessary and expensive, the PAP leaders and senior civil servants would consider what has been done in other countries and the private sector to identify suitable solutions for resolving policy problems in Singapore. The policy solutions selected would usually be adapted and modified to suit Singapore’s context. For example, the government examined the Japanese and French civil services and the Shell Company’s system of performance appraisal as part of its efforts to improve personnel management in Singapore’s public bureaucracy ( Quah, 2010 , pp. 79-81). Lee Kuan Yew revealed in his memoirs that he had consulted corporate leaders of MNCs on how they recruited and promoted senior personnel and adopted the Shell Company’s performance appraisal system for Singapore’s public bureaucracy in 1983 “after trying out the [Shell] system and finding it practical and reliable” ( Lee, 2000 , pp. 740-741).

The reliance on “policy diffusion” or the “emulation and borrowing of policy ideas and solutions from other nations” ( Leichter, 1979 , p. 42) is an important strategy adopted by the PAP government to deal with problems. The three steps in the process of “pragmatic acculturation” are: problem identification and sending a team of experts and officials on a fact-finding tour of relevant technical centres and organisations in other countries to learn how the same problems are solved; invitation of internationally renowned experts to Singapore to give their professional opinions; and formulation of the policy plan from the ideas selected from what has been learned about the problem and tailored to the specific needs of Singapore. If the ideas and procedures used elsewhere are unsuitable for Singapore’s needs, they are not adopted ( Quah, 1995 , p. 55). Singapore’s Changi Airport, which is recognised as one of the best airports in the world today, provides a good illustration of pragmatic acculturation as a team of officials was sent initially to several countries to examine the best and worst airports with the aim of building an airport which would be better than Netherlands’ Schiphol Airport (considered the best airport then) and avoiding the problems faced by New York’s Kennedy Airport or Heathrow Airport in Britain.

During the early years after independence, Singapore looked towards such small nations as Israel and Switzerland as role models for inspiration to formulate relevant public policies for defence and other areas. Later, other countries like West Germany (for technical education), the Netherlands (Changi Airport was modelled after Schiphol Airport) and Japan (for quality control circles and crime prevention) were added to the list. The important lesson in these learning experiences is the adoption by Singapore of ideas which have worked elsewhere (with suitable modification to consider Singapore’s context if necessary) as well as the rejection of unsuccessful schemes in other countries.

But nothing is for free in this world and the end result of indiscriminate welfare state policies is bankruptcy. […] In several West European countries, unemployment benefits have been so generous that some workers are better off unemployed! The money to pay for welfare state expenditure must come either from taxes or from the printing press. Increasing taxes, which mainly affects the rich, reduces the amount of money available for investment, thereby slowing down economic growth. Printing paper money to avoid unpleasant tax increases merely results in more inflation ( Goh, 1977 , p. 166).

Considering the limitations of the welfare state in Western Europe and the USA, the PAP government views social welfare as a consumption good and is concerned that “government provision of social welfare” would result in “an unhealthy dependence on the state and sap individual initiative and enterprise, thereby also undermining growth”. China, Jamaica and Sri Lanka have abandoned their welfare policies as “guaranteed social welfare” is expensive and inappropriate for developing countries. Consequently, the PAP government’s policy is “to reduce welfare to the minimum” and restrict it to “only those who are handicapped or old” ( Lim, 1989 , pp. 172, 187).

In short, policy diffusion remains an asset for Singapore so long as there is intelligent sifting of relevant policy ideas and solutions tested elsewhere by the policy makers without blind acceptance and wholesale transplantation of foreign innovations without modification to suit the local context.

Applicability of Singapore’s experience for other countries

[…] while it is difficult if not impossible to transfer public administration Singapore-style in toto to other Asian countries, it is nevertheless possible for these countries to emulate and adapt some features of public administration Singapore-style to suit their own needs, provided that their political leaders, civil servants, and population are prepared to make the necessary changes ( Quah, 2010 , p. 255).

Having identified and analysed the five secrets of Singapore’s success, the question that remains is whether policy makers in other countries could learn from Singapore’s experience to solve similar problems in their countries. After his first visit to Singapore on 12-14 November 1978, Deng Xiaoping “found orderly Singapore an appealing model for reform” and sent many Chinese officials to Singapore to “learn about city planning, public management, and controlling corruption” ( Vogel, 2011 , p. 291). Consequently, 400 delegations of mayors, governors and party secretaries from China visited Singapore on study missions following Deng’s visit ( Asiaweek, 1994 , p. 24).

Policy makers in other countries who are interested in applying Singapore’s secrets of success to solve their problems must consider three important aspects. First, they must recognise the significant contextual differences between Singapore, which is an affluent, politically stable city-state with a small land area and population, and their countries, which have lower GDP per capita and larger territories and populations. The relevance of Singapore’s approach would depend on the extent to which the policy contexts in other countries approximate Singapore’s policy context. Indeed, the contextual differences would make it difficult for larger countries like China and India with huge populations to adopt in toto Singapore-style solutions to their problems.

Yes—but there are over one hundred metropolitan areas in China that have a population of Singapore’s size or greater. The Singapore model may work if you can devote all your resources to it—but I don’t know if even the Chinese with all their resources, all their cleverness, and all their determination can do it a hundred times (quoted in Burstein and de Keijzer, 1998 , p. 171).

During his second visit to Singapore in 1980, Deng himself acknowledged the burden of China’s huge population and vast territory when he lamented that: “If I had only Shanghai, I too might be able to change Shanghai as quickly [as Singapore]. But I have the whole of China!” (quoted in Lee, 2000 , pp. 667-668).

The successful policy of country A [Singapore] cannot simply be replanted in the soil of struggling target country B [China]. Instead careful attention must be directed to the wider policy contexts involved as well as to the feasibility of policy transfer. […] Policies, like garden plants, cannot simply be plucked from one environment to be replanted in another. There are questions of soil type, rainfall, and sunlight just as there are questions of government capacity, efficiency and integrity.

The second consideration for those policy makers interested in applying Singapore’s secrets of success to solving their domestic problems is whether they have the political will to allocate the necessary resources and mobilise the required support from various stakeholders to implement Singapore-style policies effectively in their countries. Apart from their contextual differences with Singapore, other countries might lack these prerequisites for the PAP government’s effectiveness in policy implementation, namely, political stability; a strong parliamentary majority; economic affluence; a low level of corruption; rule of law; and an effective public bureaucracy.

For example, it would be too expensive economically and politically for many countries to pay competitive public sector salaries to attract the “best and brightest” citizens to join the public bureaucracy and government and to motivate and retain them. In his 2000 National Day Rally speech, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong emphasised the need to ensure good government in Singapore by “recruiting good people for government and paying them properly”. However, Goh (2000) admitted that many western leaders informed him privately that while they “envied our system of Ministers’ pay”, they added that “if they tried to implement it in their own countries, they would be booted out” (p. 44).

China is ranked 77th among 180 countries with a score of 41 on the CPI in 2017 ( Transparency International, 2018 , p. 2). This means that corruption remains a serious problem in China in spite of President Xi Jinping’s five-year-old campaign to curb corruption among the “tigers” and “flies”, which is ineffective because of its failure to address the causes of corruption, the selective enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), and the reliance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders on corruption as a weapon against their political opponents ( Quah, 2015c , pp. 84-87).

In August 2014, Wang Qishan, Secretary of the CCDI, observed that: “China should learn from the Hong Kong or Singapore model for tackling corruption as both have independent anti-corruption bodies, unlike China which relies on the party investigating itself” ( Wang, 2014 ). As China is a communist state with political power monopolised by the CCP, it is unrealistic to expect the CCP to introduce the necessary reforms to enhance the effectiveness of its anti-corruption strategy by establishing a single independent ACA like the CPIB and provide it with the required personnel and budget to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially against corrupt offenders, regardless of their status, position or political affiliation and to avoid using corruption as a weapon against political foes ( Quah, 2016b , p. 208).

Learning from Singapore’s experience, China will only succeed in minimising corruption if the CCP leaders are willing to introduce checks on their power and if they introduce reforms to address the causes of corruption. However, barring unforeseen circumstances, it is highly unlikely that President Xi Jinping and his colleagues would be willing to pay the exorbitant price required for curbing corruption in China because the implementation of the necessary anti-corruption reforms could lead to the CCP’s demise ( Quah, 2016b , p. 209). In short, do policy makers elsewhere have the political will to pay the high political and economic costs of implementing Singapore-style policy reforms in their countries?

There was never a Singapore miracle. It was simply hard-headed policy. […] Because governments which dare to face a situation, analyse it and take measures without compromise are rather scarce in this world. […] If it happened in other countries, it might be a miracle. But what happened in Singapore was not a miracle. It was policy (quoted in Mukherjee, 2015 , pp. 33, 47).

As mentioned above, Singapore policy makers have not hesitated to learn from other countries’ experiences to formulate relevant policies with appropriate modifications for the local context. However, when Singapore faces problems which other countries cannot solve, the PAP leaders initiate innovative solutions to solve these problems. As the British colonial government failed to solve the serious housing shortage and widespread corruption, the PAP government initiated innovative solutions to tackle these two problems after assuming office in June 1959 ( Quah, 2011 , p. 122). In February 1960, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) was established as a statutory board to solve the housing shortage by providing low-cost public housing for Singaporeans. In June 1960, the POCA was enacted to strengthen the CPIB’s effectiveness in combating corruption.

The HDB’s effective public housing programme has resulted in the building of 1,129,236 flats from its inception in February 1960 to December 2016 and increasing the proportion of the population living in public housing in Singapore from 9 to 82 per cent during this period ( Department of Statistics, 2017 , pp. 134, 144). As discussed in the fourth section above, the CPIB’s effectiveness in minimising corruption is reflected in Table VI , which depicts Singapore’s good performance on six corruption indicators in 2017. Thus, housing and corruption are no longer serious problems in Singapore today because of the effective and innovative strategies adopted by the HDB and CPIB, respectively, to solve these problems.

In the final analysis, bearing in mind the contextual differences and the preconditions for Singapore’s success, policy makers in other countries must have the political will and be prepared to pay the high political and economic price for implementing Singapore-style reforms with appropriate modifications to solve their problems.

Changes in Singapore’s policy context, 1959–2016

Notes: The average exchange rates were: US$1=S$1.3635 in 2010 and US$1=S$1.2579 in 2011 ( Department of Statistics, 2017 , p. 217)

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Soh , K.H. ( 2008 ), “ Corruption enforcement ”, paper presented at the Second Seminar of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Associations, Chongqing, 17-18 May .

Stowe , K. ( 1996 ), “ Good piano won’t play bad music ”, in Barberis , P. (Ed.), The Whitehall Reader: The UK’s Administrative Machine in Action , Chapter 3.6 , Open University Press , Buckingham , pp. 86 - 91 .

Tan , A.L. ( 1999 ), “ The experience of Singapore in combating corruption ”, in Stapenhurst , R. and Kpundeh , S.J. (Eds), Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National Integrity , World Bank , Washington, DC , pp. 59 - 66 .

Teng , A. ( 2015 ), “ Singapore tops world’s most comprehensive education rankings ”, Straits Times , 14 May, p. A1 .

Transparency International ( 2017 ), Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 , Transparency International , Berlin , available at: www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (accessed 25 January 2017 ).

Transparency International ( 2018 ), Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 , Transparency International , Berlin .

Turnbull , C.M. ( 1977 ), A History of Singapore 1819–1975 , Oxford University Press , Kuala Lumpur .

Vogel , E.F. ( 2011 ), Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China , Harvard University Press , Cambridge, MA .

Wang , Q. ( 2014 ), “ Anti-corruption chief says China should learn from Hong Kong, Singapore ”, Ejinsight , 27 August .

World Bank ( 2017 ), Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016 , World Bank , Washington, DC , available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports (accessed 8 October 2017 ).

Corresponding author

About the author.

Jon S.T. Quah is a retired Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and anti-corruption consultant based in Singapore. He has published widely on corruption and governance in Asian countries. His latest books include: Combating Asian Corruption: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies (2017); The Role of the Public Bureaucracy in Policy Implementation in Five ASEAN Countries (2016); Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015) (2015); Different Paths to Curbing Corruption: Lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore (2013); and Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (2011, 2013).

