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The balance of power in world politics.

• Randall L. Schweller Randall L. Schweller Department of Political Science, Ohio State University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.119
• Published online: 09 May 2016

The balance of power—a notoriously slippery, murky, and protean term, endlessly debated and variously defined—is the core theory of international politics within the realist perspective. A “balance of power” system is one in which the power held and exercised by states within the system is checked and balanced by the power of others. Thus, as a nation’s power grows to the point that it menaces other powerful states, a counter-balancing coalition emerges to restrain the rising power, such that any bid for world hegemony will be self-defeating. The minimum requirements for a balance of power system include the existence of at least two or more actors of roughly equal strength, states seeking to survive and preserve their autonomy, alliance flexibility, and the ability to resort to war if need be.

At its essence, balance of power is a type of international order. Theorists disagree, however, about the normal operation of the balance of power. Structural realists describe an “automatic version” of the theory, whereby system balance is a spontaneously generated, self-regulating, and entirely unintended outcome of states pursuing their narrow self-interests. Earlier versions of balance of power were more consistent with a “semi-automatic” version of the theory, which requires a “balancer” state throwing its weight on one side of the scale or the other, depending on which is lighter, to regulate the system. The British School’s discussion of balance of power depicts a “manually operated” system, wherein the process of equilibrium is a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen, a sense of community of nations, of shared responsibility, and a desire and need to preserve the balance of power system.

As one would expect of a theory that made its appearance in the mid-16th century, balance of power is not without its critics. Liberals claim that globalization, democratic peace, and international institutions have fundamentally transformed international relations, moving it out of the realm of power politics. Constructivists claim that balance of power theory’s focus on material forces misses the central role played by ideational factors such as norms and identities in the construction of threats and alliances. Realists, themselves, wonder why no global balance of power has materialized since the end of the Cold War.

• empirical international relations theory

Introduction

The idea of balance of power in international politics arose during the Renaissance age as a metaphorical concept borrowed from other fields (ethics, the arts, philosophy, law, medicine, economics, and the sciences), where balancing and its relation to equipoise and counterweight had already gained broad acceptance. Wherever it was applied, the “balance” metaphor was conceived as a law of nature underlying most things we find appealing, whether order, peace, justice, fairness, moderation, symmetry, harmony, or beauty. 1 In the words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “The balance existing between the power of these diverse members of the European society is more the work of nature than of art. It maintains itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it reestablishes itself very soon on the other.” 2

Centuries later, this Renaissance image of balance as an automatic response driven by a law of nature still suffuses analysis of how the theory operates within the sphere of international relations. Thus, Hans Morgenthau explained, “The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity, to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it.” 3 Similarly, Kenneth Waltz declared, “As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power.” 4 Christopher Layne likewise avers, “Great powers balance against each other because structural constraints impel them to do so.” 5 Realists, such as Arnold Wolfers, invoke the same “law of nature” metaphor to explain opportunistic expansion: “Since nations, like nature, are said to abhor a vacuum, one could predict that the powerful nation would feel compelled to fill the vacuum with its own power.” 6 Using similar structural-incentives-for-gains logic, John Mearsheimer claims that “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.” 7

From the policymaker’s perspective, however, balancing superior power and filling power vacuums hardly appear as laws of nature. Instead, these behaviors, which carry considerable political costs and uncertain policy risks, emerge through the medium of the political process; as such, they are the product of competition and consensus-building among elites with differing ideas about the political-military world and divergent views on the nation’s goals and challenges and the means that will best serve those purposes. 8 As Nicholas Spykman observed many years ago, “political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces. States cannot afford to wait passively for the happy time when a miraculously achieved balance of power will bring peace and security. If they wish to survive, they must be willing to go to war to preserve a balance against the growing hegemonic power of the period.” 9

In an era of mass politics, the decision to check unbalanced power by means of arms and allies—and to go to war if these deterrent measures fail—is very much a political act made by political actors. War mobilization and fighting are distinctly collective undertakings. As such, political elites must weigh the likely domestic costs of balancing behavior against the alternative means available to them and the expected benefits of a restored balance of power. Leaders are rarely, if ever, compelled by structural imperatives to adopt certain policies rather than others; they are not sleepwalkers buffeted about by inexorable forces beyond their control. This is not to suggest that they are oblivious to the constraints imposed by international structure. Rather, systemic pressures are filtered through intervening variables at the domestic level to produce foreign policy behaviors. Thus, states respond (or not) to power shifts—and the threats and opportunities they present—in various ways that are determined by both internal and external considerations of policy elites, who must reach consensus within an often decentralized and competitive political process. 10

Meanings of Balance of Power and Balancing Behavior

While the balance of power is arguably the oldest and most familiar theory of international politics, it remains fraught with conceptual ambiguities and competing theoretical and empirical claims. 11 Among its various meanings are (a) an even distribution of power; (b) the principle that power ought to be evenly distributed; (c) the existing distribution of power as a synonym for the prevailing political situation; that is, any possible distribution of power that exists at a particular time; (d) the principle of equal aggrandizement of the great powers at the expense of the weak; (e) the principle that our side ought to have a preponderance of power to prevent the danger of power becoming evenly distributed; in this view, a power “balance” is likened to a bank balance, that is, a surplus rather than equality; (f) a situation that exists when one state possesses the special role of holding the balance (called the balancer) and thereby maintains an even distribution of power between two rival sides; and (g) an inherent tendency of international politics to produce an even distribution of power.

The conceptual murkiness surrounding the theory extends to its core concept, balancing behavior. What precisely does the term “balancing” mean? Some scholars talk about soft balancing, 12 others have added psycho-cultural balancing, political-diplomatic balancing, and strategic balancing, 13 while still others talk about economic and ideological balancing. 14 Because balance of power is a theory about international security and preparations for possible war, I offer the following definition of balancing centered on military capabilities: “Balancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through either internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the occupation and domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition. The state balances to prevent the loss of territory , either one’s homeland or vital interests abroad (e.g., sea lanes, colonies, or other territory considered of vital strategic interest). Balancing only exists when states target their military hardware at each other in preparation for a possible war. If two states are merely building arms for the purpose of independent action against third parties, we cannot say that they are engaged in balancing behavior. State A may be building up its military power and even targeting another state B and still not be balancing against B, that is, trying to match B’s overall capabilities with the aim of possible territorial conquest or preventing such conquest by B. Instead, the purpose may be coercive diplomacy: to gain bargaining leverage with state B.” 15

The Goals, Means, and Dynamics of Balance of Power

International relations theorists have exhibited remarkable ambiguity about not only the meaning of balance of power but the results to be expected from a successfully operating balance of power system. 16 What is the ultimate promise of balance of power theory? The purpose or goal of balance of power—if such a thing can be attributed to an unintended spontaneously generated order—is not the maintenance of international peace and stability, as many of the theory’s detractors have wrongly asserted. Rather it is to preserve the integrity of the multistate system by preventing any ambitious state from swallowing up its neighbors. The basic intuition behind the theory is that states are not to be trusted with inordinate power, which threatens all members of the international system. The danger is that a predatory great power might gain more than half of the total resources of the system and thereby be in position to subjugate all the rest.

It is further assumed that the only truly effective and reliable antidote to power is power. Increases in power (especially a rival’s growing strength), therefore, must be checked by countervailing power. The means of accomplishing this aim are arms and allies: states counterbalance threatening accumulations of power by building arms (internal balancing) and forming alliances (external balancing) that serve to aggregate each other’s military power. Because the “balance of power” primarily refers to the relative power capabilities of great power rivals and opponents (it is, after all, a theory about great powers, the primary actors in international politics) in the event of war between them, fighting power is the power to be gauged. In determining what capabilities to measure, context is crucial: “To test a theory in various historical and temporal contexts requires equivalent, not identical, measures.” 17 An accurate assessment of the balance of power must include (a) the military capabilities (the means of destruction) each holds and can draw upon; (b) the political capacity to extract and apply those capabilities; (c) the capabilities and reliability of commitments of allies and possible allies; and (d) the basic features of the political geography (viz., the military and political consequences of the relationships between physical geography, state territories, and state power) of the conflict. 18 While the exact components of any particular power capability index will vary, they typically include combinations of the following measures: land area (territorial size), total population, size of armed forces, defense expenditures, overall and per capita size of the economy (e.g., gross national product), technological development (which includes measures such as steel production and fossil fuel consumption), per capita value of international trade, government revenue, and less easily measured capabilities such as political will and competence, combat efficiency, and the like.

In summary, balance of power’s general principle of action may be put as follows: when any state or coalition becomes or threatens to become inordinately powerful, other states should recognize this as a threat to their security (sometimes to their very survival) and respond by taking measures—individually or jointly or both—to enhance their military power. This process of equilibration is thought to be the central operational rule of the system. There is disagreement, however, over how the process, in practice, actually works; that is, over the degree of conscious motivation required for the production of equilibrium. Along these lines, Claude provides three types of balance of power systems: the automatic version , which is self-regulating and spontaneously generated; the semi-automatic version , whereby equilibrium requires a “balancer”—throwing its weight on one side of the scale or the other, depending on which is lighter—to regulate the system; and the manually operated version , wherein the process of equilibrium is a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen who carefully manage the affairs of the units (states and other non-state territories) constituting the system.

The manually operated balance of power system is consistent with the English School’s notion that states consider balance as something of a collective good. The role of great power comes with the responsibility to maintain the balance of power. It is “a conception of the balance of power as a state of affairs brought about not merely by conscious policies of particular states that oppose preponderance throughout all the reaches of the system, but as a conscious goal of the system as a whole.” 19

Nine Conditions that Promote the Smooth Operation of the Balance of Power

Recognizing the confusion and flexibility attending the term “balance of power,” any attempt to construct a list of conditions that make a balance of power system most likely to emerge, endure, and function properly should be seen as a worthy, if not foolhardy, exercise. In that spirit, I offer the following nine conditions, which are jointly sufficient to bring about an effectively performing balance-of-power system.

At Least Two Egoistic Actors under Anarchy that Seek to Survive. Within an anarchic realm, which lacks a sovereign arbiter to make and enforce agreements among states, there must be at least two states that seek self-preservation, above all, for a balance of power to exist. Further, states must be more self-interested than group-interested. Each desires, if possible, greater power than its neighbors. If states act to promote the long-run community interest over their short-run national interest (narrowly defined), or if they equate the two sets of interests, then they exist within either a Concert system or a Collective Security system. Simply put, states in a balance-of-power system are not altruistic or other-regarding; they act, instead, in ways that maximize their relative gains and avoid or minimize their relative losses. 20

Vigilance . States must be watchful and sensitive to changes in the distribution of capabilities. Vigilance about changes in the balance of power is not only salient with respect to actual or potential rivals. It is also necessary with regard to one’s allies because (a) when its allies are growing weaker, the state must be aware of the deteriorating situation in order to take appropriate measures to remedy the danger; conversely, (b) when its allies are growing rapidly and dramatically stronger, the state should be alarmed because today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy.

Mobility of Action . States must not only be aware of changes in the balance of power, they must be able to respond quickly and decisively to them. As Gulick points out: “Policy must be continually readjusted to meet changing circumstances if an equilibrium is to be preserved. A state which, by virtue of its institutional make-up, is unable to readjust quickly to altered conditions will find itself at a distinct disadvantage in following a balance-of-power policy, especially when other states do not labor under the same difficulties.” 21 Here, Gulick echoes a concern at the time (during the early ColdWar period) that democracies are too slow-moving and deliberate to balance effectively, putting them “at a distinct disadvantage” in a contest with an authoritarian regime.

States Must Join the Weaker (or Less Threatening) Side in a Conflict : As Kenneth Waltz puts it, “States, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.” 22 According to structural realists, the most powerful state will always appear threatening because weaker states can never be certain that it will not use its power to violate their sovereignty or threaten their survival. Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory amends this proposition to say: States, if they are free to choose and have credible allies, flock to what they perceive as the less threatening side, whether it is the stronger or weaker of two sides. For Walt, threat is a combination of (a) aggregate power; (b) proximity; (c) offensive capability; and (d) offensive intentions. 23 This last dimension, offensive intentions, is a nonstructural, ideational variable, which some critics of realism see as an ad hoc emendation—one that is only loosely connected, if at all, to neorealism’s core propositions. More on this in the conclusion of the article.

Obviously, balance of power predicts best when states balance against, rather than bandwagon with, threatening accumulations of power. But it is not necessary that every state or even a majority of states balance against the stronger or more threatening side. Instead, balancing behavior will work to maintain equilibrium or to restore a disrupted balance as long as the would-be hegemon is prevented from gaining preponderance by the combined strength of countervailing forces arrayed against it. The exact ratio of states that balance versus those that do not balance is immaterial to the outcome. What matters is that enough power is aggregated to check preponderance. 24

States Must Be Able to Project Power . Mobility of policy also means mobility on the ground. If all states adopt strictly defensive military postures and doctrines, none will be attractive allies. In such a world, external balancing would, for all intents and purposes, disappear, leaving balance-of-power dynamics severely limited. This condition is a very small hurdle for the theory to clear, however, since “great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability,” as John Mearsheimer has forcefully argued. 25

War Must Be a Legitimate Tool of Statecraft . Balancing behaviors are preparations for war, not peace. If major-power war eventually breaks out, as it did in 1914 and 1939 , there is no reason to conclude that the balance of power failed to operate properly. Quite the opposite: balance of power requires that “war must be a legitimate tool of statecraft.” 26 The outbreak of war, therefore, does not disconfirm but, in most cases, supports the theory. As Harold Lasswell observed in 1935 , the balancing of power rests on the expectation that states will settle their differences by fighting. 27 This expectation of violence exercises a profound influence on the types of behaviors exhibited by states and the system as a whole. It was not just the prospect of war that triggered the basic dynamics of past multipolar and bipolar systems. It was the anticipation that powerful states sought to and would, if given the right odds, carry out territorial conquests at each other’s expense that shaped and shoved actors in ways consistent with the predictions of realism’s keystone theory.

No Alliance Handicaps . For a balance-of-power system to operate effectively, alliance formation must be fluid and continuous. States must be able to align and realign with other states solely on the basis of power considerations. In practice, however, various factors diminish the attractiveness of certain alliances that would otherwise be made in response to changes in the balance of power that threaten the state’s security. These constraints—rooted in ideologies, personal rivalries, national hatreds, ongoing territorial disputes and the like—that impede alignments made for purely strategic reasons are called “alliance handicaps.” 28 In effect, they narrow the competitive alternatives available to states searching for allies.

Parenthetically, alliance handicaps explain why the alliance flexibility that seemingly derives from the wealth of physical alternatives theoretically available under a multipolar structure should not be confused with the actual alternatives that are politically available to states within the system given their particular interests and affinities. 29 Indeed, the greater flexibility of alliances and fluidity of their patterns under multipolarity, as opposed to bipolarity, is more apparent than real. Seen from a purely structural perspective, a multipolar system appears as an oligopoly, with a few sellers (or buyers) collaborating to set the price. Behaviorally, however, multipolarity tends toward duopoly: the few are often only two. This scarcity of alternatives due to the presence of alliance handicaps contradicts the conventional wisdom of the flexibility of alliances in a multipolar system.

Pursue Moderate War Aims . Because today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy, states should pursue moderate war aims and avoid eliminating essential actors. In Gulick’s words, “An equilibrium cannot perpetuate itself unless the major components of that equilibrium are preserved. Destroy important makeweights and you destroy the balance; or in the words of Fénelon to the grandson of Louis XIV early in the 18th century: ‘never … destroy a power under pretext of restraining it.’” 30 This lesson is easily grasped when one considers the composition of alignments before and after major-power wars. During the Second World War, for instance, the United States was allied with China and the Soviet Union against Italy, Germany, and Japan. After the war, the United States, victorious but wisely having chosen not to eliminate its vanquished enemies, allied with Japan, Italy, and West Germany against its erstwhile allies, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

For structural realists, moderate outcomes result because of, not in spite of, the greed and fear of states—to behave too forcefully, too recklessly expansionist, will lead others to mobilize against you. This is a very different understanding of moderation than the one that Edward Gulick and members of the English School have in mind when they speak of moderation within a balance of power: “restraint, abnegation, and the denial of immediate self-interest.” What is required is “the subordination of state interest to balance of power.” 31 For most realists, these notions better describe a Concert system than one rooted in balance-of-power politics, where states simply follow their narrow, short-run self-interests.

Proportional Aggrandizement (or Reciprocal Compensations ). Sometimes moderation toward the defeated power is unachievable. Under such circumstances, “if the cake cannot be saved, it must be fairly divided.” What is fair? Gulick suggests that “equal compensation” is fair. The concept of reciprocal compensation or proportional aggrandizement, he claims, “stated that aggrandizement by one power entitled other powers to an equal compensation or, negatively, that the relinquishing of a claim by one power must be followed by a comparable abandonment of a claim by another.” 32 Such an “equality” rule, however, would disrupt an existing balance. If, for instance, one state is twice as powerful as another, and together they are dividing up a third state, a division down the middle, giving them each half, will advantage the weaker power relative to its stronger partner. Instead, “proportional” compensation is not only fair but will maintain an existing equilibrium among the great powers. Simply put, the rule governing partitions must be that “the biggest dog gets the meatiest bone, and so on.” Returning to our example, a balance will be maintained if the defeated state is partitioned such that two thirds of it goes to the state that is twice as strong as its weaker associate, which receives the remaining third. Such proportional aggrandizement prevents any great power from making unfair relative gains at the expense of the others.

The Balance of Power as an International Order

At its essence, balance of power is a type of international order. What do we mean by an international order? A system exhibits “order” when the set of discrete objects that comprise the system are related to one another according to some pattern; that is, their relationship is not miscellaneous or haphazard but accords with some discernible principle. Order prevails when things display a high degree of predictability, when there are regularities, when there are patterns that follow some understandable and consistent logic. Disorder is a condition of randomness—of unpredictable developments lacking regularities and following no known principle or logic. The degree of order exhibited by social and political systems is partly a function of stability. Stability is the property of a system that causes it to return to its original condition after it has been disturbed from a state of equilibrium. Systems are said to be unstable when slight disturbances produce large disruptions that not only prevent the original condition from being restored but also amplify the effect of the perturbation. This process is called “positive feedback,” because it pushes the system increasingly farther away from its initial steady state. The classic example of positive feedback is a bank run caused by self-fulfilling prophesies: people believe something is true (there will be a run on the bank), so their behavior makes it true (they all withdraw their money from the bank); and others’ observations of this behavior increases the belief that it is true, so they behave accordingly (they, too, withdraw their money from the bank), which makes the prophesy even more true, and so on. 33

Some systems are characterized by robust and durable orders. Others are extremely unstable, such that their orders can quickly and without warning collapse into chaos. Like an avalanche, or peaks of sand in an hourglass that suddenly collapse and cascade, or a spider web that takes on an entirely new pattern when a single strand is cut, complex and delicately balanced systems are unpredictable: they may appear calm and orderly at one moment only to become wildly turbulent and disorderly the next. This inherent instability of complex, tightly coupled systems is captured by the popular catch phrase, “the butterfly effect,” coined by the MIT meteorologist, Edward Lorenz, to explain how a massive storm can be caused (or prevented) by the faraway flapping of a tiny butterfly’s wings. The principal lesson of the butterfly effect is that, when incalculably small differences in the initial conditions of a system matter greatly, the world becomes radically unpredictable. 34 Indeed, we can seldom predict what will happen when a new element is added to a system composed of many parts connected in complex ways. Such systems undergo frequent discontinuous changes from shocking impacts that create radical departures from the past.

International orders vary according to (a) the amount of order displayed; (b) whether the order is purposive or unintended; and (c) the type of mechanisms that provide order. On one end of the spectrum, there is rule-governed, purposive order, which is explicitly designed and highly institutionalized to fulfill universally accepted social ends and values. 35 At the other extreme, international order is an entirely unintended and un-institutionalized recurrent pattern (e.g., a balance of power) to which the actors and the system itself exhibit conformity but which serves none of the actors’ goals or which, at least, was not deliberately designed to do so. Here, international order is spontaneously generated and self-regulating. The classic example of this spontaneously generated order is the balance of power, which arises though none of the states may seek equality of power; to the contrary, all actors may seek greater power than everyone else, but the concussion of their actions (which aim to maximize their power) produces the unintended consequence of a balance of power. 36 In other words, the actors are constrained by a system that is the unintended product of their coactions (akin to the invisible hand of the market, which is a spontaneously generated order/system).

There are essentially three types of international orders:

A negotiated order. A rule-based order that is the result of a grand bargain voluntarily struck among the major actors who, therefore, view the order as legitimate and beneficial. It is a highly institutionalized order, ensuring that the hegemon will remain engaged in managing the order but will not exercise its power capriciously. In this way, a negotiated rule-based order places limits on the returns to power, especially with respect to the hegemon. Pax Americana ( 1945 –present) and, to a lesser extent, Pax Britannica (19th century) are exemplars of this type of “liberal constitutional” order. 37

An imposed order. A non-voluntary order among unequal actors purposefully designed and ruled by a malign (despotic) hegemon, whose power is unchecked. The Soviet satellite system is an exemplar of this type of order.

