why is human dignity important essay 300 words

Why Human Dignity is Important

What is Dignity?

Dignity is the quality of being honourable, noble, excellent or worthy. With a human regarded as the most supreme living creature, dignity, in its appealing sense, is better referred to as human dignity. It is the conceptual basis for the formulation and execution of human rights and is neither granted by the society nor can it be legitimately granted by the society. An imperative implication of human dignity is that every human being should be regarded as a very invaluable member of the community with a uniquely free expression of their right to life, integrated bodily attributes and their spiritual nature (Chapman, Audrey R, 2010).

Human dignity is a sense of self-worth. Therefore, dignity is a sense of pride in oneself that a human being has with them. This conscious sense makes them feel that they deserve respect and honour from other human beings. Many scholars argue that if a human being is in a humiliating or compromising situation then this is a major threat to their dignity. However, other human persons may still assert that they have dignity even though they find themselves in such situations. All in all, humans deserve dignity not because of their lifelong achievements but by the fact they are already human beings (TerMeulen Ruud, 2010).

Three Perspectives of Human Dignity

The question of human dignity has hit the headlines world over in the recent past. The pre-colonial period has been used as the base reference for crimes against humanity and abuse of human dignity, thence redefinition of the term human dignity by international law courts and the United Nations. Human dignity has been defined from the philosophical, religious and legalistic perspectives.

The deep philosophical roots of the term human dignity were articulated by Emmanuel Kant, a great philosopher of the famous late Enlightenment. He is considered as the source of the now contemporary concept of human dignity. He holds that the fundamental principle behind moral duties of human beings is a categorical imperative. According to Kant, imperative means that it commands us to exercise our wills in a particular way. As a result, human beings with respect for human dignity should not possess any irrational wills against their fellow human beings and the generally acceptable societal norms and values.

And according to Emmanuel Kant, the only thing we should will about is our happiness as human beings. Once we have happiness we’ll be able to enjoy good health and nourish proper relationships (Sensen Oliver, 2011). Human dignity should operate on the basis of volitional principles or maxims. Hence, the basic rational requirements and morality should be the primary demands that apply to these maxims which motivate all our actions.

Human dignity has also been developed along the lines of religious, theological and ethical perspectives. Christian and Islam views make up this perspective at large. According to the Christians, the Bible reveals that God not only created the human nature but also endowed man with unique qualities after creating man in His own image and likeness (Genesis 1:26). It is from this basis that we can deduce that the human nature deserves a very inherent dignity.

According to the Russian Orthodox Church’s basic teaching on the issue of human dignity, God has endowed all human beings in a very generous manner by distributing His gifts equally such that His showing of human dignity, nature and abundance of His unending grace remains undisputable. Owing to the fact that Jesus Christ offered His life as a ransom for sin and the sinful nature of human beings, human dignity was lifted at its best, hence it should be respected. The Bible also asserts that life according to the desires of the flesh that don’t withstand respect for other human beings is loss of and abuse of human dignity.

The Islam Texts Society puts forth the idea that human dignity is the basis of human rights. Several references are drawn from the Holy Quran which indicates that a human being deserves dignity as a result of their physical and spiritual nobility. The Quran says that God’s love for humanity is immense, the sanctity for human life immeasurable, the necessity for freedom a prerequisite thus restating the need for human equality and accountability for all acts done to humanity (Kamali, H, M, 1999) .

For this reason, Sharia Laws have been developed to help in protecting human dignity and also promote a high level of social interaction. Since God has honoured mankind by His great love, human beings should also reciprocate the same and show their love and respect for their fellow human beings. In other words, dignity is not earned by the meritorious conduct which is an expression of the favour and grace of God towards human beings.

The legal perspective of the concept of human dignity was coined at the end of the Second World War. It has been regarded as the central perspective that discourses human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all humans have been born with equality in dignity and rights. For this reason, they are endowed with enough reason and pure conscience, hence should acts towards one another with a deep spirit of brotherhood. In its preamble, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seeks for recognition and respect for the inherent dignity as well as the equal and inalienable rights of every member of the human dignity despite where they come from, their religious beliefs or background history.

Drafters of this perspective add that the human person possesses many rights because of the fact they have been born as a person, wholly, a master and manager of oneself in many aspects (Frame Tom, 2007). Therefore, all human beings deserve to be treated with utmost dignity. International Law, in pointing out the contempt of and disregard for human dignity says that abuse of human rights has resulted in numerous barbarous acts that have completely outraged the pure conscience of mankind. Digging deep the question of human dignity has led to the coining of and questions in aspects of human liberty, equality and fraternity because many people died and suffered in the hands of their fellow human beings during the war.

Case Analysis of Human Dignity

In March 28, 2010, Conor McBride brutally murdered his fiancée before turning himself to police. As a result, nobody sought a death penalty. Several issues emanate from his ordeal: justice and several elements of justice, deterrence and forgiveness. However, of concern to us now is the question of human dignity by the murderer.

The death penalty for all crimes has been abolished in Australia. The major question that arises is whether we should use justice to arrive at human dignity and justice. Is punishment a means to attaining justice? First of all, McBride hasn’t respected the dignity of his fiancée by killing her. Nonetheless, killing him would be a disregard for his dignity as well.

Several arguments arise from the death penalty for someone who has shown contempt to human dignity. The most obvious one is the fact that a murderer loses their dignity by performing this act. Therefore, they also deserve to lose it in the same manner. The other argument says that by killing another person, a murder can only retain their human dignity by being put to death as well. The last argument says that a murder’s human dignity should be respected hence they shouldn’t be put to death (Perry, Michael J, 2005).

In the case of Oscar Pistorius who participated in the 2012 Olympic Games, a powerful thought and question on human dignity has been put forward. He became the first man with a disability to participate in the able-bodied competition. He was amputated on both legs at birth. This raised tough questions as to whether he should participate in the able-bodied Olympics or in the Paralympics for those with disabilities. He insisted that he wanted to participate in the normal-bodied Olympics. However, others argued that he had an undue advantage because he runs on blades.

Later on, a question as to whether technological advancements should be allowed to take toll in the issue of human dignity arose. This is clear because without the blades, Oscar Pistorius couldn’t have participated in the able-bodied Olympics. The arguments put forward in three perspectives say that human dignity actually places limits on the enhancements of individuals. Others say that it encourages human dignity while the last group argues that those who dispute that enhancements actually threaten human dignity are those who cannot benefit from such enhancements (Kurt Bayertz, Human Dignity, 1996).

In April 1986, an unidentified university lecturer from Belfast was practically seized by some Muslim gunmen in Beirut, Lebanon. After about 5 years, Brian Keenan was a free man once again. He had survived a painful incarceration, chained to some walls of a very tiny cell. To add insult to injury, he’s a blinded musician.

Everybody thought he was actually dead but after being released, he wished to travel the whole world, eat all the food in the world and make love possibly with all the women in the world as he had said. Silently, he began recording his ordeal on tape in an attempt to make sense of his life.

This ideally meant that his dignity had been abused and he never felt as though a human being. It deeply reminded him of the ancient times of slave trade when human beings haggled the price of their fellow human beings in attempt to claim supremacy and gain access to mighty riches. As a learned man, Keenan had been taken hostage to and work as a prisoner for the Jihad in Patagonia, Chile.

Brian was captured at Belfast as a man with full vision but after about five years, he came back blind. Why did this happen? Well, he was blinded by an attack of smallpox. He actually felt that he was better dead than alive at that time. This perhaps is the greatest disregard for human dignity when people you are offering services involuntarily and free of charge can’t even treat you so that you live as a human being just like them.

Brian Keenan, in an interview with The Guardian, a British newspaper, says that he wasn’t prepared for such an endeavour. He wasn’t a musician or historian but he found himself buried in those works of art. To this day, he can’t tell how he started playing the harp yet he wasn’t a musician. That’s why he said that when one ends up spending a lot of time in some small dark place, some strange people and ideas end up visiting you. He attributes all these as an attempt to recover one’s lost dignity. Anderson Duff Attorney

As a university lecturer before his capture, Brian Keenan could actually exercise his freedom of speech and movement and even do whatever he wanted but this didn’t turn out the same when he was captured. When he was a free man, Keenan never highly regarded those who visited him. However, he found himself being very grateful to those who visited him in what he describes as a cell without a wall. This he attributes to the fact that he was surrounded by conditions beyond his wish, conditions that he didn’t perceive to be good.

It is clear from various case studies that the question of human dignity brings out a lot of questions in the areas of justice and equality in the society. It affects societal norms and generally accepted principles. For instance, no society allows a human being to kill a fellow human being.

Critically looking at all the three perspectives from whence the issue of human dignity arises, it is important to look at all of them because without one perspective, several factors surrounding human dignity cannot be properly articulated. Therefore, all the three perspectives should be used depending on the situation bringing the issue of human dignity to question.

Chapman, Audrey R, Inconsistency of Human Rights Approaches ot Human Dignity with Transhumanism, The American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 7 (2010): 61 – 63.

TerMeulen, Ruud, Dignity, Posthumanism, and the Community of Values, The American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 7 (2010): 69 – 70

Frame, Tom 2007, The Legacy of Ronald Ryan’s Last Day, Quadrant  Magazine51, nos. 1-2 (2007): 53-60.

Kamali, H, M 1999, The Dignity of Man: An Islamic Perspective, 2nd edn, Ismalic Texts Society

Perry, Michael J, Capital Punishment and the Morality of Human Rights, Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 44 (2005): 1–36.

Anderson Duff Lawyer | Attorney

Anderson Duff Lawyer Crime

Sensen, Oliver 2011, Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms, European Journal of Political Theory, 10:1, 71-91.

Kurt Bayertz, Human Dignity: Philosophical Origin and Scientific Erosion of an Idea, (Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity, ed. Kurt Bayertz [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1996], 73-90)

Mary Ann Glendon, The Bearable Lightness of Dignity, (First Things, May 2011, 41-45)

INSTANT PRICE

Get an instant price. no signup required.

We respect your privacy and confidentiality!

Share the excitement and get a 15% discount

Introduce your friends to The Uni Tutor and get rewarded when they order!

Refer Now >

FREE Resources

• APA Citation Generator
• Harvard Citation Generator
• Chicago Citation Generator
• MLA Referencing Generator
• Oscola Citation Generator
• Vancouver Citation Generator
• Turabian Citation Generator

New to this Site? Download these Sample Essays

• Corporate Law Thesis
• Political Philosophy
• Legal Writing Rules
• Sample Philosophy Thesis

Send me free samples >

How The Order Process Works

• Order Your Work Online
• Tell us your specific requirements
• Pay for your order
• An expert will write your work
• You log in and download your work
• Order Complete

Amazing Offers from The Uni Tutor Sign up to our daily deals and don't miss out!

Contact Us At

• e-mail: info@theunitutor.com
• tel: +44 20 3286 9122

Brought to you by SiteJabber

• Terms & Conditions
• Privacy Policy

Copyright © 2002-2024 - The Uni Tutor - Custom Essays. 10347001, info@theunitutor.com, +44 20 3286 9122 , All Rights Reserved. - Terms and Conditions   |   Privacy Policy

The Uni Tutor : We are a company registered in the United Kingdom. Registered Address London, UK , London , England , EC2N 1HQ

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Dignity is a complex concept. In academic and legal contexts, it is typically used in the couplet “human dignity” to denote a kind of basic worth or status that purportedly belongs to all persons equally, and which grounds fundamental moral or political duties or rights. In this sense, many believe that dignity is a defining ideal of the contemporary world, especially in western society. However, the concept of dignity has long been associated with many more meanings, some of which cut in distinctly different directions: rank, station, honor, uniqueness, beauty, poise, gravitas, integrity, self-respect, self-esteem, a sacred place in the order of things, supreme worth, and even the apex of astrological significance. Some of these connotations have faded with time. But most have enduring influence.

So, what exactly is dignity? Do its different connotations hang together in any principled way? Does dignity understood as “universal human worth”, for example, have any meaningful connection to “social rank” or “personal integrity”? Is dignity primarily a moral concept or a political and legal one? Even assuming we can make sense of its different meanings, what does dignity demand of us? What does it mean to recognize or respect it? Does it ground rights? If so, which ones? And where does the idea of dignity come from? What, in other words, is its history?

This entry will take up these questions, but without any pretense of being exhaustive. The goal is to provide a general guide to existing theory and debate, with a focus on philosophical approaches to human dignity, and mostly as it figures into the western tradition. The vast literature makes anything more ambitious than this unrealistic, even for an encyclopedic survey.

1.1 The legal history of dignity

1.2.1 the revolutionary platitude, 1.2.2 the kantian platitude, 1.2.3 the imago dei platitude, 1.2.4 the ciceronian platitude, 2.1 dignity’s defining properties vs. dignity’s grounds, 2.2 is a connection to rights a defining property of dignity, 2.3 are distinctiveness and fragility defining properties of dignity, 3.1 virtue, value, status, and the “distinctiveness” point reconsidered, 3.2 individuals vs. species, 3.3 inherent vs. constructed, 3.4 respect: an alternative lens on dignity, 4. skeptical worries, other internet resources, related entries, 1. a historical primer.

In the opening sentence of its preamble, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights affirms the “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UN 1948). This claim would surprise our modern ancestors. Until about 1830–1850, neither the English term “dignity,” nor its Latin root dignitas , nor the French counterpart dignité , had any stable currency as meaning “the unearned status or worth of all persons”, let alone the grounds of universal rights or equality. Instead, in everything from Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) to Webster’s Compendious Dictionary (1806), “dignity” was primarily used with a conventional merit connotation—something like the “rank of elevation” that Johnson officially gave it.

How did this sea change in meaning come about? The UN Declaration makes clear that dignity’s moral-political meaning had become normalized by 1948. But what happened before 1948 that explains this transformation? These are not easy questions to answer. Although theorists often include historical remarks in their inquiries, they are just as often brief and subservient to some further, non-historical point. The result is a great many half-told stories about dignity’s past.

There are some notable exceptions. For some time, legal theorists have been etching out the details of dignity’s historical role in law and jurisprudence, especially in connection to rights. Second, theological inquiries into human dignity often engage an older history of ideas, especially the Renaissance thinker Pico della Mirandola or scholastic debates about the biblical doctrine of imago Dei . Third, there is a considerable body of literature on the Enlightenment luminaire, Immanuel Kant, and his famous claim that humans do not have a “price”, only a distinctive and incomparable worth or Würde —usually translated as “dignity” (see, e.g., Korsgaard 1986; Meyer 1987; Hill 1992; Kofman 1982 [1997]; Wood 1999; Kain 2009). Let us turn to these various exceptions, and their challenges.

The connection between law and dignity strikes many as socially and morally urgent. It is thus unsurprising that some serious history of this connection already exists, especially in relation to rights theory (see, e.g., Eberle 2002 or Barak 2015). Nevertheless, the bulk of this history does not look back very far.

For example, Lewis (2007) gives a wonderful overview of the idea of dignity in international law, but his focus is on the writing of, and reaction to, the 1945 UN Charter and 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. Or consider McCrudden’s impressive 2013 edited volume, Understanding Human Dignity. The historical chapters of this volume make important contributions, but again the focus is largely the twentieth century. Scott’s chapter (2013), for example, begins by observing that the 1848 French decree to abolish slavery motivates itself from the consideration “that slavery is an assault upon human dignity ( la dignité humaine )” (2013: 61). She then nicely explores the idea of dignity in the context of post-slavery Louisiana c.1862–96. However, the chapter then jumps forward to a comparison with Brazilian society c.1970–2012. Moyn’s chapter (2013) examines early and middle twentieth century constitutional debates to show that the concept of dignity labors under poorly appreciated debts to a specifically Christian conception of democracy, and for this reason, Moyn argues, we should be skeptical about the long-term utility of dignity for secular rights theory. And Goos’s chapter (2013) offers a close examination of the role of dignity in German thought, but the focus is on post-World War II interpretation of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law). [ 1 ]

A longer legal history can be found in McCrudden (2008), whose concise review of dignity reaches back to classical Roman thought. McCrudden argues that we can trace the merit connotation of dignity as “elevated social rank” to the Roman idea of “ dignitas homini ” (2008: 656); but also, and crucially, he argues that we can trace our contemporary moral-political notion of the “basic worth or status of human persons” to this same period, when Cicero introduced the idea of “the dignity of the human race” (see also, Cancik 2002). This claim about Cicero is echoed in Michael Rosen’s 2012, Dignity: Its History and Meaning , which is another important entry into dedicated history that focuses on legal connections. Rosen’s history is mostly from a bird’s eye view, but, like McCrudden’s, Rosen’s history has the virtue of taking a long view that stretches back to antiquity. Moreover, Rosen offers some nuanced reflections on eighteenth and nineteenth century connections, including Kant’s influence on the writing of the German Grundgesetz .

Finally, when it comes to legal history, Darwall (2017) offers a sophisticated analysis of dignity’s connections to western Enlightenment conceptions of jurisprudence stretching back to the sixteenth century. Importantly, however, Darwall’s history challenges McCrudden’s and Rosen’s appeal to Cicero as a key source. We will return to this scholarly disagreement and Darwall’s competing proposal below ( §1.2.2 and §1.2.4 ).

1.2 Four Origin Stories

Given the present popularity of studying dignity, we should not only expect the historical contours of dignity to become clearer in coming years, but also for them to be occasionally redrawn. A few important platitudes have already been challenged.

The western creed of human dignity stems from the wisdom of eighteenth-century revolutionary thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, or Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette. At the founding of new liberal states like America, or the reformation of existing ones like England or France, political sages like these propounded the inviolable value of individual human beings.

In reality, one looks in vain for dignity in the founding documents of these new republics. The term appears a few times in the English Bill of Rights (1689), but not with our contemporary moral-political meaning. It appears once in the French Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (1789), but the connotation is of the privileges that attend public or political office. And for all its fiery rhetoric about equality and the “inalienable” rights of man, the US Declaration of Independence does not mention human dignity at all. Nor does the US Constitution. In fact, it is not until the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the 1919 Weimer Constitution, that the term appears in a constitutional context possibly with its moral-political connotation (McCrudden 2008; Debes 2009 and 2017b). To this corrective evidence, we should add the testimony of an entirely different set of historical voices—from Sojourner Truth, David Walker, Anna Wheeler, and William Thompson, to Susan B. Anthony, Frederick Douglass, James Rapier, and Ida B. Wells—who remind us that the revolutionary platitude was contradicted by the lived reality within these new republics. These voices decried the systematic oppression and often bloody inhumanity that stained the supposedly egalitarian societies in which they lived.

The early modern concept of dignity originates with Immanuel Kant, who in his 1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , argued that all persons have an inherent value, or dignity, in virtue of their rational autonomy. This value commands a distinct kind of moral respect, which we express by abiding by certain limits in our treatment of others. Thus, Kant argued that we have a categorical duty to treat persons always “as an end” and “never merely as a means” ( Groundwork , 4:429).

This is the greatest dogma about dignity in philosophy. But there are good reasons to rethink it in favor of a more complicated history of ideas. First, although it is well known that Kant is indebted to Rousseau in various ways (see especially Beiser 1992), recent scholarship suggests that when it comes to his ideas about “humanity” and “dignity”, the debt runs deeper than is generally understood (James 2013; Hanley 2017; Sensen 2017). Sensen also argues that it is a longstanding interpretive mistake to think that Kant grounds the obligation to respect others on any “absolute inner value” that humans possess; and that “dignity” is not the name Kant gave to such a value anyway (Sensen 2011 & 2017; see also Meyer 1987). Relatedly, Debes (2021) argues that contemporary philosophers have greatly overestimated Kant’s influence on the historical development of our notion of moral respect for persons.

On top of these corrections, Darwall (2017) argues that the conceptual link between dignity and rights does not originate with Kant. According to Darwall, only certain conceptions of dignity will support the kind of inferences about respect that could justify using dignity to ground human rights. Namely, those conceptions that render dignity as a kind of authoritative standing to make “second-personal” claims—that is, claims by one person to another. However, the original insight for this crucial point, Darwall further argues, comes from the natural lawyer Samuel Pufendorf (see also Darwall 2012).

Writing a century before Kant, Pufendorf argued that human beings have perfect natural rights (rights owed to one another) in virtue of a certain moral “standing” that we assign to each other as a constitutive part of being sociable. Whenever we address another person directly—e.g., with a claim like “You must allow me to speak”—we implicitly treat them as an accountable, responsible being. Otherwise, why address them at all? And the same is true when they address us. In other words, according to Pufendorf, being sociable implicitly involves a reciprocal assumption of basic moral status—us of them, them of us—whenever we interact, and even if the address is one that offends the equal standing of the other. Indeed, this is precisely when “dignity” becomes most urgent. Thus, Pufendorf writes:

There seems to him to be somewhat of Dignity [ dignatio ] in the appellation of Man : so that the last and most efficacious Argument to curb the Arrogance of insulting Men, is usually, I am not a Dog but a Man as well as yourself . (1672: I.VII.I [2003]: 100)

The moralized concept of dignity does not originate in the early modern era. It was celebrated as early as the Renaissance, in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s 1486 Oration on the Dignity of Man . Moreover, Pico’s oration is drawn from the older, medieval Christian doctrine of imago Dei (based on Genesis 1:26 and Wisdom 2:23), which tells us that we are made in “in the image of God”, and that this likeness grounds our distinctive moral worth or status.

This story about dignity is to Christian theology what the Kantian dogma is to philosophy. However, these claims are usually misleading if not false. For example, Copenhaver (2017) flatly contradicts the claim that Pico was talking about human dignity in a sense akin to our contemporary moral-political notion. First, Copenhaver notes that the title of the work, which draws our attention, postdates Pico (who never published it). More substantively, Copenhaver argues that Pico’s speech was a public failure in large part because it was entangled with Kabbalah mysteries for how humans can escape the body to increase their status by becoming angels. Finally, Copenhaver points out that Pico uses the Latin dignitas only twice; and

In neither case does dignitas belong to humans, except aspirationally, and neither justifies “dignity” as a translation, with all the Kantian baggage of the modern English word. (2017: 134–5)

Adding to this reversal of fortunes, Kent (2017) marshals extensive evidence from the scholastic tradition against the imago Dei platitude more generally. Although she confirms that both dignity and the doctrine of imago Dei were widely discussed by medieval Christian scholars in the Latin West, she convincingly demonstrates that these discussions did not intersect in a way that supports an inference to our contemporary moral-political notion of the “basic worth or status of humans”. This said, not all interpretations of the Christian tradition, including the doctrine of imago Dei , are beholden to this historical platitude. And the imago Dei line of inquiry on dignity has a somewhat different life in the Jewish tradition. [ 2 ]

“Dignity” derives from the Latin dignitas . And while most Romans used dignitas only in its merit sense, a few, and Cicero in particular, had a proleptic understanding of dignitas that anticipated today’s moral-political sense.