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Singapore Is Not An Island

Straits Times Press

Regular price $24.30 SGD

Essays on Singapore's Foreign Policy As a small country in Southeast Asia seeking to survive and prosper, Singapore cannot be ordinary. It must be extraordinary. Herein lies the central challenge for Singapore in every area, including foreign policy. This book is a compilation of essays and public speeches by Bilahari Kausikan over the last 25 years. A frank and passionate assessment of the geopolitical realities to date, and the uncertainties that have emerged. It is for anyone interested to know about protecting Singapore’s interests, nicely or otherwise, in a rapidly changing and complex world. AUTHOR: BILAHARI Kausikan Bilahari P S Kausikan is a veteran Singapore diplomat who retired in 2013, after serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for 32 years. He was Second Permanent Secretary and subsequently Permanent Secretary of MFA from 2001 to 2013. He is now Ambassador-at-Large. Bilahari is known nationally and internationally for his strategic analyses, and has a following in international foreign policy circles. He has also established a reputation in social media circles, especially among young Singaporeans.

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228 mm x 154 mm

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Singapore’s foreign policy under new leadership

Lawrence Wong’s foreign policy approach as Singapore’s fourth premier will be rooted in the successes of his predecessors, but he faces extraordinary pressures.

Lawrence Wong (Singapore foreign policy)

In a nutshell

Singapore has a consistent foreign policy approach based on diplomacy, as well as military strength and norms
The country’s strategic position is challenged by U.S.-China competition, regional instability and domestic political shifts
Future foreign policy will likely emphasize stability and continuity, and leverage existing partnerships

Lawrence Wong’s ascendancy as Singapore’s fourth prime minister has cast a spotlight on one of the region’s most diplomatically active countries. Few expect disruptive changes in foreign policy. Singapore’s international engagement is built on a decades-old foundation of political stability and economic growth. But the broader question remains how the country’s foreign policy engagement is likely to evolve amid regional and global challenges.

Mr. Wong enters his first term as prime minister – from May 15, 2024 – with no apparent plans to fundamentally alter Singapore’s foreign policy, which has been consistent under the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) that has governed the country since its separation from Malaysia in 1965. The country’s approach relies on actively cultivating diplomatic relationships, investing in military capabilities and supporting norms undergirding a rules-based order such as open trade.

These factors have been key to Singapore’s survival – and success – as a small but active state that has punched far above its weight. While occasional developments such as the so-called “small state debate” have highlighted some differences in views in the country, these are part of an enduring elite consensus. Mr. Wong has served decades in this system, including previous roles covering defense, education and energy. He is also part of a wider, years-long transition process to fourth-generation (4G) leadership.

Facts & figures

Singapore’s 4g leadership.

Singapore’s use of the term “4G” refers to the “fourth-generation” group of leaders currently taking over governance from the previous, or third-generation, leaders.

The concept of numbered generations of leadership has long been a part of Singapore’s political narrative, especially within the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). The first generation was led by Lee Kuan Yew, who was the country’s founding prime minister and is widely credited with transforming Singapore from a developing colony into a prosperous global city-state. The second generation was led by Goh Chok Tong, followed by the third generation under Lee Hsien Loong, the son of Lee Kuan Yew.

The 4G leaders are expected to continue this legacy of prosperity, but they also face their own set of challenges, including managing economic restructuring, maintaining social cohesion and addressing strategic geopolitical shifts. This group is composed of younger politicians who, having been groomed through various ministerial roles, embody a generational shift in leadership as they are expected to bring new perspectives and policies to address Singapore’s future needs.

At the same time, his tenure will take place as Singapore faces a more challenging environment. Abroad, Mr. Wong himself has warned that trends such as the backlash against trade, strained institutions and U.S.-China competition suggest an external environment that is “less benign and hospitable for small states like Singapore.”

Singapore’s leaders also worry that these circumstances could affect the trajectories of not only major powers, but also its neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, which could in turn affect bilateral ties. At home, while the PAP retains political dominance, the opposition has made periodic inroads and the ruling party has seen more scrutiny at times .

Singapore’s leaders have also expressed concern about rising foreign interference , with divisive issues such as the Israel-Gaza war undermining the country’s social compact. The only ethnic Chinese-majority state in Southeast Asia, Singapore is also home to sizable Malay and Indian minorities, and lies between two Muslim-majority countries (Indonesia and Malaysia), which has at times resulted in tense episodes.

Most likely: Singapore remains an important player on the international scene

Here, while Singapore would still confront manifold challenges, its leaders would be able to ensure that it preserves its position as a key global hub, continuing to play an active role internationally building on longstanding foreign policy fundamentals.

Globally, this would include continuing to craft sectoral agreements in the digital and green economy as well as taking a leadership role in shaping standards in areas like artificial intelligence .

Regionally, Singapore would also remain actively engaged as Southeast Asia struggles to manage flashpoints such as the Myanmar civil war , the South China Sea disputes and intensifying U.S.-China competition. It would also be a key node in bilateral cooperation or regional integration even amid geopolitical headwinds. This could include realizing ambitious cross-border projects with Malaysia and improving regional energy connectivity , even if this falls short of an explicit ASEAN-wide power grid. This trend would continue in the coming years, including when Singapore next holds the annually rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2027.

Less likely: Contestation hits Singapore’s foreign engagement

Singapore, faced with a fragmenting world, could see fierce divisions at home. This could strain the country’s internal harmony, increase tensions among the ruling elite, and affect aspects of the PAP’s performance amid opposition inroads.

These dynamics could in turn affect some of Singapore’s foreign policy decisions. Growing pressure and coercion from China ( as seen previously ) may affect Singapore’s delicate balance between valuing Beijing’s economic significance and maintaining its role as a key U.S. security partner .

Closer to home, growing nationalism or rising identity politics in neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia could spill over and upset the country’s social compact. Contestation could also erode Singapore’s competitiveness as a regional and global hub, which rests on its reputation for political stability. These concerns are not merely hypothetical. As Lee Kuan Yew noted in a key foreign policy speech in 2009 , Singapore’s success in staying competitive rests on its ability to “remain a cohesive, multi-racial, multi-religious nation based on meritocracy.”

Least likely: A more constrained Singapore internationally

Here, Singapore would see a decline in its status as one of the region’s most diplomatically active and militarily proficient countries. This would in turn begin to impose constraints on the ability of the ruling regime to be as active internationally as it would like.

In one version of this scenario, slowing economic growth could erode the ruling regime’s popularity, raising questions about defense spending and strengthening resistance to foreign workers despite the country’s aging population. If Singapore’s leaders find that they have to respond to these pressures by cutting defense budgets and severely restricting immigration, this risks eroding Singapore’s deterrence and its foundation as a regional talent hub. This could in turn complicate Singapore’s relationships with its Southeast Asian neighbors and make it more vulnerable to threats from foreign powers.

Given Singapore’s global relevance, these dynamics will be closely scrutinized by international observers. In the major 2009 speech, Lee Kuan Yew noted with his characteristic bluntness that Singapore will survive and prosper as long as future generations of Singaporeans “do not forget the fundamentals of our vulnerabilities, and not delude themselves that we can behave as if our neighbors are Europeans or North Americans, and remain alert, cohesive and realistic.” That is likely to remain a generational foreign policy test for Mr. Wong and Singapore’s 4G leaders in the coming years.

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Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs

Volume 46, Number 1, April 2024
ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute

Additional Information

The Domestic Determinants of Hedging in Singapore’s Foreign Policy
Terence Lee (bio)

In response to the intensifying US-China rivalry, Singapore ostensibly “hedges”, a strategy that avoids choosing between Washington and Beijing and maximizes gains from cooperating with both powers while avoiding confrontation. Hedging also extenuates Singapore’s central location in Asia and its role as an established commercial and financial hub. As such, it appears to reflect the imperative of any small state: survival. However, in contrast to the argument that domestic politics does not matter in Singapore’s foreign policy, this article demonstrates how the domestic imperative of legitimizing the political dominance of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) shapes the government’s hedging strategy.

Singapore, hedging, China-US rivalry, domestic politics, legitimacy, People’s Action Party

… sometimes, the steps we take may look like it is more aligned with one country, other times it may look as if we are more aligned with another country, but actually we are always only aligned to one country—Singapore, ourselves and our principles. … The consistent message is: We act, always, based on what is in Singapore’s interests and our principles-based approach. 1

In this statement made on 5 February 2023, Singaporean Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam described Singapore’s [End Page 77] foreign policy in seemingly schizophrenic terms. He portrayed it as cooperative and aligned, yet independent and neutral. For observers of Singapore’s foreign policy, these contradictions describe “hedging”, a concept that eschews the realist concepts of “balancing” and “bandwagoning” as irrelevant in explaining how small states respond to security challenges. 2 Hedging also entails an evident “inclination to diversify, to preserve policy independence, or to keep options open”. 3 Singapore hedges by not choosing between Washington and Beijing. Instead, it seeks to benefit from the economic opportunities offered by its relations with China while striving to keep a US military presence in the region for stability and security. 4 Singapore is far from alone in articulating this strategic preference; several Southeast Asian states pursue similar proclivities. 5

Prima facie , hedging is prudent as it mitigates risk while keeping fallback options, mixing engagement with balancing while “maximizing policy autonomy and minimizing provocation of either great power” and “reserving the flexibility to align in the future should either great power come to constitute [a] direct threat”. 6 However, if foreign policy reflects the means to achieve the interests and values of nation-states, what ends does hedging seek to attain? Paraphrasing Clausewitz, what are a hedging state’s political goals if foreign policy is the continuation of politics by other means? In other words, what are Singapore’s political objectives if hedging is its strategy to guide its diplomatic interactions with the United States and China?

This article answers these questions by examining the domestic sources of Singapore’s foreign policy. While acknowledging certain shortcomings in the existing literature, the article does not seek to add to the theorizing on hedging in International Relations. Instead, it explores how hedging addresses the political goals of Singapore’s ruling elite. Because the government, the ruling elite and the People’s Action Party (PAP) are analogous in Singapore, examining their political goals offers insights into why it hedges when dealing with China and the United States. Thus, this elite-centred analysis is consistent with the observations that foreign policymaking in Singapore is divorced from the broader public. 7

By hedging, Singapore’s foreign policy legitimizes the PAP, which has ruled the city-state since its independence in 1965. Unpacking this process further, this article reveals that hedging fosters legitimacy for the PAP through “specific” and “diffuse” support mechanisms. Specific in that support from the population is circumscribed to [End Page 78] officeholders or government bodies based on evaluations of their actions and decisions. Diffuse in that support is determined by attachments to prescribed principles, values and norms. 8

This article is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief overview of how Singapore hedges in dealing with China and the United States. It then discusses how the existing literature fails to explain why states hedge and how this practice achieves foreign policy objectives. The next section then presents the theoretical explanation of how hedging, as a foreign policy tactic, can effectively contribute to the goals of domestic legitimation. The empirical discussion of the article shows how the theoretical argument works in the case of Singapore. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the key findings and offers preliminary thoughts on whether Singapore’s domestic legitimation considerations are likely to persist.

How Does Singapore “Hedge”?

Most scholars identify Singapore as a typical hedger. 9 According to Evelyn Goh, the city-state’s hedging entails “strong engagement with China and the facilitation of a continuing US strategic presence in the region to act as a counterweight or balance against rising Chinese power”. 10 Singapore views the United States as indispensable to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. 11 The two countries share a close defence relationship, which Tim Huxley has called a “quasi-alliance”. 12 Singapore has supported the United States’ presence in Asia, hosting US naval and aircraft deployments. Its facilities were utilized by US forces en route to Afghanistan and for use in various counterterrorism operations following the 9/11 attacks. Under the “Rebalance to Asia” policy during the Obama administration, which the Trump administration continued, Singapore agreed to the forward deployment of US Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The LCS deployment was followed by that of the P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft and the conclusion of an enhanced bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement, both in 2015. 13

Singapore’s hedging involves actively courting China as well as the United States. Singapore seeks a range of cooperative economic opportunities with Beijing, including Singaporean investment in China and encouraging Chinese investment in Singapore. It is a supporter of the Beijing-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), was one of the founding members of the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and is an enthusiastic promoter of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). [End Page 79]

Singapore has also increased defence cooperation with China. For example, they signed the Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation in 2008. However, according to Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, the “scope and depth of Singapore’s defence cooperation with the United States far exceeds that with China, Singapore has been careful to cultivate positive security relations with Beijing.” 14

When Singapore hedges, it maintains “policy autonomy” and “independence” vis-à-vis the great powers. 15 Although close to the United States, Singapore has remained independent in several instances. In 1988, for example, the Singaporean government expelled a US diplomat, E. Mason Hendrickson, for meeting and allegedly cultivating opposition politicians, which Singapore claimed amounted to interference in its internal affairs. 16 During the “Asian Values” debate of the 1990s, Singaporean leaders were forthright in challenging the United States’ position that democratic freedoms and human rights are universal. 17

Singapore has also been cautious and tempered in its perceived military alignment with the United States. For instance, in 2003, it declined the offer to become a “major non-NATO ally,” preferring not to antagonize China (nor its Muslim-majority neighbours). 18 When hosting the US Air Force and Navy, Singapore has frequently stressed that US military assets are not permanently based in Singapore.