A spontaneously generated order. Order is an unintended consequence of actors seeking only to maximize their interests and power. It is an automatic or self-regulating system. Power is checked by countervailing power, thereby placing limits on the returns to power. The classic 18th century European balance of power is an exemplar of this type of order.

The predictability of a social system depends, among other things, on its degree of complexity, whether its essential mechanisms are automatic or volitional, and whether the system requires key members to act against their short-run interests in order to work properly. Negotiated (sometimes referred to as “constitutional”) orders are complex systems that rely on ad hoc human choices and require actors to choose voluntarily to subordinate their immediate interests to communal or remote ones (e.g., in collective security systems). As such, how they actually perform when confronted with a disturbance that trips the alarm, so to speak, will be highly unpredictable. In contrast, the operation of a balance-of-power system is fairly automatic and therefore highly predictable. It simply requires that states, seeking to survive and thrive in a competitive, self-help realm, pursue their short-run interests; that is, states seek power and security, as they must in an anarchic order. 38

Here, I do not mean to suggest that balance-of-power systems always function properly and predictably. Balancing can be late, uncertain, or nonexistent. These types of balancing maladies, however, typically occur when states consciously seek to opt out of a balance-of-power system, as happened in the interwar period, but then fail to replace it with a functioning alternative security system. The result is that a balance-of-power order, which may be viewed as a default system that arises spontaneously, in the absence or failure of concerted arrangements among all the units of the system to provide for their collective security, eventually emerges but is not accomplished as efficiently as it otherwise would have been.

Does Balancing Behavior Prevail Over Other State Responses to Growing Power?

There have been several recent challenges to the conventional realist wisdom that balancing is more prevalent than bandwagoning behavior, that is, when states join the stronger or more threatening side. 39 Paul Schroeder’s broad historical survey of international politics shows that states have bandwagoned with or hid from threats far more often than they have balanced against them. Similarly, I have claimed that bandwagoning behavior is more prevalent than contemporary realists have led us to believe because alliances among revisionist states, whose behavior has been ignored by modern realists, are driven by the search for profit, not security. 40 Most recently, Robert Powell treats states as rational unitary actors within a simple strategic setting composed of commitment issues, informational problems, and the technology of coercion and finds that “balancing is relatively rare in the model. Balances of power sometimes form, but there is no general tendency toward this outcome. Nor do states generally balance against threats. States frequently wait, bandwagon, or, much less often, balance.” 41 Powell freely admits, however, that a rational-unitary-actor assumption “does not mean that domestic politics is unimportant.” 42 None of these studies, however, has offered a domestic-politics explanation for bandwagoning or a theory of the broader phenomenon of underbalancing behavior, which includes buck-passing, distancing, hiding, waiting, appeasement, bandwagoning, incoherent half-measures, and, in extreme cases, civil war, revolution, and state disintegration.

In addition to studies of bandwagoning, there has been some work on what is called “buck-passing” behavior, a form of under-reaction to threats by which states attempt to ride free on the balancing efforts of others. Two popular explanations for buck-passing behavior are structural-systemic ones. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder claim that great powers under multipolarity will buck-pass when they perceive defensive advantage; while John Mearsheimer argues that buck-passing occurs primarily in balanced multipolar systems, especially among great powers that are geographically insulated from the aggressor. 43 Others argue that whether or not states balance against threats is not primarily determined by systemic factors but rather by domestic political processes. 44

Along these lines, it is important to point out that, when we speak of balancing and other competing responses to growing power, we are actually referring to four distinct categories of behavior. First, there is appropriate balancing , which occurs when the target is a truly dangerous aggressor that cannot or should not be appeased. Second, there is inappropriate balancing , which unnecessarily triggers a costly and dangerous arms spiral because the target is misperceived as an aggressor but is, in fact, a defensively minded state seeking only to enhance its security. 45 Third, there is nonbalancing , which may take the form of buck-passing, bandwagoning, appeasement, engagement, distancing, or hiding. These policies may be quite prudent and rational when the state is thereby able to avoid the costs of war either by satisfying the legitimate grievances of the revisionist state or allowing others to satisfy them, or by letting others defeat the aggressor while safely remaining on the sidelines. Moreover, if the state also seeks revision, then it may wisely choose to bandwagon with the potential aggressor in the hope of profiting from its success in overturning the established order. Finally, there is an unusual state of affairs, such as those we live under today, in which one state is so overwhelmingly powerful that there can be said to exist an actual harmony of interests between the hegemon (or unipole) and the rest of the great powers—those that could either one day become peer competitors or join together to balance against the predominant power. The other states do not balance against the hegemon because they are too weak (individually and collectively) and, more important, because they perceive their well being as inextricably tied up with the well-being of the hegemon. Here, potential “balancers” bandwagon with the hegemon not because they seek to overthrow the established order (the motive for revisionist bandwagoning), but because they perceive themselves to be benefiting from the status-quo order and, therefore, seek to preserve it. 46

Finally, there is underbalancing , which occurs when the state does not balance or does so inefficiently in response to a dangerous and unappeasable aggressor, and the state’s efforts are absolutely essential to deter or defeat it. In these cases, the underbalancing state not only does not avoid the costs of war but also brings about a war that could have been avoided or makes the war more costly than it otherwise would have been or both. 47

Criticisms of Balance-of-Power Theory

Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars of international politics have come to believe that realism and the balance of power are now obsolete. Liberal critics charge that, while power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era, international politics has been transformed as democracy extends its sway, as interdependence tightens its grip, and as institutions smooth the way to peace. If other states do arise over the coming decades to become peer competitors of the United States, the world will not return to a multipolar balance of power system but rather will enter a new multipartner phase. In the words of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “It does not make sense to adapt a 19th-century concert of powers or a 20th-century balance-of-power strategy. We cannot go back to Cold War containment or to unilateralism,” she said in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in July 2009 . “We will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multipolar world and toward a multipartner world.” 48

It is a view based on the assumption that history moves forward in a progressive direction—one consistent with the metaphor of time’s arrow. 49 Of course, realists have heard all this before. Consider Woodrow Wilson’s description of pre-World War I Europe: “The day we left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of ‘every nation take care of itself or make a partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world’.” 50

While I suspect that social constructivists would agree with most (if not all) of the arguments posed by the liberal challenge to realism, the thrust of their attack is more conceptual and theoretically oriented. As mentioned, Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” theory, by including “aggressive intentions” as a dimension of threat, widens the stimuli to which states perceive dangers to include more than just material power. Social constructivists, like Michael Barnett, charge that Walt, having shattered neorealist theory, does not go far enough in defining the ideational elements that determine threats and alliances. Ideology and ideas about identity and norms are, according to social constructivists, often the most important sources of threat perception, as well as the primary basis for alliance formation itself. 51

Finally, even self-described realists wonder if balance of power still operates in the contemporary world, at least at the global level. For various “sound realist” reasons, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth see a world out of balance—one in which the United States maintains its unchallenged global primacy for another 20 years or more. 52 Edward Rhodes goes farther, urging the field to abandon, rather than hopelessly attempting to rehabilitate, the “balancing” metaphor and the logic that flows from it. Balancing behavior, he claims, makes no sense in a world devoid of “trinitarian wars” and the belief that any state, if too powerful and unchecked by other states, threatens the sovereignty of all other states. Today, nuclear arsenals assure great powers of the ultimate invulnerability of their sovereignty. 53 Moreover, war among the great powers in the present age is, if not downright ludicrous and unthinkable, far from an expected and sensible means to resolve their disputes. Balance of power is a theory deeply rooted in a territorial view of wealth and security—a world that no longer exists. 54

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1. See Vagts ( 1948 ), 82–101. For classic analyses on the balance of power, see Wolfers ( 1962 ), 122–124; Hinsely (1963 ); Dehio ( 1962 ); Sheehan ( 1996 ); Luard ( 1992 ); Claude ( 1962 ); and Seabury ( 1965 ). For impressive recent analyses, see Levy ( 2003 ), 128–153; and Paul ( 2004 ). See also Vincent & Wright ( 1989 ).

2. Quoted in Haas ( 1953 ), 453.

3. Morgenthau ( 1966 ), 163.

4. Waltz ( 2000 ), 28.

5. Christopher Layne ( 1997 ), 117.

6. Wolfers ( 1962 ), 15.

7. Mearsheimer ( 2001 ), 21.

8. See, for example, the description of the policy-making process in Schilling ( 1962 ), 5–27; and Hilsman ( 1971 ).

9. Spykman ( 1942 ), 25.

10. This theme fits squarely within the new wave of neoclassical realist research. Neoclassical realists argue that states assess and adapt to changes in their external environment partly as a result of their peculiar domestic structures and political situations. Because complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts between external factors (primarily, changes in relative power) and policy outputs, states often react differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their responses may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones. See Rose ( 1998 ), 144–172; Schweller ( 2003 ), 311–348; and Lobell, Taliaferro, & Ripsman ( 2009 ).

11. For a sampling of this discussion, see J. A. Vasquez & C. Elman(Eds.), Realism and the balancing of power: A new debate . Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

12. T. V. Paul offers the following definition: “Soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening.” (Paul, 2004 , p. 3). See also Pape ( 2005 ), 7–45; Paul ( 2005 ), 46–71; Brooks & Wohlforth ( 2005 ), 72–108; and Lieber & Alexander ( 2005 ), 109–139.

13. Joffe ( 2002 ), 155–180.

14. For economic balancing, see Heginbotham & Samuels ( 1998 ), 171–203, esp. pp. 192–193; and Moran ( 1993 ), 211–215. For ideological balancing rooted in ideological polarity and distance, see Haas ( 2005 ); and Haas ( 2012 ).

15. Schweller (2006 ), 9. Some would now refer to this definition as “hard” balancing as opposed to “soft” balancing.

16. Claude, Jr. ( 1989 ), 78.

17. Moul, ( 1989 ), 103.

18. Moul, ( 1989 ).

19. See Bull ( 1977 ), 106.

20. Realists call this “defensive positionality.” See Grieco ( 1990 ).

21. Gulick ( 1950 ), 68.

22. Waltz ( 1979 ), 127.

23. The original statement of balance of threat theory is K. N. Walt (1985), Alliance formation and the balance of world power, International Security , 9 (4), 3–43.

24. For this argument, see Schweller, ( 1997 ), 927–930 and at 929.

25. Mearsheimer ( 2001 ), 30.

26. Jervis ( 1986 ), 60.

27. Lasswell ( 1965 ), chap. 3. This was originally published in 1935.

28. Jervis ( 1986 ), 60.

29. See Snyder ( 1997 ), 148–149.

30. Gulick ( 1950 ), 72–73.

31. Ibid ., 33, 304.

32. Ibid ., 70–71.

33. See Hardin ( 1963 ), 63–64, 73.

34. The term “butterfly effect” grew out of Lorenz ( 1972 ), an unpublished academic paper.

35. This is Hedley Bull’s definition of social order in Bull ( 1977 ), 3–22.

36. The source of stability in a balance-of-power system (equilibrium) may arise as an unintended consequence, either of actors seeking to maximize their power or of the imperative for actors wishing to survive in a competitive self-help system to balance against threatening accumulations of power. See Waltz ( 1979 ), 88–93 and chap. 6.

37. For constitutional order, see Ikenberry ( 2001 ).

38. For this logic, see Betts ( 1992 ), 5–43.

39. For the dominant view that balancing prevails over bandwagoning and other responses to rising threats, see Walt ( 1987 ).

40. Schroeder ( 1994 ), 108–148; and Schweller ( 1994 ), 72–148. Also see Jervis & Snyder ( 1991 ); and Sweeney & Fritz ( 2004 ), 428–449.

41. Powell ( 1999 ), 196.

42. Powell ( 1999 ), 26.

43. Christensen & Snyder ( 1990 ), 137–168; and Mearsheimer ( 2001 ), 271–273.

44. See, for example, Schweller ( 2006 ); Levy & Barnett ( 1991 ), 369–395; and Levy & Barnett ( 1992 ), 19–40.

45. This view of appropriate and inappropriate balancing follows Jervis’s spiral and deterrence models. See Jervis ( 1976 ), 58–114.

46. See Carr ( 1964 ), 80–82. Also see Wohlforth ( 1999 ), 5–41.

47. For underbalancing behavior, see Schweller ( 2006 ).

48. Clinton ( 2009 ).

49. See Gould ( 1987 ).

50. Quoted in Claude Jr. ( 1962 ), 81.

51. See Barnett ( 1996 ), 400–447.

52. Brooks & Wohlforth ( 2008 ).

53. Rhodes ( 2004 ), 150–176.

54. Rhodes ( 2004 ), 150–176; and Schweller ( 2014 ).

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Introduction

Iraq invasion.

“To some, power balancing is the inevitable and conflict-ridden by-product of anarchy and insecurity; to others, it is the unifying principle of a stable and cooperative international society” (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). Ikenberry’s definition of power balance in international relations shows that, the concept is understood in different ways.

However, power balance (in international relations) is an ancient ideology which defines how states, cities and regions relate. In fact, the rivalry of most world powers is best understood through the lens of “power balance” (Little 2007, p. 1).

In modern international relations, a balance of power can only be achieved if states attain a level of stability among themselves. This level of stability is attained in the absence of competition. Realistically, many states have failed to achieve this equilibrium.

The concept of power balance is enshrined in a political system that defines the behavior of states in the system (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). A balance of power is often desirable because; in its presence, the likelihood that one state takes advantage of another is low (or non-existent).

When a group of states (or one state) increases its power, other states are likely to retaliate by increasing their powers too (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). It is an endless cycle of power struggle which is defined by the doctrines of equality (Sheehan 1996). Naturally, the doctrine of equality is cemented in the fact that, states would want to ensure they are secure (first) before tackling any other nationalistic agendas.

Since the 17 th century, there have been many examples of power balance tussles (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). However, this paper focuses on the Russia–America cold war and the US-led invasion of Iraq (in 2003) as the main examples of power balance conflicts in present times. These two cases will be used as examples to understand the concept of balance of power.

The US and Russia were embroiled in a complicated balance of power tussle which was fueled by ideological, economic, and political differences (Ross 1993, p. 138). Many observers say that, the biggest difference between the two states was the difference in political systems (Ross 1993, p. 138).

Russia was a communist state and the US was a capitalist state. This difference often saw the two countries disagree on many issues, including the Cuban missile crisis that almost sent the two countries to war. The US and Russia could barely agree on any policy issue.

The conflict between the US and Russia started when the US was displeased by Russia’s resolve to withdraw from World War I (Mayall 1980, p. 161). Moreover, the US did not condone Russia’s political, social and economic systems, which were based on communism.

The US saw the communist system as a threat to its national security. For instance, the US worried about Russia’s growing influence in Europe (after the defeat of the Nazi Germany) because it already had a strong political and economic dominance in the region.

This worry was especially strong because the US knew that its political and economic ideologies were very different from Russia, and with Russia’s growing influence in Europe, its influence in Europe would be undermined (Ross 1993, p. 138).

These fears were rife when Russia and the US competed for international influence. US’s fear in this balance of power tussle is highlighted in earlier sections of this study, where it is noted that, in a balance of power tussle, states often strive to ensure they are secure, above all nationalistic issues.

The tense relations between Russia and America sparked the cold war, which was waged through military dominance. This balance of power tussle saw Russia detonate its first atomic weapon. This event marked the end of US’s autonomy of possessing nuclear weapons (Pandey 2009, p. 5).

The post-Nazi period marked the start of the cold war, where the US and Russia embarked on developing military armory (notably nuclear weapons). This military supremacy battle went on until the fall of the communism regime in 1991. The fall of communism marked the end of the cold war (Pandey 2009, p. 5).

From the above analysis, we see that, the US and Russia were engaged in a balance of power tussle that saw the two states striving to command a strong international influence over the other. Notably, this international influence was exercised in Europe, where the US and Russia strived to maintain a strong international influence.

Both states felt threatened by one other because they had opposing ideologies regarding most political and economic issues. However, with the fall of communism and USSR, the US warmed up to Russia, and the cold war ended.

This period marked the equilibrium of power between the two nations. This equilibrium is often marked with a feeling of security and an absence of military threats (Brown 2001, p. 106).

The US-led war on Iraq is a historic war of the 21 st century because it exhibits the concept of the balance of power in international relations. Though the war was won by ousting the long-serving Iraqi ruler, Saddam Hussein; the main objective of the mission (which was to eliminate weapons of mass destruction) was not achieved.

The US believed that, Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, but it failed to validate these accusations after attacking Iraq (Pandey 2009, p. 5). This justification for war is part of a wider understanding of balance of power in international relations because, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became increasingly dominant in international politics.

Its military strength became virtually unrivaled and therefore, it wielded immense political and economic influence over other nations (Pandey 2009, p. 5). More so, this power was vested in the formation of NATO which acts as a military powerhouse for member states.

However, when analyzing the concept of balance of power (in the context of the Iraq war), we should perceive the US-led invasion on Iraq as an extreme consequence of power imbalance. This analogy is true because the US decided to invade Iraq despite UN’s disapproval of the invasion.

Records show that, most of the major world powers, such as, France, Germany, China and Russia opposed the invasion but the US went ahead to invade Iraq, anyway (Pandey 2009, p. 5). This domination is explained as, a consequence of power imbalance because the US wields a lot of power over other states in the world.

From this understanding, the US is able to impose its will over other nations. In relation to this analogy, Pandey (2009) explains that, “In International Relations, an equilibrium of power is sufficient to discourage or prevent one nation from imposing its will on or interfering with the interests of another” (p. 5).

Due to the imbalance of power between the US and other states, the US was able to impose its will over other states by invading Iraq.

The Iraq war is just an example of the gap in military power that exists between the US and major world powers (which even small states can do nothing to counterbalance). The US-led invasion in Iraq therefore reiterates the importance of striving for a balance of power among states because, if this equilibrium is not achieved, a sense of dominance will be witnessed.

The concept of power balance in international relations has never been more important than when trying to understanding how different states relate. This paper gives an example of the hostile relations that existed between the US and Russia, and the US-led invasion in Iraq as modern-day examples of the understanding of balance of power in international relations.

Considering the events that preceded the collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war, we see that, there was an imbalance of power between the US and Russia before the collapse of the USSR. After the collapse of the USSR, there was a balance of power that improved diplomatic relations between the US and Russia.

On the flip side, we have witnessed the extremes of power imbalance between the US and other world nations, which saw the US, influence the decision to invade Iraq. From these examples, this paper highlights the importance of attaining a balance of power among world nations. If such an equilibrium is not achieved, powerful states will always impose their will over other states.

Brown, C. (2001) Understanding International Relations . London, Palgrave Macmillan.

Ikenberry, J. (2008) The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Models . Web.

Little, R. (2007) The Balance Of Power In International Relations: Metaphors, Myths And Models . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Mayall, J. (1980) The End Of The Post-War Era: Documents On Great-Power Relations, 1968-1975 . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Pandey, S. (2009) Concept of Balance of Power in International Relations . Web.

Ross, R. (1993) China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making In the Cold War . New York, M.E. Sharpe.

Sheehan, M. (1996) The Balance Of Power: History And Theory . London, Routledge.

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balance of power

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balance of power , in international relations , the posture and policy of a nation or group of nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power against the power of the other side. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as when embarking upon a policy of alliances.

The term balance of power came into use to denote the power relationships in the European state system from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War I . Within the European balance of power, Great Britain played the role of the “balancer,” or “holder of the balance.” It was not permanently identified with the policies of any European nation, and it would throw its weight at one time on one side, at another time on another side, guided largely by one consideration—the maintenance of the balance itself. Naval supremacy and its virtual immunity from foreign invasion enabled Great Britain to perform this function, which made the European balance of power both flexible and stable.

The balance of power from the early 20th century onward underwent drastic changes that for all practical purposes destroyed the European power structure as it had existed since the end of the Middle Ages . Prior to the 20th century, the political world was composed of a number of separate and independent balance-of-power systems, such as the European, the American, the Chinese, and the Indian. But World War I and its attendant political alignments triggered a process that eventually culminated in the integration of most of the world’s nations into a single balance-of-power system. This integration began with the World War I alliance of Britain, France , Russia, and the United States against Germany and Austria-Hungary . The integration continued in World War II , during which the fascist nations of Germany, Japan, and Italy were opposed by a global alliance of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and China. World War II ended with the major weights in the balance of power having shifted from the traditional players in western and central Europe to just two non-European ones: the United States and the Soviet Union . The result was a bipolar balance of power across the northern half of the globe that pitted the free-market democracies of the West against the communist one-party states of eastern Europe. More specifically, the nations of western Europe sided with the United States in the NATO military alliance, while the Soviet Union’s satellite-allies in central and eastern Europe became unified under Soviet leadership in the Warsaw Pact .

Because the balance of power was now bipolar and because of the great disparity of power between the two superpowers and all other nations, the European countries lost that freedom of movement that previously had made for a flexible system. Instead of a series of shifting and basically unpredictable alliances with and against each other, the nations of Europe now clustered around the two superpowers and tended to transform themselves into two stable blocs.