This historical view has attracted more attention lately, as evidenced by its earlier noted endorsement in McCrudden (2008) and Rosen (2012a) (see also, Englard 2000). However, it has been challenged on both philosophical and interpretive grounds. For example, Miriam Griffin (2017) carefully demonstrates that the textual support for this view is very thin. She argues that straightforward lexical analysis of Roman sources offers sparing evidence for connecting dignitas to our contemporary moral-political concept. Moreover, even if we branch out to other ancient Roman concepts to see if dignity might be hiding under different terminology, we run into a fundamental challenge: “Stoics and Roman moralists”, Griffin explains, “think in terms of officia , obligations or duties or functions that our nature, properly understood, imposes on us ”. Correspondingly, “[t]he entitlements and rights of those at the receiving end of our actions is not a prominent aspect of their thinking” (2017: 49).

Admittedly, Griffin allows that in some cases these obligations or duties entail a kind of treatment of others that accords with our contemporary notion of human dignity. Still, this result does not depend on any right that persons have in virtue of “the worth of a human being per se” (2017: 64; see also Meyer 1987; and Lebech 2009, especially p. 46 n. 22.)

To these challenges, Darwall (2017) adds another problem for the Ciceronian platitude. Borrowing from the exact quotations that McCrudden and Rosen use to defend attributing a moral-political notion of human dignity to Cicero, Darwall argues:

Human dignity for Cicero is nothing that could be established by conventional patterns of deference. It is the idea, rooted in the ancient notion of a great chain of being, that distinctive capacities for self-development “by study and reflection” give human beings a “nature” “superior” to that of “cattle and other animals”. Other species are motivated only by sensory instincts, whereas human beings can “learn that sensual pleasure is wholly unworthy of the dignity of the human race”, and be guided by this understanding. [Consequently] nothing in the Ciceronian notion of human dignity requires, or even leads naturally to, basic human rights. The proposition, for example, that “sensual pleasure” is “unworthy” of human dignity is less a thesis about what human beings are in a position to claim from one another by virtue of their dignity than it is an ethical standard to which we are to live up. (2017: 182–3; Cicero quotations cited in McCrudden 2008: 657, and Rosen 2012a: 12)

To be fair, Darwall’s critique hangs on two assumptions about the concept of dignity: (1) that a satisfactory account of dignity will involve a connection to, if not a grounding for, rights claims; and (2) that dignity is in no way an achievement. Both assumptions resonate strongly with contemporary moral-political talk of dignity. Nevertheless, identifying these assumptions should remind us that we have not yet clearly formulated a concept of dignity. So, let us turn to that task. [ 3 ]

2. Formulating Dignity

There is no single, incontestable meaning of dignity. In fact, there are so many possible meanings that it has become commonplace in the literature to worry about the expansive variety of conceptions, and in turn to worry whether dignity is or has become essentially ambiguous. And while its defenders find ways to mitigate or explain away this ambiguity, the concept of dignity has its share of detractors. But we will return to skeptical worries at the end of this entry. For now, and granting the prima facie force of the ambiguity worry, four broad categories of meaning stand out across context and history:

• Dignity as Gravitas: a poise or grace associated with behavioral comportment; e.g., the sophisticated manners or elegant speech of nobility, or outward composure in the face of insult or duress.
• Dignity as Integrity: the family of ideas associated with living up to personal or social standards of character and conduct, either in one’s own eyes or the eyes of others.
• Dignity as Status : noble or elevated social position or rank.
• Dignity as Human dignity : the unearned worth or status that all humans share equally (either inherent or constructed).

This “general schema” is rough and ready. Scholars divide the conceptual space in different ways, often advocating intersections between the foregoing four categories, making elaborations on them, or noting wrinkles within them.

For example, Kolnai (1976) argues that the primary function of the concept is descriptive, not evaluative. Dignity is a quality of persons, which is the fitting object of a set of pro-attitudes related to both moral appreciation and aesthetic appreciation. Thus, to be dignified is to comport oneself in a way that is not simply a reflection of authority, rank, moral uprightness, or a regimented or serious adherence to codes of conduct, but instead reflects something of “the beautiful”. As Kolnai puts it, our response to dignity is characterized, at least in part, by “our devoted and admiring appreciation for beauty” (1976: 252). Hence the distinction between (1) and (2) above (see also Brady 2007).

By contrast, although Rosen (2012a) notes that the Latin term dignitas was once part of a critical vocabulary of classical art and rhetoric, used “to characterize speech that was weighty and majestic, in contrast to discourse that was light and charming” (2012a: 13), Rosen largely blends categories (1) and (2) into a single strand of meaning, which he identifies as “dignity as behavior, character or bearing that is dignified” (2012a: 54). Rosen then accepts (3) and (4) but adds his own further category, which he calls “dignity as treatment”: “To treat someone with dignity is…to respect their dignity” (2012a: 58). As we will see more fully in a moment, this addition reflects a common observation by scholars about a tight connection between dignity and its recognition (although, it is not common to claim that the proper recognition of dignity is a separate category of dignity).

Meanwhile, Kateb (2011) stresses the need to distinguish between human dignity qua individual humans, and human dignity qua human species. According to Kateb, both have dignity. But whereas the dignity of individuals can be described as a special kind of “status”—as in category (4) above—the dignity of the human species requires a further concept, namely, of “stature”. He writes, “In comparison to other species, humanity has a stature beyond comparison” (2011: 6). To be clear, Kateb does not think that the human species has an existence above and beyond its members: it is not a natural kind. However, he argues that the interdependence of humans is,

so extensive, so deep, and so entangled…that for certain purposes we might just as well make the human species a unified entity or agency, even though we know it isn’t. (2011: 6)

Correspondingly, we can sensibly talk about the “dignity” of the species. This conclusion cuts against some positions that maintain dignity “proper” can only belong to individuals (Stern 1975; Gaylin 1984; Egonsson 1998).

A more recent schema is offered by Killmister (2020). Killmister proposes three “strands” of dignity: personal, social, and status. To have personal dignity, Killmister argues, is to take oneself to be subject to personal “dignitarian” norms. And to have social dignity is to be subject to social “dignitarian” norms. What are dignitarian norms? Dignitarian norms are norms that either the person themself, or society at large, take to be “ennobling” to uphold, or whose transgression the person or society consider to be “disgraceful or debasing” (2020: 25, 29). Like Rosen, then, Killmister effectively blends categories (1) and (2) , while at the same time drawing attention to a different organizational distinction one might make, namely, between the personal and the social. As for “status dignity”, Killmister argues that explaining this category of dignity requires a distinctive concept of respect. And her argument is worth elaborating because it exemplifies and fleshes out two closely related points shared by many existing theories:

• that any satisfactory theory of dignity must explain what it means to recognize dignity; and
• that this recognition is best described as a kind of respect .

So, consider: Dignitarian norms, according to Killmister, can typically be redescribed as articulating the grounds of respect—either self-respect (in the case of personal dignity) or respect from others (in the case of social dignity). Moreover, the kind of respect relevant to personal and social dignity, she argues, is what Stephen Darwall (1977) influentially named “appraisal respect”. This kind of respect is a positive evaluative attitude or feeling , which we express towards ourselves or others, for some merit of character. In this sense, respect is akin to esteem. Killmister writes:

to be highly personally dignified is to be such that, by our own lights, we ought to hold ourselves in high esteem…to be highly socially dignified is to be such that, by the light of our community, they ought to hold us in high esteem. (2020: 23)

By contrast, Killmister connects status dignity to what Darwall called, “recognition respect”. Recognition respect is a way of thinking about oneself or others. To recognize-respect someone (at least as Darwall first explained it) is to give appropriate weight to some fact about them in our practical deliberations, and to restrict our choices or actions accordingly.

Killmister thus argues,

We come to have status dignity, when we fall within a particular [social] category, membership in which commands respectful treatment from others in our community. (2020: 22)

She elaborates,

status dignity does not call on others to esteem us, but rather to treat us in ways appropriate to the kind of thing we are. (2020: 23, emphasis added)

Correspondingly, human dignity ends up as “an especially important instance” of status dignity. And all humans deserve recognition respect in virtue of the “fact” of their membership in the category “human” (2020: 129–30).

This said, Killmister’s conclusion diverges from Darwall’s own account of human dignity, which is tied to a revision he made to his theory of recognition respect, which connected recognition respect to the reciprocal “authority” of second-personal address, as discussed in the earlier historical reflection on Pufendorf (see §1.2.3 above; and Darwall 2006, esp. p. 14). Note also that Killmister, like Kateb, eschews thinking of “human” as a natural kind, in favor of understanding it as a social kind.

The previous section offered examples of how the general schema of dignity’s meaning gets modified in existing theory, as well as how each category of meaning might be fleshed out. More examples could be given. But to decide between any of them, it seems crucial to ask, how should we formulate the concept of dignity? In other words, instead of simply cataloging first-order views about its meaning, we need to introduce some second-order criteria.

On the one hand, we need to determine the defining properties of dignity: the distinguishing characteristics or explanatory demands that are supposed to apply to any contentful account of dignity. Such criteria might include, for example, that dignity is “inherent”; that it is “incommensurable” with other values; that it has a “distinctive normative function”; that it has an essential connection to rights; and so on.

On the other hand, we need to determine what grounds dignity: we need to say what it is about humans, or any being with dignity, that satisfies the defining properties. In other words, we need to answer the question: In virtue of what do we have dignity? The most common answer to this question, historically speaking, especially when it comes to human dignity, involves a claim about autonomy. Or if not autonomy tout court, then the “capabilities” for such autonomy (see, e.g., Nussbaum 1995, 2006a, and 2006b). Thus, one finds many variations of the claim that humans have dignity in virtue of their capacity for (or exercise of) “choice” or “rational agency”—claims that are often tethered to the earlier discussed historical platitude about Kant. This said, alternatives to the grounding question about human dignity include brute species membership, sentience, the creative power of humanity, creation “in the image of God”, a politically conferred status as “rights bearer”, the capacity for empathy and caring relationships, the earlier mentioned “personality”, the concrete “particularity” of an individual person, and the possession of “perspective”.

Sorting these views is not easy for a few reasons. First, some of the operative concepts, such as “autonomy”, are themselves hotly disputed. Second, there is no pre-theoretical reason to deny multiple ways of satisfying any given definitional criteria. That is, any given proposal for the defining properties of dignity might be satisfied by more than one ground. For example, depending on the criteria, humans might “have” dignity in virtue of both autonomy and sentience, or both divine creation and our capacity for empathy, and so on. Third, twentieth century theorists rarely took a second-order view on their subject and methods. In turn, they often confused or at least failed to clarify which of the two foregoing challenges they were trying to tackle, articulating dignity’s defining properties or articulating dignity’s grounds.

Thankfully, twenty-first century formulations of dignity are marked by increasingly conscientious attempts to articulate the defining properties of dignity, and to do so in a way that might guide discussion about dignity’s grounds. For example, in “Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual”, Iglesias (2001) distinguishes between historically older, “restricted” meanings of dignity associated with general schema (1) , (2) , and (3) ; and, on the other hand, what she calls “universal” meanings associated with schema (4) , “human dignity”. She further argues that any satisfactory universalist account must render human dignity as (4a) in some sense “inherent” or “intrinsic”; and (4b) the “grounds” of basic rights. Regarding the latter, Iglesias writes:

The connection is essential. It is rooted in the concept of the human person, in human self-understanding as constituted by the bedrock truths about what and who we are…The universal meaning of the concept of dignity, as inherent to every human being, expresses the intrinsic good that the human being is. The distinct human rights articulate those basic intrinsic goods proper to, and expressive of, each one’s dignity, individually and in community relationships—as dimensions of our very being. These basic goods—guaranteed as rights—must be recognized, respected, and promoted so that the intrinsic good that the human being is himself or herself, personally and as an individual, may be preserved and assured. Thus, the ground for advocacy and defense of human rights resides on what and who the human being is, as a human being, namely on his or her dignity. (2001: 130)

By comparison, Shultziner (2007) adopts a “philosophical-linguistic” method to distinguish moral-philosophical uses of dignity from political and legal “functions” of the concept, especially the use of dignity to ground specific rights and enforceable duties. Regarding the latter, Shultziner stresses that in real world contexts, the rights which the concept of dignity is used to ground vary considerably:

There is no fixed and universal content that spouts out of human dignity and, hence, its content and meanings are determined separately in each legal document in accordance with the political agreement achieved at the time. (2007: 78)

This might seem to express skepticism about the possibility of any general, stable concept of dignity. In fact, it underlines the point of Iglesias’s final criterion (4b) ; namely, that a defining property of dignity is the grounding connection to rights. In other words, strictly speaking, Shultziner agrees with Iglesias that at least one defining property of human dignity—in political contexts—is that dignity grounds rights, even though the content of these rights vary greatly because the grounds of dignity itself vary greatly. [ 4 ]

Another example of second-order thinking can be found in Debes (2009), who argues that any satisfactory “formal” account of human dignity—by which he means an account of its defining properties—must pick out a “distinctive” value or status belonging to humans. And it must be distinctive in the sense that it (a) is not merit based, but instead unearned; (b) is in some sense “incommensurable” with other values; and (c) makes sense of the basic “normative function” of the concept. Regarding (c), Debes argues that the concept of dignity does not purport to be only or even mainly descriptive. Instead, it has a normative purpose or role, namely, “to set off in our practical deliberations whatever ‘dignity’ is applied to—to guard or protect what has dignity” (2009: 61–2).

Or consider Waldron (2012), who tracks a confusion in legal discussions of dignity between (on the one hand) definitional claims about dignity’s defining properties and (on the other hand) claims about dignity’s practical conditions; that is, the conditions of its moral, social, or political recognition. Thus, Waldron notes the way that various human rights charters claim that dignity is “inherent” in the human person; but also “command us to make heroic efforts to establish everyone’s dignity” (2012: 16, emphasis added). Such claims, he writes, may look like an equivocation akin to claiming, as Rousseau once did, that “Man is born free but everywhere is in chains”—a claim that Jeremy Bentham later called “miserable nonsense”. However, Waldron argues that Bentham missed an easy explanation of Rousseau:

[A person] might be identified as a free man in a juridical sense—that is his legal status—even though he is found in conditions of slavery…So, similarly, one might say that every human person is free as a matter of status—the status accorded to him by his creator—even though it is the case that some humans are actually in chains and need to have their freedom represented as the content of a normative demand. (2012: 16–17)

To be clear, Waldron quickly adds that one might shy away from the specific premise of divine creation as a way of grounding human freedom. That metaphysical premise is only an example. His overarching point is that it is not incoherent to make this kind of claim. Because the operative claim about the status of human persons—namely, that they are free—is a claim about a defining property of the concept of “man” (in a juridical sense), it follows that we can distinguish this claim from any further claim about what grounds this “free” status, as well any claim about the worldly conditions that are required for this status to be expressed, realized, or recognized.

Keeping this in mind, we can now understand why Waldron thinks that we are not necessarily equivocating if we claim that dignity is inherent , but nevertheless enjoin others to establish it in practice. He writes,

On the one hand, the term [“dignity”] may be used to convey something about the inherent rank or status of human beings; on the other hand, it may be used concomitantly to convey the demand that rank or status should actually be recognized. (2012: 17)

Importantly Waldron further argues that dignity finds its proper conceptual home not in morality, but in the legal context of rights. He writes, “law is its natural habitat” (2012: 13). This is because, he argues, rights articulate, or flesh out, the kind of status that modern conceptions of dignity typically include or allude to; but also, which his own theory depends on. Thus, for Waldron, it is historically mistaken and theoretically confused to ground our contemporary concept of human dignity on thick metaphysical bases—some inviolable value that “inheres” in humans, whether by dint of divine creation or otherwise. Instead, on Waldron’s view, the contemporary notion of human dignity is essentially Samuel Johnson’s old idea of “elevated rank”, albeit refashioned in the modern consciousness to apply to all humans.

In other words, Waldron explains the historical revolution in our concept of dignity as turning on a leveling up of all people to the kind of social status once reserved only for the noble elite. We simply reappropriated the term “dignity” to describe this high status, ditching its original “sortal” connotation for a new egalitarian one (2012: 57–61). Furthermore, he claims that all this happened through (or mainly through) the paradigm of rights. Oversimplifying for sake of argument: Waldron thinks that people of lower social rank successfully annexed the rights reserved to those of higher ranks, by reinterpreting those rights as human rights. Hence why rights remain the critical apparatus for fleshing out the kind of status relevant to “dignity”, and why the proper home of dignity is law, not morality.

Waldron’s view on dignity has been influential, so a few more notes about it are fitting. First, in making these claims about dignity-as-elevated-rank, Waldron partly aligns himself with Appiah (2010), although Waldron does not seem to notice this. Second, Waldron’s claim about the “home” of dignity is contentious. It is prima facie hard to square with everyday claims about human dignity, which seem evenly spread over moral, political, and legal contexts. And it contradicts Shultziner (2007), discussed above. Moreover, Dimock (2012), Herzog (2012), and Rosen (2012b) challenge it directly, among others (see, e.g., Bird 2013).

Most important, however, in the greater context of discussing the defining prosperities of dignity, it is to register Waldron’s underlying suggestion about an “essential” connection between dignity and rights. As we have seen, this claim finds wide traction in the literature, even in accounts of dignity that are at odds with the Appiah-Waldron view of “dignity-as-elevated-rank”. For example, considering only accounts reviewed so far, Iglesias (2001) made the same claim; Darwall (2017) implies it; and both Kateb (2011) and Killmister (2020) endorse it in different ways. This raises an obvious question: What exactly is the connection between dignity and rights?

It is beyond the scope of this entry to answer this question in anything close to a comprehensive way. (Good starting points include Meyer and Parent 1992; Gewirth 1992, Carozza 2008 and 2013; and Tasioulas 2013). Instead, let us draw out a few points about the connection between dignity and rights as it bears specifically on attempts to make it a defining property of dignity itself. To get at these points, consider a final proposal about the definitional criteria of dignity, from Fitzpatrick (2013):

The primary notion of dignity is the idea of a certain moral status involving possession of an inherent, unearned form of worth or standing —a basic worth or standing that is neither dependent on one’s being of use or interest to others nor based on one’s merits, and which essentially calls for certain forms of respect. (2013: 5546)

Fitzpatrick presents this definition within the context of an encyclopedic effort to capture its meaning. As such, he is understandably aiming at something generic. However, in the light of our analysis so far, the tensions in his attempt are manifest, albeit instructive.

First, describing dignity as primarily a “status” instead of a “value” aligns with those like Waldron, who make a principled distinction between their accounts and all kinds of “worth” or “value” conceptions of human dignity (see, e.g., Killmister 2020, who emphasizes this distinction; and Dan-Cohen 2012, for analysis on its import to Waldron). However, Fitzpatrick immediately equivocates on this point, redefining status as, “worth or standing”. Similarly, consider that those like Appiah-Waldron who think human dignity depends on a refashioned idea of high social rank, must, strictly speaking, reject the property of “inherentness” that Fitzpatrick appeals to. But they might allow for the alternative description of “unearned”, especially if this is interpreted as historically indexed to the refashioned conception of status.

More important for the question about rights is to consider Fitzpatrick’s final remark that dignity, “calls for certain forms of respect”. At first blush, this appeal might seem to be merely a refinement of Debes’s (2009) claim that dignity has a distinctive “normative function”. If so, it would be a refinement that is common to many theorists, as we already noted in §2.1 . However, Fitzpatrick immediately connects this generic claim about respect to two specific elaborations of dignity’s normative function. He writes:

It is in this sense [of an inherent worth or standing that calls for respect] that many hold that all persons possess a fundamental, inalienable dignity, which grounds [1] basic rights…or [2] the authority to make claims and demands of others. (2013: 5546)

Both claims merit elaboration.

The first claim [1] gives voice to the strongest, or at least the most direct way to make the connection to rights a defining property of dignity, by making dignity the normative basis of rights. Thus, suppose one asks of any given right x , what justifies the claim that “ x is a human right”? The answer for those who take this line is, “dignity”. Or at least, “human dignity”.

Now, in one sense, claim [1] is unsurprising given that it has legal reality. For example, although the claim is only implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as well as the original Charter of the United Nations (1945), a 1966 amendment to the Charter made it explicit, declaring that rights “derived from the inherent dignity of persons”. Moreover, claims like this have become increasingly common in state constitutions, especially in the west, as well as other international charters and humanitarian declarations (see, e.g., Schachter 1983, Iglesias 2001, Shultziner 2007, and McCrudden 2008, for summaries and analysis).

And yet, it is important to note that such legal claims are almost always brute assertions. They are not conscientious attempts at theory. More exactly, they do not claim that any adequate theory of dignity (as a concept) must account for the grounding relationship between dignity and rights. This is important because, pace FitzPatrick, or those like James Griffin (2008) who adamantly stress dignity as the foundation of rights, some theorists challenge or avoid or even reject claim [1] . This includes skeptics who challenge the viability of any existing substantive accounts of dignity to ground rights (discussed later). But it also includes some theorists who defend dignity (in one form or other). For example, Waldron skirts around the kind of commitment at issue in claim [1]. He allows that dignity involves each person thinking of themselves, “as a self-originating source of legal and moral claims” (2012: 60), but the overarching implication of his argument is that rights articulate the nature of the “high” status humans have been elevated to. Dignity is thus not the normative basis of rights on his view. Instead, legal systems, and rights in particular, “constitute and vindicate human dignity, both in their explicit provisions and in their overall modus operandi” (2012: 67).

Killmister (2020) follows Waldron’s lead, but she is more explicit. “[H]uman rights”, she argues, “form part of our articulation of how members of the human kind ought to be treated” (2020: 143). And, like Shultziner (2007), she warns against attempts to derive the content of rights directly from dignity, a warning that further tells against making claim [1] part of the definitional criteria. Relatedly, Meyer (1989) concludes that insofar as we aim to explain rights, we can never successfully explain dignity: “While having and exercising certain rights is important to our dignity as human beings”, Meyer argues,

what we commonly regard as essential to human dignity would not be explained even if we were able to delineate all of the relevant rights and the particular ways in which each of them expresses or protects human dignity. (1989: 521)

Meyer’s point is enhanced (perhaps even preempted) by Donnelly’s (1982) sociological claim that in cultures where “rights” are or once were a relatively foreign concept, human dignity is not. If Donnelly is correct, then excepting motivational purposes, rights theory is arguably a non-starter for a proper account of dignity’s defining properties (see also, Howard 1992, who partly recapitulates Donnelly’s point).