While courting China, Singapore has asserted its sovereign right to act no matter what Beijing thinks. In 2004, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made a “private visit” to Taiwan. Singapore has also voiced concerns about China’s increasing militarization of the South China Sea. 19 It has stood up to what it has perceived as Chinese pressure, interference and subversion. It has rebuffed Beijing’s expectations that it should pay due deference to Beijing because it is a small Chinese-majority nation. 20 Singapore responded robustly to 2016 accusations carried in the Global Times . It refused to cede to Chinese pressure about its military training in Taiwan despite China detaining the Singapore military’s Terrex fighting vehicles in Hong Kong. 21 Also, it revoked the permanent residence status of the Chinese-American academic Huang Jing, accusing him of being an “agent of influence” seeking to subvert Singapore. 22 In 2018, Singapore’s veteran diplomat Bilahari Kausikan publicly alleged that Chinese covert influence operations had targeted Singapore. 23 [End Page 80]

Why Do States “Hedge”?

As Singapore’s relationship with China and the United States illustrates, hedging denotes a mixed foreign policy, combining cooperative and conflictive approaches and a mix of engagement and balancing. However, there is a notable gap in the existing literature regarding what states do when they hedge, why they hedge, what ends hedging attains, and if hedging realizes a state’s goals.

There are at least three theoretical explanations for why states hedge: as a form of alignment; as a means for risk management; and as a strategy. 24 In essence, states hedge to avoid decisive alignment amid a major-power competition. According to Evelyn Goh, hedging is a “middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another”. 25 Denny Roy sees it as a midpoint between outright balancing and bandwagoning, to keep options open “against the possibility of a future security threat”. 26 Hedging may also be viewed as non-alignment and a “multi-pronged” alignment, simultaneously “cultivating, maintaining, and enhancing partnerships with as many powers and players for as long as feasible”. 27

However, the existing understanding of hedging is imprecise regarding what alignment behaviour it entails. Hedging is a catch-all concept encompassing any combination of engagement and protective measures, ubiquitous for a broad range of state actions, rendering the term analytically inconsequential. In addition, without a precise specification of what type of foreign policy behaviour hedging is (or isn’t), assessing successful (or unsuccessful) hedging in relation to a state’s goals becomes challenging.

Relatedly, assuming that foreign policy results from a deliberative process, why do states choose hedging as their preferred mode of diplomacy? Prior scholarship has suggested that hedging is the preferred “fallback” option to mitigate potential future losses in the face of multiple risks and high uncertainties. 28 Alternatively, it supposes that states hedge because it is a “returns-maximizing” or “gain-seeking” form of economic and diplomatic engagement and a protective “risk-contingency” military measure. 29 However, how exactly does hedging help achieve these ostensible goals? Again, when states (and governments) decide to hedge, does this foreign policy approach have a higher likelihood of achieving the desired national outcomes and goals compared to alternative approaches?

These critiques suggest that the third conceptualization of hedging, as a strategy, may also have its flaws. Strategy involves studying [End Page 81] ends and means, value systems and preferences of actors, and how these are connected within a particular political environment, often the consequence of opposing preferences and political struggles. 30 The lack of specification of ends and how hedging attains these ends have already been discussed. Moreover, the existing literature has presented hedging as a logical (and seemingly only) strategy in response to external factors such as risk and uncertainties, but this view presents several problems.

Hedging is a suboptimal strategic response. While exercising maximal autonomy through ambiguous and mixed diplomatic stances, the hedging state communicates confusing and contradictory stances. More importantly, hedging sends unclear intentions. As scholars of international relations have noted, uncertainty about the capabilities, intent or resolve of leaders and states has long been identified as an essential cause of armed conflict. 31 Moreover, in treating hedging as an almost reflexive state response to external stimuli, it regards national governments as unitary actors and their domestic politics as hidden or not readily understood. Most studies do not capture how the interplay of elite politics and the interactions between the institutions—such as defence ministries, foreign ministries, key executive agencies and civil-military relations—that shape hedging behaviour. 32

While the existing literature on hedging has begun to recognize the importance of domestic politics, it does not fully capture the complex relationship between politics and foreign policy. Indeed, there is no systematic theorizing of how and under what conditions domestic politics influences hedging behaviour. 33 This article addresses these shortcomings by examining the domestic determinants of Singapore’s hedging strategy.

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Legitimation in Authoritarian Regimes

A non-controversial axiom is that politicians seek to stay in power and that policymaking reflects this imperative. Leaders are not neutral but wield influence over policy processes to pursue their self-interests and to reward supporters who keep them in power. 34 The same logic may be extended to foreign policy decision-making: leaders conduct external affairs to preserve their power and policy agenda at home. State survival and the maximization of national power and influence are commonly prescribed foreign policy objectives, but this necessarily includes regime survival. 35 A regime’s survival depends on it securing [End Page 82] power bases and controlling resources. Political survival depends on the leadership’s ability to manage the external-internal nexus. Paraphrasing Robert Putnam, leaders navigate both international and domestic realms, playing a two-level “game” in their foreign policy choices to satisfy both domestic and international audiences. 36 In other words, leaders need to justify their foreign policy initiatives vis-à-vis national priorities and scrutiny by non-elites.

Legitimacy is central to power and stability in any political regime, democratic or otherwise. According to Seymour Martin Lipset, political systems must be able “to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society”. 37 No political regime can merely rely only on repression and co-optation. All types of regimes need to justify their rule to maintain longevity. As a result, legitimation manufactures active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience or mere toleration from the population. 38 Thus, the question becomes not whether but rather how and to what extent a regime procures legitimacy from its foreign policy.

Regimes can achieve legitimation through their foreign policies in two ways. 39 First, foreign policy can bring concrete benefits to the country and the regime. Even dictatorships are performance-dependent, relying on quasi-social contracts in which political acquiescence is granted in return for socio-economic development and a government’s ability to maintain internal order and social security. 40 Foreign policy successes, such as the concluding defence and trade agreements, reinforce a government’s capacity and deliver tangible security and economic benefits to citizens. This is analogous to David Easton’s notion of “specific support”, in which legitimation is obtained from “quid pro quo for the fulfilment of demands” and “satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities”. 41

Second, foreign policy could buttress legitimacy and create “diffuse support” for the regime through the rally-around-the-flag effect. To develop such public support, leaders can engage in external acts of assertiveness, sabre-rattling, conflict behaviour or other forms of belligerence. Through these actions, legitimacy claims appeal to patriotism, the nation’s identity or the national interest. 42

“Diffuse support” for the regime can arise through the following logic. At first, the rally-around-the-flag effect buttresses support for a government and encourages critics of a regime to look past their differences. 43 Opposition forces are likely to either support the administration’s policies or be stymied by broad popular support for [End Page 83] the government. This phenomenon has been linked to sociology’s general in-group/out-group hypothesis that greater conflict with an out-group may improve bonds within the in-group. 44 At the same time, through foreign policy, the leadership can demonstrate its competence to the public, which in turn raises public approval of the government. 45

The legitimacy of Singapore’s ruling PAP has been described as based on “pragmatic” or “instrumental acquiescence”, in which its support is premised on its ability to deliver security, political stability and acceptable material standards of living in exchange for the curtailment of certain civil liberties. 46 Performance legitimacy is the foremost source of political support for the PAP and is analogous to Easton’s understanding of “specific support”. In practice, for Singapore (and the PAP government) to enjoy continued economic success, it must be open to foreign investments, neoliberal market practices, globalization and free trade.

Concomitant with performance legitimacy is the hegemonic discourse of vulnerability and survival, a reminder to Singaporean citizens of how the PAP has developed the nation “from Third World to First” and how Singapore’s accomplishments, though substantial, are fragile. 47 This discourse is peppered with portents of Singapore’s smallness and insecurity and how the ruling party has kept the city-state safe through diplomatic relations and considerable investment in defence. By continually highlighting the severity of Singapore’s vulnerability, the PAP presents itself as the guarantor of the country’s sovereignty, augmenting its bases of diffuse support.

This article contends that hedging stabilizes Singapore’s one-party rule through specific and diffuse support mechanisms, and it demonstrates in the following sections that Singapore’s engagement in cooperative diplomatic activities with China and the United States aids specific support, whereas asserting Singapore’s autonomy and independence vis-à-vis Beijing and Washington sustains diffuse support.

Cooperative Foreign Relations and Specific Support

Economics and specific support.

The contention that the PAP derives performance legitimacy and, thus, specific support from cooperation with China and the United States is not controversial. Singapore’s economy depends considerably on the two powers. Since 2013, China has been Singapore’s largest [End Page 84] trading partner. The United States is its third-largest trading partner, fourth-largest export market and third-largest supplier of imports. 48 Singapore’s economic links with the two countries are largely facilitated by the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (signed in 2003) and the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (signed in 2008), respectively, and these comprehensive bilateral trade agreements were the first that each of the superpowers signed with an Asian nation.

Singapore depends on Beijing and Washington’s initiatives to enhance the Indo-Pacific’s financial and trading architecture. Singapore was an early advocate of China’s BRI, a founding member of the Beijing-led AIIB and the first country to ratify the RCEP. Singapore is a key financing hub for the BRI and a source for third-country partnerships. 49 Similarly, it was among the first countries to back the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which is consistent with its early support for the Obama administration’s abortive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 50

Singapore is the largest foreign investor in China, beginning in the 1980s as Beijing opened up its economy. Some of these private sector-led, government-supported projects include the Singapore-Sichuan Hi-Tech Innovation Park, the Nanjing Eco High-Tech Island and the Jilin Food Zone. There were also state-led investment projects, including the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park, the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City, the China-Singapore (Chongqing) Demonstrative Initiative on Strategic Connectivity and the China-Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City.

The United States remains by far the largest single-country investor in Singapore, with direct investments totalling over US$270 billion (as of 2020). Singapore receives more than double the American FDI invested in other Asian countries. 51 In the manufacturing sector, US investment in Singapore is almost 50 per cent more than what it invests in all of Asia. US investment in financial and insurance services is 60 per cent larger than that from the European Union (EU), Singapore’s second largest investor. 52

While Chinese FDI in Singapore remains small relative to the United States and other developed countries, Chinese private wealth has poured into the city-state. Affluent mainlanders have moved their assets and set up family offices in Singapore, believing it to be a safe haven. 53 Wealthy Chinese have invested in private property—they accounted for 42 per cent of the private condominiums sold to overseas buyers in Singapore in the first eight months of 2022. Mainland Chinese constitute the biggest group of investors buying [End Page 85] luxury properties in prime districts, purchasing almost a fifth of apartments with price tags exceeding US$3.5 million. 54

Chinese companies have redomiciled or registered in Singapore to hedge against rising geopolitical risks as tensions escalate between Beijing and Washington. Online fast-fashion retailer Shein, electric vehicle maker Nio and IT services provider Cue were among the first to switch parent companies or global headquarters to Singapore, list on the local stock exchange, acquire local businesses and form joint ventures in the city-state. 55

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, China was Singapore’s top source of tourist arrivals, with more than 3.6 million travellers, accounting for roughly 20 per cent of all international arrivals. China was also the top contributor to Singapore’s tourism receipts in 2019, generating S$900 million (US$1.2 billion) in revenue. 56

External Security and Specific Support

Defence ties with the United States are critical for protecting Singapore’s independence and territorial integrity and are a source of specific support for the government. Although Singapore seeks to be self-reliant, such as through its significant investment in its armed forces, it depends on the benevolence of the United States and its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific. For Singapore, the United States is the benign hegemon. According to Michael Leifer,

Since Britain’s withdrawal in the 1970s, and despite clashing with Washington over political values, the USA has long been the preferred primary source of external countervailing power … for Singapore, balance of power is a policy which discriminates in favour of a benign hegemon as opposed to one which guards against any potential hegemonic state. 57

Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew (1959–90), said during a visit to Washington in April 1986 that the United States is best suited to providing the security assurance Singapore needs because

Southeast Asians are more acutely aware of the uncertainties of US policies than other regions of the world. They remember the American retrenchment in the 1970s followed by a decade of self-doubt. Hence ASEAN countries drew towards each other to seek greater strength in self-reliance. They found that together in ASEAN, they could better overcome their problems; but they still need the United States to balance the strength of the Soviet [End Page 86] ships and aircraft. The renewal of self-confidence in America has reassured us that America will help maintain the peace and stability of the region. It is this balance of power which has enabled the free-market economies to thrive. 58

Speaking in New York in 1992, Lee Kuan Yew justified Singapore’s proactive support for the United States’ continued role as the region’s “central player”, stating

No alternative balance can be as comfortable as the present one with the US as a major player. But if the US economy cannot afford a US role, then a new balance it will have to be. However, the geopolitical balance without the US as a principal force will be very different from that which it now is or can be if the US remains a central player. 59

To this end, Singapore actively encourages the United States’ military presence in the region. In 2019, it extended the 1990 memorandum of understanding (MOU) that facilitated US military access to its air and naval bases and logistics support to US personnel, aircraft and naval vessels. While not directly participating in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and AUKUS, an alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, Singapore implicitly supports these new US-led security arrangements. 60

The defence capabilities of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) would not be as extensive without the country’s strong security ties with the United States. It is the main source of the SAF’s hardware via the US’ Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Prominent FMS sales include advanced fighters (F-15SG and F-35B), AH-64D Apache Helicopters and guided munitions. At the same time, the top categories in DCS were aircraft parts and components, gas turbine engines and military electronics. The SAF enhances its professionalism through military exercises and exchanges with the United States. Singapore exercises bilaterally with the United States—the navy’s “Pacific Griffin” and the army’s “Tiger Balm”—as well as in multilateral exercises, such as the “Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) and “Red Flag”. More than 1,000 Singaporean military personnel participate in training, exercises and professional military education in the United States annually. According to the US State Department, Singapore is one of its “strongest bilateral partners in Southeast Asia [that] plays an indispensable role in supporting the region’s security and economic framework”. 61 [End Page 87]

The Ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Specific Support

Cooperative and sound ties with China also generate domestic political ( specific ) support for the PAP government, particularly from ethnic Chinese Singaporeans and their business interests. Positive Sino-Singapore relations portray the ruling party as a defender of “Chineseness” and Chinese-Singaporean business interests. 62 The necessity for doing so, while strategic, stems from repairing the PAP’s previous antipathy towards the Chinese-educated and their business activities.

Although the ethnic Chinese in Singapore comprise approximately three-quarters of the population, this community is bifurcated into two—“Chinese-educated” ( huaxiaosheng ) and “English-educated” ( yingxiaosheng )—based on the dominant language of education. The Chinese schools were established, some prior to independence, by clan associations ( huiguan ) with funding from philanthropists and the business community. For instance, Hokkien Huay Kuan, a cultural and educational foundation, was established in 1840 to promote education and social welfare and to preserve the Chinese language and culture among Chinese Singaporeans and other overseas Chinese groups in Southeast Asia. The Hokkien Huay Kuan played a prominent role in establishing Nanyang University (known as “Nantah”), the first Chinese-language university in Southeast Asia and the region’s focal point of Chinese education and culture. The Hokkien Huay Kuan donated the land on which the university was built in the 1950s while other Chinese business leaders contributed financially. However, around the time of Singapore’s independence, graduates from Chinese schools did not find jobs as easily as their English-speaking counterparts. In addition, Chinese-educated students were especially involved in political activism, contributing to a stereotype of them being pro-China or pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 63

After Singapore’s independence in 1965, the PAP believed it was strategically necessary to avoid being seen as a “third China”, so the emphasis was put on “de-Chineseness”, in which the government consciously sought to build a multiracial society and develop a “Singaporean Singapore” identity. 64 “De-Chineseness” can also be attributed to Lee Kuan Yew’s belief that Chineseness was tied to China’s active support of communism in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s:

… it was difficult to identify good Chinese-educated candidates who would remain loyal when the communists opened fired on us [End Page 88] [PAP] … we were fishing on the same pond as the communists, who exploited both Chinese nationalism and Marxist-Maoist ideas of egalitarianism … Their mental terms of reference were Chinese history, Chinese parables and proverbs, the legendary success of the Chinese communist revolution as against their own frustrating life in Singapore. 65

To “de-Chinese” Singapore, the PAP government made English the first language for education, international commerce and industry. Conspicuously, it merged Nanyang University with the University of Singapore to form the National University of Singapore. To dilute the influence of ethnic Chinese clan associations and Chinese businessmen who had considerable resources and support to sway local politics, 66 especially on issues of culture and language, the PAP developed new para-political and para-statal organizations such as the People’s Association, Citizens’ Consultative Committees and Community Centre Management Committees. These organizations directed grassroots activities in the newly developed public housing estates that gradually replaced ethnic enclaves. 67

In its economic development strategy, the PAP pushed aside Chinese businesses and relied instead on foreign multinational corporations. In its eyes, family-owned Chinese enterprises were synonymous with unproductive rentier activities. 68 As a result, “de-Chineseness” led to suspicion among the Chinese-educated that the PAP, which drew primarily from the English-educated, was engaging in political and cultural marginalization. This created a division in Singapore’s social fabric between the Chinese-educated and English-educated Chinese Singaporeans. 69 During his 1999 National Day Rally speech, then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong noted the persistent cleavage between the English-educated professionals who constituted Singapore’s “cosmopolitans” and dialect-speaking “heart-landers”. 70

Two occurrences rendered the PAP’s policy of “de-Chineseness” politically unsustainable. An economic downturn in 1985, a result of a global recession, led to significant business failures, especially among former “Nantah” graduates and other Chinese-educated Singaporeans. This forced the PAP government to re-evaluate its economic policies and its efforts to promote local business internationalization. 71 The government decided to develop a “Second Wing” of the national economy and incentivized Singaporeans to tap into China’s vast potential as a market and business partner. 72 The PAP government viewed “Chineseness” as an advantage for Singapore, permitting it to play a middleman role, parlaying its [End Page 89] Sinic affinities and its ability to straddle East and West to tap the growing economic opportunities in China.

The second circumstance compelling the PAP to reconsider its “de-Chineseness” policy was the erosion of the party’s electoral support among Chinese-educated Singaporeans. When the ruling party lost seats to the Workers’ Party and Singapore Democratic Party in the 1984 and 1991 general elections, especially in Chinese working-class constituencies, analysts believed the government had neglected the Chinese educated and dialect speakers, and the election results were sending “the PAP an important signal”. 73 Since then, the PAP has ensured it fields electoral candidates deemed acceptable to the Chinese-educated or with the necessary Chinese dialect proficiency. These politicians would campaign using Chinese dialects, especially in the heartlands. The government also formed the Chinese community liaison group, which comprises mainly Chinese-educated MPs, to help it be “attuned to sentiments in the politically important Chinese-speaking community … [and] to make sure this community does not feel marginalized in increasingly English-speaking Singapore”. 74

The re-emergence of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI) illustrates the reassertion of “Chineseness”. Founded in 1906, the SCCCI was the leading Chinese organization in Singapore, with membership encompassing the wealthiest and most influential businessmen, many of them serving as its leaders. Marginalized from its leading social and cultural roles during the period of “de-Chineseness”, the PAP turned to the SCCCI after the 1985 economic recession. It encouraged the clan associations to reconceptualize their role in cultural and economic life to attract younger members and to reap potential economic benefits from kinship ties with China. 75 One early visible step to this revival was the SCCCI’s convening of the inaugural World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention (WCEC) in 1991 and its subsequent creation of the online World Chinese Business Network. 76 Thereafter, the SCCCI “used its status to put itself at the vanguard of the ethnic Chinese network at a time when the entire economic and political world was looking for ways to benefit from the economic opening up of the PRC” and “because the Chamber had the network, which the PAP government dearly wanted and needed, it could be the broker following, and protected by, the government’s diplomatic and political endeavours”. 77

Further examples of the Singapore government’s reassertion of Chineseness include the establishment of the Chinese Heritage [End Page 90] Centre in 1995, under the auspices of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, and the National Chinese Internet Programme to develop Singapore into a cyber-hub for the Chinese language internet. Mirroring the SCCCI, the government supported the creation of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China (SingCham) in 2002 to represent Singapore’s business interests in China and help businesspeople network with their Chinese counterparts. Today, SingCham has more than 1,000 members and chapters in nine provinces and cities, including Chongqing, Guangdong and Shanghai. 78

Another less overtly discussed overture to enhance Chineseness in Singapore is the PAP government’s policy to maintain the city-state’s “racial balance”, preserving Chinese-Singaporean demographic ascendancy at three-quarters of the total population. The policy was asserted in the context of the 2013 Population White Paper. According to Grace Fu, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office,

It is our policy to maintain the ethnic balance in the citizen population as far as possible … We recognize the need to maintain the racial balance in Singapore’s population to preserve social stability. The pace and profile of our immigration intake have been calibrated to preserve this racial balance. 79

According to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, “We will maintain the racial balance among Singaporeans. The percentage of Malays among Singapore citizens will continue to be stable, even into the long-term.” 80 As birth rates among Chinese Singaporeans continued to decline, substantively for the city-state, this meant encouraging more emigres from the mainland. 81 Since the 2000s, mainland Chinese have become the second-largest source of migrants to Singapore. 82

Not all Chinese-Singaporean businesses were regarded as rentier and hence disregarded in the past. Several family-controlled enterprises, primarily those in banking, real estate and property development, remained influential in Singapore. 83 For example, the late chairman emeritus, Wee Cho Yaw, of United Overseas Bank (UOB) had deep ties with the SCCCI and the broader Chinese-educated communities. He held strong connections with the chairmen of the government’s Citizens’ Consultative Committees, Chinese businesspeople and many members of the SCCCI network. Viswa Sadasivan, a former nominated member of parliament, described him as “the power” behind the SCCCI. 84

In tandem with the externalization of Singapore’s economy in the late 1980s, influential Chinese-Singaporean companies have seen [End Page 91] their business interests with the mainland grow and become more important to their revenue streams. Ensuring healthy Sino-Singapore ties has become essential to their bottom lines. Mainboard-listed, privately owned Chinese-Singaporean companies operating significant China-based businesses include OCBC, which opened in the mainland in the 1920s; UOB, which set up its first representative office in Beijing in 1984 and incorporated UOB-China in 2007; UOB’s UOL Group, which opened UOB Building in Xiamen in 1996; and agribusiness Wilmar International’s Chinese subsidiary Yihai Kerry, which has been operating in China since the 1990s. 85

Independent Foreign Policy and Diffuse Support

Foreign affairs do not feature prominently in Singaporean electoral campaigns. 86 Nevertheless, in asserting Singapore’s independence vis-à-vis Beijing and Washington, the PAP educes diffuse support by appealing to the national interest and invoking the need for Singapore to defend its autonomy and sovereignty. In turn, this demonstrates the ruling party’s competence in confronting these external challenges to Singaporeans. However, the government’s assertion of foreign policy autonomy does not only serve these domestic imperatives. Clearly, championing Singapore’s national interests and withstanding pressure from other states, especially bigger powers, is necessary to survive.

But we can observe the envisioned legitimating goals by examining when Singapore pushes back against the great powers. Specifically, what issues did the Singaporean government assert its autonomy over? Who among the ruling elite explained the incidents, and to whom was their message directed? What was the forum the PAP used to expound its foreign policy actions? Apart from statements in parliament, key political officeholders assert Singapore’s independence and emphasize the importance of upholding sovereignty on occasions when there is grassroots support for the ruling party. These include constituency and cultural events, clan association celebrations, festivities to mark major national holidays and national events such as the Prime Minister’s holiday messages or National Day Rally speech.