There were other decisive differences between the postwar balance of power and its predecessor. The fear of mutual destruction in a global nuclear holocaust injected into the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union a marked element of restraint. A direct military confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies on European soil was an almost-certain gateway to nuclear war and was therefore to be avoided at almost any cost. So instead, direct confrontation was largely replaced by (1) a massive arms race whose lethal products were never used and (2) political meddling or limited military interventions by the superpowers in various Third World nations.

In the late 20th century, some Third World nations resisted the advances of the superpowers and maintained a nonaligned stance in international politics. The breakaway of China from Soviet influence and its cultivation of a nonaligned but covertly anti-Soviet stance lent a further complexity to the bipolar balance of power. The most important shift in the balance of power began in 1989–90, however, when the Soviet Union lost control over its eastern European satellites and allowed noncommunist governments to come to power in those countries. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 made the concept of a European balance of power temporarily irrelevant, since the government of newly sovereign Russia initially embraced the political and economic forms favoured by the United States and western Europe. Both Russia and the United States retained their nuclear arsenals, however, so the balance of nuclear threat between them remained potentially in force.

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Of the balance of power ..

I T is a question whether the idea of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrase only has been invented in these later ages? It is certain, that Xenophon [1] , in his Institution of Cyrus , represents the combination of the Asiatic powers to have arisen from a jealousy of the encreasing force of the Medes and Persians ; and though that elegant composition should be supposed altogether a romance, this sentiment, ascribed by the author to the eastern princes, is at least a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of Greece , the anxiety, with regard to | the balance of power, is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by the ancient historians. Thucydides [2] represents the league, which was formed against Athens , and which produced the Peloponnesian war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of Athens , when the Thebans and Lacedemonians disputed for sovereignty, we find, that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported Thebes against Sparta , till the great victory gained by Epaminondas at Leuctra ; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generosity, as they pretended, but in reality from their jealousy of the conquerors [3] .

Whoever will read Demosthenes 's oration for the Megalopolitans , may see the utmost refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculatist. And upon the first rise of the Macedonian power, this orator immediately discovered the danger, sounded the alarm throughout all Greece , and at last assembled that confederacy under the banners of Athens , which fought the great and decisive battle of Chaeronea .

It is true, the Grecian wars are regarded by historians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each state seems to have had more in view the honour of leading the rest, than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we consider, indeed, the small number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming sieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that noble people; we shall conclude, that the balance of power was, of itself, sufficiently secured in Greece , and needed not to have been guarded with that caution which may be requisite in other ages. But whether we ascribe the shifting of sides in all the Grecian republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics , the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was sure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often composed of its former friends and allies.

The same principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the Ostracism of Athens , and Petalism of Syracuse , and expelled every citizen whose fame or power overtopped the rest; the same principle, I say, naturally discovered itself in foreign politics, and soon raised enemies to the leading state, however moderate in the exercise of its authority.

The Persian monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the Grecian republics; and therefore it behoved him, from views of safety more than from emulation, to interest himself in their quarrels, and to support the weaker side in every contest. This was the advice given by Alcibiades to Tissaphernes [4] , and it prolonged near a century | the date of the Persian empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the first appearance of the aspiring genius of Philip , brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few instances in the history of mankind.

The successors of Alexander showed great jealousy of the balance of power; a jealousy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preserved distinct for several ages the partition made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of Antigonus [5] threatened them anew with a universal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at Ipsus saved them. And in subsequent times, we find, that, as the Eastern princes considered the Greeks and Macedonians as the only real military force, with whom they had any intercourse, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The Ptolemies , in particular, supported first Aratus and the Achaeans , and then Cleomenes king of Sparta , from no other view than as a counterbalance to the Macedonian monarchs. For this is the account which Polybius gives of the Egyptian politics [6] .

The reason, why it is supposed, that the ancients were entirely ignorant of the balance of power , seems to be drawn from the Roman history more than the Grecian ; and as the transactions of the former are generally more familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclusions. It must be owned, that the Romans never met with any such general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally have been expected from the rapid conquests and declared ambition; but | were allowed peaceably to subdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous history of their Italic wars; there was, upon Hannibal 's invasion of the Roman state, a remarkable crisis, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared afterwards (nor was it difficult to be observed at the time) [7] that this was a contest for universal empire; yet no prince or state seems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or issue of the quarrel. Philip of Macedon remained neuter, till he saw the victories of Hannibal ; and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms still more imprudent. He stipulated, that he was to assist the Carthaginian state in their conquest of Italy ; after which they engaged to send over forces into Greece , to assist him in subduing the Grecian commonwealths [8] .

The Rhodian and Achaean republics are much celebrated by ancient historians for their wisdom and sound policy; yet both of them assisted the Romans in their wars against Philip and Antiochus . And what may be esteemed still a stronger proof, that this maxim was not generally known in those ages; no ancient author has remarked the imprudence of these measures, nor has even blamed that absurd treaty above-mentioned, made by Philip with the Carthaginians . Princes and statesmen, in all ages, may, before-hand, be blinded in their reasonings with regard to events: But it is somewhat extraordinary, that historians, afterwards, should not form a sounder judgment of them.

Massinissa , Attalus , Prusias , in gratifying their private passions, were, all of them, the instruments of the | Roman greatness; and never seem to have suspected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conquests of their ally. A simple treaty and agreement between Massinissa and the Carthaginians , so much required by mutual interest, barred the Romans from all entrance into Africa , and preserved liberty to mankind.

The only prince we meet with in the Roman history, who seems to have understood the balance of power, is Hiero king of Syracuse . Though the ally of Rome , he sent assistance to the Carthaginians , during the war of the auxiliaries; “Esteeming it requisite,” says Polybius [9] , “both in order to retain his dominions in Sicily , and to preserve the Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able, without contrast or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence. For that is never, on any account, to be overlooked; nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights against it.” Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms.

In short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep | penetration and discernment. If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as at present, it had, at least, an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at present, however generally known and acknowledged among speculative reasoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extensive among those who govern the world.

After the fall of the Roman empire, the form of government, established by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great measure, for farther conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper boundaries. But when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of universal monarchy, from the union of so many kingdoms and principalities in the person of the emperor Charles . But the power of the house of Austria , founded on extensive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay, of themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised against them. In less than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendor eclipsed. A new power succeeded, more formidable to the liberties of Europe , possessing all the advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects; except a share of that spirit of bigotry and persecution, with which the house of Austria was so long, and still is so much infatuated.

In the general wars, maintained against this ambitious power, Great Britain has stood foremost; and she still maintains her station. Beside her advantages of riches and situation, her people are animated with such a national spirit, and are so fully sensible of the blessings of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will languish in so necessary and so just a cause. On the contrary, if we may judge by the past, their passionate ardour seems rather to require some | moderation; and they have oftener erred from a laudable excess than from a blameable deficiency.

In the first place, we seem to have been more possessed with the ancient Greek spirit of jealous emulation, than actuated by the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with France have been begun with justice, and even, perhaps, from necessity; but have always been too far pushed from obstinacy and passion. The same peace, which was afterwards made at Ryswick in 1697, was offered so early as the year ninety-two; that concluded at Utrecht in 1712 might have been finished on as good conditions at Gertruytenberg in the year eight; and we might have given at Frankfort , in 1743, the same terms, which we were glad to accept of at Aix-la-Chapelle in the year forty-eight. Here then we see, that above half of our wars with France , and all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

In the second place, we are so declared in our opposition to French power, and so alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refuse all reasonable terms of accommodation. Habent subjectos, tanquam suos; viles, ut alienos. All the world knows, that the factious vote of the House of Commons, in the beginning of the last parliament, with the professed humour of the nation, made the queen of Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with Prussia , which would immediately have restored the general tranquillity of Europe .

In the third place, we are such true combatants, that, when once engaged, we lose all concern for ourselves and our posterity, and consider only how we may best annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at so deep a rate, in wars, where we were only accessories, was surely the most fatal delusion, that a nation, which had any pretension to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poison, ought, in all reason, to be reserved to the last extremity; and no evil, but the greatest and most urgent, should ever induce us to embrace so dangerous an expedient.

These excesses, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, become still more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is usual, the opposite extreme, and rendering us totally careless and supine with regard to the fate of Europe . The Athenians , from the most bustling, intriguing, warlike people of Greece , finding their error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no contest ever took part on either side, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor.

Enormous monarchies are, probably, destructive to hu | man nature; in their progress, in their continuance [10] , and even in their downfal, which never can be very distant from their establishment. The military genius, which aggrandized the monarchy, soon leaves the court, the capital, and the center of such a government; while the wars are carried on at a great distance, and interest so small a part of the state. The ancient nobility, whose affections attach them to their sovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of military employments, which would carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are distant both from their pleasures and their fortune. The arms of the state, must, therefore, be entrusted to mercenary strangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occasion to turn them against the prince, and join each desperate malcontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the necessary progress of human affairs: Thus human nature checks itself in its airy elevation: Thus ambition blindly labours for the destruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The Bourbons , trusting to the support of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would push their advantage, without reserve or limitation. These, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war; but never would submit to languish in the garrisons of Hungary or Lithuania , forgot at court, and sacrificed to the intrigues of every minion or mistress, who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with Cravates and Tartars , Hussars and Cossacs ; intermingled, perhaps, with a few soldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the Roman emperors, from the same cause, is renewed over and over again, till the final dissolution of the monarchy.

Xenoph. Hist. Graec. lib. vi. & vii.

Thucyd. lib. viii.

Diod. Sic. lib. xx.

Lib. ii. cap. 51.

It was observed by some, as appears by the speech of Agelaus of Naupactum , in the general congress of Greece . See Polyb. lib. v. cap. 104.

Titi Livii , lib. xxiii. cap. 33.

Lib. i. cap. 83.

If the Roman empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from this, that mankind were generally in a very disorderly, uncivilized condition, before its establishment.

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The Balance of Power in International Relations

Metaphors, myths and models.

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Book description

The balance of power has been a central concept in the theory and practice of international relations for the past five hundred years. It has also played a key role in some of the most important attempts to develop a theory of international politics in the contemporary study of international relations. In this 2007 book, Richard Little establishes a framework that treats the balance of power as a metaphor, a myth and a model. He then uses this framework to reassess four major texts that use the balance of power to promote a theoretical understanding of international relations: Hans J. Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations (1948), Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society (1977), Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) and John J. Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). These reassessments allow the author to develop a more comprehensive model of the balance of power.

'Richard Little's study is set to be the definitive account of balance-of-power thinking within IR theory. He traces the role played by this idea in the work of Morgenthau, Bull, Waltz, and Mearsheimer, and manages to treat them all with remarkable freshness and originality. This book yields many new insights into a topic that continues to fascinate the IR mind, despite the many times its death has been foretold.'

Ian Clark - Professor of International Politics, University of Wales Aberystwyth

‘Now that academic international relations is emerging out of a metathoretical detour, the balance of power is set to regain a prominent place in the discipline. At the same time, the so-called unipolar moment has generated widespread interest among various political actors as to the merits of balancing behaviour. Richard Little’s new book will appeal to both academics and practitioners. In the first half, the author brings analytical precision to the concept and in the second half he engages with a fascinating dialogue with leading theoreticians of the balance of power. The result is an original and timely appraisal of one of the discipline’s founding concepts.

Tim Dunne - Head of Politics, University of Exeter

‘Little’s book about the 'balance of power' has two great virtues: it treats that time-honored concept with respect and sophistication, while offering critical analysis along the way. Moreover, it nicely shows the clear differences among realist thinkers who employ that concept in their theories.’

John J. Mearsheimer - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago

‘Every diplomat and every scholar fancies him or herself an expert on the balance of power. In this lucid, informative and provocative book, Richard Little proves them all wrong. With sophisticated theoretical reasoning, careful and novel interpretations of canonical texts, and wide-ranging historical analysis, Little provides a fresh analysis of a central but elusive concept. A landmark study of the balance of power and international relations theory.’

William C. Wohlforth - Professor & Chair, Department of Government, Dartmouth College

‘… a valuable contribution …’

Source: Political Studies Review

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Frontmatter pp i-vi

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Contents pp vii-vii

List of figures pp viii-ix, acknowledgements pp x-x, part i - introduction pp 1-2, 1 - reassessing the balance of power pp 3-16, part ii - metaphors, myths and models pp 17-18, 2 - metaphors and the balance of power pp 19-49, 3 - the balance of power: from metaphors to myths and models pp 50-88, part iii - balance of power models pp 89-90, 4 - hans j. morgenthau's politics among nations pp 91-127, 5 - hedley bull's the anarchical society pp 128-166, 6 - kenneth n. waltz's theory of international politics pp 167-212, 7 - john j. mearsheimer's the tragedy of great power politics pp 213-248, part iv - conclusion pp 249-250, 8 - a composite view of the balance of power for the twenty-first century pp 251-287, bibliography pp 288-311, index pp 312-317, altmetric attention score, full text views.

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Balance of power: meaning, nature, methods and relevance.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

“Whenever the term Balance of Power is used without qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among nations with approximately equality” — Hans. J. Morgenthau.

“Unmanaged struggle for power can be a source of war in international relations.”

Such a realization stands universally recognized and it has led to the development of certain devices of power management. One such device has been Balance of Power.

In fact, Balance of Power has been traditionally an important fact of international relations. It has been guiding the decisions and policies of nations. Since the 17th century Several scholars regard it as the best guide for securing the goals of national interest without getting involved in war. Upto the first half of twentieth century, Balance of Power was regarded as being the only known modern device of international management of power.

“Balance of Power is a nearly fundamental law of politics as it is possible to find.” —Martin Wright

Palmer and Perkins also hold that balance of power principle has been “a basic principle of international relations.

What is Balance of Power ?

It is indeed very difficult to define Balance of Power. It has been defined it differently by different scholars.

“The trouble with Balance of Power is not that it has no meaning, but that it has too many meanings.” —Innis L. Claude Jr.

Some writers define it in terms of equilibrium where as others in terms of “preponderance” or “disequilibrium”. Some define it as a principle of action while others define it as a policy or system.

Some Popular Definitions of Balance of Power:

(1) “Balance of Power is such a ‘just equilibrium’ in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon others.” —Sidney B. Fay

(2) “Balance of Power is an equilibrium or a certain amount of stability in power relations that under favourable conditions is produced by an alliance of states or by other devices.” —George Schwarzenberger

(3) “Balance of Power is such a system in which some nations regulate their power relations without any interference by any big power. As such it is a decentralized system in which power and policies remain in the hands of constituting units.” —Inis Claude

(4) Balance of Power means “the maintenance of such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as should prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest.” —Lord Castlereagh

(5) “Whenever the term Balance of Power is used without qualification, it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among nations with approximately equality.” —Hans. J. Morgenthau

All these definitions clearly reflect that Balance of Power is defined differently by different scholars. It is very difficult to give or select a uniformly acceptable definition. This difficultly makes it essential for us to study the features of Balance of Power.

Nature of Balance of Power

Palmer and Perkins describe several major features of Balance of Power (BOP):

1. Some Sort of Equilibrium in Power Relations:

The term Balance of Power suggests ‘equilibrium which is subject to constant, ceaseless change. In short, though it stands for equilibrium, it also involves some disequilibrium. That is why scholars define it as a just equilibriums or some sort of equilibrium in power relations.

2. Temporary and Unstable:

In practice a balance of power always proves to be temporary and unstable. A particular balance of power survives only for a short time.

3. To be Actively Achieved:

The balance of power has to be achieved by the active intervention of men. It is not a gift of God. States cannot afford to wait until it “happens”. They have to secure it through their efforts.

4. Favours Status quo:

Balance of power favours status quo in power positions of major powers. It seeks to maintain a balance in their power relations. However, in order to be effective, a foreign policy of balance of power must be changing and dynamic.

5. The Test of BOP is War:

A real balance of power seldom exists. The only test of a balance is war and when war breaks out the balance comes to an end. War is a situation which balance of power seeks to prevent and when it breaks out, balance power comes to an end.

6. Not a Device of Peace:

Balance of Power is not a primary device of peace because it admits war as a means for maintaining balance.

7. Big Powers as Actors of BOP:

In a balance of power system, the big states or powerful states are the players. The small states or less powerful states are either spectators or the victims of the game.

8. Multiplicity of States as an Essential Condition:

Balance of Power system operates when there are present a number of major powers, each of which is determined to maintain a particular balance or equilibrium in their power relations.

9. National Interest is its Basis:

Balance of Power is a policy that can be adopted by any state. The real basis that leads to this policy is national interest in a given environment.

The Golden Age of BOP :

The period of 1815-1914 was the golden age of Balance of Power. During this period, it was regarded as a nearly fundamental law of international relations. It broke down due the outbreak of First World War in 1914. It was tried to be unsuccessfully revived during 1919- 1939. However, the attempt failed and the world had to bear the Second World War.

The Second World War (1939-45) produced several structural changes in the international system as well as in the balance of power system. Under the impact of these changes, the Balance of Power system lost much of its relevance as a device of power management. It is now lost much of its relevance in international relations.

Underlying Principal Assumptions and Postulates of Balance of Power :

The Balance of Power rests upon several fundamental postulates and assumptions.

(a) Five Principal Assumptions :

(1) Firstly, Balance of Power assumes that states are determined to protect their vital rights and interests by all means, including war.

(2) Secondly, vital interests of the states are threatened.

(3) The relative power position of states can be measured with a degree of accuracy.

(4) Balance of Power assumes that “balance” will either deter the threatening state from launching an attack or permit the victim to avoid defeat if an attack should occur.

(5) The statesmen can, and they do make foreign policy decisions intelligently on basis of power considerations.

(b) Major Postulates of Balance of Power :

(1) A nation following balance of power is prepared to change its alliances or treaties if the circumstances may so demand.

(2) When a nation finds that a particular preponderance of power is increasing menacingly, it gets prepared to go to war for maintaining the balance.

(3) Balance of Power postulates that no nation is to be totally eliminated in war. War is aimed only at the weakening of power of the violator of the balance. After war a new balance of power system is achieved. The basic principle of Balance of Power is that excessive power anywhere in the system is a threat to the existence of others and that the most effective antidote to power is power.

From the above discussion of the features, assumptions, postulates and purposes of Balance of Power, it becomes clear that Balance of power is a device of power management which is used by several major powers for maintaining a balance in their power relations.

In this process they maintain a sort of equilibrium in their power relations and do not permit any state to violate the Balance. In case any state tries to disturb or violate the balance of power, the other states individually or collectively or is a group can take action, including war, for weakening the power of the violator as well as for restoring the balance.

Methods of Balance of Power:

Balance of Power is not automatic; it has to be secured by the states following this policy. In fact, there are several methods by which states try to secure and maintain balance of power. “Balance of Power is a game which is played by actors with the help of several devices.”

Major Methods of Balance of Power:

I. Compensation :

It is also known as territorial compensation. It usually entails the annexation or division of the territory of the state whose power is considered dangerous for the balance. In the 17th and 18th centuries this device was regularly used for maintaining a balance of power which used to get disturbed by the territorial acquisitions of any nation.

For examples the three partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795 were based upon the principle of compensation. Austria, Prussia and Russia agreed to divide Polish territory in such a way that the distribution of power among them would be approximately the same.

In the latter part of the 19th century, and after each of the two world wars of the 20th century, territorial compensation was used as a device for weakening the powers of the states whose actions had led to a violation of the balance. It was applied by the colonial powers for justifying their actions aimed at maintaining their imperial possessions.

II. Alliances and Counter Alliances :

Alliance-making are regarded as a principal method of balance of power. Alliance is a device by which a combination of nations creates a favourable balance of power by entering into military or security pacts aimed at augmenting their own strength vis-a-vis the power of their opponents. However, an alliance among a group of nations, almost always, leads to the establishment of a counter alliance by the opponents. History is full of examples of such alliances and counter alliances.

Whenever any nation threatened the balance of Europe, other states formed alliances against it and were usually able to curb the power of the over- ambitious state. After the Triple Alliance of 1882, a rival alliance—The Triple Entente, was slowly formed through bilateral agreements over a period of 17 years (1891-1907).

In post-1945 period, alliances like NATO, SEATO, Warsaw Pact emerged as devices of Balance of Power. The first two were established by the USA and the third one was organised by the erstwhile USSR for strengthening their respective power positions in the era of cold war.

III. Intervention and Non-intervention :

“Intervention is a dictatorial interference in the internal affairs of another state/states with a view to change or maintain a particular desired situation which is considered to be harmful or useful to the competing opponents. Some times during a war between two states no attempt is made by other states to intervene. This is done for making the two warring states weaker.

As such intervention and non-intervention are used as devices of Balance of Power. Mostly it is used by a major power for regaining an old ally or for picking up a new ally or for imposing a desired situation on other states. British intervention in Greece, the US intervention is Grenada, Nicaragua, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, and (Erstwhile) USSR’s interventions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan can be quoted as examples of interventions carried out by the big powers.

IV. Divide and Rule :

The policy of divide and rule has also been a method of balance of power. It has been a time honored policy of weakening the opponents. It is resorted to be all such nations who try to make or keep their competitors weak by keeping them divided or by dividing them.