Piling onto this, Schroeder (2012) and Moyn (2013) warn that the “normative basis” version of the connection claim between rights and dignity—i.e., claim [1] —leaves dignity vulnerable, because our contemporary concept of human dignity carries underappreciated debts to non-secular, theological traditions (see also Addis 2013). And Valentini (2017) argues that the plausibility of claim [1] depends on which other defining properties of dignity we want to defend. Specifically, if dignity is taken to be inherent, she argues, then claim [1] becomes not only “uninformative” because “the notion of inherent dignity is opaque”; it also becomes counterproductive to the aims of most rights theories. This is because, she continues, the inherentness claim pushes rights debates, “into deep metaphysical waters”, and distracts us from the main political function of rights (especially, human rights), namely, to constrain, “the conduct of powerful actors” (2017: 862–3).

Now consider connection claim [2] : dignity grounds the authority to make claims in general. Some have argued that the first connection claim [1] , which makes dignity the normative basis of rights, is ultimately just a special case of the second claim [2], about authority. Perhaps most well-known in this respect is Feinberg (1970 [1980]), who, in the course of arguing that the act or practice of making interpersonal claims is what “gives rights their special moral significance”, adds this passing remark about dignity: “what is called ‘human dignity’ may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims” (1970 [1980: 151]). Admittedly, Feinberg does not unpack the point. And it is not perfectly clear if authority per se is part of his conception of this “capacity”. Still, the point seems to resonate with claim [2], especially if we pair Feinberg’s point with Darwall’s views about second-personal authority, considered earlier. Indeed, Meyer (1989) tries to unpack Feinberg in a way that seems to anticipate Darwall’s view. (See also, Forst 2011, who offers a similar line of argument to Darwall, which he credits partly to Ernst Bloch. But see Sangiovanni 2017, who objects to both Darwall and Forst, esp. pp. 50–60).

It is possible to take an even wider view on the defining criteria of dignity. For example, consider Etinson (2020), who represents another case of conscientious second-order theorizing. Etinson argues that a complete theory of dignity should explain not only what “grounds” dignity—“that is, how and why one comes to possess or lose it”—but also its “proper” method—that is, “how inquiry into all of this should proceed and be understood” (2020: 356). The latter demand is akin to calling for an articulation of the defining properties of dignity, in the sense that we have been discussing. However, Etinson adds an important substantive claim about this method: He agrees that dignity is partly distinguished by something like a distinctive “normative function”, but sharpens this claim by suggesting that to explain this function, we should focus specifically on the conditions of dignity’s violation. This refinement is important for two broad reasons.

First, over its long history, inquiry into human dignity has often been conjoined with considerations of what it means to harm dignity: What constitutes disrespect of dignity? Can we lose it? Can it be destroyed? And so on. Call this, the question of dignity’s “fragility”. Sometimes, this question is taken up within a direct examination of dignity (see, e.g., Kaplan 1999 or Dussel 2003). At other times, the motivation is pragmatic. For example, in his reflection on legal appeals to dignity, Schacter (1983) writes:

When [dignity] has been invoked in concrete situations, it has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be recognized even if the abstract term cannot be defined. “I know it when I see it even if I cannot tell you what it is”. (1983: 849)

And in some cases, these reflections go the other way around; that is, from an analysis of a specific kind of dehumanizing harm (slavery, torture, rape, genocide; alienation, humiliation, embarrassment) to dignity, or one of its close cognates like “humanity” (see especially, Neuhäuser 2011; Morawa 2013; Haslam 2014; Frick 2021; Mikkola 2021). [ 5 ]

But whatever the context, it is crucial to distinguish between first-order encounters with dignity’s fragility, and second-order efforts that try to draw a connection between a negative methodology centered on the question of fragility and the positive effort to articulate the defining properties of dignity. It is the latter claim that Etinson makes, illustrated in the following incisive point:

Not all moral wrongs convincingly register as violations of human dignity…And this suggests that dignity is normatively special—that its violation represents a particular type of wrong. (2020: 357)

Essentially, Etinson is arguing that (1) we should add to the defining properties of dignity, that the value or status “dignity” picks out is in some sense “normatively distinctive”; and (2) in order to articulate (positively) what makes it distinctive, we must investigate (negatively) what it means to harm it. Thus, for Etinson, dignity does not simply have the normative function to “set off” the special status of humans in our practical deliberations; it sets off humans in a special way. And this “way” can only be understood through a consideration of dignity’s fragility.

The second reason for underlining this kind of negative methodology comes from Killmister (2020), who also makes second-order claims about the proper method for theorizing dignity. On her view, all the primary senses of dignity in the general schema can be harmed in some way or other. Each can be injured, lowered, embarrassed, humiliated, threatened, frustrated, even destroyed. Correspondingly, it is a criterion of any satisfactory theory, that it explains the nature and conditions of dignity’s fragility in all its primary senses ( categories 1–4 in the general schema).

The emphasis on “all” is important. Killmister’s theory stands out for being an attempt to use the criterion of fragility to offer a unified theory of dignity. And this raises a question beyond whether fragility is a defining property of dignity. Namely, for any given theory of dignity, does it purport to theorize dignity in general, or human dignity in particular? Most literature bearing the term “dignity” in its title will say at some point that it is really or mostly about human dignity. But if so, then are such theories in some sense incomplete? Must a complete theory of human dignity ( category 4 in the general schema) reconcile itself with the other primary senses of the term ( categories 1–3 ), as Killmister implores?

The next section attempts to offer some footholds for answering these new questions. But there is one more point to make here, because it is pertinent to second-order questions about how to formulate dignity. Part of what motivates Killmister’s effort at a unified theory is an attending argument that theories of dignity should fit with everyday ways of speaking about dignity. And everyday talk of dignity, she argues, often refers to the other primary senses of dignity in the general schema. Moreover, she claims that all these ways of talking are connected by the fragility criterion, as well as some of the other defining criteria we have discussed, especially (A) the idea of a normative function and (B) an essential connection to respect. Finally, she treats this “fit” between her account of the defining properties of dignity and everyday talk about dignity as important evidence for the correctness of her own criteria. Nor is she alone in staking evidentiary value on fitness to everyday language. For example, Bird (2013) and Etinson (2020) make similar arguments. [ 6 ] Do we agree? Surely, a good theory of dignity will not run roughshod over everyday usage. Still, exactly how beholden should a theory be?

3. Human Dignity: Touchstones of Analysis

The conclusion of the last section raised the following question about the conceptual landscape of dignity research: Which of the many points being made are relevant to theorizing dignity in general, and which pertain specifically to human dignity? To answer this question, it will help to distill a few enduring themes that characterize the debate over specifically human dignity. These are hardly all the themes that could be identified. Also, because each theme has been introduced in one way or other already, the following is intentionally condensed, with the understanding that any of these leads could be followed into a forest of nuance.

One could take all the existing literature on human dignity and arrange it into three groups, depending on whether any given argument renders dignity as a kind of (i) virtue or quality of character; (ii) value or worth; or (iii) status or standing. Our analysis already laid out the most important aspects in deciding between these classifications. We also noted that the trend in secular accounts is to articulate dignity as a kind of status rather than as a virtue or value. To this it should be added that virtue accounts make up the minority of all modern positions, no doubt because most contemporary positions eschew the hierarchical drift that comes with tying dignity to virtue.

Perhaps less obvious in the literature, is the agreement to articulate what is distinctive about dignity, regardless of which way it is rendered: virtue, value, or status. This “distinctiveness” point is pressing, given Etinson’s (2020) argument that a negative analysis of dignity’s fragility is crucial to understanding what is “special” about dignity as a normative concept. On his view, a good theory of dignity will pick out a “meaningful distinct set of concerns” (2020: 354), if it is to justify using the term at all. The force of this point extends beyond the question of whether fragility is a defining property of dignity. But to appreciate fully why, we need to contextualize it. So, consider the following:

The idea that human beings are morally special or distinctive has found expression in the religion, philosophy, literature, and art of all societies, modern and ancient. And connected to that idea and those expressions is an enduring struggle to understand what this peculiar “value” is. Since antiquity many have leveraged this idea about human distinctiveness into the idea that humans are supremely valuable. The chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone (c. 441 BCE), for example, lauds man as the most “wondrous” of all things in the world, a prodigy who cuts through the natural world the way a sailor cuts through the “perilous” surging seas that threaten to engulf him (verses 332 ff., cited in Debes 2009 at p. 52). Similarly, the Judeo-Christian doctrine of imago Dei trumpets human dominion over the earth and the distinctive value of humanity. Excluding God and angels, the doctrine implies that humankind is preeminently valuable.

Admittedly, these are not references to theory, strictly speaking. However, the historical development of dignity has long been tangled up with this kind of widespread attempt to explain human distinctiveness, even if only implicitly or under cognate terms like “uniqueness” (e.g., Muray 2007 and Rolston 2008). Indeed, one might say that the most basic point of the concept of dignity, especially as it was molded into the category of “human dignity”, just is to describe the distinctive virtue, value, or status of humans. From Cicero’s ancient claim about the special worth of the “human race”; to Schacter’s (1983) anti-Waldron argument that dignity’s importance outside of legal contexts highlights the need “to treat it as a distinct subject” (1983: 854); to Iglesias’s (2001) attempt to explain our “distinctiveness” as human beings; to Kateb’s (2011) claim that human dignity involves the unique role humans have as “stewards” of the earth—in all these arguments the distinctiveness point is in play. Or consider Simone Weil, writing in the shadow of World War II, and who inspired Iglesias:

There is something sacred in every man, but it is not his person. Nor yet is it the human personality. It is this man; no more nor less… The whole of him. The arms, the eyes, the thoughts, everything. Not without infinite scruple would I touch anything of this. (first published 1957 [1986: 50–51])

Similarly, Malpas (2007) explicitly argues that insofar as we are investigating human dignity, it seems we are inquiring into what is distinctively valuable about “being” human, by which he means something like the experience of being human.

This said, we must understand Etinson as arguing that it is not enough to claim that what explains the moral distinctiveness of humans is their “dignity”. We have to say what about human dignity itself is distinctive. And we must do so in a way that would substantiate (in part or in whole) the more general claim of human distinctiveness. After all, Etinson argues, not all kinds of harms to humans count as harms to their human dignity. Not even all harms to their status are obviously harms to their human dignity. Slapping someone in the face is certainly an affront to their status in some sense, and perhaps even necessarily to their social-status dignity ( (3) in the general schema), but not necessarily to their human dignity ( (4) in the general schema). (See also, Valentini 2017.)

So, what is distinctive about human dignity itself? There is more than one way to answer this question. Etinson’s own suggestion, as we have seen, is to use a negative normative lens to articulate what kinds of harms to humans count distinctively as harms against their dignity. But rather than tracing out further particular answers to this question, let us note a few final general observations about the distinctiveness point.

First, most theorists of dignity do not explicitly parse out the need to explain the distinctiveness of dignity itself, as contrasted with human distinctiveness in general. However, I submit that explaining the distinctiveness of dignity (itself) is often part of what many theorists take themselves to be doing, however indirectly. In other words, explaining dignity’s “distinct set of concerns”, to use Etinson’s phrase, seems to be constitutive of many theories of dignity. There is no space to substantiate this contention here, but we risk losing valuable insights about dignity’s distinctiveness if we don’t take this charitable approach.

Second, it is important not to run together the normative upshot of any claim about the grounds of dignity, with a definitional point about dignity’s distinctiveness. For example, if one thinks humans have dignity in virtue of their rational agency, then in one sense, this will entail a kind of distinctiveness. For, it will necessarily inform the substance of whatever rights or duties we think dignity justifies. In other words, the content of such rights and duties will need to be “distinctively” tied to rational agency, and what it means to protect, harm, or nurture this agency. Likewise for any other candidate account of dignity’s grounds. Nevertheless, this is different than talking about distinctiveness as a defining property of human dignity. Scholars like Etinson and Killmister are trying to articulate the distinctive normative function that defines dignity, regardless of its grounds—indeed, which any satisfactory account of dignity’s grounds must be able to explain.

Finally, Debes (2009) adds the following qualification to the “distinctiveness” point:

A proper account of dignity must pick out a distinctive value belonging to humans. This is not equivalent to demanding a value that belongs distinctively to humans.

The latter demand (which some theorists do insist on), not only arbitrarily rules out a shared space of dignity between different entities but also risks ruling out the best options for dignity’s grounds:

For example, if rationality should after all turn out to be the most defensible basis for a theory of human dignity, we [humans] wouldn’t want to yield it simply because we discovered that chimps and whales were rational or that Martians really have been trying to communicate with us for millennia. (2009: 61).

The conclusion of the last section brings to mind another theoretical dividing line in the literature, between those arguing for human dignity qua human individual, and those arguing for human dignity qua species. Which is it?

Some say, both. For example, Kateb (2011) argues that we must explain the uniqueness of persons and the species: “I am what no one else is, while not existentially superior to anyone else; we human beings belong to a species that is what no other species is” (2011: 17). According to Kateb (echoing Cicero), humans are partly divorced from the natural order both individually and collectively, in virtue of possessing unparalleled and morally special capacities for self-creation. Moreover, Kateb is clear that the distinctiveness of human dignity also grounds human normative supremacy. Indeed, on his view, human supremacy is one of the defining properties of dignity: “The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of being” (2011: 3–4); we are “the highest species on earth—so far” (2011: 17).

Of course, such claims are contentious. But if we want to engage them, it is important to be clear about whether we are doing so at the definitional level, or at the level of dignity’s grounds. For example, recall Cicero’s claim that it is in virtue of our distinctive capacities for self-development “by study and reflection”, that human beings have a “superior” “nature” to that of “cattle and other animals”. This Ciceronian idea about the grounds of dignity shares affinities with many other extant views, including Kant, Pico, and obviously Kateb. And we have considered reasons for rejecting this line of argument. But even if one accepts it, the present point is that one might not endorse Kateb’s claim about the “core idea” of dignity being essentially about the human species. That is, one could agree with Kateb about what grounds dignity but disagree that part of what defines dignity, is the property of species superiority. Stern (1975) and Gaylin (1984), for example, agree that the concept of dignity is most essentially about human worth or status, but argue that this does not imply that the human species possesses dignity. It only implies that each individual human has dignity.

Finally, any claim about the dignity of the species or collective humanity must confront worries about speciesism, and in turn all the objections of those who think that non-human animals have a purchase on the normative space of dignity (see, e.g., Rachels 1990; Pluhar 1995; LaFollette & Shanks 1996; Bekoff 1998; Meyer 2001; Rolston 2008; Singer 2009; and especially Gruen 2003 [2010], who explores the idea of “wild dignity”.)

It is common to talk of human dignity as “inherent”. What this means, however, is often unclear. Sometimes it is redescribed to mean “intrinsic”, other times “inalienable”. It is also often conjoined with claims that dignity is “inviolable”—although this is dubious if inviolability is supposed to be entailed by inherentness. After all, one might agree that human dignity cannot be entirely destroyed because dignity is inherent, but nevertheless allow that human dignity can be harmed, insulted, frustrated, and humiliated.

This is not to suggest that all that is inherent is indestructible. Whether human dignity can really be destroyed depends entirely on why one thinks human dignity is inherent. If one thinks that human dignity is inherent because we have dignity in virtue of possessing a soul, then they probably do not think dignity can be truly destroyed (although they may think it can be degraded; or even, if they subscribe to Christian dogma, that it was in fact degraded by the “fall” from grace). On the other hand, if one thinks that human dignity is inherent because we have dignity in virtue of our capacities for rational agency, then they probably do think dignity can be lost or destroyed, whether by extreme psychological trauma or a sharp blow to the head.

It must also be reiterated that secular theorists of dignity have increasingly turned away from “inherentness” as a defining property of dignity (see, e.g., Darwall 2006; Debes 2009; Kateb 2011; Rosen 2012a; Waldron 2012; Valentini 2017; Killmister 2020). The reasons for doing so vary. Most reflect suspicion about the metaphysical baggage, especially of the theological kind, that historically has gone hand in hand with inherentness claims. But there are often other reasons. For example, for those that think human dignity is defined by the authority or standing to hold others responsible with second-personal claims, dignity only comes into existence within actual second-personal encounters (see, e.g., Meyer 1989, Darwall 2006, Forst 2011, and perhaps Feinberg 1970 [1980]). Or recall Valentini, who argues that the problem with the metaphysical claims needed to back up inherentness is not simply that they are “heavy”, but that they distract us from the core political function of rights. Meanwhile, for those committed to a negative methodology, like Killmister or Etinson, the starting assumption is that dignity can be destroyed. And while this does not entail that dignity is not inherent, Killmister persuasively argues that such fragility strongly tells against inherentness.

All this raises the question: If not inherent, then what? The simple answer is that on many theories dignity is socially constructed. Of course, there are many theories about what it means for something to be socially constructed, with many important differences between them. There is, for example, a chasm of difference between claiming that dignity is constructed as a constitutive part of second-personal relationships ( à la Darwall or Forst) and claiming that it is constructed through the transformation of an old idea about “elevated rank” ( à la Appiah or Waldron). So, the simple answer must be turned into a complicated one, which we cannot do here.

A complete theory of human dignity must articulate the demands that dignity places on us, morally and politically. Some theories, as we have seen, build this expectation into the defining properties of dignity. But even when they do not, there is almost always some appeal, positive or negative, to some claim about what it means to recognize dignity, and most often to some claim about respect —which, furthermore, is usually claimed to be both what dignity demands and what it means to recognize dignity. The subject of respect, however, is its own labyrinth. It boasts an array of meanings, diverse applications, and extensive commentary. This said, two very general points about respect stand out in connection to human dignity.

First, the connection between dignity and respect has been made concrete in various political contexts. For example, Schachter (1983) notes that Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that,

all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. (1983: 848)

He marks a similar provision in Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Ibid). And this connection generates distinct challenges in the political context that reach beyond the human rights discourse. Schachter explains:

In the political context, respect for the dignity and worth of all persons, and for their individual choices, leads, broadly speaking, to a strong emphasis on the will and consent of the governed. It means that the coercive rule of one or the few over the many is incompatible with a due respect for the dignity of the person. (1983: 850)

However, Schachter further points out, many political theories contend,

that substantial equality is a necessary condition of respect for the intrinsic worth of the human person…In particular, relations of dominance and subordination would be viewed as antithetical to the basic ideal [of human dignity]. If this is so, great discrepancies in wealth and power need to be eliminated to avoid such relations. (ibid)

The question thus becomes, how can we achieve such egalitarian objectives, without the kind of “excessive curtailment of individual liberty and the use of coercion” that human dignity is also thought to eschew (1983: 850)? This question figures into some of history’s most influential political theories, from Hegel to Rawls. (For an inroad to understanding the Hegelian line, see Honneth 2007; for the Rawlsian line, see Bird 2021.)

Second, as already hinted, the introduction of respect raises its own distinctive challenge, namely, to explain what respect is. To do this, many theorists appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to what we earlier called “recognition respect”. When we make plans or choose to act, we recognize-respect others when we appropriately take account of some fact about them, by adapting, revising, or even foregoing our plans and choices in the light of that fact. So, which “fact”? Well, if we are talking about respecting persons as persons, in a moral sense, many theorists have answered that human dignity is the operative fact. Or, if they drill down further, then whatever they end up defending as the grounds of human dignity—whether rational autonomy, species membership, an immortal soul, etc.—is the relevant fact. [ 7 ]

However, the last few decades have witnessed a wave of new theorizing about respect. And this has consequences for theorizing about human dignity. The most notable consequence stems from the field of care ethics, where empathy, compassion, and caring have been conceived as distinct kinds of respect. Thus, although human dignity did not figure explicitly into early formulations of care ethics, as conceived by those like Noddings (1984) or Held (2006), care ethics has increasingly been developed in ways that does bring dignity to the fore, e.g., by those like Dillon (1992), Kittay (2005 and 2011), and Miller (2012). Dillon, in particular, gives voice to a profound alternative to rationalist paradigms of human dignity, noted frequently in this entry, and associated especially with Kant. She writes:

[Care respect] grounds respect for persons in something which, considered in the abstract, nearly all human beings have and can be said to have equally - the characteristic of being an individual human “me” - a characteristic which each of us values and thinks is both morally important and profoundly morally problematic not only in others but in ourselves as well, and which pulls our attention to the concrete particularities of each human individual. We are, on the care respect approach, to pay attention not only to the fact that someone is a “me” but also to which particular “me” she is. (Dillon 1992: 118)

The core idea Dillon expresses here about the grounds of dignity qua the concrete “particularity” of an individual person (as she puts it on 1992: 115), traces to Iris Murdoch (1970) and Elizabeth Spelman (1978). It also resonates with the thinking of Simon Weil, noted above in §3.2 . More generally, Dillon’s argument illustrates how taking the concept of respect as our starting point might lead to very different views about human dignity.

The conceptual complexity surrounding dignity has sparked a long history of disagreement about the utility of the concept, with some concluding that it is hopelessly messy or essentially ambiguous. One of the more cited versions comes from the Yale bioethicist Ruth Macklin, who made this complaint in a widely read 2003 editorial. “Dignity”, she asserted, “is a useless concept. It means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy” (2003: 1419).

Macklin’s claim was not backed by much argument. And judging by the literature, her complaint did nothing to slow down the application of dignity in bioethics, where it is now discussed in the context of everything from disability studies, elderly care, human research, cloning, “chimeras”, enhancement, transhumanism, and euthanasia (see the bibliography for leads to each of these). Still, one does not have to look hard to find Macklin’s allies.

For example, Rosen (2012a) claims that “animus against dignity is widely shared among philosophers, in my experience, and goes back a long way” (2012a: 143). He buttresses his claim by recounting the encouragement of a colleague to give the concept “a good kicking”, and by quoting his favorite historical challenges by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the former of whom called dignity, “the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists” (1840 [1965: 100] cited in Rosen 2013: 143). Importantly, however, for Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the problem wasn’t simply the ambiguity of the concept. They thought that the moralized notion of inherent or distinctive human worth garners widespread credence only because it flatters our pride and allows us to slip into self-deceptive moral complacency. This deflationary hypothesis strikes at the heart of our modern dignitarian ethos.

So, exactly how widespread is skepticism of dignity? There is no simple answer to this question because it depends greatly on what one takes dignity to be. Even defenders of one conception of dignity often express skepticism about other conceptions. For example, we already noted the trend away from thick metaphysical claims about dignity, which make dignity depend on anything like a divinely implanted “soul” or Kant’s “noumenal” idea of the self. Rosen calls such views, “internal kernel” theories, and further notes that reservations about these views are often both metaphysical (no such thing exists) and epistemological (we cannot justify our belief in such things). The present point, however, is that if one’s skepticism about human dignity in general turns on the specific reservation about internal kernel theories, then one should stay open minded. For, as we have seen, there are many alternatives for theorizing dignity that do not depend on such metaphysical commitments.