One such event was the Hokkien Huay Kuan Spring Reception in February 2023. Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam stated during the festivities:

As a small country, we have to be clear on what are our principles. We must always put Singapore’s interests first, and never be afraid to act in our own interests … uphold our principles and positions [End Page 92] consistently, impartially, objectively, and not let other countries, big or small, no matter how friendly, dictate to us what we do. 87

At the Pasir Ris West constituency’s Chinese New Year Dinner in 2017, Teo Chee Hean, the coordinating minister for national security and a local member of parliament, said

We should also conduct our foreign relations based on mutual respect. We have always stood by this principle whether we are conducting relations with countries, like the US or China, or with our neighbours … all of whom are bigger than we are … Standing by this principle allows every country to maintain our independence and sovereignty, and conduct our relations with other countries in the spirit of mutual respect … Importantly, when we conduct ourselves in a principled way, it also allows Singapore and Singaporeans to hold our heads up in the world, rather than bending to the will of others. 88

The most visible platform Singapore’s leaders have used to assert its independence vis-à-vis the great powers is the National Day Rally (NDR). 89 During the 2016 event, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made clear Singapore’s support for the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against China’s claims in the South China Sea:

Big powers can insist on their own interests and often do … China is not the only country to do this and nor is this the first time something like this has happened. Nevertheless, Singapore must support and strive for a rules-based international order … If rules do not matter, then small countries like Singapore have no chance of survival. 90

At the 2022 event, speaking in Mandarin, with a clear hint to the intended audience, the prime minister spoke about Singapore’s principled position against the war in Ukraine:

But we have to be firm in our position and defend fundamental principles robustly. We cannot be ambiguous about where we stand. We believe the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, big or small, must be respected. These principles are existential for all nations, but especially so for a small nation like Singapore. 91

At the same event, Lee also warned Singaporeans to be vigilant about messages shared on social media and actively guard against hostile foreign influence, but without naming China. He stated

We need to ask ourselves: where do these messages come from, and what are their intentions? And are we sure we should share [End Page 93] such messages with our friends? So please check the facts and do not accept all the information as truths. We must actively guard against hostile foreign influence operations, regardless of where they originate. Only then, can we safeguard the sovereignty and independence of our nation … I am heartened that most Singaporeans support the government’s position on the war in Ukraine, including Chinese Singaporeans who are active on Chinese-language social media. 92

This article contends that Singapore’s hedging strategy aids the domestic legitimation of the ruling PAP. It does so through the mechanisms of specific and diffuse support. The city-state relies on Beijing and Washington for its economy, defence and security. Thus, cooperative ties with the United States and China accrue performance legitimacy for the government. Separately, Singapore’s close relations with Beijing augment the PAP’s standing with the ethnic Chinese community and their business interests in the mainland, sustaining specific support. Finally, an independent and assertive foreign policy (against China, in particular), while necessary as a small state, creates a rally-around-the-flag effect and increases diffuse support for the ruling party.

The article’s findings contrast with neorealist perspectives of Singapore’s foreign policy, which emphasize a small state managing its vulnerabilities in a hostile international system. Singapore’s foreign policy has been characterized as inherently realpolitik. According to its first foreign minister, S. Rajaratnam, the “primary task” of Singapore’s foreign policy was “how to make sure that a small nation with a teeming population and no natural resources to speak of, can maintain, even increase, its living standards and also enjoy peace and security in a region marked by mutual jealousies, internal violence, economic disintegration and great power conflicts.” 93 Even though it is a one-party, autocratic state with an elite-centred foreign policy decision-making process, domestic legitimation matters in Singapore. Indeed, to invert the oft-cited adage, domestic politics does not “end at the water’s edge”.

Are these domestic legitimation considerations likely to persist as the PAP prepares to transit from the “third generation” of leaders to the fourth when Lee Hsien Loong steps down (likely in late 2024)? How will these domestic imperatives affect Singapore’s foreign policies towards the United States and China? This study posits [End Page 94] that hedging—or being equidistant—will likely remain Singapore’s guiding foreign policy stance vis-à-vis China and the United States. According to Lawrence Wong, the presumptive next prime minister and the current deputy prime minister,

Singapore has longstanding bilateral relations and deep economic links with both the US and China. The US played a vital role in underwriting the post-war global order, paving the way for stability and prosperity in Asia. This is one of the reasons that Singapore has long supported the US’ presence in our region. […] At the same time, we have supported China’s continued reform, and participated in China’s development journey over the decades. We will continue to foster close ties with China and the US, and strive to be a consistent and reliable partner to both. Our foreign policy is neither pro-US nor pro-China, but rather grounded on Singapore’s national interests. 94

The PAP’s need for cooperative ties with China to elicit support from Chinese-speaking Singaporeans is also likely to persist, not least because of the Singaporean public’s favourable views of China and President Xi Jinping 95 and the continued efforts by Beijing to cultivate a pro-China image through Mandarin-language outlets such as the city-state’s flagship broadsheet, the Lianhe Zaobao . 96

T erence L ee is Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. Postal address: National University of Singapore, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences Department of Political Science, AS1, #04-33, 11 Arts Link, Singapore 117570; email: [email protected] .

1. Loraine Lee, “‘We Are Always Only Aligned to One Country —Singapore’: Shanmugam on Need to Put National Interest First amid Global Challenges”, Today , 5 February 2023, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/we-are-always-only-aligned-one-country-singapore-shanmugam-need-put-national-interest-first-amid-global-challenges-2101246 .

2. Brock F. Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu”, Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 192–231.

3. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia: What, How, and Why?” Asan Forum , 6 June 2020, https://theasanforum.org/hedging-in-post-pandemic-asia-what-how-and-why .

4. Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies”, Policy Studies , no. 16 (Washington, D.C.: East West Centre, 2005); Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 159–85; Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Strategies toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?” Asan Forum , 22 February 2016, https://theasanforum.org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-the-great-powers-still-hedging-after-all-these-years ; Teo Ang Guan and Kei Koga, “Conceptualizing Equidistant Diplomacy in International Relations: The Case of Singapore”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 22, no. 3 (2022): 375–409.

5. Chung Chien-peng, “Southeast Asia-China Relations: Dialectics of ‘Hedging’ and ‘Counter-Hedging’”, Southeast Asian Affairs (2004): 35–53.

6. Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia”, Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 711.

7. Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2000), pp. 6–7.

8. These assertions build Kuik’s hedging and regime legitimation framework. See Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 159–85.

9. Jürgen Haacke, “The Concept of Hedging and Its Application to Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (2019): 387.

10. Evelyn Goh, “‘Betwixt and Between’: Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the US and China”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Monograph 7 (2005): 4.

11. Khong Yuen Foong, “Singapore and the Great Powers”, in Perspectives on the Security of Singapore: The First 50 Years , edited by Barry Desker and Ang Cheng Guan (Singapore: World Scientific, 2016), pp. 207–28; Tan See Seng, “America the Indispensable: Singapore’s View of the United States’ Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”, Asian Affairs 38, no. 3 (2011): 156–71.

12. Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (New South Wales, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), pp. 208–12.

13. “US P-8 Spy Plane Deployed to Singapore”, BBC News , 8 December 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35036220 ; “Singapore, US Step Up Defence Cooperation”, MINDEF Singapore News , 8 December 2015, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2015/december/2015dec08-news-releases-02572 .

14. Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia”, Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 722–23.

15. Kei Koga, “The Concept of ‘Hedging’ Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift”, International Studies Review 20, no. 4 (2018): 633–60; Kuik, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia”.

16. Seth Mydans, “Singapore Seeks to End Strain with U.S.”, New York Times , 2 June 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/02/world/singapore-seeks-toend-strain-with-us.html .

17. The debate about “Asian Values” was an attempt by leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew to push back against America’s advocacy of liberal democratic values after the end of the Cold War. See Donald K. Emmerson, “Singapore and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate”, Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (1995): 95–105.

18. Tan See Seng, “Facilitating the US Rebalance: Challenges and Prospects for Singapore as America’s Security Partner”, Security Challenges 12, no. 3 (2016): 26.

19. “China Pressures Singapore with Seizure of Military Hardware”, Nikkei Asia , 5 December 2016, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-pressures-Singapore-with-seizure-of-military-hardware .

20. John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China”, Washington Post , 30 July 2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416 .

21. Chong Zi Liang, “Parliament: Detention of Terrexes against International Law, S’pore Looks Forward to Their Return, Says Ng Eng Hen”, Straits Times , 9 January 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/detention-of-terrexes-against-international-law-spore-looks-forward-to-their-return-ng-eng .

22. Royston Sim, “LKY School Professor Huang Jing Banned, Has PR Cancelled, for Being Agent of Influence for Foreign Country”, Straits Times , 4 August 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/lky-school-professor-huang-jing-banned-has-pr-cancelled-for-being-agent-of-influence-for .

23. Charissa Yong, “Singaporeans Should Be Aware of China’s ‘Influence Operations’ to Manipulate Them, Says Retired Diplomat Bilahari”, Straits Times , 27 June 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singaporeans-should-be-aware-of-chinas-influence-operations-to-manipulate-them-says .

24. See Jürgen Haacke, “The Concept of Hedging and Its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique and a Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (2019): 375–417; Jürgen Haacke and John D. Ciorciari, “Hedging as Risk Management: Insights from Works on Alignment, Riskification, and Strategy”, Ford School of Public Policy, International Policy Center Working Paper Series , no. 124 (2022).

25. Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies”, East-West Center Policy Studies 16 (2005): 2.

26. Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 306.

27. Antonio Fiori and Andrea Passeri, “Hedging in Search of a New Age of Non-Alignment: Myanmar between China and the USA”, Pacific Review 28, no. 5 (2015): 679–702; Kuik, “Hedging in Post-Pandemic Asia”.

28. Lai Yew Meng and Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Structural Sources of Malaysia’s South China Sea Policy: Power Uncertainties and Small-State Hedging”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 75, no. 3 (2021): 279–80.

29. Kei Koga, “The Concept of ‘Hedging’ Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift”, International Studies Review 20, no. 4 (2018): 633–60; Alexander Korolev, “Shrinking Room for Hedging: System-Unit Dynamics and Behavior of Smaller Powers”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (2019): 419–52.

30. Michael Lawrence Rowan Smith and John Stone, “Explaining Strategic Theory”, Infinity Journal 4, no. 11 (2011): 27–30.

31. A review of this is in Kristopher W. Ramsay, “Information, Uncertainty, and War”, Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017): 505–27.

32. Haacke and Ciorciari, “Hedging as Risk Management”, pp. 36–37.

33. Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 3 (2013): 333–68; Pongphisoot Busbarat, “Thai-US Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Untying the Special Relationship”, Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 256–74; Elina Noor and Tengku Nur Qistina, “Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Malaysian Foreign Policy”, Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 200–219; Emirza Adi Syailendra, “A Nonbalancing Act: Explaining Indonesia’s Failure to Balance against the Chinese Threat”, Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 237–55.

34. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

35. Muthiah Alagappa, “The Study of International Order: An Analytical Framework”, in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features , edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 42–45.

36. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.

37. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (London, UK: Heinemann, 1960), p. 64.

38. Johannes Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes”, Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13–28; Steffen Kailitz and Daniel Stockemer, “Regime Legitimation, Elite Cohesion and the Durability of Autocratic Regime Types”, International Political Science Review 38, no. 3 (2017): 332–48.

39. Marianne Kneuer, “The Quest of Legitimacy: Foreign Policy as a Legitimation Strategy in Authoritarian Regimes”, ISPA-ECPR Joint Conference Paper (2011).

40. Zhao Dingxin, “The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China”, American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009): 416–33.

41. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York City, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 268; David Easton, “A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support”, British Journal of Political Science 5, no. 4 (1975): 437.

42. Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes. Theory, Government and Politics (New York City, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 104; David Easton, “A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support”, p. 444.

43. John E. Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson”, American Political Science Review 64, no. 1 (1970): 18–34.

44. Jack S. Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique”, in Handbook of War Studies , edited by M.I. Midlarsky (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 259–88.

45. Diana T. Richards, Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young, “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 504–35; Alastair Smith, Election Timing (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

46. Cherian George, “Consolidating Authoritarian Rule: Calibrated Coercion in Singapore”, Pacific Review 20, no. 2 (2007): 129–33.

47. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000 (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2012).

48. “Singapore’s International Trade 2018–2022”, Department of Statistics, Singapore, https://www.singstat.gov.sg//media/files/visualising_data/infographics/trade_and_investment/singapore-international-trade.ashx ; “Singapore”, Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/singapore .

49. “Setting the Record Straight – Singapore’s Role in the BRI”, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 27 April 2018, http://www.siiaonline.org/setting-the-record-straight-singapores-role-in-the-bri/ .