The French policy towards Germany and the British policy towards the European continent can be cited as the outstanding examples. The rich and powerful states now do not refrain from using divide and rule for controlling the policies of the new states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

V. Buffer States or Zones :

Another method of balance of power is to set up a buffer state between two rivals or opponents. Buffers, observes V.V. Dyke, “are areas which are weak, which possess considerable strategic importance to two or more strong powers, Buffer is a small state created or maintained as a separating state i.e. as a buffer state for keeping two competing states physically separate each stronger power then tries to bring the buffer within its sphere of influence but regards it as important, if not vital, that no other strong power be permitted to do so.

The major function of a buffer is to keep the two powerful nations apart and thus minimise the chances of clash and hence to help the maintenance of balance.”

VI. Armaments and Disarmaments :

All nations, particularly very powerful nations, place great emphasis on armaments as the means for maintaining or securing a favourable position in power relations in the world. It is also used as a means to keep away a possible aggressor or enemy.

However, armament race between two competitors or opponents can lead to a highly dangerous situation which cans accidently cause a war. In this way armament race can act as a danger to world peace and security. Consequently, now-a-days, Disarmaments and Arms Control are regarded as better devices for maintaining and strengthening world peace and security. A comprehensive disarmament plan/exercise involving nuclear disarmament can go a long way in strengthening the balance (peace) that exists in international relations.

VII. The Holder of the Balance or the Balancer :

The system of balance of power may consist of two scales plus a third element ‘holder’ of the balance or the balancer. The balancer is a nation or a group of nations, which remains aloof from the policies of the two rivals or opponents and plays the role of, “the laughing third party.”

It poses temptations to both parties to the balance, and each contending party tries to win over the support of the laughing third party—the balancer. Normally, the balancer remains away from both the parties but if any party to the balance becomes unduly weak resulting into a threat to the balance, the balancer joins it and helps the restoration of balance.

After that the balancer again becomes aloof. Traditionally Britain used to play the role of a balancer in Europe. However in the era cold war no state could perform the role of a balancer in international relations.

The rise of unipolarity after 1991, involving the presence of only one super power has now further reduced the chances for the emergence of a balancer in international relations. These are the seven major methods or devices of Balance of Power. These have been traditionally used by nations pursuing the policy of a balance of power.

Critical Evaluation of Balance of Power:

Balance of Power has been strongly praised as well as severely criticized.

Some Scholars observe:

“Balance of Power is nearly a fundamental law of politics as is possible to find,” —Martin Wright

“Balance of Power is a basic principle of international relations.” —Palmer and Perkins

As against this several others like Richard Cobden criticize it as unreal, inadequate and uncertain system. They hold that Balance of Power admits war in the have balance and makes the nations power hungry. The supporters of Balance of Power advance a number of arguments in favour and give example of the 1815-1914 period of history to prove the effectiveness of balance of power as a device of power management.

Balance of Power: Arguments in Favour :

(1) A Source of Stability in International Relations:

Balance of Power provides stability to international relations. It is a device of effective power management and peace. During the past 400 years it was successful, at most of the times, in preserving peace.

“Balance of Power has many a times prevented war. War breaks out only when any state assumes excessive power.” —Fredric Geniz

(2) It suits the real nature of International Relations:

Balance of Power is in tune with the dynamic nature of international relations. It helps continuous adjustments and re­adjustments in relations without any grave risk of war among states.

(3) Ensures Multiplicity of States:

Since Balance of Power postulates the presence of a number of major international actors (7 or 8 even more), it ensures multiplicity of nations and their active participation in preserving balance in international relations.

(4) Guarantees the Freedom of Small States:

Balance of Power ensures the preservation of small and weak states. Its rule that no nation is to be completely eliminated, favors the continued existence of all states. Each state feels secure about its security in the balance of power system.

(5) Balance of Power Discourages War:

Balance of Power discourages war because each state knows that any attempt to become unduly powerful shall invoke an action, even war, by all other states and hence, it keeps its ambitions under control.

(6) A Source of Peace in International Relations:

Finally, Balance of Power is always a source of peace and order in international relations. It supports status quo in relations. Between 1815-1914 it successfully prevented war.

Balance of Power: Arguments Against :

(1) Balance of Power cannot ensure Peace:

Balance of Power does not necessarily bring peace. Even during its golden days, it failed to prevent the domination of small states by the big states. It was not successful in preserving the security of small states. In fact, in the past, wars have been fought in the name of preservation of Balance of Power.

The three periods of stability—one starting from 1648, the second from 1815 and the third from Treaty of Versailles (1918), were preceded by continuous warfare and by the wholesale elimination of small states starting with the destruction of Poland, and followed by a large number of isolated acts of a similar nature. The tragedy is that all these acts were accomplished in the name of balance of power. Balance of Power cannot really secure peace and freedom of the nations.

(2) States are not Static Units:

Each state always tries to secure more and more national power. It does not really belong to any balance of power system. Another point that must be raised about the balance of power is that nations are not static units.

They increase their power through military aggressions, seizure of territory and alliances. They can change their power from within by improving social organisation, by industrializing and by mobilizing internal resources. So the traditional mechanism of the balance of power is not the only cause responsible for an increase of power.

(3) Preponderance of One State in the world can also secure Peace:

A preponderance of power in the hands of one state or group of states does not necessarily threaten world peace or the independence of any nation. The unipolarism resulting from the collapse of one super power (USSR) and the continued presence of the other super power (USA) has not in any way disturbed international peace and security or power balance. In contemporary times the preponderance of one state is a reality and yet there is peace and peaceful coexistence.

(4) Narrow Basis:

The concept of Balance of Power is based upon a narrow view of international relations. It regards power-relations as the whole of international relations. It gives near total importance to preservation of self and national-interest as the motives of all state actions. It fails to give proper weight age to other ends—social, economic, cultural and moral, that provide strong motives to international relations.

(5) A Mechanical view of Peace:

Balance of Power wrongly takes a mechanistic view of world peace as a situation of balance or equilibrium in power relations. Peace does not depend upon balance in power relations. It really depends upon international consciousness and morality.

(6) Equality of a number of States is a Myth:

Balance of Power presupposes the existence of a number of equally powerful states. In practice no two states have or can have equal power. It involves the conception of equilibrium which is in fact disequilibrium and is subject to continuous change.

(7) Nations are not free to break Alliances:

The theory of the balance of power can also be criticized on the ground that it wrongly assumes that nations are free to make or break alliances as and when they may desire for the main consideration of balance of power.

(8) Uncertainty of Balance of Power:

Morgenthau criticizes Balance of Power for its uncertainty. Balance of Power is uncertain because its operation depends upon an evaluation of power of various nations. In practice it is not possible to have an absolutely correct evaluation of power of a state.

(9) Balance of Power is Unreal:

Since the evaluation of the national power of a nation is always uncertain, no nation can afford dependence upon the balance of power. Each nation always keeps a secret about its power. Since all nations keep safe margins, the balance of power at a particular time is always unreal.

(10) Inadequacy of Balance of Power:

Balance of Power in itself is an inadequate device of international peace and security. It even accepts war as a means for maintaining a balance. Fear cannot be a real basis of international relations.

(11) Balance of Power has now lost its Relevance:

Finally, the critics argue that now Balance of Power it is not a relevant principle of international relations. The big changes in the international system as well as in the balance of power system have made it almost an obsolete system. On the basis of above arguments, the critics of Balance of Power advocate its total rejection.

Undoubtedly, in contemporary times the balance of power has lost its utility and much of its importance due to changes in the international system. However it cannot be denied that it continues to be an important factor in the regional power relations among the states of a region. It is used by nations for assessing the nature of power relations at the regional level.

Role and Relevance of Balance of Power in International Relations:

“As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing pattern of international society, balance of power policies will be followed in practice, and in all probability, they will continue to operate, even if effective supranational groupings on a regional or world level are formed” —Palmer and Perkins.

In contemporary times, Balance of Power has lost much of its utility due to several changes in the international relations. The following changes in the international relations as well as in the traditional balance of power system have adversely affected the role and relevance of Balance of Power as a device of power management in International politics.

(1) End of the era of European Domination and the dawn of era of Global Politics:

The structure of international politics has undergone a radical change from the classical period. From a narrow European dominated international system it has come to be a truly global system in which Asian, African and Latin American states enjoy a new and added importance. Today Europe is no longer the centre of world politics. European politics constitutes only one small segment of international politics. This changes has considerably reduced the operation ability of balance of power.

(2) Changes in Psychological Environment:

The characteristic moral and intellectual consensus that characterised European nations during the classical period of Balance of Power (1815-1914) has ceased to exist. Each major power now seeks to protect its interests as universal interests and hence tries to impose these upon others. The use of propaganda and ideology as instruments of national policy has increased manifold. This development has further checked the importance of balance of power.

(3) Rise of Propaganda, Psychological and Political Warfare as instruments of National Policy:

Previously, diplomacy and war used to be the chief means of conducting foreign policies. The decline of diplomacy, rise of new diplomacy and the new fear of war as a means, have brought into operation two new devices- Propaganda and Political warfare, as the instruments of national policy. These have in turn reduced the popularity and role of balance of power principle in international relations.

(4) Emergence of Ideology as a Factor of International Relations:

The new importance of ideology and other less tangible but, nevertheless, important elements of national power have further created unfavorable conditions for the operation of balance of power.

(5) Reduction in the Number of Major Powers:

The most obvious structural change that has seriously limited the role of balance of power has been the numerical reduction of the players of power-politics game. For its operation, Balance of Power needs the presence of a number of major power actors. The presence of two superpowers during 1945-91 discouraged the operation of balance of power and now there is present only one super power in the world.

(6) The Bipolarity of Cold War period and the new era of Unipolarity:

The bipolarity (presence of two super powers and their blocs) that emerged in the cold war period reduced the flexibility of the international system. It reduced the chances of balance of power whose working requires the existence of flexibility in power relations, alliances and treaties. Presently unipolarity characterizes the international system.

(7) The End of the Era of Colonialism and Imperialism:

Another big change in the structure of balance of power has been the disappearance of imperialism and colonialism: It has limited the scope for the exercise of power by the European powers, who in the past always worked as the key players of the principle Balance of Power.

(8) Disappearance of the “Balancer”:

The rise of two super powers the disappearance of the “holder of balance” or the “balancer” considerably reduced the chances of balance of power politics during 1945-91. Traditionally, Britain used to play such a role in Europe. The sharp and big decline in the power of Britain in the post-war period compelled it to abandon its role of balancer between the two super powers. No other nation or even a group of nations was successful in acting as a balancer between the USA and the (erstwhile) USSR. The absence of a balancer further reduced the role of balance of power in post-war international relations.

(9) Change of Concept of War into Total War:

The emergence of nuclear weapons and other revolutionary developments in war technology has produced a big in change the nature of war. The replacement of war by Total War has made war the most dreaded situation in international relations. This has forced nations to reject war as an instrument of balance of power which rests upon the assumption that nations can even go to war for preserving or restoring the balance.

(10) The Emergence of Global Actors:

The rise of the United Nations and several other international and regional actors in international relations has given a new looked to the international relations of our times. The presence of the UN has made a big change in the structure and functioning of the international system. With a provision for collective security of international peace and security, the United Nations constitutes a better source of peace. Due to all these changes in international relations, Balance of Power has come to suffer a big decline. It has definitely lost much of its relevance.

In contemporary times, Balance of Power has ceased to be a fully relevant and credible principle of international relations. However, it still retains a presence in international relations, more particularly, in the sphere of regional relations among states.

Some scholars observe:

“The idea of balance of power is still the central theoretical concept in international relation.” —Snyder “The Structural changes in international politics of post-war period have not greatly affected the principle of Balance of Power. It still holds good in respect of regional relations among nations.” —Arnold Wolfers Although Balance of Power has lost must of its relevance as a global level device of power management, it is still being used by the states of a region to maintain a balance in their power positions.

Several scholars admit its continued presence :

“As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing pattern of international society, balance of power policies will be followed in practice, and in all probability, they will continue to operate, even if effective supranational groupings on a regional or world level are formed.” —Palmer and Perkins

Indeed the concept of Balance of Power is bound to continue so long as the struggle for power among nations continues to characterize international relations. Even the staunch critics of Balance of Power like, Martin Wright and Friendrich admit that Balance of Power is still a basic element in international relations. Balance of power is neither totally obsolete nor dead. Its role, however, has changed from a global device to a regional device of power management.

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Balance of Power Theory in Today’s International System

“Balance of power theory grew out of many centuries of multipolarity and a few decades of bipolarity. Today the world is characterized by unprecedented unipolarity. Balance of power theory, therefore, cannot provide guidance for the world we are in.”

In responding to this statement, the essay will first discuss the logical fallacy inherent in its argument: though the balance of power theory (BOP) [1] emerged concurrent to certain types of power configuration in world politics—multipolarity and bipolarity in this case—it does not follow that it was these types of configuration per se that gave rise to the theory itself. Multipolarity and bipolarity can and should be considered, themselves, as manifestations of the underlying logic of the international system, which the BOP theory also embodies. This logic of relative positionality of states in an anarchic system, as this essay will argue, has not fundamentally changed since the emergence of BOP theory. This leads to the second empirical problem with the statement. On the one hand, a de facto unipolarity characterized by American hegemony has been around for much longer than the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the current economic and political status of China places it in a pseudo-superpower position vis-à-vis the United States. Both of these mean that the degree of unipolarity that we observe today relative to the bipolarity of the Cold War is, if any, weak. Therefore, much of BOP’s relevance in the bipolar world will continue to be in today’s international system.

The BOP Theory: Core Assumptions and the (ir)Relevance of Polarity

We should first understand the logic that gave rise to the BOP theory. Two assumptions are of central relevance. First, the international system is considered to be anarchic, with no system-wide authority being formally enforced on its agents (Waltz 1979, 88). Because of this “self-help” nature of the system, states do not have a world government to resort to in a situation of danger, but they can only try to increase their capabilities relative to one another through either internal efforts of self-strengthening, or external efforts of alignment and realignment with other states (Waltz 1979, 118). Second, states are the principle actors in the international system, as they “set the terms of the intercourse” (Waltz 1979, 96), monopolize the “legitimate use of force” (Waltz 1979, 104) within their territories, and generally conduct foreign policy in a “single voice” (Waltz 1959, 178-179). Hence states are also considered to be unitary actors in the international system. This latter assumption is important because if non-state or transnational actors are powerful enough to challenge state actors, power configuration in the world may no longer be considered in terms of polarity but, instead, in terms of the number of layers of policy “networks” [2] . This essay bases its argument on these two core assumptions about the international system as well because they have been widely accepted not only in realism and neorealism but also in neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984, etc.) and, to some degree, in constructivism (Wendt 1999, etc.) as well. Thus, they are not derivative from exclusively realist or neorealist beliefs such as relative power maximization.

With this in mind, the essay will now discuss why polarity is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the balance of power. The question of sufficiency can be answered with respect to why balance of power does not always occur even in a multipolar or bipolar world, and that of necessity with respect to why balance of power can still occur even with unipolarity. According to Waltz, balance of power occurs when, given “two coalitions” formed in the international system, secondary states, if free to choose, will side with the weaker, so as to avoid being threatened by the stronger side (Waltz 1979, 127). This condition has led some to question the validity of BOP in a unipolar world, since two or more states need to coexist in the system in order for the theory to hold (Waltz 1979, 118).

However, as this essay mentions, once we accept the two core assumptions (that of anarchy and that of states being principle actors), this condition is not necessary for BOP to be relevant. The balance of power, as Waltz suggests, is a “result” – an outcome variable that reflects the causal effect of the explanatory variables which are, in his theory, anarchy and distribution of power in the international system. This tension within Waltz’s own argument has indeed invited criticism that his version of the BOP theory is essentially attempting to explain one dependent variable (the occurrence of balance of power) with another (polarity) (Lebow, 27). To sidestep this potential loophole, therefore, we need to assess the relevance of BOP by examining whether the same structural constraints that engender balancing in the multipolar or bipolar systems are also present in a unipolar world.

If the balance of power could not be directly deduced from system polarity, what then would predict its occurrence? To answer this question will require us to go back to the two core assumptions and see what explanatory variables can be derived from these assumptions that will have some observable implications with regard to balancing. The likelihood of balance of power is, therefore, a function of these variables which, as this essay will show, boil down to 1) intention , notably the intention or the perceived intention of the major powers in the system, 2) preference of the states, particularly that between absolute and relative gains, and 3) contingency , often related to the availability of new information in a given situation, which may exogenously change the first two variables. Most importantly, none of the three is conditional upon a certain type of polarity to be effectual.

Three Explanatory Variables for Predicting Balancing: Intention, Preference, Contingency

The intention, or the perceived intention of a major power, determines whether balancing will be preferred by secondary states over other options such as bandwagoning. We can think of this in terms both why smaller states sometimes succumb to the sphere of the strongest power in the system and why they sometimes stay away from it, or challenge it by joining the second biggest power if there were one. In his analysis of the conditions for cooperation under the security dilemma, Robert Jervis shows that when there is pervasive offensive advantage and indistinguishability between offense and defense (the “worst case” scenario), security dilemma between states can be so acute that it can virtually squeeze out the “fluidity” necessary for any balance of power to occur (Jervis 1978, 186-189). By incurring incorrect “inferences”, offensive advantage and offense-defense indistinguishability ultimately serve to alter the perceived intention of the adversary as being aggressive or non-aggressive (Jervis 1978, 201). This will then dictate the smaller states’ decision to whether balance the move. If, however, the major power is perceived to have not only a non-aggressive intention, but also a benign intention of providing certain public goods, smaller states may choose to free ride on these benefits while submitting to the major power’s sphere of influence in return; an outcome of so-called “hegemonic stability” may then ensue (Keohane 1984, 12). Thus along the dimension of perceived intention, balance of power occurs when states have reservations about the major power or the hegemon’s intention but not to the extent that a precipitation to war is so imminent as to render balancing infeasible.

Second, balance of power is closely related to the states’ preference for relative versus absolute gains. From an offensive realist point of view, John Mearsheimer contends that states concerned with balance of power must think in terms of relative rather than absolute gain – that is, their military advantage over others regardless of how much capability they each have. The underlying logic here is at once intuitive—given a self-help system and self-interested states, “the greater military advantage one state has…the more secure it is” (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 11-12)—and problematic since the auxiliary assumption that every state would then always prefer to have maximum military power in the system (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 12) is practically meaningless. Similarly, Joseph Grieco points out that with the ever present possibility of war in an anarchic system, states may not cooperate even with their allies because survival is guaranteed only with a “proportionate advantage” (Grieco in Baldwin ed., 127-130). The concern for relative gain predicts that states will prefer balance of power over collective security because the latter requires that states trust one another enough to completely forgo relative gain through unilateral disarmament, which is inherently at odds with the idea of having a positional advantage for self-defense (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 36).

Meanwhile, the neoliberal institutionalist cooperation theory essentially presumes the pursuit of absolute gain over relative gain for states to achieve cooperation (Keohane 1984, 68). On a broader scale, therefore, the pursuit of relative gain would undercut international cooperation in general, in both high and low politics. It is safe to say that in practice, states are concerned with both relative and absolute gains to different degrees under different circumstances. Scholars like Duncan Snidal and Robert Axelrod have rigorously demonstrated the complexity of situations in which these two competing interests dynamically interact and change over time (see for example Snidal in Baldwin ed. and Axelrod 1984, Chapter 2). In general, though, a prevalent preference for relative gains and, more specifically, military positionality among states increases the likelihood of balancing relative to collective security. If states tend to favor absolute gains instead, we are more likely to see phenomena such as deep international institutions and pluralist security communities.

But even if there existed a malign hegemon that other states wanted to balance against, and the states all pursued relative gains, balance of power would still be conditional. That is, even with the aforementioned systemic constraints, balance of power is not a given without knowing the specific contingency factors unique to each situation. One additional implication of an anarchic system is pervasive uncertainty resulting from the scarcity of information, since all states have an incentive to misrepresent in order to further their positionality in event of war (Fearon 1998, 274). This explains why, perhaps in a paradoxical way, historically even in periods of multipolarity and bipolarity characterized by intense suspicion and tension, balancing did not happen as often as BOP would predict. The crux is the unexpected availability of new information which leads to a change in the course of action by altering preexisting beliefs and preferences. The European states’ collective decision to buttress the rising challenger Prussia in the 1800s despite the latter’s clear expansionist tendency shows that neither intention nor preference can be taken as a given, but both are subject to circumstantial construction (Goddard, 119).

In times of crisis, this constructing effect may be especially strong. Such characterized the interwar period and resulted in a significant lag in the European states’ learning which may have otherwise incurred greater balance against the revisionist Germany (Jervis 1978, 184). Still caught up in a spirit of collective security from the first war, these states were too “hot-headed” to switch to the phlegmatic behavior of balancing (Weisiger, lecture). This, however, had less to do with their perception of Germany or their pursuit of relative/absolute gains than with the transformational effect of the trauma of World War I. In short, the more rapid and unpredictable is the flux of information in a given situation, the less likely that the balance of power contingent on existing beliefs and preferences will occur as predicted.