Still, because there is more than one way to interpret Schopenhauer’s claim that dignity is a “shibboleth”, it may prove helpful to trace out a little further a few possible skeptical lines of argument, albeit briefly. So, here are four ways skepticism tends to play out in the existing literature:

Rosen suggests that Schopenhauer’s main complaint is that “dignity” is an impressive “façade” obscuring the harsh reality behind the idea, namely, that the concept lacks the substance to do the work we assign to it. More exactly, dignity cannot serve as a foundation for morality, including, serving as the normative basis of rights (Rosen 2012a: 143). We encountered this line of thinking already in the earlier discussion of the connection between dignity and rights. Essentially, the complaint is that no extant account of the grounds of dignity (e.g., Kantian rationalist arguments, Judeo-Christian imago Dei arguments, etc.) can satisfactorily explain and justify the kind of normative work dignity is supposed to do. See especially, Sangiovanni 2017, who rejects Aristotelian, Kantian, and imago Dei accounts of dignity as insufficient for the tasks dignity is typically set to, including grounding rights.

A related but distinctively different way of taking Schopenhauer’s objection, is the worry that dignity has been politically manipulated to capitalize on its deceptive potential. As Rosen notes, the general point here is not new. “The idea that illusions are essential to the political order”, he writes, “runs through the Western tradition of political thought from Plato” (2012a: 144). However, Rosen suggests that Nietzsche gets the credit for understanding how powerful an illusion human dignity, specifically, can be, for such political purpose. “Such phantoms as the dignity of man”, Nietzsche writes,

are the needy products of slavedom hiding itself from itself. Woeful time, in which the slave requires such conceptions, in which he is incited to think about and beyond himself! (from “The Greek State”, 1871; quoted in Rosen 2012a: 144)

In fact, this skeptical line goes back further than Rosen seems to appreciate. Thus, in his 1714, Fable of the Bees , Bernard Mandeville essentially made the same argument. Speaking conjecturally about the origins of morality, Mandeville writes:

Making use of this bewitching Engine [of flattery], [the Politicians] extoll’d the excellency of our Nature above other Animals…Which being done, they laid before them how unbecoming it was the Dignity of such sublime Creatures to be solicitous about gratifying those Appetites, which they had in common with Brutes, and at the same time unmindful of those higher Qualities that gave them the preeminence over all visible Beings. (1714 [1988: 43])

Dignity is vacuous. Bracketing any worries about how any given political institution manipulates the idea of dignity to achieve its ends, or how human pride might capitalize on the idea of dignity to facilitate self-deception about our personal moral failings, perhaps the idea of dignity is simply unnecessary. For example, consider the first sentence of Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights : “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. What would be lost, Rosen asks, “if one were just to say, ‘All human beings are born free and equal in rights’?” (2012a: 149). A slightly different version of this complaint is that, because of its vacuousness, dignity has become mere dogma. For example, in the legal context, Theoder Heuss, called dignity a “non-interpreted thesis” in law. And Costas Douzinas argued dignity was an empty placeholder in a “hegemonic battle” of competing legal ideologies (see also, McCrudden 2013a for some analysis of both; also, Bargaric & Allan 2006).

Dignity is ambiguous. The thrust of this frequent complaint is that dignity has become a useless concept, not so much because it is empty, but because it has too many meanings. (A few have even claimed that the concept is “essentially” ambiguous, though it is not clear what this is supposed to mean; see, e.g., Shultziner 2007 or Rotenstreich 1983.) When focused, this worry comes in three forms:

• the ambiguity of meaning makes “dignity” incomprehensible;
• the ambiguity of meaning makes “dignity” susceptible to abuse;
• the ambiguity of meaning conceals objectionable subjective opinion or substantive baggage in the concept of “dignity”.

Examples of all these positions can easily be found. But perhaps the best illustrations once again come from the legal context. Regarding (1) : see, e.g., Bates (2005), who acknowledges the problem but then tries to defend dignity. Regarding (2) : see, e.g., Gearty (2014) and Moyn (2013), who argue that the continuing ambiguity of dignity make it too easily abused in courtroom deliberation and democratic theories of rights. Regarding (3) : see Pinker (2008), who argues that dignity is a subjective phenomenon, “relative, fungible, and often harmful”; also Rosen (2012a) and Moyn (2013), both of whom argue that our modern concept labors under underappreciated debts to Christian theology;

These are not all the possible reasons for skepticism about dignity, only the most prevalent. And each is usually sharpened in various ways that make the argument cut deeper than what this summary suggests. This said, the merits of these critiques are disputable. Indeed, much of the foregoing analysis in this entry suggests strategies of response to each.

But perhaps the most fitting way to conclude is with a different kind of question entirely. Namely, how ought we respond to such skeptical attacks, if at all? Thus, it is hard not to think of Frederick Douglass’s warning, delivered in his 1852 “Fourth of July” speech, about the dangers of demanding of anyone, that they argue for their equal and basic human worth or status—especially when so many people remain not simply oppressed, but exposed to vitriolic hate in a world that constantly proclaims its faith and commitment in the ideal of human dignity. “At a time like this”, Douglass said, “scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed” (1852: 20).

• Addis, Adeno, 2013, “The Role of Human Dignity in a World of Plural Values and Ethical Commitments”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights , 31(4): 403–444. doi:10.1177/016934411303100403
• Ammicht-Quinn, Regina, Maureen Junker-Kenny, and Elsa Tamez (eds), 2003, The Discourse of Human Dignity , (Concilium 2003/2), London: SCM Press.
• Annas, George J., 2004, “American Bioethics and Human Rights: The End of All Our Exploring”, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , 32(4): 658–663. doi:10.1111/j.1748-720X.2004.tb01970.x
• Appiah, Anthony, 2010, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen , New York: W.W. Norton.
• Bagaric, Mirko and James Allan, 2006, “The Vacuous Concept of Dignity”, Journal of Human Rights , 5(2): 257–270. doi:10.1080/14754830600653603
• Barak, Aharon, 2015, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right , Daniel Kayros (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316106327
• Bates, Justin, 2005, “Human Dignity — An Empty Phrase in Search of Meaning?”, Judicial Review , 10(2): 165–168. doi:10.1080/10854681.2005.11426430
• Bayer, Oswald, 2014, “Martin Luther’s Conception of Human Dignity,” in Düwell et. al. 2014: 101–107.
• Beattie, Tina, 2013, “The Vanishing Absolute and the Deconsecrated God: A Theological Reflection on Revelation, Law, and Human Dignity”, in McCrudden 2013b: 259–274 (ch. 14).
• Beiser, Frederick C., 1992, “Kant’s Intellectual Development: 1746–1781”, in The Cambridge Companion to Kant , Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 26–61. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521365872.002
• Beitz, Charles R., 2013, “Human Dignity in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing But a Phrase?: Human Dignity in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing But a Phrase?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 41(3): 259–290. doi:10.1111/papa.12017
• Bekoff, Marc, 1998, “Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals”, BioScience , 48(8): 638–641. doi:10.2307/1313423
• Bird, Colin, 2013, “Dignity as a Moral Concept”, Social Philosophy and Policy , 30(1-2): 150–176.
• –––, 2021, Human Dignity and Political Criticism , Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108937597
• Birnbacher, Dieter, 2005, “Human Cloning and Human Dignity”, Reproductive BioMedicine Online , 10(sup 1): 50–55. doi:10.1016/S1472-6483(10)62206-7
• Bostrom, Nick, 2005, “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity”, Bioethics , 19(3): 202–214. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00437.x
• –––, 2008, “Dignity and Enhancement”, in President’s Council on Bioethics 2008: 173–206 (ch. 8). [ Bostrom 2008 available online ]
• Boxill, Bernard, 2017, “Sympathy and Dignity in Early Africana Philosophy”, in Debes 2017a: 333–359 (ch. 11).
• Braarvig, Jens, 2014a, “Buddhism: Inner Dignity and Absolute Altruism”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 170–176 (ch. 16). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.020
• –––, 2014b, “Hinduism: The Universal Self in a Class Society”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 163–169 (ch. 15). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.019
• Brady, Veronica, 2007, “The Question of Dignity: Doubts and Loves and a Whisper from Where the Ruined House Once Stood”, in Malpas and Lickiss 2007b: 119–126. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_10
• Buchanan, Allen E., 2009, “Moral Status and Human Enhancement”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 37(4): 346–381. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01166.x
• –––, 2011, Beyond Humanity? The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement , (Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587810.001.0001
• Burns, Lawrence, 2008, “What Is the Scope for the Interpretation of Dignity in Research Involving Human Subjects?”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy , 11(2): 191–208. doi:10.1007/s11019-007-9107-x
• Burrow, Rufus, Jr., 2006, God and Human Dignity: The Personalism, Theology, and Ethics of Martin Luther King, Jr. , Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [TCPS], 2014, “Tri-Council Policy Statement 2: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans”. [ TCPS 2014 available online ]
• Cancik, Hubert, 2002, “‘Dignity of Man’ and ‘ Persona ’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De Officiis I, 105–107”, in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (eds), The Hauge: Kluwer Law International, 19–39. doi:0.1163/9789004478190_003
• Carozza, Paolo, 2008, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply”, European Journal of International Law , 19(5): 931–944. doi:10.1093/ejil/chn059
• –––, 2013, “Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human Experience”, in McCrudden 2013: 615–630 (ch. 37).
• Caulfield, Timothy and Roger Brownsword, 2006, “Human Dignity: A Guide to Policy Making in the Biotechnology Era?”, Nature Reviews Genetics , 7(1): 72–76. doi:10.1038/nrg1744
• Clark, Gillian and Tessa Rajak (eds), 2002, Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198299905.001.0001
• Copenhaver, Brian, 2017, “Dignity, Vile Bodies, and Nakedness: Giovanni Pivo and Giannozzo Manetti”, in Debes 2017a: 127–173 (ch. 5).
• Dalton, James S., 1999, “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Ecology: Christian, Buddhist, and Native American Perspectives”, in Made in God’s Image: The Catholic Vision of Human Dignity , Regis Duffy and Angelus Gambatese (eds), New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 29–54.
• Dan-Cohen, Meir, 2012, “Introduction”, in Waldron 2012: 3–13.
• Darwall, Stephen L., 1977, “Two Kinds of Respect”, Ethics , 88(1): 36–49. doi:10.1086/292054
• –––, 1999, “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 28(2): 139–164. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.1999.00139.x
• –––, 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2012, “Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 50(2): 213–238. doi:10.1353/hph.2012.0024
• –––, 2013, “Respect as Honor and as Accountability”, in his Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11–29. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662609.003.0002
• –––, 2017, “Equal Dignity and Rights”, in Debes 2017a: 181–201 (ch. 6).
• De Melo-Martín, Inmaculada, 2008, “Chimeras and Human Dignity”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal , 18(4): 331–346. doi:10.1353/ken.0.0268
• –––, 2010, “Human Dignity, Transhuman Dignity, and All That Jazz”, The American Journal of Bioethics , 10(7): 53–55. doi:10.1080/15265161003686530
• Debes, Remy, 2009, “Dignity’s Gauntlet”, Philosophical Perspectives , 23: 45–78. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00161.x
• –––, 2012, “Adam Smith on Dignity and Equality”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy , 20(1): 109–140. doi:10.1080/09608788.2011.651315
• ––– (ed.), 2017a, Dignity: A History , (Oxford Philosophical Concepts), New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385997.001.0001
• –––, Debes, Remy, 2017b, “Introduction”, in Debes 2017a: 1–19. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385997.003.0001
• –––, 2017c, “Human Dignity Before Kant: Denis Diderot’s Passionate Person”, in Debes 2017a: 203–235 (ch. 7).
• –––, 2017d, “The Authority of Empathy (Or, How to Ground Sentimentalism)”, in Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives , Remy Debes and Karsten Stueber (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 153–170 (ch. 9). doi:10.1017/9781316105672.010
• –––, 2021, “Respect: A History”, in Respect: Philosophical Essays , Richard Dean and Oliver Sensen (eds), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1–28.
• DeGrazia, David, 2007, “Human-Animal Chimeras: Human Dignity, Moral Status, and Species Prejudice”, Metaphilosophy , 38(2–3): 309–329. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2007.00476.x
• Dillon, Robin S., 1992, “Respect And Care: Toward Moral Integration 1”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 22(1): 105–131. doi:10.1080/00455091.1992.10717273
• Dimock, Wai Chee, 2012, “High and Low”, in Waldron 2012: 119–128. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915439.003.0006
• Donnelly, Jack, 1982, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights”, American Political Science Review , 76(2): 303–316. doi:10.2307/1961111
• Douglas, Thomas, 2013, “Human Enhancement and Supra-Personal Moral Status”, Philosophical Studies , 162(3): 473–497. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9778-2
• Douglass, Frederick, 1852, Oration: Delivered in Corinthian Hall, Rochester , Rochester, NY: Lee, Mann, & Co.
• Duncan, Craig, 2005, “Democratic Liberalism: The Politics of Dignity”, in Libertarianism: For and Against , Craig Duncan and Tibor Machan (eds), Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 79–126.
• Dürig, Günter, 1952, “Die Menschenauffassung des Grundgesetzes”, Juristische Rundschau , 1952(7): 259–263. doi:10.1515/juru.1952.1952.7.259
• Dussel, Enrique, 2003, “Dignity: Its Denial and Recognition on a Specific Context of Liberation”, in The Discourse of Human Dignity , Regina Ammicht-Quinn, Maureeen Junker-Kenny and Elsa Tamez (eds.), London: SCM Press, 93–104.
• Düwell, Marcus, 2014, “Human Dignity: Concepts, Discussions, Philosophical Perspectives”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 23–49. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.004
• Düwell, Marcus, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, Dietmar Mieth, Naomi van Steenbergen, and Dascha Düring (eds), 2014, The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033
• Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Eberle, Edward J., 2002, Dignity and Liberty: Constitutional Visions in the Germany and the United States , Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
• Edel, Abraham, 1969, “Humanist Ethics and the Meaning of Human Dignity”, in Moral Problems in Contemporary Society: Essays in Humanistic Ethics , Paul Kurtz (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 227–240.
• Englard, Izhak, 2000, “Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional Framework,” Cardozo Law Review . 21: 1903–1927.
• Egonsson, Dan, 1998, Dimensions of Dignity: The Moral Importance of Being Human , Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-4974-7
• Etinson, Adam, 2020, “What’s So Special About Human Dignity?”, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 48(4): 353–381. doi:10.1111/papa.12175
• Fanon, Frantz, 1967, Black Skin: White Mask , Charles Markmann (trans.), New York, Grove Weidenfeld.
• ––– , 1963 [2004], The Wretched of the Earth , Richard Philcox (trans.), New York: Grove Press.
• Feinberg, Joel, 1970 [1980], “The Nature and Value of Rights”, The Journal of Value Inquiry , 4(4): 243–260. Reprinted in his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty , Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1980, 143–159. doi:10.1007/BF00137935
• FitzPatrick, William J., 2013, “Worth/Dignity”, in International Encyclopedia of Ethics , Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 5546–5553. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee205
• Fleischacker, Samuel, 2019, Being Me Being You: Adam Smith and Empathy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Forst, Rainer, 2011, “The Ground of Critique: On the Concept of Human Dignity in Social Orders of Justification”, Philosophy and Social Criticism , 37(9): 965–976. doi:10.1177/0191453711416082
• Frick, Marie-Luisa, 2021, “Dehumanization and Human Rights”, in The Routledge Hadbook of Dehumanization , Maria Fronfeldner (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 187–200.
• Friedman, Marilyn, 2013, “Care Ethics”, in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Ethics , Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 705–713. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee057
• Gaylin, Willard, 1984, “In Defense of the Dignity of the Human Being”, The Hastings Center Report , 14(4): 18–22. doi:10.2307/3561161
• Gearty, Conor, 2014, “The State of Human Rights”, Global Policy , 5(4): 391–400. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12159
• Gewirth, Alan, 1992, “Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights”, in Meyer and Parent 1992: 10–28.
• Gooding-Williams, Robert, 2018, “The Du Bois–Washington Debate and the Idea of Dignity”, in To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King Jr. , Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry (eds), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 19–34. doi:10.4159/9780674919860-002
• Goos, Christoph, “ Würde des Menschen : Restoring Human Dignity in Post-Nazi Germany”, in McCrudden 2013b: 79–94 (ch. 3).
• Gotesky, Rubin, and Ervin Laszlo (eds), 1970, Human Dignity: This Century and the Next , New York: Gordon and Breach.
• Gross, Myra, 1993, “Dignity: The Keystone of Alzheimer’s Care”, Nursing Homes: Long Term Care Management , 42(7): 8.
• Griffin, James, 2008, On Human Rights , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238781.001.0001
• Griffin, Miriam, 2017, “Dignity in Roman and Stoic Thought”, in Debes 2017a: 47–65 (ch. 2).
• Gruen, Lori, 2003 [2010], “The Moral Status of Animals”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 edition), in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/moral-animal/ >.
• Hanley, Ryan Patrick, 2017, “Rethinking Kant’s Debts to Rousseau”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 99(4): 380–404. doi:10.1515/agph-2017-0019
• Hanvey, James, 2013, “Dignity, Person, and Imago Trinitatis ”, in McCrudden 2013b: 209–228 (ch. 11).
• Harris, George W., 1997, Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character , Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Haslam, Nick, 2014, “What Is Dehumanization?”, in Humanness and Dehumanization , Paul G. Bain, Jeroen Vaes, and Jacques-Philippe Leyens (eds), New York and Hove: Psychology Press, 34–48 (ch. 3).
• Healy, Mike and Wilkowska, Iwona, 2017, “Marx, Alientation and the Denial of Dignity of Work”, in Dignity and the Organization , Monika Kostera and Michael Pirson (eds.), London: Palgrame MacMillan UK: 99–124.
• Held, Virginia, 2006, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global , New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195180992.001.0001
• Henkin, Louis, 1992, “Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights”, in Meyer and Parent 1992: 39–42.
• Henderson, Christine Dunn, 2017, “On Bourgeois Dignity: Making the Self-Made Man”, in Debes 2017a: 269–290 (ch. 9).
• Herzog, Don, 2012, “Aristocratic Dignity?”, in Waldron 2012: 99–117. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915439.003.0005
• Hill, Thomas E., Jr, 1992, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, Leviathan , London: Crooke.
• Hollenbach, David, 2013, “Human Dignity: Experience and History, Practical Reason and Faith”, in McCrudden 2013b: 123–139 (ch. 6).
• –––, 2015, “Human Dignity in Catholic Thought”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 250–259. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.031
• Honneth, Axel, 2007, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Howard, Rhoda E., 1992, “Dignity, Community, and Human Rights”, in Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspective; A Request for Consensus , Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naʿim (ed.), Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 81–104.
• Howard, Rhoda E. and Jack Donnelly, 1986, “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes”, American Political Science Review , 80(3): 801–817. doi:10.2307/1960539
• Iglesias, Teresa, 2001, “Bedrock Truth and the Dignity of the Individual”, Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture , 4(1): 114–134. doi:10.1353/log.2001.0005
• Ikeda, Takashi, 2014, “Commentary: On Crossing the Line between Human and Nonhuman: Human Dignity Reconsidered”, in The Future of Bioethics: International Dialogues , Akira Akabayashi (ed.), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 371–376. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682676.003.0047
• Imbach, Ruedi, 2014, “Human Dignity in the Middle Ages (Twelfth to Fourteenth Century)”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 64–73. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.007
• Jaber, Dunja, 2000, “Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , 13(1–2): 29–42. doi:10.1007/BF02694133
• James, David, 2013, Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence and Necessity , New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139795388
• Jenson, Robert W., 2006, “ Anima Ecclesiastica ”, in Soulen and Woodhead 2006: 59–71.
• Jha, Alok, 2008, “First British Human-animal Hybrid Embryos Created by Scientists”, The Guardian , 2 April 2008. [ Jha 2008 available online ]
• Johnson, Samuel, 1755, “Dignity”, in A Dictionary of the English Language , London. Reprinted in A Dictionary of the English Language: A Digital Edition of the 1755 Classic by Samuel Johnson , Brandi Besalke (ed.), 2012. [ Johnson 1755 available online ]
• Johnston, Josephine and Christopher Eliot, 2003, “Chimeras and ‘Human Dignity’”, The American Journal of Bioethics , 3(3): 6–8. doi:10.1162/15265160360706714
• Jotterand, Fabrice, 2010, “Human Dignity and Transhumanism: Do Anthro-Technological Devices Have Moral Status?”, The American Journal of Bioethics , 10(7): 45–52. doi:10.1080/15265161003728795
• Kain, Patrick, 2009, “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 47(1): 59–101. doi:10.1353/hph.0.0083
• Kaplan, Marion A., 1999, Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany . New York: Oxford University Press.
• Kant, Immanuel, 1785 [1996], Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch. Translated as “Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals (1785)”, in Practical Philosophy , Mary J. Gregor (ed.), (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 37–108. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.007
• Kateb, George, 2011, Human Dignity , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
• Kaufmann, Paulus, Hannes Kuch, Christian Neuhäuser, and Elaine Webster (eds), 2011, Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated , (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy 24), Dordrecht/New York: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9661-6
• Kemmerer, Alexandra, 2013, “Dignified Disciplinarity: Towards a Transdisciplinary Understanding of Human Dignity”, in McCrudden 2013b: 649–658 (ch. 39).
• Kent, Bonnie, 2017, “In the Image of God: Human Dignity after the Fall”, in Debes 2017a: 73–97 (ch. 3).
• Killmister, Suzy, 2016, “Dignity, Torture, and Human Rights”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 19(5): 1087–1101. doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9725-6
• –––, 2017, “Dignity: Personal, Social, Human”, Philosophical Studies , 174(8): 2063–2082. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0788-y
• –––, 2020, Contours of Dignity , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198844365.001.0001
• Kilner, John F., 2004, “Human Dignity”, in Encyclopedia of Bioethics , Stephen G. Post (ed.), third edition, New York: Macmillan Reference USA, volume 2, 1193–1200.
• King, Martin Luther, 1963 [2011], “The Unresolved Race Question”, Speech, District 65 Thirtieth-Anniversary Convention, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 23 October 1963. Reprinted in “All Labor Has Dignity” , Michael K. Honey (ed.), Boston: Beacon Press, 87–98.
• –––, 1963 [1986], “Letter from Birmingham City Jail”, in A Testamnet of Hope: The Essential Writing and Speechs of Martin Luther King , James Melvin Washington (ed.), New York: Harper One, 289–302.
• Kittay, Eva Feder, 2003, “Disability, Equal Dignity and Care”, in Ammicht-Quinn, Junker-Kenny, and Tamez 2003: 105–115.
• –––, 2005, “At the Margins of Moral Personhood”, Ethics (Symposium on Disability), 116(1): 100–131. doi:10.1086/454366
• –––, 2011, “The Ethics of Care, Dependence, and Disability”, Ratio Juris , 24(1): 49–58. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9337.2010.00473.x
• Kofman, Sarah, 1982 [1997], “The Economy of Respect: Kant and Respect for Women”, Nicola Fisher (trans.), Social Research , 49(2): 383–404 (an extract from her Le Respect des femmes (Kant et Rousseau) , Paris: Galilée, 1982). Reprinted in Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant , Robin May Schott (ed.), University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1997, pp. 355–372.
• Kolnai, Aurel, 1976, “Dignity”, Philosophy , 51(197): 251–271. doi:10.1017/S003181910001932X
• Korsgaard, Christine M., 1986, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity”, Kant-Studien , 77(1–4): 183–202. doi:10.1515/kant.1986.77.1-4.183
• Kraynak, Robert P. and Glenn E. Tinder (eds), 2003, In Defense of Human Dignity: Essays for Our Times , (Loyola Topics in Political Philosophy), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Krishnamurthy, Meena, 2022, “Martin Luther King Jr. on Democratic Propaganda, Shame, and Moral Transformation”, Political Theory , 50(2): 305–336. doi:10.1177/00905917211021796
• Kuhse, Helga, 2000, “Is There a Tension between Autonomy and Dignity?”, in Bioethics and Biolaw, Volume II: Four Ethical Principles , Peter Kemp, Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, and Niels Mattson Johansen (eds), Copenhagen: Rhodos International Science and Art Publishers, 61–74.
• LaFollette, Hugh and Niall Shanks, 1996, “The Origin of Speciesism”, Philosophy , 71(275): 41–61. doi:10.1017/S0031819100053250
• LaVaque-Manty, Mika, 2017, “Universalizing Dignity in the Nineteenth Century”, in Debes 2017a: 301–322 (ch. 10).
• Lebech, Mette, 2009, On the Problem of Human Dignity: A Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Investigation , Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
• Lee, Patrick and Robert P. George, 2008, “The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity”, Ratio Juris , 21(2): 173–193. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00386.x
• Lewis, Milton, 2007, “A Brief History of Human Dignity: Idea and Application”, in Malpas and Lickiss 2007b: 93–105. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_8
• Loewy, Erich H., 1999, “Physician Assisted Dying and Death with Dignity: Missed Opportunities and Prior Neglected Conditions”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy , 2(2): 189–194. doi:10.1023/A:1009997829750
• Loike, John, 2013, “The Evolving Bioethical Landscape of Human-Animal Chimeras”, in Human Dignity in Bioethics: From Worldviews to the Public Square , Stephen Dilley and Nathan J. Palpant (eds), New York/Abingdon: Routledge, 282–299.
• Lorberbaum, Yair, 2014, “Human Dignity in the Jewish Tradition”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 135–144. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.015
• Malpas, Jeff, 2007, “Human Dignity and Human Being,” in Malpas and Lickiss 2007b: 27–42.
• Malpas, Jeff, and Norelle Lickiss, 2007a, “Introduction to a Conversation”, in Malpas and Lickiss 2007b: 1–5. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_1
• ––– (eds), 2007b, Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation , Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0
• Luban, David, 2009, “Human Dignity, Humiliation, and Torture”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal , 19(3): 211–230. doi:10.1353/ken.0.0292
• Luo, An’xian, 2014, “Human Dignity in Traditional Chinese Confucianism”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 177–181 (ch. 17). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.021
• Macklin, Ruth, 2003, “Dignity Is a Useless Concept”, BMJ , 327(20–27): 1419–1420. doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7429.1419
• Mandeville, Bernard, 1714 [1988], The Fable of the Bees , 2 vols., London. Reference is to the reprint with introduction by F. B. Kaye, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press, 1988.
• Manning, Rita C., 2009, “A Care Approach”, in A Companion to Bioethics , Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 105–116. doi:10.1002/9781444307818.ch11
• McCrudden, Christopher, 2008, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights”, European Journal of International Law , 19(4): 655–724. doi:10.1093/ejil/chn043
• –––, 2013a, “In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates”, in McCrudden 2013b: 1–58 (ch. 1).
• ––– (ed.), 2013b, Understanding Human Dignity (Proceedings of the British Academy 192), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197265642.001.0001
• McMahan, Jeff, 2002, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life , (Oxford Ethics Series), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195079981.001.0001
• McNamee, M. J. and S. D. Edwards, 2006, “Transhumanism, Medical Technology and Slippery Slopes”, Journal of Medical Ethics , 32(9): 513–518. doi:10.1136/jme.2005.013789
• Metz, Thaddeus, 2010, “Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights”, Journal of Human Rights , 9(1): 81–99.
• Meulen, Ruud ter, 2010, “Dignity, Posthumanism, and the Community of Values”, The American Journal of Bioethics , 10(7): 69–70. doi:10.1080/15265161003728852
• Meyer, Michael J., 1987, “Kant’s Concept of Dignity and Modern Political Thought”, History of European Ideas , 8(3): 319–332. doi:10.1016/0191-6599(87)90005-2
• –––, 1989, “Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control”, Ethics , 99(3): 520–534. doi:10.1086/293095
• –––, 2001, “The Simple Dignity of Sentient Life: Speciesism and Human Dignity”, Journal of Social Philosophy , 32(2): 115–126. doi:10.1111/0047-2786.00083
• Meyer, Michael J. and William A. Parent (eds), 1992, The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• Midgley, Mary, 1984, Animals and Why They Matter , Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
• Mieth, Dietmar, 2014, “Human Dignity in Late-Medieval Spiritual and Political Conflicts”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 74–84. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.008
• Migiel, Marilyn, 1991, “The Dignity of Man: A Feminist Perspective”, in Refiguring Woman: Perspectives on Gender and the Italian Renaissance , Marilyn Migiel and Juliana Schiesari (eds), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 211–232.
• Mikkola, Mari, 2021, “Why Dehumanization is Distinct from Objectification”, in The Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization , Maria Kronfeldner (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 326–340.
• Miller, Sarah Clark, 2012, The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation , (Routledge Studies in Philosophy), New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203334393
• Morawa, Alexander H. E., 2003, “Vulnerability as a Concept of International Human Rights Law”, Journal of International Relations and Development , 6(2): 139–155.
• Morris, Bertram, 1946, “The Dignity of Man”, Ethics , 57(1): 57–64. doi:10.1086/290530
• Moyn, Samuel, 2013, “The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity”, in McCrudden 2013b: 95–112 (ch. 4).
• Muray, Leslie A., 2007, “Human Uniqueness vs. Human Distinctiveness: The ‘Imago Dei’ in the Kinship of all Creatures”, American Journal of Theology & Philosophy , 28(3): 299–310.
• Murdoch, Iris, 1970, The Sovereignty of the Good , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Neal, Mary, 2012, “‘Not Gods But Animals’: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood”, Liverpool Law Review , 33(3): 177–200. doi:10.1007/s10991-012-9124-6
• Neuhäuser, Christian, 2011, “Humiliation: The Collective Dimension”, in Kaufmann et al. 2011: 21–36. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9661-6_3
• Noddings, Nel, 1984, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education , Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Norcross, Alastair, 2004, “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases”, Philosophical Perspectives , 18: 229–245. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00027.x
• Nordenfelt, Lennart, 2003, “Dignity of the Elderly: An Introduction”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy , 6(2): 99–101. doi:10.1023/A:1024150526303
• –––, 2009, “The Concept of Dignity”, in Dignity in Care for Older People , Lennart Nordenfelt (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 26–53. doi:10.1002/9781444316414.ch2
• Novak, Michael, 1998, “The Judeo-Christian Foundation of Human Dignity, Personal Liberty, and the Concept of the Person”, Journal of Markets and Morality 1(2): 107–121.
• –––, 1999, “Human Dignity, Human Rights”, First Things , 97: 39–42.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., 1995, “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings”, in Nussbaum and Glover 1995: 61–104. doi:10.1093/0198289642.003.0003
• –––, 2000a, “The Future of Feminist Liberalism”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association , 74(2): 47–79. doi:10.2307/3219683
• –––, 2002b, “The Worth of Human Dignity: Two Tensions in Stoic Cosmopolitanism”, in Clark and Rajak 2002: 31–49.
• –––, 2004, “Beyond ‘Compassion and Humanity’: Justice for Nonhuman Animals”, in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions , Cass R. Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, 299–320.
• –––, 2006a, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
• –––, 2006b, “The Moral Status of Animals”, Chronicle of Higher Education , 3 February 2006. [ Nussbaum 2006b available online ]
• Nussbaum, Martha C. and Jonathan Glover (eds), 1995, Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities , (Wider Studies in Development Economics), Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198289642.001.0001
• Ober, Josiah, 2014, “Meritocratic and Civic Dignity in Greco-Roman Antiquity”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 53–63. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.006
• O’Mathúna, Dónal P, 2006, “Human Dignity in the Nazi Era: Implications for Contemporary Bioethics”, BMC Medical Ethics , 7(December): article 2. doi:10.1186/1472-6939-7-2
• –––, 2013, “Human Dignity and the Ethics of Human Enhancement”, Trans-Humanities Journal , 6(1): 99–120. doi:10.1353/trh.2013.0012
• O’Neill, Onora, 1998, “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature II”, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume , 72: 211–228.
• Parekh, Serena, 2008, Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity: A Phenomenology of Human Rights , New York: Routledge.
• Pharo, Lars Kirkhusmo, 2014, “The Concepts of Human Dignity in Moral Philosophies of Indigenous Peoples of the Americas”, in Düwell et al. 2014: 147–154 (ch. 13). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.017
• Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, 1486, Oratio de hominis dignitate (Oration on the dignity of man), C. Glenn Wallis, Paul J. W. Miller, and Douglas Carmichael (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1965.
• Pinker, Steven, 2008, “The Stupidity of Dignity”, The New Republic , 27 May 2008. [ Pinker 2008 available online ]
• Pluhar, Evelyn B., 1995, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals , Durham, NC: Duke University Press. doi:10.1215/9780822396048
• President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008, Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics , Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. [ President’s Council on Bioethics 2008 available online ]
• Pritchard, Michael S., 1972, “Human Dignity and Justice”, Ethics , 82(4): 299–313. doi:10.1086/291853
• Pufendorf, Samuel, 1672/1691 [2003], De officio hominis et civis ( The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature) , Andrew Tooke (trans.), 1735, Ian Hunter and David Saunders (eds), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 2003.
• Quinn, Philip, 2007, “On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons”, in Persons: Human and Divine , Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, 237–260.
• Rachels, James, 1990, Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Rolston, Holmes, 2008, “Human Uniqueness and Human Dignity: Persons in Nature and the Nature of Persons”, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics , Adam Schulman (ed.), President’s Council on Bioethics.
• Rosen, Michael, 2012a, Dignity: Its History and Meaning , Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2012b, “Dignity Past and Present”, in Waldron 2012: 79–97. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915439.003.0004
• –––, 2013, “Dignity: The Case Against”, in McCrudden 2013b: 143–154 (ch. 7).
• Rotenstreich, Nathan, 1983, Man and His Dignity . Magnes Press, Hebrew University.
• Saastamoinen, Kari, 2010, “Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem”, Journal of the History of Ideas , 71(1): 39–62. doi:10.1353/jhi.0.0065
• Sandler, Ronald and John Basl, 2010, “Transhumanism, Human Dignity, and Moral Status”, The American Journal of Bioethics , 10(7): 63–66. doi:10.1080/15265161003714019
• Sangiovanni, Andrea, 2017, Humanity Without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Schachter, Oscar, 1983, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept”, American Journal of International Law , 77(4): 848–854. doi:10.2307/2202536
• Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1840 [1965], Über das Fundament der Moral , Copenhagen. Translated as On the Basis of Morality , E. F. J. Payne (trans.), Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrrill, 1965.
• Schroeder, Doris, 2012, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Appeal to Separate the Conjoined Twins”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 15(3): 323–335. doi:10.1007/s10677-011-9326-3
• Schwöbel, Christopher, 2006, “Recovering Human Dignity”, in Soulen and Woodhead 2006: 44–58.
• Scott, Rebecca J., 2013, “Dignité/Dignidade: Organizing against Threats to Dignity in Societies after Slavery”, in McCrudden 2013b: 61–78 (ch. 2).
• Sensen, Oliver, 2011, “Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms”, European Journal of Political Theory , 10(1): 71–91. doi:10.1177/1474885110386006
• –––, 2017, “Dignity: Kant’s Revolutionary Conception,” in Debes 2017a: 237–262 (ch. 8).
• Shah, Mustafa, 2017, “Islamic Conceptions of Dignity: Historical Trajectories and Paradigms”, in Debes 2017a: 99–126 (ch. 4).
• Singer, Peter, 2009 “Speciesism and Moral Status”, Metaphilosophy , 40(3-4): 567–581. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01608.x
• Shultziner, Doron, 2007, “Human Dignity: Functions and Meanings”, in Malpas and Lickiss 2007b: 73–92. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_7
• Sophocles, c. 441 BCE [1951], Antigone , in The Loeb Classical Library: Sophocles Vol. 1 (LCL 21), F. Storr (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Soskice, Janet, 2013, “Human Dignity and the Image of God”, in McCrudden 2013b: 229–244 (ch. 12).
• Soulen, R. Kendall and Linda Woodhead (eds), 2006, God and Human Dignity , Grand Rapids, MI/Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing.
• Spelman, Elizabeth V., 1978, “On Treating Persons as Persons”, Ethics , 88(2): 150–161. doi:10.1086/292066
• Spiegelberg, Herbert, 1971, “Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy”, The Philosophy Forum , 9(1–2): 39–64. doi:10.1080/02604027.1971.9971711
• Statman, Daniel, 2000, “Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect”, Philosophical Psychology , 13(4): 523–540. doi:10.1080/09515080020007643
• Stern, A., 1975, “On Value and Human Dignity”, Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture , 1975(Spring): 74–90.
• Sulmasy, Daniel P., 2007, “Human Dignity and Human Worth”, in Malpas and Lickiss 2007b: 27–42. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_2
• Tadd, Win, Linus Vanlaere, and Chris Gastmans, 2010, “Clarifying the Concept of Human Dignity in the Care of the Elderly: A Dialogue between Empirical and Philosophical Approaches”, Ethical Perspectives , 17(2): 253–281. doi:10.2143/EP.17.2.2049266
• Tarling, Nicholas, 2007, “Dignity and Indignity”, in Malpas and Lickiss 2007b: 141–150. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6281-0_13
• Tasioulas, John, 2013, “Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights”, in McCrudden 2013: 191–312 (ch. 17).
• Toscano, Manuel, 2011, “Human Dignity as High Moral Status”, Les ateliers de l’éthique/The Ethics Forum , 6(2): 4–25. doi:10.7202/1008029ar
• Trinkaus, Charles Edward, 1970, In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought , 2 vols., London: Constable.
• [UN] United Nations, 1945, United Nations Charter . [ UN 1945 available online ]
• –––, 1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights . [ UN 1948 available online ]
• Valadier, Paul, 2003, “The Person who Lacks Dignity”, in Ammicht-Quinn, Junker-Kerry, and Tamez, 2003: 49–56.
• Valentini, Laura, 2017, “Dignity and Human Rights: A Reconceptualisation”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies , 37(4): 862–885. doi:10.1093/ojls/gqx011
• Van Assche, Kristof and Sigrid Sterckx, 2014, “The Protection of Human Dignity in Research Involving Human Body Material”, in Humanity across International Law and Biolaw , Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias, and Wouter G. Werner (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 265–287. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107257139.016
• Varga, Somogy, 2017, “Reflection taking refuge from history in morality: Marx, morality, and dignity”, in Debes 2017a: 291–300.
• Verbeek, Theo, 2014, “Rousseau and Human Dignity”, in Düwell et. al. 2014: 117–125. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511979033.013
• Waldron, Jeremy, 2012, Dignity, Rank, and Rights , Meir Dan-Cohen (ed.), (Berkeley Tanner Lectures), New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915439.001.0001
• Walzer, Michael, 1994, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad , Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Webster, Noah, 1806, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language, New Haven, CT: Sidney’s Press,[ Webster 1806 available online ].
• Weil, Simone, 1957 [1986], “La personne et le sacré”, written 1942/43, first published in Écrits de Londres et dernières lettres , Paris: Gallimard, 1957. Translated as “Human Personality”, in Simone Weil: An Anthology , Siân Miles (ed.), New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986.
• Weithman, Paul, 2008, “Two Arguments from Human Dignity”, in President’s Council on Bioethics 2008: 435–467 (ch. 17). [ Weithman 2008 available online ]
• Wolf, Susan, 1995, “Commentary on: Martha Nussbaum’s ‘Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings’”, in Nussbaum and Glover 1995: 105–115. doi:10.1093/0198289642.003.0004
• Wood, Allen W., 1999, Kant’s Ethical Thought , (Modern European Philosophy), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173254
• World Medical Association [WMA], 2013, “World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects”, 64th WMA General Assembly, Fortaleza, Brazil, October. [ WMA 2013 (Declaration of Helsinki) available online ]
• Zhuangzi [Chuang Tzu, late 4th century BCE], 1968, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu , Burton Watson (trans.), New York: Columbia University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Council of Europe, 1997, “ Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine ” (ETS No. 164), Oviedo.
• 1689, “ English Bill of Rights ”
• 1789, Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen .
• NHS Confederation, Local Government Association, Age UK, 2012, “ Delivering Dignity: Securing Dignity in Care for Older People in Hospitals and Care ”.
• The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
• UNESCO, 2005, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights , 19 October 2005, Paris.