50. Charissa Yong, “Singapore welcomes US’ Proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Plan, Says PM Lee”, Straits Times , 12 May 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/singapore-welcomes-us-proposed-indo-pacific-economic-plan-says-pm-lee ; Timothy Gardner and Ayesha Rascoe “Obama, Singapore Leader Push Pacific Trade Deal in State Visit”, Reuters, 2 August 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-singapore-idUKL1N1AJ0MA .

51. “2022 Investment Climate Statements: Singapore”, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, United States State Department, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/singapore/ .

52. Danielle Issac, “Foreign Direct Investments from the US to Singapore Hit Over $244b”, Singapore Business Review , 2019, https://sbr.com.sg/economy/exclusive/foreign-direct-investments-us-singapore-hit-over-244b .

53. Evelyn Cheng, “China’s Rich Are Moving Their Money to Singapore. Beijing’s Crackdown Is One of the Reasons”, CNBC , 29 March 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/30/chinas-wealthy-moving-money-to-singapore-amid-common-prosperity-push.html ; “China’s Mega-Rich Move Their Wealth, and Partying, to Singapore”, Business Times (Singapore) , 4 February 2023, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/global/chinas-mega-rich-move-their-wealth-and-partying-singapore ; Jason Douglas, “As China Reopens, Flight of Wealthy Chinese to Singapore Set to Accelerate”, Wall Street Journal , 27 February 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-china-reopens-flight-of-wealthy-chinese-to-singapore-set-to-accelerate-c0b12282 .

54. Jonathan Burgos, “Wealthy Chinese Lead Home Purchases in Singapore, Sending Prices Soaring”, Forbes , 9 November 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanburgos/2022/11/09/wealthy-chinese-lead-home-purchases-in-singapore-sending-prices-soaring ; Yong Hui Ting, “Hundreds of Ultra-Rich Chinese Eyeing Move to Singapore, Generating US$2.4b Inflows: Consultant”, Business Times (Singapore) , 4 August 2022, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/global/hundreds-ultra-rich-chinese-eyeing-move-singapore-generating-us24binflows ; Xinghui Kok and Chen Lin, “Disillusioned at Home, Super-Rich Chinese Set Their Sights on Singapore”, Reuters, 31 January 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/disillusioned-home-super-rich-chinese-set-their-sights-singapore-2023-01-30/ .

55. Mercedes Ruehl and Leo Lewis, “Chinese Companies Set Up in Singapore to Hedge against Geopolitical Risk”, Financial Times , 30 November 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/a0c11e3e-ab72-4b4b-a55c-557191e53938 .

56. Abigail Ng, “Singapore’s Air Travel Is Rebounding despite China’s Border Restrictions, Transport Minister Says”, CNBC , 8 January 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/26/singapore-air-travel-recovering-despite-lack-of-chinese-visitors.html ; Elysia Tan, “Singapore Tourist Arrivals Dip from Post-Covid Record to 816,254 in November”, Business Times (Singapore) , 13 December 2022, https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/singapore/singapore-tourist-arrivals-dip-post-covid-record-816254-november ; Vanessa Lim, “Tour Agencies Welcome News of China’s Reopening but Labour Crunch Is Cause for Concern”, Channel News Asia , 29 December 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/china-covid-19-reopening-tour-agencies-welcome-news-3172856 .

57. Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London, UK: Routledge, 2000), p. 27.

58. Lee Kuan Yew quoted in Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, “Betwixt Balance and Community: America, ASEAN, and the Security of Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6, no. 1 (2006): 37–38.

59. Ang Cheng Guan, Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought (London, UK: Routledge, 2013), p. 73.

60. Singapore hosted a senior official level Quad meeting in June 2018. See Ian Storey and William Choong, “The AUKUS Announcement and Southeast Asia: An Assessment of Regional Responses and Concerns”, ISEAS Perspective , no. 2023/23, 29 March 2023, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2023_23.pdf .

61. “U.S. Security Cooperation with Singapore”, US Department of State, 12 April 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-singapore/ .

62. “Chineseness” refers to the importance and prominence of the Chinese language and culture as well as the idea that the racial-cultural identity of Chinese Singaporeans would assist cultural relevancy with mainland Chinese and Singapore’s economic and political engagement with Beijing. See Eugene K.B. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of Nation-Building in Singapore”, China Quarterly 175 (2003): 751–74.

63. Kwok Kian-Woon, “Chinese-Educated Intellectuals in Singapore: Marginality, Memory and Modernity”, Asian Journal of Social Science 29, no. 3 (2001): 495–519.

64. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness”, p. 753.

65. Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings & Times Editions, 1998), p. 280.

66. There is no better illustration of the socio-cultural and political power that Chinese businesses have in Singapore than the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI). See Sikko Visscher, The Business of Politics and Ethnicity: A History of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007).

67. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness”, pp. 756–57.

68. Stephan Haggard and Linda Low, “State, Politics, and Business in Singapore”, in Political Business in East Asia , edited by Edmund Gomez (London, UK: Routledge, 2003), p. 306.

69. Karl Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006), p. 109.

70. “First-World Economy, World-Class Home: ESM Goh Chok Tong’s 1999 NDR Speech”, Petir , 22 August 1999, https://petir.sg/1999/08/22/first-world-economy-world-class-home-esm-goh-chok-tongs-1999-ndr-speech/ .

71. Haggard and Low, “State, Politics, and Business in Singapore”, p. 306.

72. Chan Heng Chee, “Singapore: Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy”, in Asia and the Major Powers: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy , edited by Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi and Sung-joo Han (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), pp. 280–305.

73. Diane K. Mauzy and Robert Stephen Milne, Singapore Politics under the People’s Action Party (London, UK: Routledge, 2002), pp. 150–51. See also Hussin Mutalib, “Singapore’s 1991 General Election”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 1992 , edited by Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), p. 302.

74. Tan, “Re-engaging Chineseness”, p. 763.

75. Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control , p. 158.

76. Ibid., chapter 6.

77. Ibid., p. 282.

78. Justin Ong, “Singapore Business Chamber in China Key to Relations between the Two Countries: Alvin Tan”, Straits Times , 14 February 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-business-chamber-in-china-key-to-relations-between-the-2-countries-minister-of .

79. Speech by Minister Grace Fu on population, delivered at the Committee of Supply, Singapore, 5 March 2014, https://www.population.gov.sg/media-centre/speeches/speech-by-minister-grace-fu-on-population/ .

80. Amir Hussin, “We Will Maintain Racial Balance among S’poreans: PM Lee”, Today , 9 February 2013, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/we-will-maintain-racial-balance-among-sporeans-pm-lee .

81. The resident total fertility rate (TFR) for Chinese Singaporeans has declined from 1.08 in 2011 to 0.96 in 2021. The TFR for Malay Singaporeans has increased from 1.64 in 2011 to 1.82 in 2021. For Indian Singaporeans, it has decreased from 1.09 in 2011 to 1.05 in 2021. See “Population in Brief 2022”, National Population and Talent Division, https://www.population.gov.sg/media-centre/publications/population-in-brief/ .

82. Hui Yang, Peidong Yang and Shaohua Zhan, “Immigration, Population, and Foreign Workforce in Singapore: An Overview of Trends, Policies, and Issues”, HSSE Online 6, no. 1 (2017): 10–25; “Estimated Number of Asian Immigrants in Singapore in 2020, by Country of Origin [Graph]”, Statista, . statista.com/statistics/692951/asian-immigrant-stock-of-singapore-by-country-of-origin/ .

83. See Lai Si Tsui-Auch, “Singaporean Business Groups: The Role of the State and Capital in Singapore Inc.”, in Business Groups in East Asia: Financial Crisis, Restructuring, and New Growth , edited by Se-Jin Chang (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 94–115; Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “The Singapore State Revisited”, Pacific Review 13, no. 2 (2000): 195–216.

84. Michael D. Barr, The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), p. 37.

85. “China Business”, OCBC Wing Hang, https://www.ocbcwhhk.com/webpages/en-us/html/china_bus/china_bus/china_bus.html ; “Business Story – About UOB”, UOB, https://www.uobchina.com.cn/aboutus-en/corporate.page#2 ; “Our History”, UOL Group Limited, https://www.uol.com.sg/about-uol/our-history/ ; “Group Introduction”, Yihai Kerry Arawana Holdings Co. Ltd., https://www.yihaikerry.net/about/fazhanlicheng .

86. See Steven Oliver and Kai Ostwald, “Explaining Elections in Singapore: Dominant Party Resilience and Valence Politics”, Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 2 (2018): 129–56; Steven Oliver and Kai Ostwald, “Singapore’s Pandemic Election: Opposition Parties and Valence Politics in GE2020”, Pacific Affairs 93, no. 4 (2020): 759–80.

87. “Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan Spring Reception 2023 – Speech by Mr K Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law”, Ministry of Home Affairs, 5 February 2023, https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/speeches/singapore-hokkien-huay-kuan-spring-reception-2023/ .

88. “DPM Teo Chee Hean at the Pasir Ris West Chinese New Year Dinner 2017”, Prime Minister’s Office, 4 February 2017, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/dpm-teo-chee-hean-pasir-ris-west-chinese-new-year-dinner-2017 .

89. The NDR is an annual message delivered by the prime minister of Singapore on the first or second Sunday after the National Day Parade on 9 August. It is Singapore’s equivalent of the President of the United States’ State of the Union address. The prime minister uses the rally to review the country’s status, its key challenges, as well as to set the country’s direction, major policy changes, the economy, plans and achievements.

90. “National Day Rally 2016”, Prime Minister’s Office, 21 August 2016, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/national-day-rally-2016 .

93. S. Rajaratnam, “Speech at University of Singapore Society”, 30 July 1966, cited in Barry Desker and Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, “S Rajaratnam and the Making of Singapore Foreign Policy”, in S Rajaratnam on Singapore: From Ideas to Reality , edited by Kwa Chong Guan (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006), p. 4.

94. “DPM Lawrence Wong’s Interview with Nikkei Asia (May 2023)”, Prime Minister’s Office, 24 May 2023, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/DPM-Lawrence-Wong-Interview-Nikkei-Asia-May-2023 .

95. Singapore was one of only three countries among the 19 countries surveyed by the Pew Research Centre that regarded China and its leadership favourably. See Laura Silver, Christine Huang and Laura Clancy, “How Global Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era”, Pew Research Centre, 28 September 2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/09/28/how-global-public-opinion-of-china-has-shifted-in-the-xi-era/ .

96. Shibani Mahtani and Amrita Chandradas, “In Singapore, Loud Echoes of Beijing’s Positions Generate Anxiety”, Washington Post , 24 July 2023, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/we-will-maintain-racial-balance-among-sporeanspm-lee .

Explaining Hedging: The Case of Malaysian Equidistance

From Foes to Friends: China and the United States in Laos’ Foreign Policy

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Our Fundamentals

Our Challenges

Singapore in a Diverse World

Singapore in a HyperConnected World

Safeguarding our Sovereignty and National Interests

Expanding Our International Space

The Geopolitical Space

The Economic Space

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[Last updated on 17 July 2023]

Respect for National Sovereignty

Singapore seeks to develop a wide network of friends based on the principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and the equality of states, regardless of size. We aim to be a friend to all and an enemy to none, but will uphold our principles and defend our national interests as an independent and sovereign nation.

Support for Rules-based Multilateral System

Singapore’s survival is best served by a rules-based multilateral system, which upholds the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. Adherence to international law offers better protection for small states like Singapore. Singapore therefore strongly supports core principles such as the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-interference in a country’s internal affairs, all of which are enshrined in the UN Charter. Similarly, we must speak out against violations of such principles when they occur.

Building Overlapping Circles of Friends

Singapore actively engages and seeks to make common cause with as many countries as possible to forge overlapping circles of friends, so that they all have a stake in the peace, stability and development of our region, and can create a stable balance of power in the Asia Pacific. This provides small countries like Singapore with more room for manoeuvre.

We start with building an open, inclusive and rules-based ASEAN-centred regional architecture.

Beyond our immediate neighbourhood, Singapore works with other partners around the world to advance our shared interests and address common challenges. For example, we co-founded the Forum of Small States (FOSS), which has proven to be a valuable platform for informal exchange and mutual support, capacity-building and technical cooperation among its 108 small state members.

Creating Political and Economic Space for Singapore

As a small country, Singapore is vulnerable to international developments and trends. For us to maintain our place in the world, we must continue to be successful as a country and economy. We also need to make ourselves relevant to the world by identifying new opportunities and areas of cooperation, sharing our experiences and providing capacity building for developing countries.