The Fall of USSR, the Rise of China, and Empirical Implications for the BOP Theory

Having shown that BOP has less to do with polarity than with intention of aggression, preference for relative gains, and circumstantial factors in an anarchic world, this essay will now show why our current system, characterized by American hegemony, is not so much different from the preceding ones. Doing so will not only address the necessity question mentioned earlier, but also show that even if we accept the premise that BOP is less applicable to unipolarity than to multipolarity and bipolarity, this hardly affects BOP’s relevance to today’s world.

Though BOP gained much leverage during the Cold War, which is considered a textbook case of bipolarity, a closer look at Waltz’s discussion of American dominance at the time reveals what really resembles a picture of American hegemony rather than bipolarity (Waltz 1979, 146-160). Most important, however, is the fact that concurrent to this widening gap between the U.S. and the USSR, a corresponding increase in the balance of power against the U.S. did not occur. Rather, we saw the opposite happen where Soviet satellite states started drifting away one after another. This greatly undermines BOP’s explanatory power even for bipolarity. Richard Lebow’s succinct summary of the years leading to the Soviet collapse illustrates that not only did the USSR productivity remain vastly inferior to that of the U.S., but also that its military (nuclear) capabilities never reached the level as to be a real challenger to the U.S. Hence, the actual period of strict bipolarity during the Cold War is much shorter than is conventionally believed (Lebow, 28-31). It is debatable as to what extent the Soviet “anomaly” was primarily the result of perception, preference, or contingency (such as that discussed in Risse, 26), but major discordances between the balance of power and polarity lend further support to this essay’s argument that BOP is not determined by polarity itself, but by variables inherent in the international system, which may or may not lead to a concurrence of balance of power and certain types of polarity.

The demarcation between the bipolar Cold War system and the unipolar post-Cold War system is, therefore, fuzzy at best. This has been further complicated by China’s rise in the most recent decades. To put things in perspective: at the peak of the Cold War, the U.S. enjoyed a GDP of $5,200 billion (USD)—about twice of that of the USSR ($2,700 billion). As of last year, it was $16,000—also about twice of that of China’s ($8,200 billion). [3] If we were to measure superpower status by nuclear capability (which many scholars use to pinpoint the start of Cold War), the picture is even more ambiguous, with as many as nine states currently having nuclear weapons, including North Korea. [4]

Rather than questioning American hegemony today, which this paper does not intend to do, these facts simply serve to remind us of the continuity rather than discreteness of the recent stages of polarity. Because of this, the supposed unipolarity as of present has little bearing on the validity of the BOP theory in explaining state behavior. Hans Morgenthau reaffirms the balance of power as a “perennial element” in human history, regardless of the “contemporary conditions” that the international system operates under (Morgenthau, 9-10). The essence of the BOP theory cannot be reduced to the occurrence of balance of power. With the logic of anarchy and principality of state actors largely unchanged, we can, therefore, imagine a situation of balancing against the U.S. even in a unipolar system—if the U.S. is no longer perceived as a benign hegemon and if states are more concerned with their military disadvantage as a result, especially when a combination of situational factors and diplomatic efforts further facilitates such a change in perception and preference.

Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984.

Fearon, James, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 52:2, 1998.

Goddard, Stacie, “When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power,” International Security 33:3, 2008-2009.

Grieco, Joseph, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in David Baldwin ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , 1993.

Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30:2, 1978.

Keohane, Robert, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy , 1984.

Lebow, Richard Ned, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War , 1995.

Mearsheimer, John, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19:3, 1994-1995.

Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace , 1967.

Risse, Thomas, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization , 54:1, 2000.

Snidal, Duncan, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation” in David Baldwin ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , 1993.

Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics , 1979.

Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis , 1959.

Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics , 1999.

“The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency .

[1] I will use the acronym “BOP” to refer to the theory of balance of power, and “balance of power” to refer to the actual phenomenon of balance of power.

[2] This term is directly borrowed from the title of Networked Politics by Miles Kahler, but numerous works have alluded to the same concept, such as those by Kathryn Sikkink, Martha Finnemore and Anne-Marie Slaughter, to name a few.

[3] The World Factbook , Central Intelligence Agency.

— Written by: Meicen Sun Written at: University of Pennsylvania Written for: Mark Katz Date written: October 2013

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Balance of Power

Introduction, definitions and meaning.

• Balance-of-Power Mechanisms
• Balance of Power as Manual or Automatic
• Balance of Power in International Law
• Balance of Power in History
• Balance of Power in the First Half of the 20th Century
• Balance of Power during the Cold War
• Balance of Power in the Post–Cold War Era
• Alternatives to Balance of Power in History
• Newer Interpretations: The Soft-Balancing Debate
• The Future of Balance of Power

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Balance of Power by Erik Underwood , T.V. Paul LAST REVIEWED: 15 January 2020 LAST MODIFIED: 15 January 2020 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0202

Balance of power is one of the most discussed and contested theoretical and policy concepts in international relations. It is in fact the bedrock of realism of all varieties, in particular classical and structural, and it is the most significant variable in systemic theories of international stability. The idea of balancing power has been popular since 17th-century Europe, although it was around in some fashion in ancient Greek, Indian, and Chinese statecraft. Beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it took a prominent role in legal and political thought, with legal theorists and policymakers seeing the concept as central to considerations of international law and strategy. The fact that balance of power has found enduring relevance to scholars and policymakers throughout the ages suggests that the theory is one whose value should be carefully considered. The theory holds that when power is balanced among competing states, peace is obtained, but disequilibrium in power means a strong state can attack a weaker state and rob the latter of its security and independence. The goal of balance of power is to prevent any power from becoming too strong, first by deterring aggression, but if that fails, by ensuring that the aggressor does not significantly alter the balance of power. For realists, balance of power is born in the crucible of international anarchy. It is either a tool that states manually use to keep the power and aggressive behavior of other states in check, or a state of affairs generated by power competition among states. According to realism, states fear other states, and international anarchy creates a self-help system where one’s own strength and ability to find allies with similar interests are the only means to achieve security.

Haas 1953 offers some eight meanings and definitions of balance of power, showing how difficult it is to define the concept. While empirically the balance of power often refers to a description of the relative military balance between states, in international-relations theory the most commonly accepted definitions refer to an equilibrium of power between states that preserves stability and peace. Morgenthau 2006 defines a balance of power as “stability in a system composed of a number of autonomous forces. Whenever the equilibrium is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other elements composing the system, the system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium.” For Waltz 1979 the balance of power refers to an equilibrium of power in the international system that states, as the units in the system, will achieve through their individual efforts at self-preservation. To structural and neorealists the question is not whether a balance of power will be achieved, but what distribution of power will be obtained under it. Power distributions are defined either as multipolar, with three or more great powers; bipolar, with two great powers; and unipolar, with power concentrated in one great power. It is also important to distinguish between a balance of power and balancing, the latter referring to efforts or strategies seeking to constrain the power of others, sometimes for the purpose of seeking a balance of power. For Rosecrance 2003 there is a set of stringent criteria to identify balancing by a state: it must be motivated by defensive and not offensive purposes, when seeking allies it must join the weaker coalition, and it must be willing to defend its allies and restore the balance of power when threatened. For Mearsheimer 2014 , balancing is something that self-interested states engage in to check the power-maximizing ambitions of their peers. The author defines balancing as where “threatened states seriously commit themselves to containing their dangerous opponent.” Alternatively, Walt 1987 argues that states do not balance purely against power; they balance against threat, and power is just one element that generates threat.

Haas, Ernst B. “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?” World Politics 5.4 (1953): 442–477.

DOI: 10.2307/2009179

In this classic article, in the context of the onset of the Cold War, Haas discusses the various ways in which scholars of his time understood balance of power in terms of (1) the distribution of power, (2) equilibrium, (3) hegemony, (4) stability and peace, (5) instability and war, (6) power politics in general, and (7) a universal law of history, as well as (8) a system and guide to policymaking.

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics . New York: W. W. Norton, 2014.

In this book, Mearsheimer develops his theory of offensive realism, arguing that because states can never be certain of the intentions of other states, looking only to their power to determine their intentions, states must maximize their power, with each seeking to become a regional hegemon. Here every state is a potential aggressor and must be balanced.

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace . Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006.

In this classical text, Morgenthau develops a theory of international politics that, among a wide variety of subjects, covers balance of power. For Morgenthau, states seek power because of an innate desire of humans for power and prestige, and power has many elements, including not just material but also ideational elements of national character and morale.

Paul, T. V., James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.

This colleciton of essays contains theoretical explanations, criticisms, and regional and global applications of balance-of-power theory and policy. It aso contains valuable citations and ideas as well as changing notions of balance of power in the contemporary world.

Rosecrance, Richard. “Is There a Balance of Power?” In Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate . Edited by J. A. Vasquez and C. Elman. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.

In this book chapter, Rosecrance critiques definitions of balance of power which he argues define the concept too broadly. He provides a narrower definition to try to more accurately capture empirical cases: a state must be motivated by defensive purposes, when balancing through alliances it must join the weaker coalition, and it must be willing to defend those allies and the balance of power.

Walt, Stephen. The Origins of Alliances . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.

In contrast to Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism and offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, Walt argues that states balance against threat. Aggregate and offensive power are seen as generators of threat, but geographical proximity influences the ability to project power, and states are concerned over whether other states possess aggressive intentions. Each of these decides whether a state sees a threat, and balances against that threat.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

In this seminal text, Watlz develops the theory of structural realism, which sees anarchy as the key driver of conflict, since with no higher power, states must rely on self-help. He develops a theory of balance of power, arguing that states will automatically form balances of power against more-powerful states, and that the main variation that will occur will be between bipolar (power concentrated in two great powers) or multipolar systems (power concentrated three or more great powers), with the former more stable.

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The Balance of Power: A Brief Prehistory of a Concept

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Presented at “Negotiating Authority: Models of Governance in Medieval and Early Modern Times”, a conference organised at the University of Pécs, April 7–8, 2022.

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A central concept in International Relations scholarship, the 'Balance of Power' (BoP) has been seen as both convenient justification for power politics and as necessary precondition for liberal internationalism. This paper will refute neither of these perspectives, but will seek instead to establish the view that the usefulness of the BoP stems not from any quality inherent in the concept, but rather from the widespread acceptance of its importance, and from the existence of a broader set of assumptions implicit in that acceptance. The paper will explore the implications of the adoption of the BoP concept by the international (and academic) community by examining the historical context that surrounded its ascendance and the ways that ascendance was ensured. The emphasis on 'balance' can in fact be seen as having resulted in a significant redefinition of ''power and, importantly, the construction of a new framework of legitimacy. A focus on the normative function of the concept can provide a more nuanced basis for an analysis of its effectiveness as a tool for the study and practice of international relations.

International Law

Erik Underwood , T.V. Paul

Balance of power is one of the most discussed and contested theoretical and policy concepts in international relations. It is in fact the bedrock of realism of all varieties, in particular classical and structural, and it is the most significant variable in systemic theories of international stability. The idea of balancing power has been popular since 17th-century Europe, although it was around in some fashion in ancient Greek, Indian, and Chinese statecraft. Beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it took a prominent role in legal and political thought, with legal theorists and policymakers seeing the concept as central to considerations of international law and strategy. The fact that balance of power has found enduring relevance to scholars and policymakers throughout the ages suggests that the theory is one whose value should be carefully considered. The theory holds that when power is balanced among competing states, peace is obtained, but disequilibrium in power mean...

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Stella Ghervas (2017). "Balance of Power vs. Perpetual Peace: Paradigms of European Order from Utrecht to Vienna, 1713-1815", The International History Review, 39, 3 (2017): 404-425. Abstract: "Over the course of the eighteenth century, two major models of European international order emerged as alternatives to universal monarchy: one was based on the balance of power; the other centred on the idea of perpetual peace. This article traces each back to its origins in debates around the moment of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. In particular, it examines the evolution of the doctrine of balance of power in early eighteenth-century English political thought and then as a legal principle incorporated into the Treaty of Utrecht, before proceeding to the counter-proposal in the form of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's "Plan of Perpetual Peace" and the objections it raised. It then shows how Saint-Pierre's paradigm of a league of European states found (albeit in altered form) its way into the Treaty of the Holy Alliance (1815) proposed by Tsar Alexander I after the defeat of Napoleon. It concludes by highlighting the fundamental soundness of the idea of European league, as well as the flaws inherent in the early model of Saint-Pierre." To link to this article: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2016.1214613

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Recovering a Balance-of-Power Principle for the 21st Century

Post title post title post title post title.

Writing in Foreign Affairs at the start of 2021, Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi, now senior American officials in charge of policy towards China, argued that a balance-of-power framework was needed for the region of East Asia. Using Henry Kissinger’s study of the 1814–15 Congress of Vienna as a guide, they described such a balance as potentially serving as the foundation of “an order that the region’s states recognize as legitimate.” From what I could discern, the article received surprisingly little attention, and the extent to which this thinking now drives America’s China policy remains hidden to those outside the White House. Nonetheless, the mention of such an approach to diplomacy, particularly at a time when a consensus considers the international order to be in a moment of systemic transition, is an idea worthy of investigation.

The term “balance of power” is one of the more overused and misunderstood in the modern English lexicon. It is invoked across a range of disciplines and industries, usually to describe the arrangement of certain subjects or phenomena in relation to one another. The journalist Brian Windhorst, for example, recently described the playoff series between the Boston Celtics and Milwaukee Bucks as one in which the “balance of power [was] constantly shifting” between the teams over the course of seven games. In an entirely different context, Rae Hart writes in the Jacobin that the “balance of power in the economy” must move “away from capital and toward working people.” Such variances in meaning seem to confirm the historian Albert Pollard’s view — one nearly 100 years-old — that the term “may mean almost anything; and it is used not only in different senses by different people, or in difference senses by the same people at different times, but in different senses by the same person at the same time.”

For those concerned with American foreign policy, the concept suffers from lazy usage, a reality which gives rise to certain misconceptions around its purpose and its nature. For some, the concept is synonymous with the measure of material power, whether military, economic, financial, or technological. For example, Michael Horowitz has written of how advancements in AI can affect the balance of global power. Others see it as a tool or method of statecraft, but this tends to be of a certain school of thought — one that is colored by stark power considerations devoid of ethical principles. Along these lines, Stephen Walt has criticized the lack of a balance-of-power approach in American statecraft, yet the concept is seen to be soulless, a mechanical creation operating in an inanimate system. Like other realists, the concept of a balance of power is seen to be a hard-headed, sober approach to the distribution of power in an anarchic system of states.

Like so many other terms that are regularly invoked in the study and practice of international politics — for example realpolitik , raison d’état , prudence, nationalism, internationalism, and world order — there is a generational need to re-examine the intellectual and historical roots of these concepts, how they have evolved over time, and the ways they are used and misused in the modern day. This is because scholars and practitioners have not so much arrived at certain truths of international politics as settled on certain perceptions, ones conditioned by the time in which they live. Ideas themselves, as Alfred Vagts once put it , “are like rivers arising in a swamp or moor region rather than in a mountain spring, and often they see the light of day only after they have run for miles through subterranean caverns.”

With this reflection as a guide, this essay examines certain interpretations of the balance of power concept throughout history. It is selective rather than comprehensive, and it aims to shine light on an older, seemingly forgotten variety of the idea. Specifically, it illuminates the view that seeking such a balance is not always intended for naked self-interest and self-help. Instead, we might look to older conceptions of a balance among powers, particularly those ideas that grew up in Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries. Here a fundamental principle was that the objective of a balance of power rested not solely in the preservation of one’s interest, but in a wider interest, or unity, of the whole.

What might that be today? The exact application, if any, remains an open question, yet the basic insight here is that the concept of the balance of power should be understood as something more than a mechanical or immoral method of statecraft. It is instead an approach that can hold as its objective an ethical order deemed legitimate by the principal states or groups of states in a regional or international system. In grasping this older conception of the balance of power, we can embody an approach to statecraft that not only sees the relationship between power and ethics as intertwined but also provides a more robust intellectual framework in this period of systemic international transition. The Russo-Ukrainian War has made the most fundamental questions — of power, morals, law, institutions, and order — starkly relevant once again. For policymakers and analysts, returning to and expanding our understanding of those concepts we take for granted, the balance of power among them, is a first step towards planning for and calibrating a future international system.

American Conceptions of the Balance of Power

At various points in the first half of the 20th century, the balance of power was derided as an outdated and immoral form of diplomacy. Considering it a traditional practice of European nations, American leaders tended to see it as inherently destabilizing and an approach to politics that held great dangers for the United States. President Woodrow Wilson, who has the distinction of having ushered in a major intellectual spring of American statecraft, based his views, in part, on a philosophical aversion to the balance of power. Echoing the calls of the British politicians Richard Cobden and John Bright nearly a century before — the latter had called it a “foul idol” — Wilson stood before the Senate in January 1917 to argue that “Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. … There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.”

The failure of the League of Nations to thwart aggression in the 1930s, and the power politics that engulfed East Asia, Eastern Africa, and Western Europe over the course of that decade, led Wilson’s democratic successors in the Roosevelt administration to champion a similar message. Speaking after the conclusion of the Moscow Conference in October 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull affirmed that what the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union were planning for the post-war world would, and must, put an end to the balance-of-power system that had plagued global politics for centuries. A similar line was taken by Franklin Roosevelt, who, in what would be his last address to Congress on March 1, 1945, described the purported achievements of the Yalta Conference. “It ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries — and have always failed.”

Such statements, combined with the tendency of American statesmen to remain non-committed or “disentangled” from the politics of the European powers in the 19th century, can lead us to view the record of American diplomatic history as one traditionally averse to the balance of power concept. But is this the case?

It is no secret that American leaders have been conscious of this phenomenon in international politics. In 1787, Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 11 that the United States needed to be the arbiter of the balance of European competition in the new world. Decades later, the famed Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had as its principal aim the consolidation of American power in the Western hemisphere, but as Charles Edel has rightly noted , to say that American leaders were uninterested in the European balance of power would be a discredit to their international thought. Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt grasped this concept, and while he ostensibly kept the United States out of European balance-of-power arrangements, he thought about the world balance on a more global scale — a premise that led him in part to the idea of needing to be dominant in the western hemisphere. “No other president defined America’s world role so completely in terms of national interest, or identified the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of power,” Henry Kissinger wrote of the 26th president. The record of American diplomacy in this regard led some, including Hans Morgenthau and Alfred Vagts, to argue that such notions, attractive or not, have always been a focus for leaders in Washington. Morgenthau went so far as to say that, with the exception of the War of 1812, the United States had regularly “supported whatever European power appeared capable of restoring the balance of power by resisting and defeating the would-be conqueror.”

If the balance of power as a method of statecraft was more veiled in the 19th and early 20th centuries, its application during the period of the Cold War seemed to become more apparent. Arnold Wolfers wrote in 1959 that the concept had become “intimately related to matters of immediate practical importance to the United States and its allies.” Kissinger and Richard Nixon are perhaps the American statesmen most associated with the balance of power given their policy towards China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. As a scholar, Kissinger had cut his teeth on the study of the Congress of Vienna and the European system in the first decades after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, but while he valued this systemic arrangement as a practitioner, he also believed that the concept had fundamentally changed. “Today’s striving for equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power of previous periods,” he told an audience gathered in Washington in 1973. “The very notion of ‘operating’ a classical balance of power disintegrates when the change required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be achieved by limited means.” He had in mind here the modern intensity of ideology — specifically between liberalism and communism — and how these conflicting positions ultimately prevented a common notion of legitimacy. Similarly, although for different reasons, Stanley Hoffman described the irrelevance of the term: “The balance of power familiar to students of history is the past; there is no future in our past.”

Other writers in these decades saw it differently, however, and the balance-of-power concept became further associated with the giants of the realist school of international relations. Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and, later, John Mearsheimer, held that the balance of power, more so than a conscious method of statecraft, was simply the reality of international politics. In other words, nation-states — operating independently and instinctively — would, naturally develop toward a system in which a balance of power was the best they could hope for. It was, Waltz argued as early as 1954, “not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen.” The motivations for pursuing a balance of power thus came to be seen as a kind of natural condition, one created by the conscious or unconscious pursuit of material power.

Recovering an Older Interpretation

Scholars of Western political thought have detected approaches resembling the balance of power as far back as Ancient Greece. Traces are indeed discoverable in the writings of Xenophon , Thucydides , and Polybius , among others. The Scottish polymath David Hume was one of the first writers to recognise these older influences. “The maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity,” he argued . “If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as at present, it had, at least, an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians.”

The more recognisable form of the balance of power, however, both in its theory and application, has its roots in the 15th-century diplomacy of Italian city-states. It was in this period that powers like Venice, Milan, Naples, Florence, and the Papal States developed alliances to balance against one another (one example was the triple alliance of Florence, Milan, and Naples against Venice). As Francesco Guicciardini phrased it, these states

were unremitting in the watch that they kept on one another’s movements, deranging one another’s plans whenever they thought that a partner was going to increase his dominion or prestige. And all this did not make the peace any less stable, but rather made the powers more alert and more ready to bring about the immediate extinction of all those sparks that might start a fire.

Importantly, it was in these years that writers began to conceptualize and advocate such a practice, one that could be used as a tool or mechanism by statesmen of the time.