animals, moral status of | cognitive disability and moral status | ethics, biomedical: chimeras, human/non-human | Kant, Immanuel: moral philosophy | moral status, grounds of | recognition | respect | rights: human

Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful to my anonymous referees, who provided careful, generous, and thorough feedback on initial drafts of this entry. For research assistance on various elements of this article I am grateful to Zachary Neemah, Samuel Munroe, Reese Faust, and Alejandro Toledo. The history section draws on my own introduction to Dignity: A History (2017a), by permission of Oxford University Press.

Copyright © 2023 by Remy Debes < rdebes @ memphis . edu >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

• Search Menu

Sign in through your institution

• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Emotions
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Acquisition
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Religion
• Music and Culture
• Music and Media
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Politics
• Law and Society
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Oncology
• Medical Toxicology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Medical Ethics
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Security
• Computer Games
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Cognitive Psychology
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Strategy
• Business History
• Business Ethics
• Business and Government
• Business and Technology
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic Systems
• Economic Methodology
• Economic History
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• Ethnic Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Theory
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Politics and Law
• Politics of Development
• Public Administration
• Public Policy
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous chapter
• Next chapter >

5 Understanding Human Dignity in Human Rights

• Published: November 2018
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

This chapter offers an interpretation of the idea of human dignity that explains how it can play certain valuable roles in human rights discourse. The idea contributes to the articulation of a distinctive set of norms that are universalist and humanist, the justification of specific human rights, the grounding of the great normative force of these rights, the combined generation of both negative and positive duties correlative to them, the explanation of the significance of political struggles against their violation, and the illumination of the arc of humanist justice running from basic requirements mandating people’s access to a decent life to maximal requirements to support people’s access to a flourishing life. The idea of human dignity is articulated through a conceptual network that includes an organic set of more specific ideas. These ideas include status-dignity, condition-dignity, dignitarian norms, the basis of dignity, the circumstances of dignity, and dignitarian virtue.

Signed in as

Institutional accounts.

• GoogleCrawler [DO NOT DELETE]
• Google Scholar Indexing

Personal account

• Sign in with email/username & password
• Get email alerts
• Save searches
• Purchase content
• Activate your purchase/trial code
• Add your ORCID iD

Institutional access

Sign in with a library card.

• Sign in with username/password
• Recommend to your librarian
• Institutional account management
• Get help with access

Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:

IP based access

Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.

Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.

• Click Sign in through your institution.
• Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
• When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
• Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.

If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.

Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.

Society Members

Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:

Sign in through society site

Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:

• Click Sign in through society site.
• When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.

If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.

Sign in using a personal account

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.

A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.

Viewing your signed in accounts

Click the account icon in the top right to:

• View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
• View the institutional accounts that are providing access.

Signed in but can't access content

Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.

For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.

Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Rights and permissions
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

• Putting ethics at the centre of everyday life.
• LIVING OUR ETHICS
• ANNUAL REPORTS
• Articles, podcasts, videos, research & courses tackling the issues that matter.
• WHAT IS ETHICS?
• Events and interactive experiences exploring ethics of being human.
• UPCOMING EVENTS
• PAST EVENTS
• PAST SPEAKERS
• FESTIVAL OF DANGEROUS IDEAS
• Counselling and bespoke consulting programs to help you make better decisions and navigate complexity.
• CONSULTING & LEADERSHIP
• Our work is only made possible because of you. Join us!
• BECOME A MEMBER
• SUPPORT OUR WORK
• THE ETHICS ALLIANCE
• BANKING + FINANCIAL SERVICES OATH
• RESIDENCY PROGRAM 2024
• YOUNG WRITERS’ COMPETITION
• YOUTH ADVISORY COUNCIL
• ENGAGE AN EXPERT
• MEDIA CENTRE
• HIRE OUR SPACE

Ethics Explainer: Dignity

Explainer politics + human rights relationships, by the ethics centre jethro lawrence 19 jan 2017, when we say someone or something has dignity, we mean they have worth beyond their usefulness and abilities. to possess dignity is to have absolute, intrinsic and unconditional value..

The concept of dignity became prominent in the work of  Immanuel Kant . He argued objects can be valuable in two different ways. They can have a price or dignity. If something has a price, it is valuable only because it is useful to us. By contrast, things with dignity are valued for their own sake. They can’t be used as tools for our own goals. Instead, we are required to show them respect. For Kant, dignity was what made something a person.

Dignity through the ages

Beliefs about where dignity comes from vary between different philosophical and religious systems. Christians believe humans have dignity because they’re made in the image of God. This is called  imago dei .  Kant believed humans possessed dignity because they’re rational. Others believe dignity is a way of recognising our common humanity. Some say it’s a social construct we created because it’s useful. Whatever its origin, the concept has become influential in political and ethical discourse today.

A question of human rights

Dignity is often seen as a central notion for human rights. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the “inherent dignity” of “all members of the human family”. By recognising dignity, the Declaration acknowledges ethical limits to the ways we can treat other people.

Kant captured these ethical limits in his idea of respect for persons. In every interaction with another person we are required to treat them as ends in themselves rather than tools to achieve our own goals. We fail to respect people when we treat them as tools for our own convenience or don’t give adequate attention to their needs and wishes.

When it comes to practical matters, it’s not always clear what ‘dignity and respect for persons’ require us to do. For example, in debates around  assisted dying  (also called assisted suicide or euthanasia) both sides use dignity to argue for opposing conclusions.

Advocates believe the best way to respect dignity is by sparing people from unnecessary or unbearable suffering , while opponents  believe dignity requires us never to intentionally kill someone. They claim dignity means a person’s value isn’t diminished by pain or suffering and we are ethically required to remind the patient of this, even if the patient disagrees.

Who makes the rules?