Hence, Singapore must remain nimble and adaptable to global trends and developments, and strive to be an active and constructive player internationally.

Rallying Domestic Support and Unity for Our Foreign Policy Decisions

Foreign policy begins at home. Singapore’s foreign policy is for Singaporeans to decide.

Our first and most important line of defence is a vigilant and well-informed citizenry that understands the geostrategic forces at play and our national interests.

Building Up Our Own Defence

Singapore’s existence as an independent and sovereign country is not guaranteed and cannot be taken for granted. The Ukraine-Russia war and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait have shown that military conflicts may still arise. We must never lose the ability to defend ourselves. We cannot and should not outsource our national security and be dependent on others for our protection.

It is therefore crucial that Singapore maintains a strong and credible armed force to serve as a vital bulwark in our external relations and foreign policy.

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What is Singapore’s Foreign Policy?

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]: Section B: Essay Writing Theme II: Cold War in Asia [1945-1991] – Singapore’s Foreign Policy during the Cold War

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” — Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, 1 March 1848

What is a ‘foreign policy’? It refers to a set of strategies employed by the state to protect its domestic and international interests. A ‘foreign policy’ affects the state’s interactions with other states. Ultimately, the policy is implemented to safeguard national interests.

Foreign policies can involve the use of aggressive (military force) or non-coercive means (diplomacy). Also, these policies can also be carried out through engagement with other states in addressing a common challenge, such as regional security threats.

Singapore’s foreign policy: A summary There are two key foreign policy theories that are covered the A Level H1 History syllabus: Survival and Realism.

1. Survival One key ideology that shaped Singapore’s foreign policy is the concept of survival. Following the sudden Separation that led to Singapore’s independence in 1965, the government had to deal with political threats and economic challenges.

Amidst the Cold War context, the rise of Communist insurgencies was a common concern that affected the political stability of Southeast Asian nations. In Singapore, the government was challenged by the Barisan Sosialis .

As for the economic viewpoint, the People’s Action Party (PAP) took the first step towards modernisation by embarking on state-led industrialisation. In particular, the government aimed to establish strong trade ties with other countries, including Great Powers like the USA.

The historical roots of Singapore’s political ideology of survival lie in the events following the country’s ejection from Malaysia in 1965. Survival in both political and economic terms for newly independent Singapore was a very real issue for the PAP Government. The government in the period 1965-67 was involved in an intense, often violent struggle, for power against the Barisan Sosialis and the communists. …In terms of economic policy, the survival ideology is linked with the concept of the “global city” first proposed in 1972 by Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam. This concept suggests that if Singapore is to survive, it must establish a relationship of interdependence in the rapidly expanding global economic system . An excerpt from “SINGAPORE: Reconciling the Survival Ideology with the Achievement Concept” by Lee Boon-Hiok [from the Southeast Asian Affairs 1978 ]

2. Realism Realism describes the notion that states should act according to their best interest. From a realist’s perspective, the world is in a constant state of anarchy. Individuals are inherently egoistic and will do anything to pursue power. As such, states should protect their interests through means like the development of an independent defence force as well as the conduct of diplomacy.

Singapore’s interpretation of such a concept and practice was spelled out by Lee Hsien Loong in the same speech as follows: This policy depends on the competing interests of several big powers in a region, rather than on linking the nation’s fortunes to one overbearing partner. The big powers can keep one another in check and will prevent any one of them from dominating the entire region, and so allow small states to survive in the interstices between them. It is not a foolproof method, as the equilibrium is a dynamic and possibly unstable one, and may be upset if one power changes course and withdraws. Nor can a small state manipulate the big powers with impunity. The most it can hope to do is to influence their policies in its favour. An excerpt from “ Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability ” by Michael Leifer

More importantly, Singapore did not rely solely on the goodwill of external powers to manage security challenges. Its emphasis on regionalism and multilateralism was also another vital channel, seen in terms of Singapore’s diplomatic role in ASEAN and the United Nations.

Through Singapore’s consistent lobbying efforts at the United Nations General Assembly, the government was successful in publicise the Cambodian conflict at the international level.

Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs distinguished itself as a diplomatic dynamo during the course of the Cambodian conflict. The advocacy, lobbying and drafting skills of its officials were employed to great effect within the United Nations against Vietnam and its client government in Phnom Penh. For example, the declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea held at the UN in 1981 was drafted by Singapore’s delegation. Singapore’s diplomatic success was accomplished through playing on the political sensibilities of states that had been alarmed by the example of a government despatching its army across an internationally recognised boundary to remove an incumbent administration recognised at the United Nations and replacing it with another of its own manufacture. An excerpt from “ Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability ” by Michael Leifer

What can we learn from this article? Consider the following question: – Assess the view that Singapore’s foreign policy was largely shaped by Realism.

Join our JC History Tuition and learn more about Singapore’s foreign policy in response to the Second and Third Indochina Wars.

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Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's Written Reply to Parliamentary Questions on the Impact of the Middle East Tensions on Southeast Asia, 8 May 2024

08 may 2024.

QUESTION Mr Christopher de Souza : To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) how the escalation of tension in the Middle East will impact geopolitics in the Southeast Asia region; and (b) how is the Ministry preparing for it. REPLY 1 Southeast Asia has been affected by the escalation of armed conflicts in the Middle East since the Hamas’ terrorist attack on 7 October 2023, Israel’s subsequent military response in Gaza and the consequential dire humanitarian situation. There is also a heightened risk of a wider regional conflagration with global economic impact. 2 In October 2023, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a Statement on the Recent Escalation of Armed Conflict in the Middle East. They urged the “immediate end of violence to avoid further human casualties”. Further, they called for “the full respect of International Humanitarian Law” and for “safe, rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian corridors”. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers strongly condemned the “acts of violence which have led to the deaths and injury of civilians, including ASEAN nationals”. They called for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages. 3 In December 2023, all ASEAN Member States voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly 10th Emergency Special Session resolution which called for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. Several ASEAN Member States, including Singapore, are also conveying urgently needed humanitarian assistance to Gaza. 4 Naturally, ASEAN Member States have different national perspectives. But on the core issues – the need for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire, the immediate release of all hostages, the need for humanitarian assistance to flow, and support for a two-state solution – ASEAN Member States share common views. With mutual understanding and respect, as well as a spirit of compromise, ASEAN has usually been able to find consensus on difficult issues. 5 On Singapore’s part, we remain committed to ensuring that developments in the Middle East do not affect the close partnerships we share with fellow ASEAN Member States.

. . . . .

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SINGAPORE 8 MAY 2024

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a ministry of the Government of Singapore responsible for conducting and managing diplomatic relations between Singapore and other countries and regions.

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How Do U.S. Firms Withstand Foreign Industrial Policies?

China’s industrial policies (“Five-Year Plans”) displace U.S. production/employment and heighten plant closures in the same industries as those targeted by the policies in China. The impact was not anticipated by the stock market, but U.S. companies in the "treated industries" suffer a valuation loss afterwards. Firms shift production to upstream or downstream industries benefiting from the boost, or offshore to government-endorsed industries in China. Such within-firm adjustments offset the direct impact. U.S. firms are better able to withstand foreign government interventions provided that they enjoy flexibility, including preexisting business toeholds in the "beneficiary" industries, financial access, and labor fluidity.

Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau or the National Bureau of Economic Research.. This research was carried out at a Federal Statistical Research Data Center under FSRDC Project Number 1831. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.

MARC RIS BibTeΧ

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UK and Singapore strengthen collaboration in sustainable finance and FinTech

HM Treasury

Published 8 May 2024

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This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-singapore-strengthen-collaboration-in-sustainable-finance-and-fintech/uk-and-singapore-strengthen-collaboration-in-sustainable-finance-and-fintech

Singapore, 8 May 2024

The United Kingdom (UK) and Singapore held the 9th UK-Singapore Financial Dialogue in Singapore today. Both countries discussed collaboration opportunities in priority areas such as sustainable finance and FinTech and innovation, and exchanged views on recent developments in non-bank financial intermediation ( NBFI ) as well as efforts to improve cross-border payment connectivity.

Sustainable Finance

The UK and Singapore reaffirmed their commitment to scale financing in support of the net zero agenda.

A. Developments in transition planning:

The UK and Singapore reaffirmed that globally comparable and sound transition plans are essential for the scaling of transition finance. The UK updated on the progress of the Transition Plan Taskforce ( TPT )’s disclosure framework following its publication in October 2023, and outlined plans for introducing expectations for listed companies’ transition plan disclosures. The Monetary Authority of Singapore ( MAS ) shared its consultation on Transition Planning Guidelines in 2023, which set out supervisory expectations for financial institutions to have a sound transition planning process, as they build climate resilience and manage risks arising from the global transition to a net zero economy and the expected physical effects of global warming. The UK and Singapore also noted the importance of ongoing work at G20, Financial Stability Board ( FSB ), Basel Committee’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Risks ( TFCR ), International Organization of Securities Commissions ( IOSCO ) and Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System ( NGFS ) in this respect.

B. Disclosure standards, ESG ratings and data products:

The UK and Singapore re-affirmed their commitment to implement the International Sustainability Standards Board ( ISSB )’s standards to improve the consistency, comparability, and reliability of sustainability-related disclosures globally. The UK provided an update on its Sustainability Disclosure Requirements and its associated labelling regime. The UK and Singapore also discussed the voluntary codes of conduct for ESG ratings and data product providers that have been published in their respective countries, noting that both codes were aligned with IOSCO ’s recommendations. Both countries agreed to consider collaboration opportunities as the regulatory landscape evolves, including through IOSCO ’s Sustainable Finance Taskforce.

C. Sustainable infrastructure and investment:

The UK and Singapore noted the large funding gap for Asia’s green and transition finance, and agreed that there are opportunities to mobilise private capital for the net zero transition. Building on the September 2023 UK-Singapore Strategic Partnership [footnote 1] to accelerate regional sustainable infrastructure and investment, the UK and Singapore will collaborate to develop and finance green finance and energy transition projects in the region. MAS provided an update on Singapore’s blended finance initiative, the Financing Asia’s Transition Partnership (FAST-P) [footnote 2] , which will bring together key public, private and philanthropic sector partners to mobilise financing to de-risk and finance transition and marginally bankable green projects in Asia.

FinTech and Innovation

The UK and Singapore exchanged views on their respective approaches to manage risks and capture opportunities in the digital space.

A. Artificial intelligence (AI):

The UK and Singapore discussed financial stability risks, cyber security risks, as well as supervisory considerations associated with the increased use of AI in the financial sector. Both countries agreed that international standards were key to facilitating innovation while managing risks to consumers, financial market stability and integrity, and explored areas for collaboration through international fora, such as IOSCO and FSB .

B. Cryptoassets:

The UK provided an update on its final proposals for creating the UK’s financial services regulatory regime for cryptoassets, under which the government will bring a number of cryptoasset activities, such as exchange, custody, and lending activities, into the regulatory perimeter for the first time. The UK also updated on its plans to regulate certain fiat-referenced stablecoins and create the environment for stablecoin issuers and service providers to operate and grow in the UK.

C. Central Bank Digital Currency ( CBDC ):

The UK shared developments on progress following the publication of the “digital pound” consultation response paper on 25 January 2024, including a design phase which would be followed by a decision on whether to proceed with a retail CBDC . The UK also shared their thinking on wholesale payments, including on infrastructure supporting the settlement of tokenised transactions.

D. Tokenisation and distributed ledger technology ( DLT ):

The UK and Singapore shared their respective projects and initiatives in tokenisation and DLT and agreed on the benefits of asset and fund tokenisation to the financial ecosystem, from broadened investor access to investment products to simplifying distribution and trading of such products digitally. As part of Project Guardian’s policymaker group, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and MAS , together with the other policymakers [footnote 3] , aim to advance discussions on the regulatory treatment of digital assets. Both countries agreed to share learnings on how regulatory regimes could facilitate responsible innovation.

Developments in the NBFI Sector and Cross-Border Payment Connectivity

The UK provided an update on recent developments to address risks in the NBFI sector. Both countries underlined the importance of enhancing authorities’ ability to monitor risks in NBFIs via better data gathering and sharing. They also agreed on the importance of finalising on-going international policy work on margining practices and NBFI leverage, and to subsequently implement agreed NBFI policies at domestic level. The UK and Singapore agreed to continue their collaboration to address vulnerabilities associated with NBFIs, including at IOSCO and the FSB .