Into the 17th century, the number of writers examining and opining on the balance of power grew rapidly. The reasons for this are diverse. On the one hand, these decades were a period of great advancement in the natural sciences, particularly physics, which gave rise both to new approaches to understanding the world and to efforts to apply these methods to the study of human societies. “The modern law of inertia, the modern theory of motion,” Herbert Butterfield once described , “is the great factor which in the seventeenth century helped to drive the spirits out of the world and opened the way to a universe that ran like a piece of clockwork.” This had an important influence on those concerned with politics between societies. More so than in the preceding centuries, there was a feeling that the problems raised by political and economic competition could be solved by new, discoverable solutions. The balance of power had become, as Martin Wight once noted , the “political counterpart of Newtonian physics.”

As one of the great historians to examine the iterations of the balance of power concept in European history, Wight highlighted , among other phenomena, the dominant religions of the period. The “earliest stable balance” on continent, he argued, had been that between the Catholics and Lutherans, codified in the Peace of Augsburg. There was also the influence of the theory of “mixed constitution,” which had its origins in Platonic and Aristotelian political philosophy and worked out its modern form in the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany. But one of his great illuminations was the balance-of-power approach employed by William III, who negotiated the first and second Grand Alliances of 1689 and 1701. Both groupings were initiated in peacetime and designed to counter the power of France on the European continent. Though William died shortly after the second agreement, his efforts helped to bring into existence the treaties of Utrecht in 1713 . The profound aspect of this diplomatic achievement was this: The balance of power principle was geared at upholding a larger moral framework, namely the “ res publica Christiana ” throughout Europe.

Into the 19th century, this view concerning the purpose of the balance of power was championed by the likes of the German historian Arnold Heeren, who said of the balance of power, “What is necessary to its preservation has at all times been a question for the highest political wisdom.” To see it as a simple exercise of balancing material capabilities, he warned, was to misunderstand its purpose. “Nothing […] but the most short-sighted policy would ever seek for its final settlement by an equal division of the physical force of the different states.” In other words, those aiming at a balance of power would need to hold in their minds an understanding of its ultimate purpose.

In the same century, another German historian wrote what became one of the most important reflections on the balance of power concept. Leopold von Ranke’s 1833 essay titled The Great Powers set out to examine the European order between the reign of Louis XIV and the defeat of Napoleon. The balance of power, he argued , was the key to maintaining such a system. Moreover, there was something unique about how the concept was understood in this period — something that, in equal measure, legitimized and justified its existence. In his mind, that the European powers were part of a wider European civilization, with a shared history between them, allowed them to develop and implement a balance of power, while this balance, when executed properly, allowed each society to continue to develop according to the values it held universal.

The Return of Statecraft and the Role of Ideas

The writing here has been an exercise in recovery rather than reconstitution. Its aim has been to shine light on older and diverse approaches to the concept of a balance of power, as a way of broadening the discourse around future American foreign policy in an increasingly multipolar world. Older approaches, concepts, and ideas of statecraft become buried under the succession of events and, more consequentially, shaded by the mythical notions that grow up around these moments or periods of history. It is the responsibility of historians and scholars of international politics to, from time to time, excavate and re-examine these earlier precedents. This is not to reveal truths as much as insights, ones that might be seized upon by the official or analyst looking for a guide in the maelstrom of immediate objectives.

The balance-of-power concept as understood in the United States today tends either to carry the dark undertones highlighted by Richard Cobden and John Bright and advanced by Woodrow Wilson, or to be viewed as the soulless approach of self-styled realists. What is lost is a different interpretation, one that sees the balance of power as a purposeful approach to statecraft, one that can and ideally should serve as a foundational framework for negotiated settlements that ascribe to the international politics some semblance of order.

On a practical level, there is opportunity for governments to approach future cooperation and competition through this lens. In the Indo-Pacific, governments — even those in Europe — seem to be jostling for position. Perhaps there are benefits to be gained by aiming first for a balance of military and economic power, and then toward some structures that might facilitate both dialogue and decisions about major questions in the region. Important, however, is that the powers principally concerned hold as their ultimate objective not outright victory but a negotiated order that can employ an ethical or moral basis that governments deem legitimate in this period.

In this way, we might go some way toward reversing, or at least recalibrating, the understood purpose of a balance of power in foreign policy. Such a view echoes ideas put forward by Hedley Bull, Richard Little, and Michael Sheehan, who have seen in older interpretations some important guides for contemporary policymaking. Sheehan, who has written an excellent historical study of the term “balance of power,” argues that modern understandings should return to its “Grotian form” (named after the Dutch diplomat and jurist Hugo Grotius). Writing in the period of the Thirty Years War (1618 to 1648), Grotius articulated norms and laws which, because societies shared common characteristics and experiences, could be applied to larger international context. It is the same rationale that underpinned the work of later scholars of international law, such as Lassa Oppenheim, who wrote in 1905 that a “law of nations can exist only if there be an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the members of the family of nations.”

Through this understanding of older interpretations, we arrive, too, at a more fundamental aspect of statecraft. Specifically, try as some might, ethical considerations cannot and should not be viewed as separate from or subordinate to considerations of power. At the highest level of policy, these aspects — power and ethics — are fused together in ways that a great deal of modern commentary on international politics obscures. To take one example, when a writer like Eliot Cohen, one of the great thinkers in American foreign policy over the preceding decades, calls in Foreign Affairs for future American statesmen and women to turn away from grand strategy and toward statecraft, we are forced to pause. For not only is grand strategic thinking, properly understood, an essential dimension of statecraft, but at its root is the most fundamental dilemma of politics — how to strike the balance between ethics and power — which Western thinkers (to say nothing of other civilizations) have been grappling with for millennia. And far from a seminar exercise, the question plays out in real time. Looking at the Russo-Ukrainian War, for example, the moral question is a simple one to answer. The political, not so much.

It is this acceptance of the ever relevant, if intractable, dilemma of power and ethics that brings us to a final point: the role of ideas in domestic and international order, and the necessity of strategists, especially those focusing on the longer term, being able to recognize and grapple with the influence and impact of such phenomena. When asked what set George Kennan apart from other distinguished American diplomats of his era, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin remarked of his friend that:

Interest in ideology. Intellectualism of a certain kind. Ideas. Deep interest in, and constant thought, in terms of attitudes, ideas, traditions, what might be called cultural peculiarities of countries and attitudes, forms of life. Not simply move after move; not chess. Not just evidence of this document, that document, showing that what they wanted was northern Bulgaria, or southern Greece. But also mentalités .

If we can accept as a precept the relevance of ideational, as opposed to solely mechanical, thinking in statecraft, we can move toward understanding how ideas themselves have changed over time, and whether, if at all, older interpretations are relevant or applicable to modern realities. “Ideas are nothing but the unremitting thought of man, and transmission for them is nothing less than transformation,” the philosopher Benedetto Croce wrote . In our own time, recognizing the way in which the concept of the balance of power has morphed over centuries allows us to grasp both its complexities and its potential applicability to present and future statecraft.

Andrew Ehrhardt is an Ernest May Fellow in History and Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School.

Image: Print by Gillam, F. Victor,  Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

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The View of Encyclopedia

Balance of Power

The balance of power is one of the oldest concepts of international relations . It at once provides an answer to the problem of war and peace in international history. It is also regarded as a universal law of political behavior, a basic principle of every state’s foreign policy through the ages, and, therefore, a description of a significant pattern of political action in the international field. Before the present inquiry into a general theory of international relations, the balance of power was regarded as the only tenable international relations theory, especially from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century.

Broadly speaking, it refers to a relative power position of states as actors in international relations . With its emphasis on the cultivation of power and the utilization of power for resolving the problem of power, it appears to be a sensible way of action in an international society where their national interests and prejudices govern nations. The balance of power is part and parcel of a system of power politics. Its strength and life will always be determined by the latter.

Thus the theory of balance of power is widely held. It is an overused theory in international relations. It means different things to different scholars. Claude has aptly remarked that it is an ambiguous concept as it has so many meanings. 1

Similarly, Schleicher observes, “it is virtually meaningless” 2

Wight says the notion of the balance of power is notoriously full of confusion. 3

It is used as a policy, as a system, as a status, and as a symbol. It is also used at times as a propaganda ploy.

Therefore, it becomes a tough task to precisely explain the meaning of the term, which will be universally acknowledged at any given time. Despite this difficulty, an attempt has been made in the following paragraphs to describe the meaning and nature of the concept with prominent scholars of international relations.

Meaning And Nature In Balance Of Power:

To know the meaning of balance of power, one may take the analogy of a balancer with a pair of scales. If the weights in the two scales are equal, there is balance. The same thing can be applied to international relations. The two states or two coalitions of states are in balance if they are equally powerful.

In a world where many nations with different degrees of power exist and in which each nation endeavors to maximize its power, there is a tendency for the entire system to be in balance. In other words, different nations manipulate and group themselves in such a way that no single nation or group of nations is strong enough to dominate others because that of a rival group balances its power. It is believed that so long as this kind of balance is established, there is peace, and small nations’ independence is protected.

Definitions:

How different scholars have endeavored to define this concept is mentioned as under. Mostly it is defined as a state of dynamic equilibrium characterizing relations among nations . It is the process of matching some nations’ powers against those of other nations so that there is no upheaval or chaos in the relations among nations.

For example, Castlereagh defined balance of power as maintaining such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as should prevent any of them from becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest.  Similarly, Fay defines it as just equilibrium in power among the family of nations as it will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the others. 5

Besides, many other scholars have also explained the concept of balance of power in terms of equilibrium. In practice, however, nations have mostly desired preponderance, not an equilibrium of power. Spykman observes the truth of the matter that states are interested only in a balance in their favor.

The balance desired is the one that neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice. 6

Thus another usage of the balance of power refers to a situation in which competing powers prefer a disequilibrium condition and not of equilibrium. In this way, the balance of power sometimes means equilibrium and sometimes disequilibrium.

Dickinson also explains the two usages of the term “It means, on the one hand, and equality, as of the two sides when an account is balanced, and on the other hand, an inequality as when one has a balance to one’s credit at the bank.” 7

He further says this theory professes the former but pursues the latter. 8

Dyke explains the prime object of balancing power is to establish or maintain such a distribution of power among states. It will prevent anyone from imposing its will upon another by the threat of violence. 9

The concept of power assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures, no one power or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the rest’s security. 10

Thus as a status or condition, the balance of power has meant three things, namely,

• Equality or equilibrium of power among states results in balance.
• A distribution of power in which some states are stronger than others, and
• A ny distribution of power among states.

Thompson and Morgenthau have identified it as a policy. Thus it is held that in a multi-state system, the only policy that can check the erring behavior of other states is that of confronting power with countervailing power. 11

The balance of power is also known as a system of international politics . According to this meaning, the balance of power is a certain kind of arrangement for international relations working in a multi-state world . Martin Wight, A.J.P. Taylor, and Charles Lerche have used this term as a system.

Many other scholars have used it not as a concept but merely as a symbol of realism in international relations. This usage is based on the idea that the balance of power is nothing but a corollary of international relations’ power factor. The acceptance of the power factor gives way to foreign policies based on the balance of power. Louis Halle, John Morton Blum, and Reinhold Niebuhr have all treated power balance as a symbol of the realist philosophy.

Morgenthau has used the term in four different ways :

• A s a policy aimed at a certain gate of affairs,
• A s an actual state of affairs,
• A s an approximately equal distribution of power, and
• A s any distribution of power. 12

Haas pointed out that the concept had been utilized extensively in at least eight mutually exclusive meanings :

• E quilibrium resulting from an equal distribution of power among nation-states.
• E quilibrium resulting from the unequal distribution of power among nation-states.
• E quilibrium resulting from the dominance of one nation-state (the balancer).
• A system providing for relative stability and peace.
• A system characterized by instability and war.
• A nother way of saying power politics.
• The universal law of history  and
• A guide for policymakers. 13

Likewise, Schleicher has discussed three, Zinnes seven, and Wight nine meanings of power balance. 14

Despite the multiple, imprecise, and ambiguous nature, the balance of power is near the very core of international politics.

Pie-requisites:

Couloumbis and Wolfe have summed up four pre-requisites for the existence of a balance of power system, which are explained as under:

• A multiplicity of sovereign political actors results
• in the absence of a single centralized, legitimate, and strong authority over these sovereign actors.
• R elatively unequal distribution of power (i.e., states, wealth, size, military capability) among the political actors that make up the system. This permits states’ differentiation into at least three categories great powers, intermediate powers, and smaller nation-states.
• C ontinuous but controlled completion and conflict among sovereign political actors are perceived as scarce world resources and other values.
• A n implicit understanding among the rulers of the great.

Powers that the perpetuation of the existing power distribution benefits them mutually. 15

Assumptions:

There are certain assumptions of the balance of power that also operate as conditions affecting the balance’s stability. Quincy Wright has given five major assumptions, which are as follows: 16

• S tates are committed to protecting their vital interests by all possible means, including war, though it is up to each state to decide for itself as to which of its rights and interests are vital and which method it should adopt to protect them.
• T he vital interests of states are or may be threatened. If the vital interests are not threatened, then there should be no need for a state to protect them.
• T he balance of power helps protect the vital interests either by threatening other states with committing aggression or by enabling the victim to achieve victory in case aggression occurs. This assumption means that states are not generally likely to commit aggression unless they have superiority of power.
• T he Relative power position of various states can be measured to a great degree of accuracy. This measurement can be utilized in balancing the world forces in one’s favor.
• Politicians make their foreign policy decisions based on an intelligent understanding of power considerations.
• O ne more assumption may be added to the list presented by Wright. The balance of power assumes that there will be one balancer maintaining splendid isolation and ready to join.

The side of the scale, which becomes higher at any given period. Such a state always works on Palmerston’s advice that it can have no permanent enemies and permanent allies in the world. Its only permanent interest is to maintain the balance of power itself.

Characteristics:

The chief characteristics of the balance of power system can be enumerated as under:

1. Equilibrium:

The term suggests equilibrium, an equal distribution of power. When this equilibrium is lost, the balance of the sewer fails. Balance is not a permanent feature of international politics as occasional disequilibrium is not ruled out in the system. Thus, the concept is concerned with equilibrium as well as disequilibrium.

2. Temporary:

The balance of power is always temporary and unstable. With the change of time and conditions, it also changes and gives way to another system of balance of power. Neither a balance of power system nor its original contending powers can live long.

3. Active Intervention:

Balance of power is not  “a gift of the gods” but an outcome of the men’s active intervention. Whenever a state apprehends that the balance is being titled against it, it has to counter it quickly. It must be prepared to take necessary steps, including risking a war if it is determined to safeguard its vital interests, which would be in danger if it remains passive. Thus, the balance of power is the result of diplomatic activity, not of natural happening.

4. Status Que:

The balance of power normally favors the status quo. Therefore, those who benefit from it generally favor it, and it is opposed by those who see a loss to their position. History has witnessed many wars owing to these contrary motivations of the states.

5. Difficult to De amine Existence:

It is not easy to say when a balance of power has been accomplished. A real balance of power can never exist, and it probably would not be recognized as such if it did exist. “The only real test, presumably, is that of war, and resorting to war not only upsets the balance but also creates the very conditions which a balance of power policy is supposedly designed to prevent.” 17

6. Subjective and Objective Approaches:

It offers both a Subjective and objective approach. Historians take the objective view while statesmen take the subjective View. In the historian’s opinion, there is a balance between two states if they are equally powerful. To be more realistic, the statesman aims at not only equilibrium but a preponderance or imbalance in its favor.

7. Conflicting Aims:

Primarily it aims to preserve peace. At times it has achieved this aim in particular areas or the state system as a whole. At other times it has also tended to increase tensions between nations and to encourage wars.

8. Big-Power Game:

It is mainly a big power game. Big powers are neither interested in peace nor instability but in their security. Small powers are usually victims or, at best, spectators rather than players. They are used as mere weights on the scales. They are objects rather than subjects.

9. Unsuitable for Democracies:

Unless geographical, political, military, and other considerations are peculiarly favorable, democracy is never interested in this game. It is interested in power politics only in times of crisis. On the other hand, a dictatorship is most inclined to dominate the contest and gather all the rewards.

10. The Balancer:

It admits to the existence of some balancer state or states or an organization. The balancer state is not a small, insignificant power, but it is a powerful one in its own right, and the other contending powers try to cultivate such a balancer. Britain was such a balancer during the nineteenth century. During the post-war period, when the power distribution had become largely bipolar, the UNO tried to function as a balancer.

11. Operation Questionable:

Many scholars point out that the balance of power is largely inoperative and irrelevant under present conditions. According to them, it worked well only when it was confined to the European state system, and with the expansion of the state system to an international scale, it is impossible for any nation or international organization to play the role of a balancer or for the system to operate along its traditional lines.

The nuclear and space age has further relegated its relevance. There is truth in these contentions, yet the fact is that this game continues to be played, with nation-states as the chief actors. Palmer and Perkins rightly observe. Certainly, new forces and patterns are developing, and though still in their formative stages, they may make former preoccupation with the balance of power seem inconsequential indeed. 18

Types Of The Balance Of Power:

The balance of power has the following forms:

Simple Balance:

If power is concentrated in two states or two opposing camps, the balance of power is simple. This type’s chief characteristic is that states or groups of states are divided into two camps like the two scales of the balance. In simple balance, the power distribution between the two opposing camps is almost equal. The United States and the Soviet Union individually, and the Eastern and the Western block collectively were examples of the simple balance in the post-war period of bipolarism.

Multiple Balance:

When there is a wide dispersal of power among states, and several states or groups of states balance each other, the balance is called multiple or complex. There need not be a single system; instead, there may be many subsystems or local balances of power within a system. The multiple balance can be compared to a chandelier. A complex balance may or may not have a balancer. A simple balance may turn into a multiple or complex balance and vice versa.

Local, Regional, and Global:

Balances may, in terms of their geographical coverage, be spoken of as local, regional, and global. If it is at the local level, the balance is local, like we may speak of the balance of power between India and Pakistan. It is regional, if an area or a continent, say Europe or Asia, is involved. It is global or worldwide if all the countries participate in it through a network of alliances and counter-alliances.

Flexible and Rigid:

Sometimes, balances have also been known as rigid or flexible. When princes could make sudden and radical shifts in their alliances in the monarchical days, the balance was generally flexible. With the coming of ideologies and greater economic interdependence, the balance of power has tended to become rigid.

We Devices And Methods:

With time, the balance of power has developed certain means and methods, techniques, and devices through which it can be achieved and maintained. The same are as follows arms new Armament and Disarmament. The main device for achieving balance is the arm.

Whenever one nation increases its strength, its rival has no other alternative but to enter an arms race. If the first nation can preserve its strength, the balance of power will be upset, but if its opponents can also consolidate their power by arming themselves, the balance of power is preserved. The armament race between the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-war period was perhaps the greatest of all armament races.

Like armaments, disarmament can destroy or restore a balance of power. The states concerned may agree on a proportionate reduction in their arms to stabilize the balance of power among them. But in practice, disarmament is sparingly utilized, except on defeated powers after a general war.

Though it is often resorted to by victor powers to maintain a favorable balance of power, its overall role has been disappointing.

Alliances and Counter-Alliances:

The balance of power has often been maintained by the method of alliances and counter-alliances. Alliances have been the most convenient institutional device to increase one’s insufficient power. Nations have always endeavored to make, abandon, and remake alliances depending upon their interests. Several security pacts are designed to improve the military power position. Alliances can be offensive as well as defensive.

Offensive alliances, however, must be condemned as they breed counter-coalitions, and the outcome is generally warred. The Triple Entente countered the Triple Alliance of 1882 in 1907. Similarly, the Axis formed in 1936 was a counterweight against France and East European nations’ alliance. The Strange Alliance of the Second World War was a reaction against the Axis powers. It was, however, formed with a defensive purpose in the post-Second World.

The US, with its allies, formed NATO, SEATO CENTO, etc., and the USSR countered them with the Warsaw Pact.

Compensation and Partition:

A state enhances its power by acquiring new territories and thus tilts the balance in its favor. When such a thing happens, the other side also takes immediate steps to increase its power in compensation to preserve the balance. When some powerful nation occupies small nations’ territories, the powerful rival nations cannot tolerate this act. They place a condition either to share their prey with them or to allow them to compensate themselves elsewhere under such conditions.

The powerful rival nations divide small nations and swallow their share of the prey. Poland’s partition and later on its division between Russia, Prussia, and Austria is a well-known example of compensation and partition. After the Second World War , Germany, Korea, and Vietnam were partitioned similarly.

This method involves the redistribution of territory so that the international balance of power is not affected. Each Great Power becomes a beneficiary and a weak state of their victim. Generally, such redistribution arises after the war, yet it may also be needed during peacetime.

Intervention and Non-Intervention:

Intervention is another commonly used device for keeping balance. The allies may shift their loyalty from one side to another. Under such circumstances, it is quite usual for a big nation to regain a lost ally by intervening in domestic affairs and establishing a friendly government there.

Non-intervention suggests neutrality or guarantee of neutrality for certain states or efforts to localize war or protect the rights of neutrals in war times. At times neutrality also plays the role of keeping the balance of power.