There are also disputes about exactly who is worthy of dignity. Should it be exclusive to humans or extended to animals? And do all animals possess intrinsic value and dignity or just specific species? If animals do have dignity, we’re required to treat them with same respect we afford our fellow human beings.

Ethics in your inbox.

Get the latest inspiration, intelligence, events & more.

• Everyday Ethics Monthly
• Professional Ethics Quarterly

By signing up you agree to our privacy policy

You might be interested in…

Opinion + Analysis Relationships

Who are you? Why identity matters to ethics

Explainer Relationships

Ethics Explainer: Perfection

Putting the ‘identity’ into identity politics.

Opinion + Analysis Politics + Human Rights, Relationships, Society + Culture

Film Review: If Beale Street Could Talk

BY The Ethics Centre

The ethics centre is a not-for-profit organisation developing innovative programs, services and experiences, designed to bring ethics to the centre of professional and personal life..

BY jethro lawrence

Dignity of the Human Person: What Does It Mean? 

Human dignity is discussed in a wide array of contexts. Most people recognize it as a critical part of justifying human rights and measuring what is just and moral. By nature of being human, all people are ensured certain rights that cannot be withheld based on characteristics that make them unique, such as gender, race, sexuality, and so on. Where did the concept of human dignity come from? Has it changed over the years?

Human dignity as a philosophical concept

The word “dignity” comes from the Latin word dignitas and the French dignite . In their original meaning, these words referenced a person’s merit and not their inherent value as a human person. “Dignity” was about social status, wealth, and power. To have dignity meant a person held a privileged position in society over others. The word “dignified” still has this connotation as you most likely picture a certain type of person when you hear the word. Does this mean the concept of human dignity as we recognize it today didn’t exist?

While the term “dignity” meant something different in the past, people have always been drawn to the concept of inherent human rights. In 539 B.C.E., Cyrus the Great of Persia established basic rights for the newly-conquered Babylon. He freed slaves, promoted racial equality, and allowed people to practice their own religions. The laws were recorded in cuneiform on a clay cylinder, which was unearthed in the late 19th-century. Experts consider “the Cyrus Cylinder” one of the earliest human rights documents in history.

The concept of “natural law” and “natural rights” can also be found in ancient Indian, Greek, and Roman philosophy. In most places, wealth and social status still entailed more privileges. While the idea of inherent rights was brewing, they were not respected equally based solely on shared humanity.

Human dignity in international law

Since people understood dignity to mean something specifically related to status, it does not appear in the US Constitution. It was also not used by British abolitionists working against slavery. It wasn’t until 1948 with the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the dignity of the human person entered international law. It can be found at the beginning of the preamble: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world…” (emphasis added). It appears another five times including in Article 1, which states, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) , this concept is emphasized in the line, “These rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”

There can be no doubt about what “dignity” means in this context. While the concept of natural laws, human rights, and human dignity did exist before the post-WWII era, it was not established as a legal concept. From this point on, human dignity represents the foundation of universal human rights. It’s also found in various constitutions around the world. In Germany, it is the most important principle and stated in the first paragraph of Article 1: “Human dignity is invoidable.” Dignity is also listed in the constitutions of South Africa and Switzerland .

Human dignity as a religious concept

Human dignity isn’t only a philosophical or legal concept. It’s also found within religious frameworks. Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism are four major examples, though all religions recognize the equality of humans. That equality is often not respected or emphasized in practice, but in terms of religious teachings, it is something the vast majority of religions have in common. In Catholic teachings, the church believes all humans have dignity because they are created in the likeness of God. Judaism and Islam teach a similar belief, while in Buddhism, a person’s dignity is derived from humanity’s shared “Buddha-nature.” This describes everyone’s potential for a state of wakening defined by wisdom and compassion .

Why does respecting human dignity matter?

As a philosophical, legal, and religious concept, why is human dignity important? It justifies universal human rights and dictates how people should be treated. While humans have seemed naturally drawn to the concept of human rights, they have just as naturally looked for reasons to exclude certain people. Traits like gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, and more have been used to discriminate and harm. Inherent rights stem from the concept of human dignity and establish that discrimination is immoral. Those that perpetuate discrimination and violate human rights can be held accountable. Respecting human dignity matters because it ensures a just, fairer world where everyone can flourish.

You may also like

15 Political Issues We Must Address

15 Trusted Charities Fighting for LGBTQ+ Rights

16 Inspiring Civil Rights Leaders You Should Know

15 Trusted Charities Fighting for Housing Rights

15 Examples of Gender Inequality in Everyday Life

11 Approaches to Alleviate World Hunger 

15 Facts About Malala Yousafzai

12 Ways Poverty Affects Society

15 Great Charities to Donate to in 2024

15 Quotes Exposing Injustice in Society

14 Trusted Charities Helping Civilians in Palestine

The Great Migration: History, Causes and Facts

About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

• Relationships

Why Dignity Matters

The Important Role Dignity Plays in Our Lives and Relationships

Posted August 7, 2011

When I tell people that I have written a book about dignity, the response is always the same: They pause for a moment and say "that is so important." When I ask them to tell me why they think it's important, the most common response is that "we all want that feeling of self-worth ." While it is true, my experience is that in spite of its universal appeal, it's a topic that rarely gets discussed. We may not have words to describe it, but we all have an internal experience of it.

We know how great it is to be seen, heard, and acknowledged for who we are and treated as if we mattered. Who doesn't enjoy the praise of being recognized for doing a good job or being honored for going beyond the call of duty? We also know what it feels like to be treated as inferior, discriminated against, ignored, misunderstood, criticized and excluded. There is little worse than being in a situation where you are treated unfairly and can do nothing about it, or being excluded from something that means a lot to you. We are all too well aware of the feelings that accompany these violations of our dignity. What is not common is to bring them up for discussion. It is often too embarrassing to admit that we have been treated so badly. It is why I decided to focus my attention on matters of dignity and to give us a language to bring these issues to the surface so that we can legitimize the suffering that accompanies these painful human experiences and do something about them. We don't have to just live with them. The dignity model has ways to address them.

Matters of dignity are at the heart of every interaction we have on a daily basis and the time has come for us to pay attention to them and to give them voice. They show up in the workplace, in schools, at home, in intimate relationships-everywhere human beings come into contact with one another. Although most of my career has been spent working on repairing relationships at the international level-between warring parties all over the world where dignity violations abound-I have been spending a lot of time recently in the corporate world where there is also no shortage of indignity. One of the major issues I have uncovered in the workplace is that employees often feel that they are not treated well, but have no way to "speak-up" for fear of retribution. They tell me it would be career suicide to go to their bosses and tell them that they have violated their dignity. The end result is that there is a lot of resentment on the part of employees and little desire to extend themselves beyond what their job requires. It is infuriating to them that they are being mistreated and that there is no way to give voice to it. Conflicts over dignity are an everyday experience but very few people feel skilled in handling them. They reach the core of our humanity-injuring that part of us that wants nothing more than to be valued and seen as significant.

This is why I have focused my attention on matters of dignity. The time has come to shed light on something that we may not have either the courage or language to discuss. The shame that accompanies being treated badly prevents us from doing the very thing we need to do to recover from violations of our dignity: bring them out into the open, validate them, and give them the attention they deserve. We wouldn't think twice about getting help when we have a physical injury. When we have a wound to our dignity-there is nowhere to go; no 911 call, no emergency room. Bringing the issue to light can help us all heal from the many subtle and not so subtle ways that indignity has found its way into our lives. Everyday I remind myself that "we can do better and we can do it with dignity."

Donna Hicks, Ph.D. , is the author of Dignity: The Essential Role It Plays in Resolving Conflict and an Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

• Find a Therapist
• Find a Treatment Center
• Find a Psychiatrist
• Find a Support Group
• Find Online Therapy
• United States
• Brooklyn, NY
• Chicago, IL
• Houston, TX
• Los Angeles, CA
• New York, NY
• Portland, OR
• San Diego, CA
• San Francisco, CA
• Seattle, WA
• Washington, DC
• Asperger's
• Bipolar Disorder
• Chronic Pain
• Eating Disorders
• Passive Aggression
• Personality
• Goal Setting
• Positive Psychology
• Stopping Smoking
• Low Sexual Desire
• Child Development
• Self Tests NEW
• Therapy Center
• Diagnosis Dictionary
• Types of Therapy

At any moment, someone’s aggravating behavior or our own bad luck can set us off on an emotional spiral that threatens to derail our entire day. Here’s how we can face our triggers with less reactivity so that we can get on with our lives.

• Emotional Intelligence
• Gaslighting
• Affective Forecasting
• Neuroscience

• Collected Philosophy

February 5th, 2018

A history of human dignity.

0 comments | 198 shares

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

Remy Debes on the tangled, contradictory origins of our concept of dignity

In Western society, the idea of human dignity is precious. Understood as something like the inherent or unearned worth that all humans share equally, human dignity is typically treated as the moral basis of human rights. For the same reason, it usually stands as a limit of reasonable disagreement—that is, as a limit to what we think we should tolerate in disagreements with others about the good, the right, or the just; rejecting the idea of human dignity is beyond the pale. Human dignity also calls us to action with distinctive urgency. We protest fiercely when we think human dignity under fundamental threat. We weep to hear news that it has been trampled, mocked, or violated. And we cringe whenever we think ourselves complicit in its injury, even indirectly, as would be true, say, if we learn that our soldiers have tortured their prisoners or that a political leader we voted for has racist sympathies. In short, to borrow a bit of lingo from John Rawls, human dignity is one of the clearest points of ‘overlapping consensus’ in Western culture today—and perhaps across all cultures.

But this cornerstone concept of Western morals is very recent—at least, as a concept recognizable by the term ‘dignity’. In fact, until about 1850 the English term ‘dignity’—as well as its Latin root, dignitas , and its French counterpart, dignité —did not have any currency as meaning the ‘inherent or unearned worth of humans’. Instead, throughout the modern era, ‘dignity’ connoted merit and a form of inequality; the sense of dignity we employ when we use ‘dignitary’, signifying social status of a kind associated with nobility, power, gentlemanly comportment, or preferment within the church.

‘Dignity’ appears nowhere in the US Declaration of Independence. Ditto for the US Constitution. During the French Revolution, no one was chanting, ‘Liberté, égalité… dignité!’. And the nineteenth-century English abolitionists who helped turn the tide against slavery in the West weren’t penning speeches or printing pamphlets decrying human bondage in the name of ‘dignity’—not, at any rate, as we understand the meaning of this term today. The first official use of the term in anything like the sense we tend to use it now didn’t appear in a major political declaration until the Mexican Constitution of 1917, and even then it didn’t clearly connote ‘inherent or unearned worth of humans’. This moralized meaning wasn’t codified until 1948, when the United Nations ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and used the term twice in the preamble of that declaration to justify it.

These facts thus set up a two-pronged question. On the one hand, just how did the moralized connotation of the term ‘dignity’ come into use? On the other hand, even if the term ‘dignity’ didn’t have a moralized connotation until c.1850 or later, isn’t it possible that the concept had an earlier historical life, under the guise of different terminology?

A few years ago, I set out to answer these questions. Working with a variety of scholars, I eventually compiled the first dedicated historical treatment . I won’t try to summarize all the contributions to this volume here, but I will highlight one curious surprise that the volume turns up.

There is one story about the origin of the idea of dignity that goes as follows: The German luminaire Immanuel Kant revolutionized the concept of dignity when, in 1785, he argued that his foundational moral principle, the ‘categorical imperative’, could be understood as follows:

So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.

Kant’s full argument for why we should never treat another human as a ‘mere means’ is complicated, but in part it turns on the claim that persons do not have a ‘price’. Instead, Kant argues, persons are ‘above all price’. He writes:

Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent has a Würde .

And so now, the crucial link: even in the earliest translations of these claims (around the end of the eighteenth century), Kant’s term Würde was translated as ‘dignity’. And so, voila! The origin of our moralized concept of dignity is at hand. Between Kant’s massive influence on German and Anglophone traditions, the term ‘dignity’ was forever bonded to its new, morally precious meaning.

Alas, no. As a history of our present-day concept of dignity, the foregoing is at best a just-so story . To be sure, Kant’s thoughts about human worth have influenced a wide range of late-twentieth-century and present-day moral and political philosophers. Indeed, no summary of the philosophy of human dignity would be complete without considering Kant’s influence. However, when it comes to the emergence of the concept of dignity and how that concept took life under the actual term ‘dignity’, the Kant-wellspring story doesn’t pan out.

Return to the eighteenth century and consider, to begin with, the decision by Kant’s earliest translators to use the term ‘dignity’ to translate Kant’s concept of Würde . Why did they do this? After all, the literal translation of Würde is ‘worth’. Well, in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the English term ‘worth’ was dominated by fungible, economic notions of value. However, as we saw, Kant explicitly contrasted ‘price’ to the Würde of persons. Thus, Kant seemed to be denying precisely any such fungible connotation to his use of Würde . Correspondingly, English translators needed a new term. They chose ‘dignity’. And so here is the crucial point: it seems unlikely this choice was blind. Instead, this choice suggests that the English connotation of ‘dignity’ already allowed some contrast from any kind of fungible or merit sense of value and which we might ascribe to persons. That is, it is more likely that the term suggested itself, so to speak, as a possible substitute for ‘worth’ in translating Würde .

Wait—didn’t I already say that before 1850 the term ‘dignity’ didn’t have any currency as meaning the ‘unearned worth of persons’? Yes. But this only means that before 1850 there was no such established usage. This is compatible with thinking there were some shifts in the meaning of the term before 1850, and, correspondingly, that there was already some conception of the ‘unearned worth of persons’. My present point, then, is that we find these shifts even before 1785, when Kant published his seminal moral work.

Some evidence for my suggestion can be gleaned from combing through the dictionaries of the day. For example, Samuel Johnson’s 1755 Dictionary suggests a drift in the concept of dignity, namely, towards a non- fungible sense of worth. Thus, consider Johnson’s first two definitions of ‘equality’:

1) Likeness to any qualities compared.

2) The same degree of dignity.

Given the range of egalitarian agitation across all elements of mid-eighteenth-century European culture, this is a remarkable definition. In the first place, to suggest that true equality means equal dignity is to challenge the then-dominant use of ‘dignity’ to indicate un equal measures of social distinction, such as existed between gentry and commoners. This impression is buttressed by the usage example Johnson selected for the second definition noted above, of ‘the same degree of dignity’:

One shall rise, Of proud ambition; who, not content with fair equality , fraternal slate, Will arrogate dominion undeserv’d, Over his brethren. (from Milton)

Or consider another of Johnson’s usage examples, this time for the first definition of ‘man’ as ‘human being’:

The king is but a man as I am. (from Shakespeare)

In a day where divine right and absolute sovereignty were live ideas, and dictionaries and encyclopaedias had become clandestine means for the expression of irreverent ideas, we definitely miss something if we dismiss Johnson’s usage choices as politically and philosophically unimportant. Instead, I suggest Johnson’s choices mark a deeper story about a general rethinking of human worth during the European enlightenment—a story that somehow explains, at least partly, how we got to the moralized sense of dignity common today.

Or consider this: As early as 1760, Kant himself noted that he was inspired by Rousseau on the question of human worth. ‘Rousseau set me right about this’, Kant wrote, adding that he learned from Rousseau, ‘to honour humanity’. To be fair, this debt is nowadays widely appreciated by Kant scholars. But there is also evidence of other pre-Kantian origins of the moralized concept of dignity. For example, in my own contribution to the anthology, I show that Denis Diderot , Rousseau’s compatriot, was working out his own notion of dignity. And in Stephen Darwall ’s contribution, he shows that before both these thinkers there was the seventeenth-century natural law thinker,  Samuel Pufendorf  who even used the term dignity, writing at one point :

There seems to him to be somewhat of Dignity ( dignatio ) in the appellation of Man: so that the last and most efficacious Argument to curb the Arrogance of insulting Men, is usually, I am not a Dog, but a Man as well as your self.

It is usually forgotten that Kant had little influence on British thought until at least 1830. And what influence he did have both before and after this point was variously circumscribed. In England, all early discussion of Kant (before 1800) took place outside the university, in the pages of popular literary journals. And while Kant enjoyed a brief flash of popularity in these journals at the very end of the eighteenth century, what was conveyed in them was greatly simplified, even trivialized. Moreover, there was little discussion of his ethics, with most attention given over to his theoretical, theological, and political views—the last mostly based on his essay ‘ Perpetual Peace ‘. In this last respect, Kant ended up seeming a radical with dangerous Jacobite leanings. By the close of the century, the English public had become rather suddenly conservative and nationalistic, with a growing suspicion of German Enlightenment thought and culture. In short, despite the brief fascination with Kant, by 1798 the influential Critical Review complained that  ‘The philosophy of Kant is little known in this country’.

After 1806, Kant’s name virtually disappeared from English periodicals for decades. And translations of Kant’s work, which had already been scarce, were not in demand. His practical philosophy was especially slow to find its way into English. In particular, the  Groundwork , where he made his famous claims about dignity, was not professionally translated into English until 1836, when J. W. Semple, a Scotsman, offered the first serious edition. And even this translation was not easily accessible until a revised edition appeared in 1869, ‘at a third of the original price’, by another Scotsman, Henry Calderwood. Indeed, what scholarly interest in Kant did exist in the first half of the nineteenth century was mostly contained to Scotland, where the balance of attention was still on his theoretical philosophy. Taken all together, then, whatever influence Kant had on Anglophone moral philosophy, let alone the Anglophone concept of respect in general, must have been slight before 1870, if not much later.

All told, clearly it is high time for a rethinking of how the West came to embrace its notion of human dignity, and to ask what it really means. Perhaps, like its history, we will discover there is still much to be said about what this most fundamental, shared ‘worth’ of human beings consists in.

This essay is based on Dignity: A History , edited by Remy Debes (Oxford University Press, 2017).

About the author

Remy Debes is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. His research interests include ethics, moral psychology, and the history of Enlightenment philosophy.

Does the Future Exist? January 22nd, 2018

Related posts.

Death, Fear, and Self-mourning

October 19th, 2015.

Are We Morally Equal by Nature?

February 15th, 2016.

Just Leisure?

August 28th, 2018.

What Does Hoarding Tell Us about Mental Health?

October 10th, 2016.

Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE [email protected]

45,000+ students realised their study abroad dream with us. Take the first step today

Here’s your new year gift, one app for all your, study abroad needs, start your journey, track your progress, grow with the community and so much more.

Verification Code

An OTP has been sent to your registered mobile no. Please verify

Thanks for your comment !

Our team will review it before it's shown to our readers.

Essay on Human Rights: Samples in 500 and 1500

• Updated on  
• Dec 9, 2023

Essay writing is an integral part of the school curriculum and various academic and competitive exams like IELTS , TOEFL , SAT , UPSC , etc. It is designed to test your command of the English language and how well you can gather your thoughts and present them in a structure with a flow. To master your ability to write an essay, you must read as much as possible and practise on any given topic. This blog brings you a detailed guide on how to write an essay on Human Rights , with useful essay samples on Human rights.

This Blog Includes:

The basic human rights, 200 words essay on human rights, 500 words essay on human rights, 500+ words essay on human rights in india, 1500 words essay on human rights, importance of human rights, essay on human rights pdf.

Also Read: Essay on Labour Day

Also Read: 1-Minute Speech on Human Rights for Students

What are Human Rights

Human rights mark everyone as free and equal, irrespective of age, gender, caste, creed, religion and nationality. The United Nations adopted human rights in light of the atrocities people faced during the Second World War. On the 10th of December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Its adoption led to the recognition of human rights as the foundation for freedom, justice and peace for every individual. Although it’s not legally binding, most nations have incorporated these human rights into their constitutions and domestic legal frameworks. Human rights safeguard us from discrimination and guarantee that our most basic needs are protected.

Did you know that the 10th of December is celebrated as Human Rights Day ?

Before we move on to the essays on human rights, let’s check out the basics of what they are.

Also Read: What are Human Rights?

Also Read: 7 Impactful Human Rights Movies Everyone Must Watch!

Here is a 200-word short sample essay on basic Human Rights.

Human rights are a set of rights given to every human being regardless of their gender, caste, creed, religion, nation, location or economic status. These are said to be moral principles that illustrate certain standards of human behaviour. Protected by law , these rights are applicable everywhere and at any time. Basic human rights include the right to life, right to a fair trial, right to remedy by a competent tribunal, right to liberty and personal security, right to own property, right to education, right of peaceful assembly and association, right to marriage and family, right to nationality and freedom to change it, freedom of speech, freedom from discrimination, freedom from slavery, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of movement, right of opinion and information, right to adequate living standard and freedom from interference with privacy, family, home and correspondence.

Also Read: Law Courses

Check out this 500-word long essay on Human Rights.

Every person has dignity and value. One of the ways that we recognise the fundamental worth of every person is by acknowledging and respecting their human rights. Human rights are a set of principles concerned with equality and fairness. They recognise our freedom to make choices about our lives and develop our potential as human beings. They are about living a life free from fear, harassment or discrimination.

Human rights can broadly be defined as the basic rights that people worldwide have agreed are essential. These include the right to life, the right to a fair trial, freedom from torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to health, education and an adequate standard of living. These human rights are the same for all people everywhere – men and women, young and old, rich and poor, regardless of our background, where we live, what we think or believe. This basic property is what makes human rights’ universal’.

Human rights connect us all through a shared set of rights and responsibilities. People’s ability to enjoy their human rights depends on other people respecting those rights. This means that human rights involve responsibility and duties towards other people and the community. Individuals have a responsibility to ensure that they exercise their rights with consideration for the rights of others. For example, when someone uses their right to freedom of speech, they should do so without interfering with someone else’s right to privacy.

Governments have a particular responsibility to ensure that people can enjoy their rights. They must establish and maintain laws and services that enable people to enjoy a life in which their rights are respected and protected. For example, the right to education says that everyone is entitled to a good education. Therefore, governments must provide good quality education facilities and services to their people. If the government fails to respect or protect their basic human rights, people can take it into account.

Values of tolerance, equality and respect can help reduce friction within society. Putting human rights ideas into practice can help us create the kind of society we want to live in. There has been tremendous growth in how we think about and apply human rights ideas in recent decades. This growth has had many positive results – knowledge about human rights can empower individuals and offer solutions for specific problems.

Human rights are an important part of how people interact with others at all levels of society – in the family, the community, school, workplace, politics and international relations. Therefore, people everywhere must strive to understand what human rights are. When people better understand human rights, it is easier for them to promote justice and the well-being of society. 

Also Read: Important Articles in Indian Constitution

Here is a human rights essay focused on India.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. It has been rightly proclaimed in the American Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Created with certain unalienable rights….” Similarly, the Indian Constitution has ensured and enshrined Fundamental rights for all citizens irrespective of caste, creed, religion, colour, sex or nationality. These basic rights, commonly known as human rights, are recognised the world over as basic rights with which every individual is born.