The UK and Singapore reiterated their commitment to the G20’s Roadmap to Enhancing Cross-Border Payments, including the FSB ’s priorities for this year as laid out in its most recent progress report. The BIS Innovation Hub Singapore Centre also shared the progress of Project Nexus [footnote 4] , a multilateral approach to connect domestic instant payment systems to improve the speed, cost, transparency and accessibility of cross-border payments.

The UK and Singapore renewed their commitment to engagement beyond the Dialogue through a series of roadmap engagements to explore further cooperation in sustainable finance and FinTech and innovation, ahead of the next Financial Dialogue due to be held in the UK in 2025.

Two industry-led UK-Singapore business roundtables on Transition Planning and Generative AI will take place on 9 May 2024 with participation by industry participants from both countries.

The Transition Planning roundtable will examine current regulatory initiatives and next steps for Financial Institutions and their portfolio companies in their transition to net zero.

The Generative AI roundtable will discuss the challenges this technology poses for regulatory compliance and identify strategies to harness the benefits of generative AI while fostering innovation and protecting consumers.

The Dialogue was jointly chaired by Deputy Managing Director (Markets and Development) of MAS , Mr Leong Sing Chiong, and Director General (Financial Services) of HM Treasury (HMT), Ms Gwyneth Nurse. The Dialogue was attended by senior officials from MAS , HMT, Bank of England, FCA, the High Commission of the Republic of Singapore in London, and the British High Commission in Singapore.

About the Monetary Authority of Singapore

The Monetary Authority of Singapore ( MAS ) is Singapore’s central bank and integrated financial regulator. As a central bank, MAS promotes sustained, non-inflationary economic growth through the conduct of monetary policy and close macroeconomic surveillance and analysis. It manages Singapore’s exchange rate, official foreign reserves, and liquidity in the banking sector. As an integrated financial supervisor, MAS fosters a sound financial services sector through its prudential oversight of all financial institutions in Singapore – banks, insurers, capital market intermediaries, financial advisors and financial market infrastructures. It is also responsible for well-functioning financial markets, sound conduct, and investor education. MAS also works with the financial industry to promote Singapore as a dynamic international financial centre. It facilitates the development of infrastructures, adoption of technology, and upgrading of skills in the financial industry.

About HM Treasury

HM Treasury is the UK government’s economic and finance ministry, maintaining control over public spending, setting the direction of the UK’s economic policy and working to achieve strong and sustainable economic growth.

The department is responsible for:

public spending: including departmental spending, public sector pay and pension, annually managed expenditure (AME) and welfare policy, and capital investment;
financial services policy: including banking and financial services regulation, financial stability, and ensuring competitiveness in the City;
strategic oversight of the UK tax system: including direct, indirect, business, property, personal tax, and corporation tax;
the delivery of infrastructure projects across the public sector and facilitating private sector investment into UK infrastructure; and
ensuring the economy is growing sustainably

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-singapore-joint-declaration-9-september-2023 ↩

Allied Climate Partners, International Finance Corporation, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Temasek Establish a Green Investments Partnership in Asia ↩

The FCA joins forces with global regulators to foster digital innovation - Project Guardian (fca.org.uk) ↩

BIS’s Project Nexus prototype successfully links Eurosystem, Malaysia and Singapore payment systems; partners in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand to work towards wider payment connectivity (mas.gov.sg) ↩

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Review: The Opioid High of Empire

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The Opioid High of Empire

Two new books turn a spotlight on how the colonial past lives on in unacknowledged ways..

In 2019, when Britain’s Labour Party pledged to review the country’s legacy of colonialism, Nigel Farage, then the leader of the Brexit Party (now Reform UK), warned Britons against obsessing “about the past.” “It was a different world, a different time,” he said. Months later, as Black Lives Matter protests swept across the Atlantic and amid calls for a reevaluation of revered historical figures with records of racism, then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson echoed this view. “We cannot now try to edit or censor our past,” he said. “We cannot pretend to have a different history.” For Johnson and Farage—and they were hardly alone—history was done, fixed, settled.

Smoke and Ashes: Opium’s Hidden Histories , Amitav Ghosh, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 416 pp., $32, February 2024; Empireworld: How British Imperialism Shaped the Globe , Sathnam Sanghera, PublicAffairs, 464 pp., $35, May 2024

Two new books, Sathnam Sanghera’s Empireworld : How British Imperialism Shaped the Globe and Amitav Ghosh’s Smoke and Ashes : Opium’s Hidden Histories , provide an elegant riposte to this view, turning a spotlight on how the colonial past lives on years after the dismantling of the British imperial state. Together, they also render for a general readership what, contra Farage and Johnson, academic historians have long known: that British imperialism continues to influence our world today in manifold—and often unacknowledged—ways.

Sanghera’s is a follow-up to Empireland , his 2021 bestseller on how imperialism continues to shape Britain, where he was born to Punjabi parents in the 1970s and now works as a journalist. That book, he writes, exposed him to “thousands of abusive tweets and letters” and “hundreds of suggestions that I leave the country if I couldn’t learn to love British history.” The volume and intensity of this racist abuse was so great that it “ingrained itself into my daily existence, becoming as commonplace as my morning bowl of porridge,” he writes.

Fortunately for us, instead of retreating, Sanghera’s response was to widen his canvass, moving beyond his homefront to examine the British Empire’s impact on the wider world and assuming, in Empireworld , the role of a globe-trotting archeologist of imperialism, dusting off faraway colonial footprints. What he finds could fill a whole new British Museum.

Sanghera uncovers the empire’s distinctive stamp on buildings, language, systems of government, even varieties of flora and fauna. He examines the impact of, among other things, slavery, indentured labor, and the opium trade, and his catalog of imperial legacies is dense and damning.

Sanghera recounts how British colonialism was “largely responsible for the environmental destruction of the South Atlantic island of St Helena,” where colonists first felled trees for “cooking, heating and the distillation of booze” and then sealed the island’s environmental fate by importing invasive plants; how it resulted in “present-day New Zealand losing at least 60 per cent of its forests”; and how Britons’ taste for mahogany furniture and doors, “which were fashionable from the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth, and that visitors to National Trust houses coo over in the twenty-first century, led to near extinction of the trees in the West Indies.”

No, College Curriculums Aren’t Too Focused on Decolonization

Critics of campus demonstrations are aiming at the wrong target. We need to study more history, not less.

The Indian Anti-Colonial Movement Never Ended

It’s where we actually are in history.

Yet Empireworld is more than a catalog of what happened. Sanghera is an astute observer of the way the imperial past lives on, twisting attitudes in the present. Take Barbados, where Sanghera was surprised to find no mention of slavery during a tour of a colonial mansion on a former plantation. The tour guide explained that one of the bathrooms did not have running water because the owners considered it an “unnecessary expense,” Sanghera writes, but the guide didn’t clarify that this was likely because enslaved people carried water for them.

That was just one of several elisions on the tour. Sanghera writes that it “felt as if the topic was being deliberately sidestepped.” The tourists who visited the plantation—mostly white, mostly British—simply “didn’t care,” the guide told Sanghera, and “are marvelling at the accomplishments of their ancestors.”

Politics shift, rulers change; centuries-old dynamics, reinforced with selective tellings of the past, are harder to displace. As Sanghera muses during one of his research trips: It “would be easier to take the ghee out of the masala omelettes I’ve become addicted to eating for breakfast in India.”

British ships destroy an enemy fleet in Canton curing the First Opium War, circa 1841. Dea Picture Library/via Getty Images

Where Sanghera ranges widely across the former empire, Ghosh, in Smoke and Ashes , focuses on one aspect of it: the opium trade. Ghosh started to research the opium trade two decades ago for his Ibis trilogy, a fictional rendering of the events in the 1830s that led up to the First Opium War between Britain and China. But in its concerns about the reverberations of the colonial past and the sirens they sound about the future, Smoke and Ashes feels more akin to The Nutmeg’s Curse and The Great Derangement , Ghosh’s nonfiction works on the history of the climate crisis and our imaginative failure to reckon with it.

The story, this time, begins with tea. Nineteenth-century Britain, having acquired a taste for the Chinese brew, faced an economic conundrum. It wanted tea, lots of it, but China was largely uninterested in British goods. This resulted in a trade imbalance, with huge amounts of money flowing from Britain to China. Imperial administrators wanted to reverse this tide in the British exchequer’s favor, so they sought to increase the flow of exports to China from Britain’s Indian colonies. Opium was the centerpiece of this economic offensive. The opium trade already existed, but European colonizers expanded it by an “order of magnitude,” Ghosh writes.

A series of drawings from 1882 show scenes from an opium factory in Patna, India: the balling room, the drying room, and the stacking room. Hulton Archive/Getty Images

Under the British, opium production in India was transformed into a giant state monopoly, one propped up by what Ghosh calls “self-exculpatory” myths. Although China had banned the addictive drug by the late 1700s, Britain justified the trade by claiming that “non-white people were by nature prone to addiction and depravity,” he writes. British colonizers also claimed that the trade was simply a successor to an earlier opium enterprise under the Mughals—one that, Ghosh writes, doesn’t appear to have existed.

As China sought to crack down on opium imports, the trade led to wars and, ultimately, “to immense profits for the British Empire for well over a hundred years,” Ghosh writes. Britain’s victory in the mid-19th-century Opium Wars brought the empire control of Hong Kong, compensation for destroyed opium, and the forced legalization of the opium trade in China. Profits also flowed across the pond, as American capitalists, cut off from trade with nearby British colonies following their War of Independence, started to import Turkish opium to China.

This trade, as Ghosh shows, had an outsized impact on today’s world, from the global drug trade to modern India’s economy, where some of today’s economic problems can be traced back to the British opium monopoly. The Indian states where opium production was centered were rapaciously exploited by colonial officials, and they remain among the poorest in the nation today. Furthermore, he writes, many “of the cities that are now pillars of the modern globalised economy—Mumbai, Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai—were initially sustained by opium.”

An Indian police officer destroys poppy flowers being grown for opium production in Jharkhand, India, on Feb. 6, 2017. Sanjib Dutta/AFP via Getty Images

“Study the historian before you begin to study the facts,” the British scholar E.H. Carr said in a lecture series he gave in the early 1960s on the nature of history. Ghosh and Sanghera are, of course, very different kinds of writers; the former is one of India’s best-known literary figures, the latter a longtime journalist. They differ in approach and in their style of writing. What they share is the perspective of the outsider—outside, that is, of academia. Both rely on the works of professional historians to tell their stories. But as outsiders, they are also unconstrained by the rules of the academy: Both books roam widely, jumping from academic history to memoir to journalism. The results are works that are accessible, in the best sense of the word: complex stories, rivetingly told, that will appeal to a broad swath of readers.

They also do more than chronicle. “Britain cannot hope to have a productive future in the world without acknowledging what it did to the world in the first place,” Sanghera writes. This doesn’t mean grappling with reductive questions of the sort implied by Farage and Johnson. Indeed, asking whether the empire was good or bad, he writes, is “as inane and pointless as asking whether the world’s weather has been good or bad over the last 350 years.” Instead, Sanghera calls for a much more nuanced view of Britain’s imperial history. For him, this entails filling the yawning gap in Westerners’ understanding about the empire and interrogating “some of the common claims and controversies about British imperial influence.”

Ghosh, long concerned about our unfolding climate catastrophe—for which Foreign Policy named him a Global Thinker in 2019—sounds a broader alarm about humanity’s limits in constraining the forces it unleashes. “There is no better example of this than the story of the opium poppy,” he writes. “It is at once a cautionary tale about human hubris, and a lesson about humanity’s limits and frailties.”

Both Ghosh and Sanghera understand, as Carr also argued in the 1960s, that “the past is intelligible to us only in the light of the present; and we can fully understand the present only in the light of the past.” For Carr, the past and present were in constant dialogue, and the function of history was to “enable man to understand the society of the past, and to increase his mastery over the society of the present.” Empireworld and Smoke and Ashes fulfill this function brilliantly, looking back at the colonial past not simply to draw up a balance sheet of what happened but to understand the present and, hopefully, reimagine our shared futures.

Books are independently selected by FP editors. FP earns an affiliate commission on anything purchased through links to Amazon.com on this page.

Nikhil Kumar is a New York City-based writer and journalist. His work has appeared in the New York Times , Time , and the Independent , among other publications. Twitter: @nkreports

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