Before the end of World War II, Britain intervened in Greece to see that it did not fall into the hands of local communists. After World War ll, the United States intervened in Guatemala, Cuba, Lebanon, Laos, Kuwait, etc., and the Soviet Union in North Korea, North Vietnam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, etc.

Divide and Rule:

It is a time-honored policy as well as a technique. This method keeps the competitors weak by dividing them or keeping them divided, thereby maintaining a balance of power. The Romans adopted it to keep their control over scattered peoples. Britain often used it to keep its large empire under control. She has been a notorious practitioner of this policy. It has been her cardinal policy towards Europe.

Now this policy has become a device of the balance of power. Both the superpowers have endeavored to create divisions in the opposite camp. If the Soviet Union was interested in Western Europe’s disintegration, the USA was interested in creating a rift in the East European camp led by the Soviet Union.

Buffer States:

The setting up of a buffer state has also operated as another device for the balance of power. Such a state is usually a weak one. It is situated between two powerful neighbors. It always keeps safety apart by contributing to peace and stability and maintaining the balance of power.

There have been various instances of buffer states in history. Afghanistan had been a traditional buffer state between Imperial Russia and British India, as Tibet was a buffer state between Imperial China and British India. In Europe, Belgium and Holland had served as buffer states between France and Germany.

In the post-Second World War period, various lines, such as the 38th Parallel in Korea or the 17th Parallel in Vietnam, on partitioned countries, and the ceasefire zones are indirectly serving the cause of buffer states in a new world situation. They are also designed to prevent a confrontation of Superpowers and thereby preserve a balance of power.

Domestic Methods:

If a state feels that the balance has been tilted in favor of the rival, it will also become more powerful. It can do so only by improving elements of power domestically. The state concerned would try not merely to acquire more powerful weapons but also to develop related industries and other aspects of science and economy whose total effect would strengthen the balance.

Domestic measures needed for this purpose may also entail the introduction of compulsory military training and the allotment of more money in the defense budget. It may also include developing the indigenous capability to manufacture sophisticated weapons and related military hardware, including ICBMs.

Balance Of Power In The Past:

The concept of balance of power can be found in some form or the other in ancient times, especially among India, China, the Greek, and the Roman states. It is one of the oldest terms in international relations theory . In his Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, David Hume has maintained the Greek politics game as a distinct expression of the notion of the balance of power.

The Roman period saw a decline in the notion and operational aspects of the balance of power as Rome virtually demonstrated monopolistic power over the world. Similarly, it did not flourish during the entire range of the Middle Ages . 19

However, the development of the doctrine of the balance of power and its large-scale practice became feasible from the fifteenth century onwards. Bernardo Rucellai and Machiavelli made the theoretical contribution to the formulation and enunciation of the doctrine.

In the words of Morgenthau, “The alliances Francis concluded with Henry VIII and the Turks to prevent Charles V of Ha Hapsburg from stabilizing and expanding his empire are the first modern example on a grand scale of the balance of power.” 20

The sixteenth century facilitated an identifiable process of balance of power. In this very century, England held the balance between France and the Holy Roman Empire .

The seventeenth century, and during it, the Thirty Years War (16184648) provides, among other points of analysis, a perceptible analytical point about the balance of power. With the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the nation-state system’s establishment, the concept became more practicable than ever before. The period between 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia) and 1789 (the French Revolution ) is regarded as the first golden age of classical balance of power both in theory and practice.

The eighteenth century formally recognized the balance of power in the legal process. The phrase ad conservatism in European equilibrium adopted under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) provisions illustrates this. The concept found expression in the works of Edmund Burke and David Hume during this period. The three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) provide an example of applying the balance of power.

The nineteenth century (1815-1914) can be considered the second golden age of the classical balance of power. Napoleon Bonaparte confronted Britain and the other European nations during this century. After successive wars spread over the years, Britain and her allies finally restored the balance of power.

The Congress of Vienna (1815) sought to establish a new balance of power resting on the principle of legitimacy and possibly preserving the status quo. Subsequently, Britain acted as a balancer in Europe’s politics through her pioneering leadership arising out of the Industrial Revolution and her overall leadership based on her developed navy and world trade. The balance of power prevented seven wars between 1871 and 1914. It maintained peace for a long time in this century.

In the twentieth century, Europe was divided into two camps, with the Triple Entente (1902) completed in opposition to the Triple Alliance (1882). When the delicate balance in the Balkans was disturbed, it led to the First World War. In the inter-war period, the doctrine was still followed, though, in theory, it was incompatible with the concept of collective security.

But finally, it proved stronger than the collective security embodied in the League of Nations. As a result, it provoked a series of alliances and counter-alliances, thereby leading to the Second World War. The post-war trends reveal that the balance of power has ceased to perform the traditional role that it played in the Euro-eccentric world order in both its theoretical and practical aspects.

However, this does not mean that the balance of power has completely not been in existence since 1945. A regional type of balance of power such as NATO, SEATO, the Warsaw Pact, etc., revealed their existence. Moreover, the superpowers have created such equilibrium in practically all major areas of tension and conflict that if the USA had built up Pakistan to match India in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, the USSR would have hobnobbed with India. There are so many similar examples.

According to the Soviet viewpoint, the balance of power was inconceivable before the twentieth century, in a situation where relations among the nations were rigidly hierarchical, and the dominance of imperialist power had no parallel anywhere. With the emergence and consolidation of a rival socialist system, the soviet Communists argued that the real balance of power came into being and countered capitalism’s designs and its highest stage of development imperialism. 21

Balance Of Power Today-Is It Relevant?

Today, the balance of power has witnessed several significant changes. Keeping in view the rapidly changing world conditions. it is being questioned whether the balance of power is relevant or valid or whether it has become obsolete. It seems that the theory of balance of power cannot be applied in the present circumstances in the classical sense of the term.

There are two different opinions in this respect. According to one view, the existing world conditions are least favorable for the balance of power’s existence or relevance. The other view holds that its validity is still relevant. Both views are discussed in detail:

Obsolete and Irrelevant:

The factors or unfavorable conditions or changes in the world that rendered the concept irrelevant and outdated are mentioned below:

1 . New Forces:

The balance of power Operated well in those times of modern history when in Europe, several states of approximately equal strength existed. Later on, when the European balance of power turned into a world balance of power, conditions became unfavorable for the successful working of the balance of power.

The effect of new forces like nationalism, industrialism, new methods and techniques of warfare, developments in international organization and law, growing economic interdependence of nations, mass education, the end of colonial frontiers, and the rise of many new nations have greatly changed the nature of contemporary world politics . All these forces and changes have made the balance of power too naive and too complex a phenomenon.

2. Numerical Reduction of Powers:

Before the Second World War, there were seven Great Powers. After this war, the USA and the USSR were the only two Great Powers left. In previous periods the balance of power was Operated by way of coalitions among several nations. The principal actors, though differing in power, were still of the same order of magnitude.

The greater the number of Great Powers, the greater the number of possible combinations that will oppose and balance each other. The numerical reduction of Great Power in the post-war period can play a major role in international politics has created unfavorable conditions for the balance of power system.

3. Bi-polarises:

As the balance of power presupposes the presence of three or more states of roughly equal power, and because the rise of a bipolar world system goes against this requirement, the balance of power is outmoded. All the major states were committed after the Second World War to one camp or another, and no single nation was strong enough to tip the balance between the two superpowers.

The disparity in power between the Super Powers and other powers is so wide that each is mightier than any other power or possible grouping. As a consequence, the major powers have not only lost their ability to tip the scales, but they have lost the freedom of movement to switch sides.

The wishes of the small powers have become meaningless. The will of the Super Powers and other compelling circumstances determine their alignments. Gone are the days of ever-shifting alliances.

It was also contended that the bipolar system was itself a guarantee of peace. The superpowers in this system would not use weapons of destruction, but those weapons would be an effective deterrent against other countries.

4. Lack of Balancer:

There is no power now to play a balancer’s role, which was successfully performed by Britain in yesteryear. Britain no longer holds so decisive a position to determine the balance. Its role as a balancer has ceased after the Second World War. The Great Powers are powerful enough to determine the scale’s position with their preponderance alone that the third power has no place to hold the balance.

5. Nuclear Weapons.

The impact of nuclear weapons has made the classical assumptions of the balance of power invalid. The changed character of modern warfare would shudder even the most ruthless supporter of the balance of power from taking the risk of encouraging a global conflict to the right balance. The threat of war is of limited utility in the nuclear age due to the nuclear stalemate.

5. Ideological Factor.

The ideological considerations in world politics became so potent that they overshadowed nationalism. The ideologies are cutting across national boundaries and thus undermining the balance of power concept. When foreign policy is guided by ideology, it loses its interest in the balance of power and lacks the essential means to follow it.

6. Disparities in the Power:

The inequalities in the power of states are increasing. Wide disparities can be seen among nations in the sphere of political, economic, and military power. While the superpowers are becoming more and more powerful, the lesser states are becoming weaker. Such a condition is contrary to the requirements of a working system of balance of power.

7. Collective Security:

The emerging importance of collective security, international law , and international organizations like the United Nations has further relegated the balance of power to the background. Many contemporary scholars believe that law and its enforcement should depend more on morals, the consensus of nations, public opinion , the United Nations, and collective security than on a mechanism of balance of power. They also consider that collective security and international organizations can better maintain world peace in the present circumstances.

8. Decline of Alliances:

The decline in the alliance system’s relevance, which is the cornerstone of the balance of power, has further made it obsolete. It is tough now for a state to observe any strict adherence to an alliance in an exclusive manner. It is becoming clearer that each nation has areas of both amity and enmity with every other nation. This trend is slowly leading to the rise of an almost universal bilateral system, against multilateral alliances.

Valid and Relevant

Although the balance of power has lost much of its significance in the conditions prevailing after the Second World War, its operation is still relevant. It is incorrect to say that it is fully obsolete or irrelevant or has no future.

The notion of its supposed irrelevance is based on an appreciation of the impact of values like peace and internationalism and the changes in international society. Those who consider it irrelevant and obsolete do so because they do not reckon with certain important factors. The factors that testify to the relevance and existence of balance

1. Reality of Power:

The change in international society has removed those conditions in which the balance of power functioned in the past, yet it has not eliminated power’s reality. As the balance of power is a technique of managing power, it can be denounced as irrelevant only after some other method of managing power has been found. Otherwise, the balance of power is still relevant, although its relevance would depend on how far its mechanism is modified to suit the changed conditions.

2. Objective Factors:

There are two other objective factors of the present international reality that prove a balance of power even in the days of bipolarism. One is the role of the uncommitted nations in maintaining an equilibrium between the two superpowers. These countries have been behaving like what Richard Rosecrance calls the multipolar buffer. 22

This shows that the buffer concept, which has been so significant in the past, is not completely wiped out today. The other is the superpowers’ role in maintaining an equilibrium between the countries directly involved in a crisis. An example of the former is the relaxation in the Cold War brought about by the uncommitted nations. The latter example is the attempts made by both the US and the Soviet Union to keep a balance in the Indian subcontinent in West Asia.

3. Nation-State System:

As long as the multi-nation-state system exists, the balance of power politics will continue to be followed by the nations’ practices. Palmer and Perkins observe: that in its heyday, it was a basic feature of the nation-state system. As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing international society pattern, the balance of power policies will be followed in practice; however, roundly, they are damned in theory. In all probability, they will continue to operate, even if effective supranational groupings, on a regional or world level, are formed. 23

4. Rise of Multipolansm:

Bipolarism remained a feature of international politics for almost two decades after the Second World War. It was argued above that owing to bi-polarization, the balance of power became obsolete. Since the early sixties, the bipolar ism has been declining and multifarious again rising. Britain, France, Germany, Japan, China, etc., have regained their lost power. Many middle-class or second-grade powers have also come on the scene. Thus the unfavorable conditions for the balance of power created by the numerical reduction of, Great Powers have now been removed to a great extent.

5. End of Ideology:

Though ideological considerations have played a significant role in the recent past for the last few years, its influence has been on the wane. By the late eighties, communism collapsed in the Soviet Union as well as in East Europe, the communist bloc disintegrated, and ideological struggle lost its edge. Consequently, ideology as a negating factor of the balance of power has disappeared.

6. Balance Exists:

After the collapse of Soviet power in the late eighties and the United States’ success in liberating Kuwait from Iraq, it is commonly believed that the only superpower left in the world is the United States. Militarily and economically, it is matchless. Thus in the present world, the USA can be regarded as a balancer. In this way, the above factors and developments prove that the balance of power is still relevant, valid, and meaningful, although in a different context.

Critical Evaluation:

The theory and practice of the balance of power have been a subject of great debate and discussion. There is disagreement among scholars on the point of its ultimate value and advantage.  It has been defended as well as criticized. Its advocates and critics have put forward various arguments for and against the balance of power. The Same are discussed below

Purpose, Utility, and Merits:

The advocates of the balance of power believe in its utility and give the following arguments in favor of it.

 1. Guarantees Peace:

Balance of power is the only guarantee of peace in the absence of the universal acceptance of the principles of collective security. When security continues to be a national obligation, it can never be ensured except by a balance of power. The prerequisite of security and order among sovereign states is that force is checked by counterforce within a balance of power. It has always served the cause of peace and order in history. If the balance is preserved, neither will there be aggression nor war, and therefore, peace will automatically be achieved.

2. Discourages War:

The balance of power prevents or discourages the resort to war. As a state cannot hope to win a war, it will not initiate one if its power is in equilibrium with a potential victim. Most of the wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were due to imperial rivalries. In contrast, the balances were maintained in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which contained struggles between European powers. Whenever peace reigned in Europe, it owed its existence to the balance of power.

3. Curbs Imperialism:

Balance of power makes it difficult for any power to become so powerful as to overwhelm the rest. Indeed, the absence of a stable equilibrium creates an opportunity for the emergence of Powers of lesser caliber to dominant positions. Thus, the balance of power helps. In containing hegemony and universal imperialism.

4. Meets Justice:

In the absence of a supreme international authority capable of enforcing justice, the balance of power enables international law to command respect. Vattel mentioned this mutuality between the balance of power and the rule of law in international society in 1758. The balance of power acts as a deterrent to grandiose ambition and thus meets the cause of justice.

5. Maintains International law:

The balance of power is essential to the maintenance of international law. For example, Oppenheim supports this argument by observing the Balance of power is an indispensable condition to the very existence of international law. He further says that a law of nations can exist only if there is an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the family of nations. Several other authors of international law also agree with this argument.

6 Prunes Independence:

The balance of power has also proved useful in preserving the independence of small states. It prevents the destruction of any particular state because, in their interests, other states will not allow this to happen. The balance of power is designed to preserve each state’s independence by preventing any state from increasing its power to threaten the others.

7. Preset-ewes State System:

The balance of power preserves the multi-state system. It does so by preserving the identity of individual states. It helps in the preservation of a multiple nature of international society and its stability. It serves as a means of maintaining a community of states. Thus, it has served the cause of peace, justice, law, and independence, thereby preserving states’ communities through the ages.

Defects, Criticism, and Demerits:

Morgenthau has criticized the balance of power on three counts: its uncertainty, unreality, and inadequacy.  Its other defects and demerits can be explained as follows:

1. Does Not Bring Peace:

The balance of power does not bring peace. On the contrary, it encourages war. Many believe that nations will light only when the two are equally matched. But if the preponderance of power is on one side, the stronger nation may not fight to get what it requires, while the weaker nation would be foolish to begin a war for what it wants. In periods called the golden age of the balance of power, there were constant wars. Moreover, by pursuing the policy of preventive war and intervention, the balance of power may directly serve the cause of war.

2. Divides the World:

The operation of the technique of alliances and counter-alliances divides the world into rival camps, inflicted by mistrust and suspicion. Therefore, any local conflict will tend to become a big or world war. If it prevents small wars, it instigates the big ones having more devastating effects.

3. No Real Security:

As politicians never accept a real equilibrium of forces but always look ahead to a favorable balance in terms of the bank balance, they are regularly engaged in a struggle to improve their power position. Thus instead of security, it int intensifies the power struggle.

4. Does Not Increase Power:

Nations are not static units. They enhance their power through military aggression, seizing territory, and alliances. They employ certain domestic and foreign, internal, and external means for this purpose. They can consolidate their power from within by improving the social and economic organization. So the traditional method of the balance of power is not the only cause responsible for increasing power.

5. Does Not Meet justice:

The balance of power never aims at concluding treaties upon principles of justice. It aims merely at preventing the supposed preponderance of one power over another or acquiring the preponderance of one power over another. It acts based on expediency and immediate gains. Once these are realized, the system of alliances breaks down, and the world is once again sent back to mutual animosity and hostility.

6. Wrong Assumption:

Balance of power rests on the idea of power or physical force. Its underlying assumption is that if one nation possesses the ability to attack another, it will utilize that ability sooner or later. It assumes that states are naturally hostile political entities. It accepts the condition of enmity between states as normal relations. But it is difficult to accept such assumptions today.

Such assumptions take for granted that nothing other than power drives an urge for power to dominate states. However, states are interested in many things other than power. Many are genuinely interested in peace. Most civilized states accept that there are ethical norms that must be given precedence over mere power considerations. Peace also depends on the moral conscience of nations and the restraining influences of ethical norms.

7. Unrealistic:

Balance of power is, after all, a mechanical concept. To attempt to appropriate the law of statics and convert it into a principle to be applied in a dynamic world is, at the bottom, unrealistic. Balance of power entails many factors such as population, territory, resources, armaments, allies, etc. These are not static. Thus, it is tough to calculate precisely and pursue rationally a policy of balance of power over a considerable period.

8. Big Power Game:

It believes that the equilibrium among great powers would ensure world peace. In it, small countries matter little. They are required to play to the tune of the great powers. Thus the balance of power theory favors big powers and ignores smaller ones.

Despite the above defects and criticism, the balance of power is still a valid concept in international politics. The impact of new forces that shaped our contemporary world has prevented the balance from operating appropriately. In conclusion, it can be said that the balance of power is difficult to be applied in practice.

Even then, it has acted as a universal pattern of political action of states in history. It did something to preserve a nation’s independence and prevent any nation from becoming over-powerful. It has survived the passage of time the League of Nations or the United Nations and the nuclear age. The balancing process will continue in the future as the struggle for advantage and power in international relations.

It is wrong to ignore its current relevance as the long spell of peace at the center or global level is mainly caused by balance and deterrence. Notwithstanding the disturbance in local balance, superpowers always endeavor that such disturbance in the peripheral balance does not lead to the central balance’s tilting. Thus, central balance will generally be maintained in the future while periodic disturbances can occur in local balances.

Power Vacuum:

As stated above, the concept of balance of power has undergone a sea change, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. This period witnessed the emergence of two superpowers who strived to create their Spheres of influence in different parts of the world and devised new techniques of balancing each other.

One of the techniques was filling the power vacuum. Under the pretext of filling the power vacuum, each superpower endeavored to increase its power and contain or balance the opponent’s power.

The term power vacuum is of recent origin. The United States coined it during the Cold War days. The declining imperial powers Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, etc., were granted independence to their erstwhile colonies in post-World War II. After the decolonization, the newly independent countries found themselves very weak politically, economically, and militarily, needing some outside powers’ crutches.

This is an illustration of what a power vacuum implies. This afforded a golden opportunity to the newly emerged Super Powers the USA, and the USSR, to provide them the necessary props in political support, economic and military aid. In this way, superpowers filled the power vacuum in different weak countries after declining imperial or smaller powers. Super Powers vied with each other to woo these countries to their side.

For instance, the Soviet Union filled the power vacuum in East Europe, North Korea, Vietnam, and other decolonized Third World countries. The USA also took prompt action to counter the move of the Soviet Union by spreading its tentacles to these very countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America on the plea of containing the communist hegemony.

The concept of a power vacuum was given a definite shape by the United States in the wake of the British decision to withdraw East of Suez. The United States invoked this theory to justify its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

It argued that a complete withdrawal from the Indian Ocean would lead to a dangerous power vacuum over a vast and vulnerable area which the US and Britain’s other allies would find extremely difficult to fill, a vacuum that would serve neither Britain’s long term interests nor its stake in world ace and Stability.

The Americans argued that if they did not move into the Indian Ocean, the vacuum would be filled by the Russians. In brief, over the vacuum theory’s pretext, the US justified its entry into the region.

The vacuum theory was vehemently rejected by India and other major littoral states of the region. For instance, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, India’s then Prime Minister, during her visit to some Southeast Asian countries in May 1966, said that the British withdrawal did not create any vacuum. If it did so, she asserted it should be filled by local powers and not by outside powers.

Even the US Congress disapproved of the power vacuum theory. However, despite this, the US Defense Department continued to increase its naval presence in the region. The US Defense Department insisted on the need for a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean since the early sixties.

By the early seventies, the US had established control over all the main gates to the Indian Ocean. Thus it had established a hold on Simonstown, at the entrance of the Atlantic Ocean, on Masirah, which served as an approach to the Persian Gulf on Diego Garcia which commanded central position in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Straits, which was the most important route from the Pacific through their political proximity to the ASEAN countries.