In recognition of human rights, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was made on the 10th of December, 1948. This declaration is the basic instrument of human rights. Even though this declaration has no legal bindings and authority, it forms the basis of all laws on human rights. The necessity of formulating laws to protect human rights is now being felt all over the world. According to social thinkers, the issue of human rights became very important after World War II concluded. It is important for social stability both at the national and international levels. Wherever there is a breach of human rights, there is conflict at one level or the other.

Given the increasing importance of the subject, it becomes necessary that educational institutions recognise the subject of human rights as an independent discipline. The course contents and curriculum of the discipline of human rights may vary according to the nature and circumstances of a particular institution. Still, generally, it should include the rights of a child, rights of minorities, rights of the needy and the disabled, right to live, convention on women, trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation etc.

Since the formation of the United Nations , the promotion and protection of human rights have been its main focus. The United Nations has created a wide range of mechanisms for monitoring human rights violations. The conventional mechanisms include treaties and organisations, U.N. special reporters, representatives and experts and working groups. Asian countries like China argue in favour of collective rights. According to Chinese thinkers, European countries lay stress upon individual rights and values while Asian countries esteem collective rights and obligations to the family and society as a whole.

With the freedom movement the world over after World War II, the end of colonisation also ended the policy of apartheid and thereby the most aggressive violation of human rights. With the spread of education, women are asserting their rights. Women’s movements play an important role in spreading the message of human rights. They are fighting for their rights and supporting the struggle for human rights of other weaker and deprived sections like bonded labour, child labour, landless labour, unemployed persons, Dalits and elderly people.

Unfortunately, violation of human rights continues in most parts of the world. Ethnic cleansing and genocide can still be seen in several parts of the world. Large sections of the world population are deprived of the necessities of life i.e. food, shelter and security of life. Right to minimum basic needs viz. Work, health care, education and shelter are denied to them. These deprivations amount to the negation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Also Read: Human Rights Courses

Check out this detailed 1500-word essay on human rights.

The human right to live and exist, the right to equality, including equality before the law, non-discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, and equality of opportunity in matters of employment, the right to freedom of speech and expression, assembly, association, movement, residence, the right to practice any profession or occupation, the right against exploitation, prohibiting all forms of forced labour, child labour and trafficking in human beings, the right to freedom of conscience, practice and propagation of religion and the right to legal remedies for enforcement of the above are basic human rights. These rights and freedoms are the very foundations of democracy.

Obviously, in a democracy, the people enjoy the maximum number of freedoms and rights. Besides these are political rights, which include the right to contest an election and vote freely for a candidate of one’s choice. Human rights are a benchmark of a developed and civilised society. But rights cannot exist in a vacuum. They have their corresponding duties. Rights and duties are the two aspects of the same coin.

Liberty never means license. Rights presuppose the rule of law, where everyone in the society follows a code of conduct and behaviour for the good of all. It is the sense of duty and tolerance that gives meaning to rights. Rights have their basis in the ‘live and let live’ principle. For example, my right to speech and expression involves my duty to allow others to enjoy the same freedom of speech and expression. Rights and duties are inextricably interlinked and interdependent. A perfect balance is to be maintained between the two. Whenever there is an imbalance, there is chaos.

A sense of tolerance, propriety and adjustment is a must to enjoy rights and freedom. Human life sans basic freedom and rights is meaningless. Freedom is the most precious possession without which life would become intolerable, a mere abject and slavish existence. In this context, Milton’s famous and oft-quoted lines from his Paradise Lost come to mind: “To reign is worth ambition though in hell/Better to reign in hell, than serve in heaven.”

However, liberty cannot survive without its corresponding obligations and duties. An individual is a part of society in which he enjoys certain rights and freedom only because of the fulfilment of certain duties and obligations towards others. Thus, freedom is based on mutual respect’s rights. A fine balance must be maintained between the two, or there will be anarchy and bloodshed. Therefore, human rights can best be preserved and protected in a society steeped in morality, discipline and social order.

Violation of human rights is most common in totalitarian and despotic states. In the theocratic states, there is much persecution, and violation in the name of religion and the minorities suffer the most. Even in democracies, there is widespread violation and infringement of human rights and freedom. The women, children and the weaker sections of society are victims of these transgressions and violence.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ main concern is to protect and promote human rights and freedom in the world’s nations. In its various sessions held from time to time in Geneva, it adopts various measures to encourage worldwide observations of these basic human rights and freedom. It calls on its member states to furnish information regarding measures that comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights whenever there is a complaint of a violation of these rights. In addition, it reviews human rights situations in various countries and initiates remedial measures when required.

The U.N. Commission was much concerned and dismayed at the apartheid being practised in South Africa till recently. The Secretary-General then declared, “The United Nations cannot tolerate apartheid. It is a legalised system of racial discrimination, violating the most basic human rights in South Africa. It contradicts the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. That is why over the last forty years, my predecessors and I have urged the Government of South Africa to dismantle it.”

Now, although apartheid is no longer practised in that country, other forms of apartheid are being blatantly practised worldwide. For example, sex apartheid is most rampant. Women are subject to abuse and exploitation. They are not treated equally and get less pay than their male counterparts for the same jobs. In employment, promotions, possession of property etc., they are most discriminated against. Similarly, the rights of children are not observed properly. They are forced to work hard in very dangerous situations, sexually assaulted and exploited, sold and bonded for labour.

The Commission found that religious persecution, torture, summary executions without judicial trials, intolerance, slavery-like practices, kidnapping, political disappearance, etc., are being practised even in the so-called advanced countries and societies. The continued acts of extreme violence, terrorism and extremism in various parts of the world like Pakistan, India, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Somalia, Algeria, Lebanon, Chile, China, and Myanmar, etc., by the governments, terrorists, religious fundamentalists, and mafia outfits, etc., is a matter of grave concern for the entire human race.

Violation of freedom and rights by terrorist groups backed by states is one of the most difficult problems society faces. For example, Pakistan has been openly collaborating with various terrorist groups, indulging in extreme violence in India and other countries. In this regard the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva adopted a significant resolution, which was co-sponsored by India, focusing on gross violation of human rights perpetrated by state-backed terrorist groups.

The resolution expressed its solidarity with the victims of terrorism and proposed that a U.N. Fund for victims of terrorism be established soon. The Indian delegation recalled that according to the Vienna Declaration, terrorism is nothing but the destruction of human rights. It shows total disregard for the lives of innocent men, women and children. The delegation further argued that terrorism cannot be treated as a mere crime because it is systematic and widespread in its killing of civilians.

Violation of human rights, whether by states, terrorists, separatist groups, armed fundamentalists or extremists, is condemnable. Regardless of the motivation, such acts should be condemned categorically in all forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever they are committed, as acts of aggression aimed at destroying human rights, fundamental freedom and democracy. The Indian delegation also underlined concerns about the growing connection between terrorist groups and the consequent commission of serious crimes. These include rape, torture, arson, looting, murder, kidnappings, blasts, and extortion, etc.

Violation of human rights and freedom gives rise to alienation, dissatisfaction, frustration and acts of terrorism. Governments run by ambitious and self-seeking people often use repressive measures and find violence and terror an effective means of control. However, state terrorism, violence, and human freedom transgressions are very dangerous strategies. This has been the background of all revolutions in the world. Whenever there is systematic and widespread state persecution and violation of human rights, rebellion and revolution have taken place. The French, American, Russian and Chinese Revolutions are glowing examples of human history.

The first war of India’s Independence in 1857 resulted from long and systematic oppression of the Indian masses. The rapidly increasing discontent, frustration and alienation with British rule gave rise to strong national feelings and demand for political privileges and rights. Ultimately the Indian people, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, made the British leave India, setting the country free and independent.

Human rights and freedom ought to be preserved at all costs. Their curtailment degrades human life. The political needs of a country may reshape Human rights, but they should not be completely distorted. Tyranny, regimentation, etc., are inimical of humanity and should be resisted effectively and united. The sanctity of human values, freedom and rights must be preserved and protected. Human Rights Commissions should be established in all countries to take care of human freedom and rights. In cases of violation of human rights, affected individuals should be properly compensated, and it should be ensured that these do not take place in future.

These commissions can become effective instruments in percolating the sensitivity to human rights down to the lowest levels of governments and administrations. The formation of the National Human Rights Commission in October 1993 in India is commendable and should be followed by other countries.

Also Read: Law Courses in India

Human rights are of utmost importance to seek basic equality and human dignity. Human rights ensure that the basic needs of every human are met. They protect vulnerable groups from discrimination and abuse, allow people to stand up for themselves, and follow any religion without fear and give them the freedom to express their thoughts freely. In addition, they grant people access to basic education and equal work opportunities. Thus implementing these rights is crucial to ensure freedom, peace and safety.

Human Rights Day is annually celebrated on the 10th of December.

Human Rights Day is celebrated to commemorate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UNGA in 1948.

Some of the common Human Rights are the right to life and liberty, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom from slavery and torture and the right to work and education.

Popular Essay Topics

We hope our sample essays on Human Rights have given you some great ideas. For more information on such interesting blogs, visit our essay writing page and follow Leverage Edu .

Sonal is a creative, enthusiastic writer and editor who has worked extensively for the Study Abroad domain. She splits her time between shooting fun insta reels and learning new tools for content marketing. If she is missing from her desk, you can find her with a group of people cracking silly jokes or petting neighbourhood dogs.

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Contact no. *

Leaving already?

8 Universities with higher ROI than IITs and IIMs

Grab this one-time opportunity to download this ebook

Connect With Us

45,000+ students realised their study abroad dream with us. take the first step today..

Resend OTP in

Need help with?

Study abroad.

UK, Canada, US & More

IELTS, GRE, GMAT & More

Scholarship, Loans & Forex

Country Preference

New Zealand

Which English test are you planning to take?

Which academic test are you planning to take.

Not Sure yet

When are you planning to take the exam?

Already booked my exam slot

Within 2 Months

Want to learn about the test

Which Degree do you wish to pursue?

When do you want to start studying abroad.

September 2024

January 2025

What is your budget to study abroad?

How would you describe this article ?

Please rate this article

We would like to hear more.

Essay on Dignity Of Human Life

Students are often asked to write an essay on Dignity Of Human Life in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Dignity Of Human Life

Understanding dignity.

Dignity means to respect and value all people. It is the belief that every person is important and worthy. The dignity of human life is a fundamental principle. This means that we should always treat people with kindness and respect.

The Importance of Dignity

Dignity is very important in our lives. It helps us feel good about ourselves. When we treat others with dignity, we show them that they are important. This can make them feel good and improve their lives.

Dignity and Human Rights

Dignity is also linked to human rights. Human rights are the basic rights that every person should have. They include the right to be treated with respect and dignity.

Upholding Dignity

To uphold the dignity of human life, we must treat all people with respect. This includes being kind, fair, and understanding. We should also stand up for people’s rights. This can help to create a world where everyone is treated with dignity.

In conclusion, the dignity of human life is very important. It helps to make the world a better place. We should always strive to treat others with respect and uphold their dignity.

250 Words Essay on Dignity Of Human Life

Understanding human dignity.

Human dignity is a term that means the respect and worth or value that a person has. This is something that we all have, no matter our age, race, or where we come from. It is not something that can be taken away from us. It is a basic right that every person should have.

The Importance of Human Dignity

Human dignity is important because it makes sure that every person is treated fairly and equally. It means that no one should be treated badly or looked down upon because of who they are or where they come from. It helps to make sure that everyone has the same chances in life, no matter their circumstances.

Respecting Human Dignity

To respect human dignity, we need to treat others the way we would like to be treated. This means being kind and understanding, and not judging others based on their appearance or background. We should listen to others and value their opinions, even if they are different from our own.

In conclusion, human dignity is a fundamental right that everyone should have. It ensures that everyone is treated equally and with respect. By understanding and respecting human dignity, we can help to create a world where everyone is treated fairly and has the same opportunities in life.

500 Words Essay on Dignity Of Human Life

What is the dignity of human life.

The dignity of human life means that every person deserves respect and should be treated with value. It’s a belief that all people, no matter who they are or where they come from, have worth. This principle is at the heart of many of our most important rules and laws. It guides us to treat each other kindly, fairly, and with understanding.

Why is Dignity Important?

Dignity is important because it helps us to feel valued and respected. When we treat each other with dignity, we show that we care about each other’s feelings and well-being. It helps us to build strong relationships and communities. It also encourages us to stand up for our rights and the rights of others. When we see that our dignity is being violated, we can speak up and take action to protect it.

How Can We Show Dignity?

There are many ways to show dignity. One of the simplest ways is to listen to others. When we listen, we show that we value what others have to say. We can also show dignity by being polite and respectful in our words and actions. This includes treating others fairly, not judging or criticizing them, and not making fun of them. We can also show dignity by helping others, especially those who are less fortunate than us.

What Happens When Dignity is Not Respected?

When dignity is not respected, it can lead to feelings of sadness, anger, and even fear. It can make people feel like they are not important or valued. This can damage their self-esteem and make it hard for them to trust others. It can also lead to conflicts and fights. In extreme cases, it can even lead to violence and harm.

How Can We Protect Dignity?

We can protect dignity by standing up for our rights and the rights of others. This means speaking up when we see someone being treated unfairly or disrespectfully. It also means helping those who are less fortunate than us. We can also protect dignity by teaching others about its importance. This can be done through education, discussions, and by setting a good example in our own behavior.

In conclusion, the dignity of human life is a fundamental principle that guides us in how we should treat each other. It is important for our well-being and for the well-being of our communities. By respecting and protecting dignity, we can create a world where everyone is treated with kindness, fairness, and understanding.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

• Essay on Dignity And Respect
• Essay on Digitization And Its Benefits
• Essay on Digitalization Impact

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Brill | Nijhoff

Brill | Wageningen Academic

Brill Germany / Austria

Böhlau

Brill | Fink

Brill | mentis

Brill | Schöningh

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

V&R unipress

Open Access

Open Access for Authors

Transformative Agreements

Open Access and Research Funding

Open Access for Librarians

Open Access for Academic Societies

Discover Brill’s Open Access Content

Organization

Stay updated

Corporate Social Responsiblity

Investor Relations

Policies, rights & permissions

Review a Brill Book

Author Portal

How to publish with Brill: Files & Guides

Fonts, Scripts and Unicode

Publication Ethics & COPE Compliance

Data Sharing Policy

Brill MyBook

Ordering from Brill

Author Newsletter

Piracy Reporting Form

Sales Managers and Sales Contacts

Ordering From Brill

Titles No Longer Published by Brill

Catalogs, Flyers and Price Lists

E-Book Collections Title Lists and MARC Records

How to Manage your Online Holdings

LibLynx Access Management

Discovery Services

KBART Files

MARC Records

Online User and Order Help

Rights and Permissions

Latest Key Figures

Latest Financial Press Releases and Reports

Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

Share Information

Specialty Products

Press and Reviews

Share link with colleague or librarian

Stay informed about this journal!

• Get New Issue Alerts
• Get Advance Article alerts
• Get Citation Alerts

Human Dignity in an Ethical Sense: Basic Considerations

The idea of human dignity is an ancient one. It has been the object of reflection with different approaches, during the various periods in the history of philosophical, theological, and ethical thought. This essay focuses on the most relevant approaches to the idea of human dignity in this cultural evolution, proposing a look at the ontological paradigm and its limits, the ethical paradigm and its values, and the theological paradigm and its resources. An anthropological reading concludes this essay, bringing out the relational value of the idea of human dignity. Based on this particular focus, the idea of human dignity assumes a form of critical thinking that makes us sensitive to the real inequalities between human beings and opens the possibility of ethical and political practices of recognition and emancipation.

• 1 Introductory Considerations

No other concept has had so much resonance in the history of ethical thought than that of the dignity of the person. Defining the concept, however, has caused acrimonious scholarly debates in various areas of moral reflection. 1

In the context of the themes that emerge in the field of bioethics, human dignity and its definition are foundational, both for the issues surrounding clinical ethics and also the field of biomedical research. To cite one example among many, we may consider the recent document of the Deutscher Ethikrat of 9 May 2019, concerning interventions on the human germ line. In this document, among the standards for ethical evaluation there is a list of eight factors, the first of which is human dignity ( Menschenwürde ). It is recognized that human dignity requires a priority of consideration, even before freedom, responsibility, solidarity, and other factors. Indeed, it can be said that human dignity is the foundation for all other ethical factors. 2

The recourse to the category of human dignity is very common also in other documents, such as strictly religious, moral-theological documents. Consider the declaration by the Second Vatican Council on religious freedom, Dignitatis Humanae (1965), or more recently the declaration by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on some questions of bioethics, Dignitas Personae (2008).

In addition, against the background of anthropological, ethical, legal, and political reflections stands the thorny and dramatic problem of violence against women. The concept of human dignity must engage this issue with sensitivity to considerations and contributions that revolve around gender. 3

And yet, no other concept is so difficult to define, especially when we consider its implications for specific ethical issues. For this reason, careful reflection and analysis are required both on human dignity’s historical and systematic development, and on the need to contextualize its importance and meaning.

We know well that the idea of human dignity is very ancient and has its roots already in classical culture. 4 The dignitas romana that Cicero writes about reflects a concept already known to Greek philosophy, although in these writings the emphasis is placed mainly on the socio-political aspects of personal action within the community. The dignity with which a person establishes and lives out his life in society constitutes the substance of his dignity.

Against this historical background, Christianity looks in depth at another dimension of human dignity, introducing a consideration that is more distinctly anthropological. 5 In fact, the Fathers of the ancient church, Justin and Irenaeus for example, focus on the anthropological vision of the First Testament, emphasizing the wonder of God’s creative work and the goodness of all creation, especially the goodness of human beings. The reference to the theme of the imago Dei becomes indispensable for a theological definition of human dignity. Although it moves the discourse in a typically religious-theological direction, it also contributes to an analysis directly linked to the essence of the person and therefore to anthropology. 6

The following reflection intends to contribute to the ongoing definition of human dignity, embracing a gender sensitive perspective that leads us to emphasize the substantial and concrete character with which we should approach the theme of human dignity.

• 2 The Foundational Value of the Dignity of the Person

While in the past the concept of human dignity was the sole focus in defining the person, today it is understood as a foundational value and used to explain other ethical concepts, such as freedom, responsibility, and solidarity. If we observe the development of applied ethics in biology, medicine, social life, economic reality, family life, etc., the concept of human dignity always appears when we address the question of the foundation and formulation of norms. Human dignity becomes more and more a formal reality, subject to an aporia that is not easily solved; in itself, it says little, and yet it is expected to be a strong foundation for the formulation and justification of norms. This aporia is evident in a striking manner, when considering the concept of human dignity in relation to the theme of human rights. This is the most striking example of the disconnect between the foundational and comprehensive expectations of the concept of human dignity and its actual lack of content.

This is not the place to trace a history of human rights, however. The decades that separate us from the 1948 UDHR have certainly provided many occasions for reflection and analysis concerning both the problem of the theoretical foundation for these rights and the historical conditions in which they are in fact recognized, cultivated, and practiced or where, instead, they are trampled underfoot and violated. 7

In the network of considerations emerging from various ideological and cultural perspectives, there is a surprising consistency in that the only exhaustive foundation for human rights is precisely the dignity of the person. This choice for human dignity overcomes a centuries-old history of fragile references to extrinsic values, where the foundation was represented by elements rooted, not directly in the nature of the person, but rather in some of his individual, social, or collective dimensions. Agreement on the point that human dignity is the sole foundation for the rights of the person is a turning point of epochal value and brings with it a new concreteness and stability in the interpretation of human rights and in their morally binding value.

And yet, the concreteness and stability crumble when we try to define the concept of human dignity. The initial universal agreement on human dignity as a foundation for human rights becomes a point of disagreement due to particular definitions of human dignity, to such a degree that the solidarity that occurs in advocating human rights breaks up into fragmentary ideological barriers in light of those definitions. In particular, the abstractness with which one approaches the theme of human dignity and rights is alarming. It is not only the result of a disproportionate focus on the essentialist, metaphysical, ontological definition of human dignity, but it is also the tragic consequence of a neglected existential contextualization of this dignity, in the history of people, in people as subjects who have a gender identity that makes them specific and unique.

This is why the appeal that comes from much of feminist theology or queer theology today must be taken seriously. When – as for example Linn Marie Tonstad writes – the importance of “anti-essentialism and denaturalization” are recognized as starting points for a contextualized perspective, respectful of the subject specificity of every human being, then the theme of dignity enters into an area of substantial, consistent, and concrete understanding. 8 But this sensitivity requires a process of rethinking that evolves through different philosophical and theological approaches and perspectives.

3 How Can We Understand Human Dignity?

• 3.1 The Ontological Approach and Its Limits

The first perspective we consider is an “ontological” approach (which can also be defined as “natural law”). Here, it is the nature of the person, with his or her concreteness of being, that functions as a fundamental point of disagreement on the definition of human dignity.

The qualitative leap in the ontology of the person, with respect to the being of other beings, demands the recognition of a particular dignity, which is of a higher degree than the dignity of other beings. A philosophical-metaphysical angle plays the greatest role here in deciphering the ontological and essential characteristics of the person, to emphasize the person’s superiority, intangibility, in other words, her dignity. Within this ontological approach there are different nuances, deriving mainly from the way the person’s essence is related to her historical, interpersonal, and social existence. One can and must speak, therefore, of an ontology that is more or less essentialist, more or less individualistic, more or less relational, etc. The essence of the person is mainly expressed in the fundamental law that is incumbent upon it, a law that derives from its nature as a person. The natural law, therefore, becomes the proper location of the dignity of the person. The need to respect human dignity runs parallel to the need to respect the natural law in which the person is situated. And the same dynamic is also valid on the part of the human subject: she cannot escape from respect for the natural law, because otherwise she offends and destroys her own dignity as a person.

From this perspective, human dignity is nothing other than the fullness of being; the telos of the person that is already written within her, through natural law. The perception of this fullness does not happen, however, in abstract and generically deductive terms, but is combined with the growth of the person’s sensitivity, with her reaction to a scale of objective values, in a context of experience that is a viable route for raising awareness and personalizing the value of her personal dignity. In this sense, the ontological approach of some authors is completed and more accurately identified as an “inductive-ontological” approach (for example, for J. Messner), 9 with due consideration for a positive and relevant meaning of experience, historicity, and the space-time, cultural-environmental conditioning. However, the metaphysical level remains predominant, and regarding what directly concerns human rights, there is a strong focus on their juridical aspect, as a particular representation of the natural law. The substantial gender identity of the person appears irrelevant in this ontological approach. More specifically, this absence of reference to the specific gender of people affects the female subject, who is, so to speak, incorporated into the generically “human”, that is, male.