In sum, the US made the Indian Ocean an American lake. The Soviet Union countered and balanced America by entering into a friendship treaty with India in 1971 and consolidating its hold in Vietnam.

References:

1. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power, and International Relations (New York, 1962), p.11.

2. Cp. Schleicher, International Relations: Cooperation and Conflict (New Delhi, 1963), p. 355.

3. Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power” in H. Butterfield and Martin Wight, ed., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London, 1966). Paperback, p.149.

4. Cited in Lenox A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin World Politics in Transition (New York, 1956), pp. 107-108.

5. Sidney B. Fay, “Balance of Power” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1937), II, p. 395.

6. Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York, 1942), pp. 21-22.

7. C. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy 1904-1914 (New York, 1926), pp. 5-6.

9. Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (Bombay, 1966) p.221.

10. Norman D. Palmer 8: Howard C. Perkins, International Relations (Calcutta, 1970), p.212.

11. Kenneth W. Thompson and Hans J. Morgenthau, eds. , Principles and Problems of International Politics (New York. 1950), p. 103.

12. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1967) Fourth Edition, pp. 161-63.

13. Ernst Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda ?” World Politics, July 1953), pp. 442-77.

14. For detail, see C.P. Schleicher, n.2, p. 355. Dina A. Zinnes, ” An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories,” Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), 4(1967), pp. 27087 Martin Wight, n.3,p. 151.

15. Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe. Introduction to International Relations: Power and justice (New Delhi, 1986) Indian Reprint of 3rd and, p. 43.

16 . Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1942), Vol.11, pp. 74359.

17. Palmer and Perkins, n. 10, p. 214.

18. Ibid., p. 215.

19. For details, see Supra n. 10.p. 218-19.

20 . Morgenthau, n. 12, p. 173.

21. For details sees, William Zimmerman. Soviet Perspectives on International Relations 19564967, (Bombay, 1972) Indian ed., p. 250.

22 . See Richard N. Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), 2nd ed., p. 332.

23. Supra n. 10., p. 235.

24. L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, RF. Roxburgh, Ed. (Longmans, 1926) p. 93-94.

25. For detail, see supra n. 12, pp. 202-221.

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12 thoughts on “Balance of Power”

High quality article of Balance of Power,Thank you, it is an honor to work with you.

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It admits of the existence of some balancer state/ states or an organization. The balancer state is not a small, insignificant power, but in its own’ right it is a powerful one and the other contending powers try to cultivate such balancer. Britain was such a balancer during the ninetieth century. During the post-war period, when the distribution of power had become largely bipolar, the UNO tried to function as a balancer.

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Absolutely Great

Because the balance of power was now bipolar and because of the great disparity of power between the two superpowers and all other nations, the European countries lost that freedom of movement that previously had made for a flexible system. Instead of a series of shifting and basically unpredictable alliances with and against each other, the nations of Europe now clustered around the two superpowers and tended to transform themselves into two stable blocs.

can I know the editors name?

Its Team of university of Political Science

Can I find out the author and publication date of the article. To use as a reference in my homework

Binoy kumar malhotra: April 25, 2018

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Biden announces new policy shielding undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens from deportation

President Joe Biden is taking executive action to protect undocumented spouses of American citizens — a move that would shield about 500,000 immigrants from deportation.

The White House announced the election-year policy Tuesday, framing it as “new action to keep families together.” NBC News reported last week that action protecting the spouses was likely to be announced soon, after urging from immigration advocates and Democratic lawmakers and as the president courts Latino voters in crucial battleground states.

The new policy would allow noncitizens who have been in the country for at least 10 years and are married to a U.S. citizen, and their children, to apply for permanent residence without leaving the country.

During a ceremony at the White House, Biden called the steps a "commonsense fix" to a system that is "cumbersome, risky and separates families."

He said the order would go into effect this summer and stressed that it would not benefit people who recently came into the country. Instead, it would help people who are "paying taxes and contributing to our country" and their family members.

“This is the biggest thing since DACA,” said a source familiar with the matter, an immigration advocate.

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, announced by then-President Barack Obama in 2012, allowed immigrants who illegally came to the U.S. as children to stay in the country.

Foreshadowing the likely battles to come over the policy, the White House was keen to stress that it has been tough on unlawful border crossings and has worked to dismantle people-smuggling networks.

The president "believes that securing the border is essential," it said in a news release Tuesday outlining the new action.

"He also believes in expanding lawful pathways and keeping families together, and that immigrants who have been in the United States for decades, paying taxes and contributing to their communities, are part of the social fabric of our country," the statement said.

The statement added that the spouses eligible to apply for this have been in the U.S. for 23 years on average.

The program would also make it easier for some undocumented immigrants to get a green card and a path to U.S. citizenship.

Sources also say that the undocumented spouses would be allowed to obtain work permits on a case-by-case basis.

The action includes plans to allow DACA recipients who earned degrees in higher education and are seeking a job in that same field to more quickly receive work visas.

Republicans, including former President Donald Trump , blasted the executive action.

Speaking at a campaign rally in Wisconsin, Trump said that if he's elected in November, Biden’s new immigration policy would be immediately “ripped up and thrown out.”

"It's been a nonstop catastrophe, but one of crooked Joe's most destructive moves yet is the lawless executive action he's taken today," Trump said. "Under this program, a deluge of illegals will be given immediate green cards and put on the fast track to rapid citizenship so they can vote."

The presumptive Republican nominee for president, who has made immigration and border issues a cornerstone of his campaign, said "millions" of immigrants would benefit from the program, a figure that contrasts with a White House estimate that it would impact roughly 500,000 people who are spouses and 50,000 non-citizen children who are under 21 with a non-citizen parent who married an American before they were 18 who may also qualify.

House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., also ripped the administration's announcement, painting it as "granting amnesty to hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens" and saying it would "incentivize more illegal immigration and endanger Americans."

The new program is expected to be challenged in court.

Noting the likelihood of lawsuits, Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin, D-Ill., who chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee, said in a statement that passing legislation would be "the only action that will fully allow these deserving individuals to put down roots, start families, further their education, and continue contributing to our society without fear of deportation." But he also acknowledged that getting a bill through Congress would be unlikely given Republican opposition to previous immigration overhauls.

Gabe Gutierrez is a senior White House correspondent for NBC News.

Julie Tsirkin is a correspondent covering Capitol Hill.

Julia Ainsley is the homeland security correspondent for NBC News and covers the Department of Homeland Security for the NBC News Investigative Unit.

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I t is 70 years since AT&T ’s Bell Labs unveiled a new technology for turning sunlight into power. The phone company hoped it could replace the batteries that run equipment in out-of-the-way places. It also realised that powering devices with light alone showed how science could make the future seem wonderful; hence a press event at which sunshine kept a toy Ferris wheel spinning round and round.

Today solar power is long past the toy phase. Panels now occupy an area around half that of Wales, and this year they will provide the world with about 6% of its electricity—which is almost three times as much electrical energy as America consumed back in 1954. Yet this historic growth is only the second-most-remarkable thing about the rise of solar power. The most remarkable is that it is nowhere near over.

To call solar power’s rise exponential is not hyperbole, but a statement of fact. Installed solar capacity doubles roughly every three years, and so grows ten-fold each decade. Such sustained growth is seldom seen in anything that matters. That makes it hard for people to get their heads round what is going on. When it was a tenth of its current size ten years ago, solar power was still seen as marginal even by experts who knew how fast it had grown. The next ten-fold increase will be equivalent to multiplying the world’s entire fleet of nuclear reactors by eight in less than the time it typically takes to build just a single one of them.

Solar cells will in all likelihood be the single biggest source of electrical power on the planet by the mid 2030s. By the 2040s they may be the largest source not just of electricity but of all energy. On current trends, the all-in cost of the electricity they produce promises to be less than half as expensive as the cheapest available today. This will not stop climate change, but could slow it a lot faster. Much of the world—including Africa , where 600m people still cannot light their homes—will begin to feel energy-rich. That feeling will be a new and transformational one for humankind.

To grasp that this is not some environmentalist fever dream, consider solar economics. As the cumulative production of a manufactured good increases, costs go down. As costs go down, demand goes up. As demand goes up, production increases—and costs go down further. This cannot go on for ever; production, demand or both always become constrained. In earlier energy transitions—from wood to coal, coal to oil or oil to gas—the efficiency of extraction grew, but it was eventually offset by the cost of finding ever more fuel.

As our essay this week explains, solar power faces no such constraint. The resources needed to produce solar cells and plant them on solar farms are silicon-rich sand, sunny places and human ingenuity, all three of which are abundant. Making cells also takes energy, but solar power is fast making that abundant, too. As for demand, it is both huge and elastic—if you make electricity cheaper, people will find uses for it. The result is that, in contrast to earlier energy sources, solar power has routinely become cheaper and will continue to do so.

Other constraints do exist. Given people’s proclivity for living outside daylight hours, solar power needs to be complemented with storage and supplemented by other technologies. Heavy industry and aviation and freight have been hard to electrify. Fortunately, these problems may be solved as batteries and fuels created by electrolysis gradually become cheaper.

Another worry is that the vast majority of the world’s solar panels, and almost all the purified silicon from which they are made, come from China. Its solar industry is highly competitive, heavily subsidised and is outstripping current demand—quite an achievement given all the solar capacity China is installing within its own borders. This means that Chinese capacity is big enough to keep the expansion going for years to come, even if some of the companies involved go to the wall and some investment dries up.

In the long run, a world in which more energy is generated without the oil and gas that come from unstable or unfriendly parts of the world will be more dependable. Still, although the Chinese Communist Party cannot rig the price of sunlight as OPEC tries to rig that of oil, the fact that a vital industry resides in a single hostile country is worrying.

It is a concern that America feels keenly, which is why it has put tariffs on Chinese solar equipment. However, because almost all the demand for solar panels still lies in the future, the rest of the world will have plenty of scope to get into the market. America’s adoption of solar energy could be frustrated by a pro-fossil-fuel Trump presidency, but only temporarily and painfully. It could equally be enhanced if America released pent up demand, by making it easier to install panels on homes and to join the grid—the country has a terawatt of new solar capacity waiting to be connected. Carbon prices would help, just as they did in the switch from coal to gas in the European Union.

The aim should be for the virtuous circle of solar-power production to turn as fast as possible. That is because it offers the prize of cheaper energy. The benefits start with a boost to productivity. Anything that people use energy for today will cost less—and that includes pretty much everything. Then come the things cheap energy will make possible. People who could never afford to will start lighting their houses or driving a car. Cheap energy can purify water, and even desalinate it. It can drive the hungry machinery of artificial intelligence. It can make billions of homes and offices more bearable in summers that will, for decades to come, be getting hotter.

But it is the things that nobody has yet thought of that will be most consequential. In its radical abundance, cheaper energy will free the imagination, setting tiny Ferris wheels of the mind spinning with excitement and new possibilities.

This week marks the summer solstice in the northern hemisphere. The Sun rising to its highest point in the sky will in decades to come shine down on a world where nobody need go without the blessings of electricity and where the access to energy invigorates all those it touches. ■

For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly  Cover Story newsletter .

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline “The solar age”

Leaders June 22nd 2024

Ai will transform the character of warfare, emmanuel macron’s project of reform is at risk, how to tax billionaires—and how not to, javier milei’s next move could make his presidency—or break it, india should liberate its cities and create more states.

From the June 22nd 2024 edition

Discover stories from this section and more in the list of contents

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Nigel Farage’s claim that NATO provoked Russia is naive and dangerous

It is also a wilful misreading of history

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Watch CBS News

Bill Gates says "support for nuclear power is very impressive in both parties" amid new plant in Wyoming

By Kaia Hubbard

Updated on: June 16, 2024 / 3:14 PM EDT / CBS News

Washington — Microsoft founder Bill Gates said Sunday that he's "quite confident" that a next generation nuclear power project will continue regardless of the balance of power in Washington next year, saying "support for nuclear power is very impressive in both parties."

Gates and his energy company TerraPower are spearheading a major project that broke ground in Kemmerer, Wyoming last week — a nuclear power plant that relies on sodium cooling rather than water, which is believed to both simplify the process while also being safer, and could make nuclear energy a source of low-cost electricity. The company applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in March for a construction permit an advanced nuclear reactor using sodium. 

The project is on track to start producing power by 2030, and marks the first time in decades that a company has tried to set up the reactors as part of commercial power in the U.S. Nuclear power works without spewing out climate-changing greenhouse gasses. The site of new plant is adjacent to the Naughton Power Plant, which is set to stop burning coal in 2026 and natural gas a decade later, according to The Associated Press .

Gates touted that "nuclear has benefits beyond climate," which he said has prompted the bipartisan support. While Democrats see value in the clean energy source, Republicans may take interest in energy security, he said. 

"Of all the climate-related work I'm doing, I'd say the one that has the most bipartisan energy behind it is actually this nuclear work," Gates said Sunday on "Face the Nation." 

For some, the value may lie in U.S. leadership and competitiveness on the issue, Gates said. 

"You really don't want the nuclear reactors around the world, made by our adversaries, because it's economically a huge job creator," Gates said. "And because the materials involved in these reactors possibly could be diverted, you want your eye on in making sure that it's not feeding into some military related activity. And so the U.S. leadership in this space has a lot of strategic benefits."

Gates said the country that's building the most nuclear reactors is China, but if the U.S. tapped into its "innovation power," it could be competitive. 

"If we unleash the innovation power of this country, we tend to lead," he said. "I feel great about the support we're getting from the federal government in this nuclear space to take our history of excellence, and solve the problem that our current reactors are just way too expensive. And so let's make the changes, you know, be willing to out-innovate our foreign competitors, to maintain that lead."

One issue the project initially faced was that the uranium fuel would need to come from Russia. Gates noted that the project was delayed from 2028 to 2030 because of the fuel supply, with Russia's war against Ukraine changing the calculus. But suppliers in the United Kingdom and South Africa, along with an eventual supply from uranium mines in the U.S. and Canada will allow the project to go forward, he said.

"We can go to the free world and meet our fuel requirements," Gates said. "And so now building up the alternate plan, with the federal government helping us figure that out, that's now completely in place."

Kaia Hubbard is a politics reporter for CBS News Digital, based in Washington, D.C.

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Election latest: Labour to 'simplify' transitioning process - as Sky to interview NI party leaders

Labour have plans to 'simplify' the transitioning process, which will streamline the procedure of acquiring a gender recognition certificate. Sky News is interviewing Northern Ireland party leaders today, and will be broadcasting live from 8pm in an election special from the nation.

Monday 24 June 2024 06:50, UK

• General Election 2024

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• 'Many more people' under investigation in Tory election betting scandal
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• Live reporting by Faith Ridler

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• Read more:  Who is standing down? | Key seats to watch | What counts as voter ID? | Check if your constituency is changing | Guide to election lingo | Sky's election night plans

Labour are planning to simplify the process for people to transition, if they enter government.

The party wants to ditch the current two-year waiting period for people to acquire a gender recognition certificate (GRC) - instead implementing a similar length "cooling-off period" after applying for a GRC, Sky News understands.

This echoes similar policies the party proposed earlier in the year.

It comes following JK Rowling's intervention on Friday night, when she attack Labour over its position ( read more here ).

The current rules require someone to provide two years' worth of evidence they have been living as a different gender before getting a GRC, which will no longer be the case under Labour's plans.

A diagnosis of gender dysphoria will still be required, but this will be done via one specialist doctor, rather than under the present system that requires a panel of clinicians and lawyers.

And Sky News understands that the requirement for a trans person to have spouse's consent to change gender will also be removed.

A Labour spokesman said: "Labour will modernise, simplify and reform the intrusive and outdated gender recognition law to a new process.

"We will remove indignities for trans people who deserve recognition and acceptance; while retaining the need for a diagnosis of gender dysphoria from a specialist doctor, enabling access to the healthcare pathway.

"Britain is a reasonable and tolerant society where most people know that there are a small number of individuals who do not identify with the gender that they were born into. 

"Labour's plans will protect single-sex spaces, treat everybody with respect and dignity, maintain the existing two-year time frame for gender recognition, and ensure that robust provisions are in place to protect legitimate applications."

Welcome back to the Politics Hub.

We're into the final furlong now, with less than a fortnight left in the election campaign.

There's now ten days until polling booths open in the 2024 general election.

Today, our senior Ireland correspondent David Blevins will be sitting down with the leaders of political parties in Northern Ireland ahead of the vote.

The DUP will be launching their manifesto later this morning.

And from 8pm, Sarah-Jane Mee will be hosting a special edition of the UK tonight from Northern Ireland.

Speaking to us this morning on behalf of the Conservative Party will be Northern Ireland Secretary Chris Heaton-Harris at 7.15am .

And Then Labour's shadow health secretary Wes Streeting will be on at 8.15am .

We'll be back at 6am with all the latest from this busy election campaign, which has entered its latter days before polls open on 4 July.

Until then, you can scroll through the posts below to catch up on the day.

Join us for more live updates on Monday.

It's an election campaign - and that means political donations have ramped up.

What exactly are the rules on donations? Do they change for elections? Who gets the most money? Why do people donate? And can parties give funds back?

Here, we explain...

Veterans minister Johnny Mercer has tonight offered further details of an "awkward" hustings in Plymouth, after which he claimed his Labour rival was "bloating" his military service.

Mr Mercer, who is standing as the Conservative candidate for the Plymouth Moor View constituency, took aim at his Labour opponent Fred Thomas after the event on Wednesday.

The minister questioned whether the Labour candidate had served in combat missions during his time as a Royal Marine, as had been reported by the Guardian newspaper in 2023.

Labour has said Mr Thomas is unable to discuss much of his role in the armed forces because of its "sensitive" nature.

Now, in a lengthy social media post, Mr Mercer described the event, which he said "descended into anarchy".

In response to Mr Mercer's comments, Labour's shadow defence secretary John Healey said: "The Commanding Officer of the Special Forces Support Group wrote of Fred's integrity and his character. Those words will not have been penned lightly. Mr Mercer should do the right thing and withdraw his deeply disrespectful remarks."

By Adam Boulton , Sky News commentator

Have you ever taken part in an opinion poll? I was about to say I haven't and then a dim memory surfaced from decades ago of a nice lady with a clipboard asking me questions in the Berkshire town of Pangbourne.

Whether or not your opinions have been sampled, you will have found it impossible to miss coverage of polls during this election campaign.

Reporting of opinion polls has been such a feature of the race that some are complaining about it. The controversy has been inflamed after the dramatic results shown in recent MRP polls,  such as this week's YouGov survey for Sky News .

Critics range from those who argue polls are one-day wonders that take coverage away from the "real issues" to others grumbling that polls distort how people vote, even though they may turn out to be wrong.

In this election, there are at least 18 separate companies publishing voting intention polls. They are busier than ever now the campaign is under way.

Read the rest of Adam's column here:

A flurry of general elections since 2015 has brought an unprecedented churn in our parliamentary representatives.

This year, two in five MPs aren't seeking re-election and the picture for the Conservatives is record-breakingly grim.

An unparalleled total of 23% of Conservative MPs are calling it a day in 2024, more than the previous high of 22% of Tories who quit in 1997, another year of boundary changes.

In contrast, only 15% of Labour MPs are resigning.

There are many reasons MPs quit: from retirement, family commitments and health concerns to career change, abolished constituencies, and the prospect of defeat.

But their decision to depart can reveal much about life in Westminster and have a significant impact on parliament's mix of experience, demographics, and the direction of political parties.

Dr Sofia Collignon, associate professor in Comparative Politics, analyses the churn in our representatives here:

Our politics show hosted by political correspondent Ali Fortescue has just wrapped up for today.

But don't worry - the Politics Hub will be live at 7pm on Sky News every night through the election campaign.

And until then, you can keep up with all the latest right here.

This is the question asked by our political correspondent Darren McCaffrey ...

In 2019, Liz Truss was once again elected MP for South West Norfolk - her fourth election win.

The then international trade secretary and later prime minister romped home to victory with nearly 70% of the vote.

Her constituency was one of the safest in the country.

Now, if the polls are to be believed, it is hanging in the balance.

Watch below as Darren tries to track Ms Truss down:

The full list of candidates in the South West Norfolk constituency is:

• Earl Elvis of East Anglia - The Official Monster Raving Loony Party • James Bagge - Independent • Gary Conway - Heritage Party • Pallavi Devulapalli - Green Party • Lorraine Douglas - Communist Party of Great Britain • Terry Jermy - Labour Party • Toby McKenzie - Reform UK • Josie Ratcliffe - Liberal Democrats • Liz Truss - Conservative and Unionist Party

Crossbench peer Lord Darroch is next up with Ali Fortescue.

She asks if Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer becoming prime minister would change the UK's relationship with the European Union.

"Yes, there will be a reset," he says. "I think that he is hosting a European political community summit in Blenheim House within a couple of weeks of the election."

Lord Darroch says Sir Keir will likely be "the star of that show".

"If he wins as big as some of the polls suggest, this will be a historic margin of victory.

"All the other leaders will want to meet him, and talk to him, and discover how he did it."

He will find himself "almost mobbed" at this summit, Lord Darroch claims.

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