• 3.2 Ethical Approach and Its Values

A second perspective to define human dignity is the transcendental philosophical approach, as formulated by I. Kant. 10 He sees the reason for human dignity as based on the moral self-determination of the human being, on his moral autonomy. This autonomy is “the reason for the dignity of human nature and of any rational nature”. 11 In fact, a being who is able to become a law to himself cannot be without dignity. Moral autonomy entails an immediate consequence: the person, in his actions, must abide by the dictates of a categorical imperative which concerns and grounds his dignity. This imperative is formulated by Kant as follows: “Act in such a way as to use the humanity that is in you and in every other person always as an end and never as a pure means.” 12 The categorical nature of this ethical requirement is in turn based on the rationality of the person. The person is truly capable of giving herself direction and moral directives, and this is her dignity.

The foundation of this dignity is not an empirical datum. It does not belong to the fluctuation of contingent experiences, but is firmly anchored in the rational nature of the human person and is expressed in the ability to translate the depth of reason into ethical terms. However, dignity does not depend on the concrete realization of the moral imperative. It can be predicated of every human being, as a subject endowed with ethical autonomy and antecedently to seeing how this ethical autonomy is exercised in the concrete. In a sense, the Kantian formulation of human dignity is also essentialist and relates to the nature of the person. This is done, however, not in relation to ontology, but rather in relation to the substantial morality of the person.

With this shift initiated by Kant, from the terrain of metaphysics to the terrain of morality, a new and relevant element for the foundation of human rights and for a more adequate understanding of their nature is introduced. Kant recovers the close relationship between the idea of law and that of duty. On the basis of a person’s due dignity, the human being is the subject of inalienable rights, and their transgression would immediately lead to the human being’s reduction from an end to a pure means. But on the basis of the ability to orient herself to the good and to follow the categorical imperative in her moral life, the human being is also the active subject of moral duties concerning herself and other persons.

In this predominantly ethical approach, the suspicion could easily emerge that at the root is a sort of moral optimism, of enthusiastic faith in the human ability to perceive and to follow the categorical imperative and therefore to express her dignity always and in any case. Kant overcomes the risk of this misunderstanding by emphasizing that in the person, in her historical condition, evil acts constitute a real attack on the human being, on her will and her dignity. It is only the predisposition and the inclination towards the good that establishes the dignity of the person, not the realization of good acts. With this qualification, Kant thereby salvages the possibility that the rights as a human person will be recognized and attributed even to one who is unjust and dishonest.

Human dignity consists, then, in an ontological openness of being to the good and is the responsibility of the subject, beyond the moral evaluation of her behavior. Human rights are ultimately founded on this human quality of being and becoming a subject open to the good.

However, the danger of abstractness in this vision of dignity must not be overlooked. This abstractness is connected above all with the formal character of the anthropological reference on which dignity is based. The minimal concrete specification, the insufficient level in considering the material scale of values in their genesis and in placing them as motivational instances for life practices, make the idea of human dignity ultimately evanescent, unable to affect the transformative processes of its own history and that of other people.

• 3.3 Theological Approach and Its Resources

The third perspective on human dignity is immediately related to the basic lines of a theological anthropological approach. Human dignity has its roots in the fundamental reality of the creation and salvation of the human being by God. God imprints on the human being his image and his likeness, thereby making the human being superior to all other beings who are creatures, but not creatures created in the image of the Creator. Only the human being has this original characteristic, and she alone has a specific and proper dignity, the summit of all other forms of dignity.

The theological emphasis that we see here has produced over the centuries a diversified history of the interpretation and utilization of the theme of the human being as an image of God. Recently, an ecumenical working group of Catholics and Protestants in Germany produced the text Gott und die Würde des Menschen , recognizing the imago Dei category as the fundamental article of Christian theological anthropology and the basis for every ethical evaluation. 13

The appeal to dignity in the patristic era had its own background and a directly parenetic and ethical use. The Christian who had to “recognize his own dignity” 14 had to assume different styles of judgment and behavior than other citizens. But this limitation of the theme of the image to the ethical field is certainly not the most original contribution we find in Christianity.

Especially in theological and philosophical writings in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the theme of dignity is incorporated into a broader vision and leads to the formulation of different and correlative theses, which intend to answer the question of how and in what respect the character of the human being is manifested as an image of God. In other words: what is the dignity of the human person? 15

The age of scholastic philosophy was characterized by a deliberate choice for the intellectual-rational value of the image of God, imprinted on the human being. The formulation of the imago in speculo rationis contains this truth. Here, we focus on the human ability to know herself and God, and this is her dignity.

But such a partial interpretation, though worthy of theoretical and systematic attention, reduced the transparency of the divine imprint, present in the human creature and concealed the nobility of the whole person, reducing her to a broken system of intelligence and will, of reason, of heart and body. To this theological anthropology is also added the belief that only the human being as man – not as woman – was the image of God. 16

It is urgent to overcome this reductive vision through the recovery of a holistic anthropology that is clearly present in the Bible, even if overshadowed by the dualistic tendencies of Greek philosophy, which penetrated primitive Christianity and still remains in some circles. The dignity of the person does not concern his capacity for knowledge and conscience. Rather, it embraces the unitary and total good of his reality, of his will, of his existence in and as a body, in his capacity for intersubjective relations and in his imperfect relationship with the divine, God, without losing contact with the contingency of historical situations, which are precarious and threatened by the risk of negativity and evil.

The dignity of the person is the dignity of the whole being, because in the totality of this being God’s presence lives and exists and is expressed through the imprint of his image. The human being is thus ennobled in his nature and in his history as a human subject and is as such a recipient of fundamental rights and capable of corresponding duties.

As a result of the intimate unity between the plan of creation and the plan of salvation, every human being carries within himself the image of God and derives from this identity the foundation of his own dignity, which is expressed in the right to have rights, in the claim to see them recognized and in the capacity to assume duties, exercised in responsibility.

• 4 Anthropology of Human Dignity

The philosophy of humanism and of the Renaissance was able to focus on the theme of human dignity in effective terms and to create a literary genre, with works collected under the title De dignitate hominis , among which we must certainly mention the Oratio de hominis dignitate of Pico della Mirandola (1486).

The effort of Renaissance humanism was to penetrate more deeply the anthropological vision, to obtain elements useful to define the category of human dignity. The path of anthropology remains the only practicable path today, if we are to reach a concept of human dignity that does not leave this an empty concept, but charges it with real meaning. Obviously, this path is also exposed to a risk: today anthropology is no longer a homogeneous reality, and there is no one single anthropology. The reality of pluralism, in the basic vision of the human being, of the world and of history, must first be assumed as a cultural horizon in which an anthropological reflection takes place. In connection with this, the art of dialogue on knowledge about the human being, and therefore on the understanding of the concept of human dignity in a pluralist context, must be developed.

Under these conditions, a composite reconstruction of the category of human dignity and the corresponding value of the human rights that are based on it becomes possible. The voices in this dialogue between persons and institutions that are sensitive to the human good and take care to stay clear of a fundamentalist vision, must have all the sufficient space they need in order to express themselves, but also the wisdom and competence to make themselves credible. In this proposal, which undoubtedly has an emancipatory potential within it, gender sensitivity plays an important role, for only thus is it possible to redeem the category of dignity both from abstractness, and from its confinement in an ideal of non-inclusive man.

On this basis, and in order to promote a constructive dialogue, we can indicate those areas where anthropology should focus. Those areas are central elements for the understanding and self-understanding of the person as a “subject”, who is present and alive in history as “corporeity” and is open to “transcendence”. Although an analytic explanation of these intrinsic and substantial dimensions of the person is beyond the scope of this essay, we can say that the various rights that can be predicated about the person directly concern what we have set out above.

In the dignity of the person as an individual subject, as a reality in herself, as an end in herself and not as a pure means, fundamental rights to self-determination are anchored with regard to the way of organizing and structuring her life, to freedom of opinion, and to the choice of where and how to practice her profession.

In the dignity of the person, as a holistic being, far from the soul-body duality and reconciled with her own corporeality, assumed as the formal reality of her being present in the world, the inalienable rights to life, bodily integrity, and health are rooted. At the same time, rights to conditions worthy of humanity also have their location here, to guarantee well-being and safety for a person’s own life: the right to housing, work, a healthy environment and a habitable planet.

And finally, in the dignity of the person as a self-transcending being that is substantially constituted as capable of relationality, of founding confrontation with the “you”, there emerges in the person’s various relationships the fundamental rights to socialization, to forms of love, marriage and family relationships, as well as to participation in social life. Here we also have the fundamental right to religious freedom and to the cultural expressions of one’s faith.

• 5 Conclusion

The theme of human dignity and human rights is a permanent challenge for everyone. We are all involved on a double front: that of growing in the personal awareness of being subjects of dignity and rights, and that of participating in the recognition of the dignity of the other and in the realization of the rights of others. Delegations or limitations of responsibility are not allowed in these two areas, precisely because rights are not an optional good, but the structural and structuring necessity for the person’s dignity.

Those who refuse to grow in the careful and relevant awareness of their rights, expose their dignity as a person to the risk of frustration, and make themselves vulnerable. Those who do not share in solidarity with the destiny of individuals and peoples who fight for their rights, equally endanger the human dignity that is present in those who share their own humanity.

From this point of view, it is significant to note the shift in perspective that can be seen in the enumerations of human rights that have progressively been made over the centuries, and in the 1948 UDHR . The unambiguous solidarity, which corrected the privatized and individualistic approach of the past and which made the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples in 1976 possible, must be taken as a basic guideline for reflecting on, and fighting for, human rights, but also in understanding, articulating, and critiquing concepts of human dignity.

Ultimately, human dignity runs on two tracks of understanding that can and must complement each other. On the one hand, there is the substantive track, which goes back to the totality of the human person as subject, without leading to an individualistic isolation of the human being. On the other hand, there is the relational path, which opens the subject into a network of belonging and cultivates in the person an inclusive and participatory lifestyle. 17 In the relational nature of human dignity is the intrinsic link between the right to one’s dignity and the duty to respect the dignity of others. Today, we are particularly attentive to this relational nature of human dignity, also through the gender sensitivity and the gender culture that is expressed in the recognition and in the dynamic of caring for the dignity of the other. These factors result from the matrix of an emancipation project that is typical of modernity and that from time to time takes on political values and generates the real assumption of responsibility. 18

Only the balanced balance between these two paths ensures a possible future for the theme of human dignity.

Antonio Autiero (born in Naples/Italy 1948) received his doctoral degree in moral theology at the Accademia Alfonsiana in Rome and in Philosophy at the University of Naples. 1983–1985 he was a fellow of the Foundation Alexander von Humboldt at the University of Bonn (Germany). There he was working together with Franz Böckle. In 1991 he became professor of moral theology at the University of Münster, until his retirement in 2013. In the time 1997–2011 he directed the Center for Religious Studies of Trento (Italy). Antonio Autiero has authored or edited books and articles (about 250) on fundamental moral theology, theories of the moral subject and in the field of applied ethics. Autiero is a member of the German Academy of Ethics in Medicine, the StemCell Research governmental commission in Berlin and the Planning Committee of Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church. He is also coordinator of the ethics group by COMECE (Commission of European Episcopal Conferences) in Brussels.

• Bibliography

Bayertz , Kurt : “ Die Idee der Menschenwürde: Probleme und Paradoxien ”, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 81 ( 4 / 1995 ), p. 465 – 481 .

• Search Google Scholar
• Export Citation

Bilaterale Arbeitsgruppe der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz und der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands : Gott und die Würde des Menschen . Paderborn/Leipzig : Evangelische Verlagsanstalt/Bonifatius , 2017 .

Børresen , Kari Elisabeth : The Image of God. Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition . Minneapolis, MN : Fortress , 1995 .

Børresen , Kari Elisabeth : Subordination and Equivalence. The Nature and Role of Woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. A Reprint of a Pioneering Classic , Kampen : Kok Pharos , 1995 .

Centi , Beatrice : “ Il tema della dignità della ragione nel rapporto che Kant instaura tra morale critica e antropologia filosofica ”, in: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia , Serie III 12 ( 2 / 1982 ), p. 707 – 747 .

Dean , Richard : The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2006 .

Deutscher Ethikrat : Eingriffe in die menschliche Keimbahn. Stellungnahme , Berlin : Deutscher Ethikrat , 2019 .

Honneth , Axel : The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts , Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1995 .

Honneth , Axel : Anerkennung: Eine europäische Ideengeschichte . Berlin : Suhrkamp , 2018 .

International Theological Commission : Communion and Stewardship. Human Person Created in the Image of God . Rome : LEV , 2004 .

Kant , Immanuel : Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi, in Scritti morali , trans. by Pietro Chiodi . Torino : UTET , 1995 .

Łuków , Pawel : “ A Difficult Legacy: Human Dignity as the Founding Value of Human Rights ”, in: Human Rights Review 19 ( 2018 ), p. 313 – 329 .

Magli , Ida : Sulla dignità della donna. La violenza sulle donne: il pensiero di Wojtyla . Parma : Guanda , 1993 .

Messner , Johannes : Das Naturrecht. Handbuch der Gesellschaftsethik, Staatsethik und Wirtschaftsethik . Berlin : Duncker & Humblot GmbH , 8 2018 .

Nussbaum , Martha : The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics . Princeton, NJ & Oxford : Princeton University Press , 3 2009 .

Quante , Michael : Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie. Demokratische Werte im Kontext der Lebenswissenschaften . Hamburg : Meiner , 2010 .

Rosen , Michael : Dignity. Its History and Meaning . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 2012 .

Schlag , Martin : La dignità dell’uomo come principio sociale. Il contributo della fede cristiana allo Stato secolare . Roma : EDUSC , 2013 .

Schmidt am Busch , Hans-Christoph / Zurn , Christopher (ed.): The Philosophy of Recognition. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives . Lanham, MD : Lexington Books , 2009 .

Siep , Ludwig : Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes . Hamburg : Meiner , 2014 .

Tonstad , Linn Marie : Queer Theology. Beyond Apologetics . Eugene, OR : Cascade Companions , 2018 .

von der Pfordten , Dietmar : “ Zur Würde des Menschen bei Kant ”, in: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik ( 2006 ), p. 501 – 517 .

Zylberman , Ariel : “ The Relational Structure of Human Dignity ”, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 ( 4 / 2018 ), p. 738 – 752 .

Cf. Bayertz, Die Idee der Menschenwürde ; Quante, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie .

Deutscher Ethikrat, Eingriffe in die menschliche Keimbahn , p. 89–96.

The juxtaposition of the theme of dignity and that of violence against women has also been made for a long time in the various pronouncements of the popes from John Paul II to Pope Francis. For John Paul, cf. Magli, Sulla dignità della donna . In the case of Francis, the homily at the Mass on January 1, 2020 will be particularly remembered, with its incisive expression: “every violence inflicted on women is a violation of God.”

( http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/2020/01/01/0001/00001.html ).

For a good historical reconstruction of the concept, see Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning . On the specific contribution of Hellenistic culture, see Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire .

Cf. Schlag, La dignità dell’uomo come principio sociale .

International Theological Commission, Communion and Stewardship .

The relationship between dignity and human rights is not easy to understand. Tension points are well expressed and systematically analysed by P. Łuków, A Difficult Legacy .

Tonstad, Queer Theology , p. 70–72.

Messner, Das Naturrecht .

Useful references are: Centi, Il tema della dignità della ragione ; Dean, The Value of Humanity ; von der Pfordten, Zur Würde des Menschen .

Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , p. 95.

Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , p. 88.

Bilaterale Arbeitsgruppe der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz und der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands, Gott und die Würde des Menschen , no. 50.

Famous is the exhortation “Agnosce, Christiane, dignitatem tuam” of St. Leo the Great (Homilia in Nativitate Domini, 21, 3).

The Prologue to I , II of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas articulates a reflection on the theme of the image of God in the human being as the foundation of his or her profile as a free, autonomous subject, a bearer of dignity.

We read in the Decretum Gratiani (1140), q. 5, c. 33: “Mulier debet velare caput, quia non est imago Dei.” To understand this nodal point, the researchs of K.E. Børresen remain fundamental, in particular The Image of God , and Subordination and Equivalence .

Zylberman, The Relational Structure of Human Dignity .

For the implications of this concept, see Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie ; Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition ; Id., Anerkennung. Eine europäische Ideengeschichte ; Schmidt am Busch/Zurn, The Philosophy of Recognition .

Content Metrics

Reference Works

Primary source collections

COVID-19 Collection

How to publish with Brill

Open Access Content

Contact & Info

Sales contacts

Publishing contacts

Stay Updated

Newsletters

Social Media Overview

Terms and Conditions  

Privacy Statement  

Cookie Settings  

Accessibility

Legal Notice

Terms and Conditions   |   Privacy Statement   |  Cookie Settings   |   Accessibility   |  Legal Notice   |  Copyright © 2016-2024

Copyright © 2016-2024

• [66.249.64.20|185.80.151.41]
• 185.80.151.41

Character limit 500 /500

Human Dignity

• Reference work entry
• First Online: 01 January 2022
• pp 1537–1546
• Cite this reference work entry

• Roberto Andorno 2 &
• Antonio Pele 3  

121 Accesses

The concept of human dignity plays an increasing role in contemporary ethics, bioethics, and human rights. This chapter aims, first, to present the major paradigms of dignity that have contributed over the centuries to shape the modern idea that every individual has inherent worth and accompanying rights; second, to stress that human dignity holds a prominent place as an overarching principle in the international documents relating to bioethics; and finally, to point out that the idea of dignity plays also an important guiding role as a moral standard for patient care at the bedside.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Durable hardcover edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Andorno, R. (2009). Human dignity and human rights as a common ground for a global bioethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 34 (3), 223–240.

Google Scholar  

Andorno, R. (2013). The dual role of human dignity in bioethics. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 16 (4), 967–973.

Annas, G. J. (2005). American bioethics. Crossing human rights and health law boundaries . New York: Oxford University Press.

Baillie, L. (2009). Patient dignity in an acute hospital setting: A case study. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 46 (1), 23–37.

Chochinov, H. M. (2002). Dignity-conserving care. A new model for palliative care. Helping the patient feel valued. Journal of the American Medical Association, 287 (17), 2253–2260.

Council of Europe. (1997). Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine . Oviedo, 4 April 1997. European Treaty Series (ETS) n° 164.

European Union. (2000). Charter of Fundamental Rights European Union. Official Journal of the European Communities , C 364/1 , 18 December 2000.

Habermas, J. (2010). The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights. Metaphilosophy, 41 (4), 464–480.

Lenoir, N., & Mathieu, B. (2004). Les normes internationales de la bioéthique . Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Matiti, M., & Trorey, G. (2008). Patients’ expectations of the maintenance of their dignity. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 17 , 2709–2717.

McCrudden, C. (2008). Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights. The European Journal of International Law, 19 (4), 655–724.

Pele, A. (2010). La dignidad humana. Sus orígenes en el pensamiento clásico . Madrid: Dykinson.

Pellegrino, E. (2008). The lived experience of human dignity. In US President’s Council on Bioethics (Ed.), Human dignity and bioethics (pp. 513–539). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Qianfang, Z. (2000). The idea of human dignity in classical Chinese philosophy: A reconstruction of Confucianism. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 27 (3), 299–330.

Sachedina, A. (2009). Islam and the challenge of human rights . New York: Oxford University Press.

Schachter, O. (1983). Human dignity as a normative concept. The American Journal of International Law, 77 , 848–854.

Taylor Mill, H. ([1851] 1983). Enfranchisement of women . London: Virago.

United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights . General Assembly, Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 1948.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (1997). Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights . 29th General Conference, 11 November 1997.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2005). Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights . 33rd General Conference, 19 October 2005.

UNESCO. (1984). Le droit d’être un homme. Anthologie mondiale de la liberté . Paris: Editions de l’UNESCO.

Further Readings

Barilan, Y. M. (2012). Human dignity, human rights, and responsibility. The new language of global bioethics and biolaw . Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Chochinov, H. (2007). Dignity and the essence of medicine: The A, B, C, and D of dignity conserving care. British Medical Journal, 335 , 184–187.

Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its history and meaning . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Institute of Law, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

Roberto Andorno

PUC Rio University, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Antonio Pele

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Roberto Andorno or Antonio Pele .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Center for Healthcare Ethics, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

Henk ten Have

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this entry

Cite this entry.

Andorno, R., Pele, A. (2016). Human Dignity. In: ten Have, H. (eds) Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09483-0_231

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09483-0_231

Published : 19 January 2022

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-319-09482-3

Online ISBN : 978-3-319-09483-0

eBook Packages : Religion and Philosophy Reference Module Humanities and Social Sciences Reference Module Humanities

Share this entry

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Ethics — Persuasive Paper on Death with Dignity

Persuasive Paper on Death with Dignity

• Categories: Death Ethics

About this sample

Words: 678 |

Published: Jun 6, 2024

Words: 678 | Page: 1 | 4 min read

Table of contents

Introduction, body paragraph 1, body paragraph 2, body paragraph 3.

Cite this Essay

Let us write you an essay from scratch

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

Get high-quality help

Dr. Heisenberg

Verified writer

• Expert in: Nursing & Health Philosophy

+ 120 experts online

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Related Essays

2 pages / 1020 words

6 pages / 2770 words

5 pages / 2147 words

1 pages / 552 words

Remember! This is just a sample.

You can get your custom paper by one of our expert writers.

121 writers online

Still can’t find what you need?

Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled

Related Essays on Ethics

Utilitarianism is a prominent ethical theory that has influenced moral philosophy for centuries. In this essay, we will explore the definition and history of utilitarianism, examining its association with renowned philosophers [...]

Being a responsible person means taking the necessary steps to ensure that one is doing the right thing in the right way. It involves being accountable for one's actions and making wise considerations when faced with difficult [...]

In Harper Lee's novel "To Kill a Mockingbird," one of the most memorable characters is Atticus Finch, a lawyer who defends Tom Robinson, a black man falsely accused of raping a white woman. Atticus's decision to take on this [...]

Ethics and values are foundational principles that guide human behavior and shape the moral fabric of society. They define what is right and wrong, influence decision-making, and determine the standards by which individuals and [...]

Revenge is a complex and controversial topic that has been debated for centuries. Some argue that revenge is a natural human instinct, while others believe it is never justified. In this essay, we will explore the various [...]

Overview of the author's moral and ethical stance based on Levinas' theory Connection to biblical passage "Thou shalt not kill" Discussion of how scripture and Catholic teachings inform the author's conscience [...]

Related Topics

By clicking “Send”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement . We will occasionally send you account related emails.

Where do you want us to send this sample?

By clicking “Continue”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy.

Be careful. This essay is not unique

This essay was donated by a student and is likely to have been used and submitted before

Download this Sample

Free samples may contain mistakes and not unique parts

Sorry, we could not paraphrase this essay. Our professional writers can rewrite it and get you a unique paper.

Please check your inbox.

We can write you a custom essay that will follow your exact instructions and meet the deadlines. Let's fix your grades together!

Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free